J-M04001-19
2019 PA Super 295
IN THE INTEREST OF D.W., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: D.W. :
:
:
:
:
: No. 104 WDM 2019
Appeal from the Dispositional Order Entered July 29, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-02-JV-0001074-2019
BEFORE: BOWES, J., DUBOW, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
OPINION BY BOWES, J.: FILED OCTOBER 1, 2019
Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1770, D.W. seeks expedited review of out-of-
home placement in a juvenile delinquency matter.1 We grant expedited
review and affirm.2
On June 12, 2019, Pittsburgh Police Officer Lucas Burdette and two
members of his tactical team were performing a proactive patrol in the
Homewood section of Pittsburgh when they encountered then seventeen-
year-old D.W. and four of his cohorts sitting in a parked automobile smoking
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1 Our review is limited to the propriety of out-of-home placement. We do not
confront the merits of the adjudication of delinquency. D.W. challenges that
decision in a separate appeal docketed at 1291 WDA 2019. See Pa.R.A.P.
1770(c)(2) (“A petition for review under subdivision (a) shall not challenge
the underlying adjudication of delinquency.”).
2 D.W.’s Application for Relief Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 123 is denied as moot.
The Application for Post-Submission Communication Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
2501(a) is granted insofar as we considered the submission in disposing of
the juvenile’s Rule 1770 petition for expedited review.
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marijuana. D.W. sat in the driver’s seat, and all five passengers were in
conversation with a sixth person who was standing outside of the vehicle. The
police officers wore plain clothes and operated an unmarked police vehicle.
As the officers approached the group, the individual standing outside the car,
leaned into the passenger-side window and alerted its occupants. Officer
Burdette observed the five occupants respond to the alert by moving anxiously
inside the vehicle. Based on his training and experience, Officer Burdette
believed that the people in the car were attempting to conceal a weapon or
contraband. He initiated an investigatory stop, detected “an overwhelming
smell of marijuana emanating from the vehicle,” and observed in plain view a
backseat passenger holding a marijuana cigar. N.T., 7/9/19, at 12.
When Officer Burdette asked D.W. to step out of the car, the officer
noticed a large unnatural bulge on the right side of D.W.’s waist. Concerned
for his safety, Officer Burdette performed a Terry3 pat-down frisk for
weapons, which immediately revealed a handgun that was subsequently
identified as an operable 9mm Norinco pistol. As a minor, D.W. was ineligible
to carry a concealed firearm.
The police charged D.W. with firearms not to be carried without a license
and possession of firearms by a minor. Pending the resolution of the juvenile
adjudication proceedings, D.W. was detained in the Shuman Juvenile
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3 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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Detention Center in Pittsburgh. Following hearings 4 on July 2 and 9, 2019,
the juvenile court adjudicated D.W. delinquent for committing acts that would
constitute the two violations of the Uniform Firearms Act if committed by an
adult, and determined that he was “in need of further court supervision and/or
treatment.” N.T., 7/9/19, at 63, 81.
The juvenile court immediately proceeded to the dispositional phase.
Anthony Gray, the juvenile probation officer, recommended enrolling D.W. in
the Community Intensive Supervision Program (“CISP”), an in-home program
administered by the Allegheny County Court. Id. at 64. Probation Officer
Gray reasoned that CISP was appropriate because this incident was D.W.’s
first contact with the delinquency proceedings, and he viewed the program as
the least restrictive treatment at that stage. Id. at 65. The probation officer
also noted that the juvenile was an expectant father, who will have obligations
to his child. Id. at 68-69. While Probation Officer Gray was not certain
whether D.W. received mental health treatment, Mary Zorn, who supervised
the family’s involvement with Children Youth and Family (“CYF”),
subsequently clarified that the minor did, in fact, receive treatment, but did
not complete it. Id. at 76.
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4 In addition to the delinquency petition that is the genesis of this appeal, the
adjudication hearing addressed a second delinquency petition involving a
misdemeanor disorderly conduct charge filed at 879 of 2019. That charge
stemmed from an altercation D.W. engaged in at his high school. While that
incident resulted in a ten-day suspension from school, the Commonwealth
ultimately withdrew the delinquency petition because the victim failed to
appear. See N.T., 7/9/19, at 62.
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Ms. Zorn also testified that the family received CYF services for
approximately one and one-half years, including assistance with obtaining
stable housing and transportation to school. Id. at 75, 77-78. The agency
closed the case nearly one month before the juvenile delinquency hearing
occurred, which was near the date that police arrested D.W. for the present
gun charges. Ms. Zorn further explained that D.W. received mental health
treatment until his June 12, 2019 arrest and commitment in the Shuman
Center. Id. at 76.
D.W. endorsed juvenile probation’s recommendation of in-home
placement with CISP. Id. at 79-80. However, highlighting D.W.’s ability to
receive needed educational and medical services in out-of-home placement
and noting the contributions of K.J. (“Mother”) to her son’s pervasive truancy
and her tolerance of the juvenile’s decision to carry a handgun, the
Commonwealth opposed returning the child to the family home. Id. at 70-
71, 80. In general, the Commonwealth asserted, “It seems[D.W.] is a danger
to himself as well as to others.” Id. at 81.
