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Susan L. Carlson
CHIEF JUSTICE
Supreme Court Clerk
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
THE CHURCH OF THE DIVINE
EARTH, No. 96613-3
Petitioner,
V. En Banc
CITY OF TACOMA,
Respondent.
Filed iEP f 9 ww
JOHNSON,J.—This case concerns whether the city of Tacoma(City) can be
held liable for damages for imposing an unlawful condition on a building permit. In
an appeal brought under the Land Use Petition Act(LUPA), chapter 36.70C ROW,
the superior court ruled that the City acted unlawfully when it placed a condition on
the Church ofthe Divine Earth's(Church) building permit, requiring an
uncompensated-for dedication of land for right-of-way improvements. However,the
court denied the Church's action for damages under RCW 64.40.020, and the Court
of Appeals affirmed. We reverse and remand for a new trial.
The Church ofthe Divine Earth v. City ofTacoma, No. 96613-3
FACTS
On September 20, 2013,the Church submitted an application to the City to
build a parsonage on property it owned. A single-family residence had previously
been located on the property, but it had been demolished in 2012. City staff reviewed
the pennit application and placed a number of conditions on it, including, at issue
here, a requirement that the Church dedicate a 30-foot-wide strip of land for right-of-
way improvements to a street abutting the property. While the existing street was
generally 60 feet wide in other areas, it was 30 feet wide next to the Church's
property. This lack of uniformity had existed for around 100 years.
The Church challenged the permit conditions, and the City eventually removed
most ofthem but kept the requirement for a dedication. The Church appealed the
decision to the City's hearing examiner, and the hearing examiner granted summary
judgment in favor ofthe City.
The Church filed a timely appeal under LUPA,in which it challenged the
hearing examiner's decision and also sought damages under RCW 64.40.020. In
addressing the propriety ofthe dedication, the court confined its review to the
administrative record that had been before the hearing examiner and acknowledged
that, in that record, the stated purpose by the City for imposing the dedication
requirement was to create a uniform street. The court held that this reason was
The Church ofthe Divine Earth v. City ofTacoma, No. 96613-3
insufficient to justify the requirement and reversed the hearing examiner, invalidating
the condition.
The case then proceeded to trial on the issue of damages. The court issued an
order prohibiting the City from entering evidence to show the dedication was
imposed for any reason other than unifonnity. However, during trial. City officials
testified that the dedication was intended to address a variety of issues, including to
alleviate impacts to traffic, visibility, parking, and pedestrian safety, as well as to
bring the street into compliance with city codes and industiy best practices. The trial
court apparently considered the evidence and found that the City imposed the
dedication to address increased vehicular and pedestrian traffic and related safety
impacts, and to ensure adequate visibility. It then concluded (a)"[t]he City
reasonably believed that the development conditions it attached to the permit had a
nexus to the project and were proportional" and (b)the City "did not know and
should not have reasonably known that its requirement for a dedication of right of
way would be considered violative ofNollan/Dolan^^^f Clerk's Papers(CP)at 2408.
The court denied the Church's request for damages, and the Church appealed.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, holding that "[bjecause the City
reasonably believed that it satisfied the requirements of NollanlDolan, it did not
'Nollan V. Cal. Coastal Comm'n,483 U.S. 825, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 97 L. Ed. 2d 677
(1987); Dolan v. City ofTigard, 512 U.S. 374, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 129 L. Ed. 2d 304 (1994).
The Church ofthe Divine Earth v. City ofTacoma, No. 96613-3
know and should not have known that its action was unlawful." Church ofDivine
Earth v. City ofTacoma, 5 Wn. App. 2d 471, 494,426 P.3d 268 (2018). The Court of
Appeals also awarded attorney fees to the City. The Church petitioned this court, and
we granted limited review.^ Church ofDivine Earth v. City ofTacoma, 192 Wn.2d
1022,435P.3d285 (2019).
ISSUE
1. Whether the City knew or should reasonably have known its requirement for
a dedication of land was unlawful.
