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2019 PA Super 290
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
ORONDA LIGON : No. 215 EDA 2017
Appeal from the Order December 6, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0009244-2012
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., GANTMAN, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J.,
OLSON, J., KUNSELMAN, J., NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., and
McLAUGHLIN, J.
OPINION BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 24, 2019
The Commonwealth appeals from the order dismissing its case against
Oronda Ligon on the day of trial. The Commonwealth argues the trial court
abused its discretion when it dismissed the case against Ligon because,
although the complaining witnesses were not at the courthouse, the
Commonwealth had informed the court that they were on their way and it was
ready to proceed with trial. We reverse and remand.
Police arrested Ligon in March 2012 and charged him with a large
number of crimes, including charges of robbery, burglary, and aggravated
assault, as well as violations of the Uniform Firearms Act.1 The charges
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1 In all, he was charged with two counts each of robbery (threat of immediate
serious injury), conspiracy, unlawful restraint (serious bodily injury), theft by
unlawful taking, receiving stolen property, terroristic threats, simple assault,
recklessly endangering another person, and false imprisonment. He was also
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stemmed from the September 2011 robbery and assault of Carl Brady and his
grandmother, Doris Martin.
After five continuances of the preliminary hearing, Ligon was held for
trial. The court then granted copious continuances of the trial; Ligon requested
most of the continuances. He was subject to unrelated charges in federal court
and told the Commonwealth that he wanted to resolve those charges before
pleading guilty in this matter. Ligon ultimately elected to go to trial in this case
and, after additional continuances, the case was reassigned to a new trial
judge. The new judge granted two more continuances, one due to a court
conflict and one because the prosecutor had another trial.
The trial in this case finally began on Monday, December 5, 2016, and
on that day, the parties picked a jury. The following morning, before the jury
came into the courtroom, the assistant district attorney (“ADA”) told the trial
court that the complaining witnesses had not arrived. N.T., 12/6/16, at 3. The
ADA stated that, although she had arranged a ride for the complaining
witnesses, when the ride arrived, they did not answer the door. Id. at 3, 12.
The ADA said she had been in “constant contact” with them, having spoken
with both the day before trial and having met with one of them on the Friday
preceding trial. Id. 3-4. The ADA asked for “a little bit more time” for the
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charged with one count each of aggravated assault, burglary, criminal
trespass, firearms not to be carried without a license, carrying firearms on
public streets in Philadelphia, and possessing instruments of crime. 18
Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3701(a)(1)(ii), 903(c), 2902(a)(1), 3921(a), 3925(a),
2706(a)(1), 2701(a), 2705, 2903(a), 2702(a), 3502(a), 3503(a)(1)(i),
6106(a)(1), 6108, and 907(a), respectively.
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witnesses to arrive. Id. at 3. The court said it could “probably give [the
Commonwealth] till 11.” Id. at 4.
When the court reconvened at 11:00 a.m., a second ADA explained that
the probation officer of complaining witness Carl Brady was attempting to
contact him, and the Commonwealth had arranged “for transportation to go
to his house, since he is in a wheelchair to get him into that vehicle and come
down to court.” Id. at 8. The ADA stated she “should have confirmation that
all of that is happening in about 20 to 30 minutes.” Id. The court said it would
recess the proceedings until 11:45 a.m. Id. at 16.
The Court reconvened at 12:00 p.m., and the first ADA said the
witnesses were “on their way,” said she was ready to proceed with trial, and
asked if she could begin with her opening statement. Id. at 17. The trial court
replied that the witnesses were supposed to be there at 9:30 a.m. The ADA
again advised the court that the witnesses were on their way. She said she
was ready to begin with her opening statement and could put on another
witness, by the end of which she was “absolutely certain” the complaining
witnesses would arrive. Id. at 17-18. The trial court declined to allow the
prosecution to begin. It instead dismissed the charges, stating, “Okay. Well,
the case is discharged.” Id. at 18.
