J-E01005-19
2019 PA Super 281
IN RE: ADOPTION OF K.M.G. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: T.L.G., MOTHER :
:
:
:
:
: No. 580 WDA 2018
Appeal from the Decree March 5, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of McKean County Orphans' Court at
No(s): 42-17-0239
IN RE: ADOPTION OF: A.M.G. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: T.L.G., MOTHER :
:
:
:
:
: No. 581 WDA 2018
Appeal from the Decree March 5, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of McKean County Orphans' Court at
No(s): No. 42-17-0240
IN RE: ADOPTION OF S.A.G. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: T.L.G., MOTHER :
:
:
:
:
: No. 582 WDA 2018
Appeal from the Decree March 5, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of McKean County Orphans' Court at
No(s): No. 42-17-0241
IN RE: ADOPTION OF J.C.C. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
J-E01005-19
APPEAL OF: T.L.G., MOTHER :
:
:
:
:
: No. 583 WDA 2018
Appeal from the Decree March 5, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of McKean County Orphans' Court at
No(s): 42-17-0242
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., OLSON, J., DUBOW,
J., KUNSELMAN, J., NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., and McLAUGHLIN,
J.
CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINION BY OLSON, J.:
FILED SEPTEMBER 13, 2019
I concur in the Learned Majority’s conclusion that this Court lacks
authority to consider, sua sponte, whether a conflict exists between a child’s
legal interest and the child’s best interest in the context of a contested
termination of parental rights proceeding. See Majority Opinion at 10. I write
separately, however, to express my view that, in light of this conclusion, the
remainder of the Majority’s determinations as to the second, third, and fourth
issues certified for review are advisory in nature. Hence, I would not express
any opinion on these matters within the context of this appeal.
It is well-settled that courts should refrain from addressing legal issues
in the abstract and which are not pertinent to the resolution of the particular
dispute before them. See Pittsburgh Palisades Park, LLC v.
Commonwealth, 888 A.2d 655, 659 (Pa. 2005) (“The courts in our
Commonwealth do not render decisions in the abstract or offer purely advisory
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opinions[.]”). Once the Majority determined that this Court lacks authority to
raise the conflicts issue on its own, the related standard of review and best
practice issues lost any meaningful relevance in the dispute before us and
made judicial consideration of these matters imprudent. See Stuckley v.
Zoning Hearing Bd. Of Newtown Tp., 79 A.3d 510, 516 (Pa. 2013) (“Where
the issues in a case are moot, any opinion issued would be merely advisory
and, therefore, inappropriate.”); see also City of Philadelphia v.
Commonwealth, 838 A.2d 566, 577 (Pa. 2003) (“judicial intervention is
appropriate only where the underlying controversy is real and concrete, rather
than abstract”).
In its opinion, the Majority initially concludes that this Court does not
enjoy “the authority to review sua sponte whether a conflict existed between
counsel’s representation and the child’s stated preference in an involuntary
termination of parental rights proceeding.” Majority Opinion at 10. Having
made this determination, the Majority then goes on to state its views as to
the standard of review that applies when reviewing an orphans’ court decision
holding that a guardian ad litem does not have a conflict, the standard of
review that applies when a party fails to raise a conflict issue before the
orphans’ court and, instead, raises it for the first time on appeal, and the best
practices for an orphans’ court to follow in determining whether a guardian
has a conflict. See Majority Opinion at 10-12. In light of the Majority’s initial
conclusion, it follows, a fortiori, that the remaining issues are unnecessary to
our resolution of this appeal and best avoided.
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Admittedly, the views expressed by the Majority with respect to the
second, third, and fourth issues accepted for review do not differ materially
from the legal framework within which we consider the vast majority of similar
issues raised in other appeals. Nevertheless, I believe that caution and
prudence dictate that we refrain from legal pronouncements that are not
necessitated by the facts or procedural posture of the matter before us. For
this reason, I am unable to join my wise colleagues in their disposition of the
second, third, and fourth claims certified for our review.
Judge Nichols joins this concurring/ dissenting opinion.
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