ANALYSIS
We should first settle what this case is not about. This is not a case challenging
the constitutionality of a land use decision; the propriety ofthe permit condition was
already resolved by the lower court and is not before us on appeal. And because the
superior court invalidated the permit condition, this is not a claim for just
compensation for a taking. Instead, what we have before us is a claim for damages
under RCW 64.40.020 for an attempted exaction ofland through an unlawful permit
condition.
RCW 64.40.020(1) allows a property owner who files an application for a
permit to bring an action for damages
to obtain relief from acts of an agency which are arbitrary, capricious,
unlawful, or exceed lawful authority, or relief from a failure to act
^ Amicus briefs in support of the Church were filed by Pacific Legal Foundation and the
Building Industry Association of Washington.
The Church ofthe Divine Earth v. City ofTacoma, No. 96613-3
within time limits established by law: PROVIDED,That the action is
unlawful or in excess oflawful authority only if the final decision ofthe
agency was made with knowledge of its unlawfulness or that it was in
excess of lawful authority, or it should reasonably have been known to
have been unlawful or in excess of lawful authority.
This statute does overlap to some degree with LUPA insofar as, to obtain damages
under RCW 64.40.020, the land use decision must, necessarily, be invalid. But not
every successful LUPA appeal will justify damages, as is expressly acknowledged in
RCW 36.700.130(2)(stating that "[a] grant of relief by itself may not be deemed to
establish liability for monetary damages"). To establish liability for such damages
under RCW 64.40.020, a plaintiff must meet a higher burden than is required in
LUPA,establishing actual or constructive knowledge, or that the government entity
acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner.
Our review here is limited to the question of whether the Church may obtain
damages for the City's unlawful action. As the statute indicates, the City incurs
liability for an unlawful action "only if thefinal decision ofthe agency was made
with knowledge of its unlawfulness .. . or it should reasonably have been known to
have been unlawful." RCW 64.40.020(1)(emphasis added). The City argued, and the
trial court held, that the final decision was that ofthe hearing examiner. Therefore,
the issue in this case is whether the City knew or should reasonably have known the
hearing examiner's decision to allow the permit condition was unlawful. The trial
court appears to have based its findings of fact and conclusions oflaw on arguably
The Church ofthe Divine Earth v. City ofTacoma, No. 96613-3
improper, irrelevant evidence, and the Court of Appeals, in turn, applied the wrong
standard in its review.
Whether the City should reasonably have known the final decision was
unlawful is an issue involving related questions of both law and fact. Isla Verde Int'l
Holdings, Ltd. v. City ofCamas, 147 Wn. App. 454, 467, 196 P.3d 719(2008). It
requires an examination ofthe law, which the City is presumed to have known,see,
e.g.. State ex rel. Dungan v. Superior Court, 46 Wn.2d 219, 222, 279 P.2d 918
(1955), and the material facts underlying the final decision. The statute creates an
objective standard, asking whether a reasonable person looking at the facts utilized in
the final decision would be expected to know the decision violated established law.
See, e.g.. In re Forfeiture ofOne 1970 Chevrolet Chevelle, 166 Wn.2d 834, 841, 215
P.3d 166(2009)(holding that while "actual knowledge" is a subjective standard,
having "reason to know" is an objective standard); Cloud v. Summers,98 Wn. App.
724, 731,991 P.2d 1169(1999)(recognizing the objective nature of whether a
plaintiff should have known of an injury).
A permit condition for an uncompensated dedication ofland is unlawful where
it fails to fulfill the requirements laid out in two formative cases on unconstitutional
conditions, v. California Coastal Commission,483 U.S. 825, 107 S. Ct. 3141,
97 L. Ed. 2d 677(1987), andZ)o/a« v. City ofTigard, 512 U.S. 374, 114 S. Ct. 2309,
129 L. Ed. 2d 304 (1994). Taken together, the Nollan and Dolan cases create a
The Church ofthe Divine Earth v. City ofTacoma, No. 96613-3
framework for analyzing the constitutionality of a permit condition involving an
uncompensated land dedication. First, the government must show the development
will create or exacerbate an identified public problem. Second, the government must
show the proposed condition will tend to solve or alleviate the public problem.