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The Commonwealth filed this appeal.2 In its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion,
the trial court stated that it dismissed the case because, in the absence of the
complaining witnesses, the prosecution would be unable to make out a prima
facie case. Trial Court Opinion, filed July 19, 2017, at 3. The court also opined
that the order from which the Commonwealth had appealed was not a final
order, because the dismissal was without prejudice and the Commonwealth
could refile the charges. Id. at 2. The court stated:
In this case, this court dismissed the criminal complaint
against [Ligon] in light of the Commonwealth’s failure to
make a prima facie case due to the absence of the
complaining witnesses on the date set for trial, nearly five
years after the complaint was filed. Finally on the date of
trial, a jury was selected and waited patiently on the
following day for hours before the case was dismissed. This
court did not dismiss the complaint with prejudice. At the
trial readiness conference on December 5, 2016, the
Commonwealth asserted that it was ready to proceed to
trial. On December 6th at trial, the Commonwealth failed to
have the complaining witnesses appear in court for
necessary testimony. Thereupon, this court dismissed the
complaint against [Ligon]. As in [Commonwealth v.
Jones, 676 A.2d 251 (Pa.Super. 1996)] and
[Commonwealth v. Waller, 682 A.2d 1292 (Pa.Super.
1996) (en banc)], this court’s dismissal was based upon the
Commonwealth’s failure to present necessary witnesses to
make a prima facie case. In neither the docket nor the
transcripts did this court ever represent the dismissal to be
with prejudice. This court also notes that the dismissal of
the complaint occurred 1,782 days after the complaints had
originally been filed. Therefore, the Commonwealth’s appeal
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2The Commonwealth also filed a motion to re-instate the bills of information,
which the trial court denied. The Commonwealth appealed from that order,
and we consolidated the two appeals. See Commonwealth v. Ligon, 375
EDA 2017. Because the Commonwealth is no longer pursuing that appeal, we
have remitted the record to the trial court. See Order, filed 8/30/18, at 2.
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is precluded from appellate review and its sole recourse is
the refiling of criminal charges.
1925(a) Op. at 3-4 (italics added, citations to record omitted).
The Commonwealth’s brief raises the following issue:
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in dismissing the case
after the statute of limitations had expired because the
victims – an elderly woman and a paraplegic man – were
unexpectedly late for court where the Commonwealth
affirmed that, despite the victim’s absence, it was ready for
trial, and [Ligon] suffered no prejudice as a result of any
brief delay?
Commonwealth’s Br. at 4.
I. The Order Discharging Ligon Is a Final Order.
The trial court is of the opinion that we lack jurisdiction because the
Commonwealth’s appeal is interlocutory. It reasons that the order dismissing
the charges is not a final, appealable order because the Commonwealth can
refile charges in the trial court. The Commonwealth counters that it is unable
to refile charges because the applicable statutes of limitations had expired by
the time the trial court dismissed the case, rendering the order at issue final.3
A party may appeal from a final order. Pa.R.A.P. 341(a). A final order
includes an order that “disposes of all claims and of all parties.” Pa.R.A.P.
341(b)(1). Often, an order dismissing criminal charges is not a final order, as
the Commonwealth may refile charges. Commonwealth v. Waller, 682 A.2d
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3Because the Commonwealth was unaware until the trial court filed its Rule
1925(a) opinion that the trial court believed the Commonwealth could refile
charges, the Commonwealth did not waive this argument. See
Commonwealth v. Zheng, 908 A.2d 285, 286 (Pa.Super. 2006).
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1292, 1294 (Pa.Super. 1996) (en banc). If, however, “the defect which
requires the dismissal of [the] charges is uncurable, then the order dismissing
the charges is final, and appellate review is proper.” Id.
We faced a situation similar to the one at hand in Commonwealth v.
Finn, 496 A.2d 1254, 1255 (Pa.Super. 1985). There, the Commonwealth
appealed from an order discharging a defendant following a preliminary
hearing. We explained that such orders are ordinarily not final orders, as the
Commonwealth may re-arrest the defendant. Id. However, in Finn, the
defendant was not subject to re-arrest because the statute of limitations had
expired at the time of the discharge order. Id. We therefore concluded that
the order “must be viewed . . . as a final order from which an appeal may
properly be taken.” Id.
Here, two separate statutes of limitations applied to the crimes with
which Ligon was charged. For some of the crimes, such as burglary and
aggravated assault, the statute of limitations was five years. 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 5552(b). For others, the statute of limitations was two years. 42 Pa.C.S.A
§ 5552(a). Ligon was charged with committing the crimes on September 11,
2011. Therefore, the statutes of limitations had expired at the latest on
September 11, 2016, months before the court dismissed all charges on
December 6, 2016.