Finally, the government must show that the condition is roughly proportional to the
development's anticipated impact. In fulfilling these requirements, the government
must, to some degree, quantify its findings, and cannot rely on speculation regarding
the impacts or mitigation ofthem.
The City provided little documentation to the hearing examiner to justify its
requirement for a dedication. The record contained minutes from a September 25,
2013 review panel where the Church's permit was discussed, and a declaration from
the director of planning and development services, Peter Huffrnan. The review panel
minutes state that the Church was being required to dedicate the land "to provide
consistent right-of-way widths" along the street, and 30 feet was being required "to
stay consistent and provide adequate street and sidewalk area." CP at 598. Huffrnan's
declaration summarized the City's reason for the dedication as "It is important to the
City that the [right of way] in all City streets be uniform." CP at 127. Thus, the City's
stated reason for the dedication was to create a consistent, uniform street.
The hearing examiner's ruling was the "final decision," and the City provided
the hearing examiner only with documentation evidencing consistency and
The Church ofthe Divine Earth v. City ofTacoma, No. 96613-3
uniformity as justifications for the dedication requirement. Therefore, under RCW
64.40.020(1)the question for the superior court was whether the Church proved the
City knew or should reasonably have known that its goal for a consistent, uniform
street did notjustify the permit condition under Nollan and Dolan. As noted above,
despite an order from the trial court properly limiting evidence to the reasoning
presented to the hearing examiner for the final decision, the court permitted City
officials to testify extensively regarding other reasons the City imposed the condition.
The City asserted that the dedication was imposed to address increased vehicular and
pedestrian traffic from the development, and concerns about visibility and
obstructions to pedestrians, as well as to meet general standards for roads. None of
these reasons had been presented to the hearing examiner. Nevertheless, the court
apparently considered this additional reasoning and, in its findings of fact, asserted
that the Church's parsonage would both increase and impair safety for vehicular and
pedestrian traffic and that the dedication was necessary to ensure adequate visibility.
The trial court erred in permitting testimony ofreasons for the dedication that
had not informed the City's final decision to impose the permit condition. Since these
additional reasons did not inform the City's final decision, the City could not use
them as justification for having imposed the condition. Evidence ofthese other
justifications was not relevant to the issue before the court, which was whether the
Church proved the City knew or should reasonably have known the hearing
The Church ofthe Divine Earth v. City ofTacoma, No. 96613-3
examiner's decision did not satisfy a Nollan and Dolan analysis. The court's findings
of fact leave no doubt that the additional evidence led the court to conclude damages
were not warranted. Because the court's findings were based on evidence not
considered by the hearing examiner, they lack the necessary support and cannot
justify the court's conclusions oflaw. Hegwine v. Longview Fibre Co., 162 Wn.2d
340, 352-53, 172 P.3d 688 (2007)(holding that findings offact must be supported by
substantial evidence and must, in turn,justify a court's conclusions of law).
The Court of Appeals then erred on review by applying the wrong legal
standard under the statute. The court held that because the City "reasonably believed"
its requirement for a dedication was lawful,"it did not know and should not have
known that its action was unlawful." Church ofDivine Earth, 5 Wn. App. 2d at 494.
But whether the City believed in the lawfulness of its actions is a subjective question
and conflicts with the statutory standard ofRCW 64.40.020. As discussed above, the
statute requires an objective standard, asking whether the City's final decision
"should reasonably have been known to have been unlawful." Thus, damages are not
available ifreasonable minds with the necessaiy knowledge and expertise could have
concluded that the City's decision was lawful. The City's subjective beliefthat the
dedication was lawful does not determine what it objectively should reasonably have
loiown. The Court of Appeals erred in reasoning otherwise.
The Church ofthe Divine Earth v. City ofTacoma, No. 96613-3
CONCLUSION
We reverse the Court of Appeals and remand for a new trial. On remand, the
trial court should confine its review addressing the propriety ofthe dedication to
evidence relevant to the hearing examiner's final decision. In deciding whether
damages are justified, the court must determine whether the Church proved the City
loiew or should reasonably have known its permit condition for a dedication ofland
was unlawful.
WE CONCUR;
icy\
10
Church ofthe Divine Earth v. City ofTacoma, No. 96613-3
Yu, J. (dissenting)
No. 96613-3
YU,J. (dissenting) — In this case, we granted review as to whether a city
should be held liable for damages in accordance with RCW 64.40.020 for initially
imposing a condition on a building permit that was later deemed unlawful in an
appeal brought pursuant to the Land Use Petition Act(LUPA), chapter 36.70C
RCW. Because the majority omits key facts, misinterprets the trial court's
preliminary pretrial evidentiary ruling, and misreads the Court of Appeals opinion
regarding the standard for imposing damages pursuant to RCW 64.40.020, it
incorrectly declines to address the sole issue presented, and instead reverses and
remands for a new trial that is entirely unnecessary.
I would hold the trial court did not err when it considered additional
evidence in the damages proceeding beyond that presented in the separate LUPA
appeal to determine whether the city reasonably should have known that its actions
were unlawful. I would also hold that the Court of Appeals applied the correct
Church ofthe Divine Earth v. City ofTacoma, No. 96613-3
Yu, J. (dissenting)
legal standard for assessing liability pursuant to RCW 64.40.020, and I would
affirm its holding that the city is not liable for damages in this case. I therefore
respectfully dissent.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In September 2013, the Church of the Divine Earth (Church) applied for a
building permit to construct a parsonage on a vacant lot that the Church had
recently acquired. Clerk's Papers(CP)at 782. After the initial review, the city of
Tacoma (City) imposed a number of conditions on the building permit. Id. at 106.
Viewed as a whole, these development conditions sought to create a safe and
accessible roadway for pedestrians and visitors to the parsonage. The City also
cited multiple deficiencies in the permit application that would need to be cured
before the application review could continue. Id. at 869.
The Church did not attempt to cure the deficiencies in its application until
after litigation had begun, id. at 879-880, opposed all the City's conditions, and
submitted a waiver request. Id. at 600. Despite the incomplete application, the
City removed all of the conditions except for a 30-foot right-of-way dedication. Id.
at 13. This dedication requirement was eventually reduced from 30 feet to 8 feet.
Id. at 105. The main purpose for the right-of-way dedication was to create a
uniform street, but in context, the dedication was simply one of many conditions
Church ofthe Divine Earth v. City ofTacoma, No. 96613-3
Yu, J. (dissenting)
imposed to generally improve safety and bring the neighborhood into compliance
with the Tacoma Municipal Code.'
The Church and the City continued to negotiate the permit application due to
some confusion over whether the building would be used solely as a parsonage or
would also be used for religious assembly.^ See id. at 108. Finally, in April 2014,
the director of planning and development services sent a letter to the Church
clarifying the status of the application and advising the Church of its right to seek
review. Id. at 155-57. Shortly thereafter, the Church appealed the City's actions to
a hearing examiner, raising primarily constitutional challenges to the City's
development conditions. Id. at 603. After determining that the constitutional
issues raised by the Church were beyond its jurisdiction, the hearing examiner
granted summary judgment in favor of the City, allowing the City to impose the
right-of-way dedication as a development condition. Id. at 9-17.
The Church then appealed the hearing examiner's decision to the Pierce
County Superior Court pursuant to LUPA. Meanwhile, in a separate proceeding,
the Church alleged the City violated the Public Records Act(PRA), chapter 42.56
'Other purposes included improving visibility, achieving compliance with the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, and mitigating the potential increase in
vehicular traffic due to the construction of the parsonage on the vacant lot. See CP at 106;
Verbatim Report of Proceedings(VRP)(May 9, 2016) at 801.
^ Additionally, the Church had constructed a garage in advance of the permit application.
CP at 106. City attorney Jeff Capell explained that the City wanted the Church to "tie . . . up"
the loose ends with regards to the permit application. VRP (Feb. 19, 2015) at 20.
Church ofthe Divine Earth v. City ofTacoma, No. 96613-3
Yu, J. (dissenting)
RCW,and brought a claim for damages pursuant to RCW 64.40.020. See id. at
220 (Stipulated Order Bifurcating LUPA Appeal from PRA & Damages Claims).