Consistent with Finn, we conclude that where, as here, the statute of
limitations expired before the trial court dismissed the charge at issue, such
that the Commonwealth cannot refile the charges, the order dismissing the
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charges is final and appealable. See Waller, 682 A.2d at 1294; Finn, 496
A.2d at 1255. Because the order was final and appealable, we have jurisdiction
and will address the Commonwealth’s issue on appeal.
II. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion In Dismissing the Charges.
On the merits, the Commonwealth argues that the trial court should not
have dismissed the charges because the Commonwealth’s actions were not
egregious or in bad faith. It points out that at the start of the morning, it
alerted the court that the witnesses were not present, and the court allowed
it time to contact them. The Commonwealth adds that by the time the court
dismissed the case, it had informed the court that they were en route to court
and the prosecution was ready to begin.
We review an order dismissing charges against a defendant for an abuse
of discretion. Commonwealth v. Robinson, 122 A.3d 367, 372 (Pa.Super.
2015) (citing Commonwealth v. Kolansky, 800 A.2d 937, 939 (Pa.Super.
2002)). A trial court has the “authority to regulate attendance upon its
schedule and concomitant authority to sanction a breach[.]” Commonwealth
v. Carson, 510 A.2d 1233, 1235 (Pa. 1986). In a civil case, it is a private
party that seeks to use the court’s authority to its own ends that will bear the
brunt of the sanction. Id.
Imposing such a sanction on the Commonwealth in a criminal case,
however, is a different matter. In criminal cases, any sanction the trial court
imposes “must be visited upon the offender and not upon the interests of
public justice.” Id. In other words, courts must take into account the effect
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the sanction will have on public interests. The court must calibrate the penalty
in a criminal case to the nature of the violation, while taking into account other
relevant circumstances, such as the running of the statute of limitations. The
court certainly has the power to vindicate its authority, but must do so without
unfairly harming the public’s interest. Id.
We do not think the trial court struck an appropriate balance in this
instance. At the time of dismissal, the Commonwealth was not in violation of
any court order specifically regulating witnesses’ attendance. At most, it had
failed to ensure that its complaining witnesses were in court at the proper time
to comply with the court’s schedule. To that end, it had arranged for the
witnesses’ attendance ahead of time, albeit ineffectually. When the witnesses
failed to show up, it promptly informed the court and asked for an extension.
The court, in its discretion, gave the prosecution the leeway it requested and
allowed a recess for the Commonwealth to procure the witnesses’ attendance.
Yet when the Commonwealth later informed the court that it was ready
to proceed, the court dismissed the charges. This was an abuse of discretion.
The prosecution had assured the court that the witnesses were on their way,
and proposed a solution that would allow the case to begin and give time for
the witnesses to get to the courtroom. Despite having given the
Commonwealth time to make such arrangements, the court refused to allow
the Commonwealth to go forward with them. It instead dismissed the case on
the stated belief that the Commonwealth could not make out a prima facie
case without the complaining witnesses. The court could not know that such
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was the case, and it is not for the court, barring circumstances not present
here, to regulate the order of the Commonwealth’s witnesses.
Although a trial court may properly take steps to regulate the
presentation of evidence, it “should bear in mind that [its] undue interference,
impatience, or participation in the examination of witnesses, or a severe
attitude on [its] part toward witnesses . . . may tend to prevent the proper
presentation of the cause, or the ascertainment of the truth in respect
thereto.” Commonwealth v. McGuire, 488 A.2d 1144, 1152 (Pa.Super.
1985) (en banc) (quoting Commonwealth v. Myma, 123 A. 486, 508-09
(Pa. 1924)).
The court here failed to abide by McGuire’s admonition. It went too far,
under these circumstances, in refusing to allow the Commonwealth to give its
opening statement and put on another witness. Having allowed the
Commonwealth time to bring the witnesses to the courtroom, the court could
not dismiss the case immediately after the ADA stated she was ready. The
court’s actions amounted to undue interference with the Commonwealth’s
presentation of its case and prevented “the proper presentation of the cause,
or the ascertainment of the truth[.]” Id. The court’s dismissal order was an
abuse of discretion, and we reverse it and remand the case for further
proceedings.
Order reversed. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/24/19
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