In the LUPA appeal, Judge Martin found that the City had failed to "carry its
burden to prove the condition complied with the requirements" of the
Nollan/Dolan analysis^ and invalidated the right-of-way dedication requirement.
Id. at 275. The case before us concerns only the separate damages claim, and as
noted below, the sole issue was whether the City knew or reasonably should have
known the dedication was unlawful. RCW 64.40.020(1).
In the damages proceeding, a different judge. Judge Hogan,found that the
City had, in fact, conducted a NollanlDolan analysis, cited several reasons for
imposing the conditions beyond street uniformity, and concluded that the City was
not liable for damages pursuant to RCW 64.40.020. CP at 2400-09.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that there was substantial evidence
to support the trial court's findings of fact and that the trial court correctly
concluded "that the City did not know and should not have known that the
dedication requirement would later be found to violate Nollan/Dolan and.
^ Nollan V. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 97 L. Ed. 2d 677
(1987); Dolan v. City ofTigard, 512 U.S. 374, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 129 L. Ed. 2d 304 (1994). A
Nollan/Dolan analysis must be conducted when "government demands that a landowner dedicate
an easement allowing public access to her property as a condition of obtaining a development
permit." Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 546, 125 S. Ct. 2074, 161 L. Ed. 2d 876
(2005). Such conditions will be deemed unconstitutional takings of private property without just
compensation unless the government shows that the conditions are proportionate and that they
have a nexus to the problem created by the development.
Church ofthe Divine Earth v. City ofTacoma, No. 96613-3
Yu, J. (dissenting)
therefore, was unlawful." Church ofDivine Earth v. City ofTacoma, 5 Wn. App.
2d 471, 495, 426 P.3d 268 (2018). We granted review of one issue: "whether the
City ofTacoma is liable for damages because it knew or should have known its
action was unlawful." Order, Church ofDivine Earth v. City ofTacoma, No.
96613-3 (Wash. Mar. 6, 2019).
ANALYSIS
The only claim before us is the Church's claim for damages pursuant to
RCW 64.40.020(1), which provides.
Owners of a property interest who have filed an application for a
permit have an action for damages to obtain relief from acts of an
agency which are arbitrary, capricious, unlawful, or exceed lawful
authority, or relief from a failure to act within time limits established
by law: PROVIDED,That the action is unlawful or in excess of
lawful authority only if the final decision of the agency was made with
knowledge ofits unlawfulness or that it was in excess of lawful
authority, or it should reasonably have been known to have been
unlawful or in excess of lawful authority.
(Emphasis added.) The only issue relevant to this claim on which we granted
review is whether the City knew or should have known that the 8-foot right-of-way
dedication would ultimately be determined to be an unlawful development
condition. Yet the majority does not reach this issue and instead reverses and
remands for a new trial based on perceived errors regarding the trial court's
evidentiary rulings and the Court of Appeals' alleged reliance on an incorrect legal
standard. I would hold the trial court's evidentiary rulings in the damages
Church ofthe Divine Earth v. City ofTacoma, No. 96613-3
Yu, J. (dissenting)
proceedings were within its discretion and the Court of Appeals applied the correct
legal standard to reach the correct conclusion. I would therefore affirm.
First, I agree with the majority that the hearing examiner's decision is the
final agency decision and thus the relevant point in time for reviewing whether the
City knew or reasonably should have known the right-of-way dedication was
unlawful. However, the majority is incorrect to hold that the trial court in the
damages proceeding relied on "arguably improper, irrelevant evidence." Majority
at 5-6.
While the trial court in the damages proceeding did preliminarily grant a
motion to exclude evidence of reasons justifying the conditions other than street
uniformity, the court ultimately allowed extensive testimony on this topic because
it was relevant to determine whether the City's actions were arbitrary or capricious.
See Verbatim Report of Proceedings (Apr. 27, 2016) at 50. When City staff
testified as to reasons for the conditions other than uniformity, the Church's
counsel properly did not object because allowing this testimony was entirely within
the trial court's discretion. The trial court in the LUPA appeal may have been
limited to the evidence before the hearing examiner, RCW 36.70C.120(1), but the
trial court in the separate claim for damages was bound only by the ordinary Rules
of Evidence, and therefore had the discretion to consider relevant evidence as to
Church ofthe Divine Earth v. City ofTacoma, No. 96613-3
Yu, J. (dissenting)
whether the City reasonably should have known that the hearing examiner's
decision was unlawful.
Moreover, while the hearing examiner's record was limited,"^ it in fact
contains evidence that the City had discussed reasons for the conditions other than
street uniformity. CP at 106 (citing a need to provide an adequate street sidewalk
area and compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act and "Public Right of
Way Accessibility Guidelines"). Although the City did not expressly state that the
reason for the right-of-way dedication was safety, the reasoning for the other
conditions initially imposed was tied to safety. Taken as a whole, it is reasonable
to infer that the reason for imposing all of the conditions was to improve safety.
Ultimately, the trial court in the damages proceeding and the Court of
Appeals both recognized that the City had performed a NollanlDolan analysis by
discussing nexus and proportionality in the City's initial review of the permit
application. Id. at 2401. This finding is supported by the testimony of City staff
members and the documents considered in the record, which were properly
The hearing examiner's record includes (1) review panel minutes, September 25, 2013,
(2) Tacoma Planning and Development Services' letter decision, April 28, 2014,(3) affidavit of
Steven Weinman, June 9, 2014,(4) assessor's parcel summary for 6605 East B Street,(5)
corporation's division registration data for Church of the Divine Earth,(6) declaration of Peter
Huffman, July 3, 2014,(7) WSBA lawyer search showing no listing for Terry Kuehn,(8) aerial
photograph and drawing of lots in neighborhood,(9) amended declaration of Peter Huffman,
July 9, 2014,(10) Tacoma Public Works Department memorandum (Kuntz to Kammerzell),
March 5, 2014,(11)Tacoma Planning and Development Services' letter (Kuntz to Kuehn),
March 7, 2014,(12) various scenarios put forward by City for development at 6605 East B
Street. CP at 10-11.
Church ofthe Divine Earth v. City ofTacoma, No. 96613-3
Yu, J. (dissenting)
admitted in the damages proceeding at the trial court's discretion and without
objection. I would therefore not hold that the trial court in the damages proceeding
considered improper and irrelevant evidence, nor would I hold that this alleged,
unpreserved error requires a new trial.
Second, the majority claims that the Court of Appeals applied the wrong
standard in determining whether the City was liable for damages. Majority at 9. It
did not. The Court of Appeals' opinion contains a single, arguably unartful
recitation of the standard as asking whether the City "reasonably believed that it
satisfied the requirements of NollanlDolanf which may suggest an improper,
subjective standard. Church ofDivine Earth, 5 Wn. App. 2d at 494. However,
throughout the rest of the opinion, the Court of Appeals clearly applies the proper
objective standard in its analysis and correctly states that standard multiple times.
Id. at 485 ("the City did not know and should not have known that the dedication
was unlawful"), 490 (quoting RCW 64.40.020(1)), 493 ("The relevant question is
whether the City knew or should have known that the right-of-way dedication
requirement was unlawful."), 494(quoting RCW 64.40.020(1)), 495 ("the City did
not know and should not have known that the dedication requirement would later
be found to violate NollanlDolan and, therefore, was unlawful"). A single,
arguably unartful statement in the context of an otherwise proper analysis does not
constitute reversible error.
Church ofthe Divine Earth v. City ofTacoma, No. 96613-3
Yu, J. (dissenting)
CONCLUSION
Without objection, the trial court in the damages proceeding properly
considered relevant evidence as to whether the City should have known that the
hearing examiner's decision would ultimately be held unlawful. Based on this
evidence, the court determined the City could not be held liable for damages
pursuant to RCW 64.40.020 and the Court of Appeals, applying the correct legal
standard, properly affirmed. Because the majority fails to address the sole issue on
which we granted review and reverses for an unnecessary new trial based on an
incorrect reading of the record and the Court of Appeals' decision, I respectfully
dissent.
Church ofthe Divine Earth v. City ofTacoma, No. 96613-3
Yu, J. (dissenting)
LuiAM-i
10