The juvenile court deferred its final disposition as to placement.
Instead, the court ordered D.W. to undergo mental health and substance
abuse evaluations, comply with treatment recommendations, and submit to
random drug screens. Id. Significantly, the court opined,
Theres a number of things that are going on here in regard
to [D.W.]. One, obviously he needs some [drug and alcohol]
treatment in regard to marijuana. Obviously he needs a mental
health treatment. He was in mental health. He was not
discharged from mental health treatment. That alone, coupled
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with a gun charge here today that he's been adjudicated in is a
clear state[ment of the] risk in regard to anyone's community.
It is my understanding he has been shot, carrying a firearm.
We're just lucky someone else hadn't been shot at this case as
well.
I do not believe that he can receive what he needs at this
particular time as well as keeping the community safe with him
being in the community. Therefore, he is to be detained.
Id. at 81-82. The court recommitted D.W. to the Shuman Center pending its
final disposition.
The juvenile court reconvened the disposition hearing on July 22, 2019.
Probation Officer Gray testified that D.W was accepted by two residential
placement facilities: Abraxas and the Summit Academy. N.T., 7/22/19, at 3.
He added that, if out-of-home placement is required, D.W. preferred to be
placed at Abraxas. Id. The probation officer also presented the results of the
respective mental health and drug and alcohol evaluations that were
performed while D.W. was detained at the Shuman Center. Id. at 4. As it
relates to D.W.’s argument herein, the psychiatric evaluation noted that the
proposed referral to CISP was “seem[ingly] a good option for this child. He
can remain home as he remains on probation.” Psychiatric Evaluation,
7/12/19, at 5. In addition, the drug and alcohol evaluation performed by Taji
Walsh of the juvenile probation department revealed “a high probability of . . .
substance use disorder,” which involves “a progression in use, . . . loss of
control, denial, preoccupation with use, and delusional thinking.”
Drug/Alcohol Assessment Results, 7/15/19, at 3. Ms. Walsh recommended
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“[t]hat [D.W.] participate in an intensive outpatient program with regular drug
screens. If placement is being sought, a program with a strong drug and
alcohol component is recommended with aftercare treatment.” Id. at 4.
While Probation Officer Gray did not expressly renew his initial
recommendation for CISP during the July 22, 2019 hearing, D.W. reiterated
his preference for in-home placement through that program. Id. at 7. At the
close of the hearing, the juvenile court held the matter in order to review the
newly-admitted reports. On July 29, 2019, the juvenile court entered the final
dispositional order directing that “[D.W.] remain detained with permission to
place in an appropriate placement.” Juvenile Court Order, 7/29/19.
Thereafter, D.W. filed the instant petition for expedited review of out-
of-home placement in a juvenile delinquency matter pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
1770.5 He asserts that the juvenile court abused its discretion by ordering
out-of-home placement without complying with the technical requirements of
the applicable rules of appellate and juvenile court procedure. Primarily,
however, he complains that the juvenile court failed to fashion an
individualized disposition or explain why it believed that out-of-home
placement was the least restrictive alternative. He further assailed the
placement as inconsistent with the considerations of public protection and his
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5 While the juvenile court order is dated July 22, 2019, the court did not enter
the order on the juvenile court docket until one week later, July 29, 2019.
Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1770(a), D.W. had ten days, or until August 8, 2019, to
file a petition for expedited review of out-of-home placement. As D.W. filed
the instant petition on August 5, 2019, he complied with the ten-day
requirement.
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treatment, supervision, rehabilitation, and welfare under the particular
circumstances of his case. He requests that we vacate the dispositional order
and direct the juvenile court to commit D.W. to CISP. To our disappointment,
the Commonwealth failed to respond to the petition for expedited review, or
to any of the juvenile’s subsequent filings in this court.
This Court reviews a juvenile court’s dispositional order directing out-
of-home placement for an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. K.M.-F,
117 A.3d 346, 350 (Pa.Super. 2015) (quoting (In the Interest of A.D., 771
A.2d 45, 53 (Pa.Super. 2001) (en banc)). It is well settled that, “[u]nder
Pennsylvania law, an abuse of discretion occurs when the court has overridden
or misapplied the law, when its judgment is manifestly unreasonable, or when
there is insufficient evidence of record to support the court’s findings.” J.M.R.
v. J.M., 1 A.3d 902, 908 (Pa.Super. 2010) (citation omitted). The K.M.-F,
court reiterated, “In a juvenile proceeding, the hearing judge sits as the finder
of fact. The weight to be assigned the testimony of the witnesses is within the
exclusive province of the fact finder.” Id. at 351 (quoting In the Interest of
A.D., supra at 53).
The following precepts inform our review of D.W.’s petition for expedited
review. Pa.R.A.P. 1770 establishes the mechanism for this Court to perform
expedited review of a juvenile court’s imposition of out-of-home placement.
Rule 1770 provides as follows:
(a) General rule. If a court under the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 6301 et seq., enters an order after an adjudication of
delinquency of a juvenile pursuant to Rules of Juvenile Court
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Procedure 409(A)(2) and 515, which places the juvenile in an out
of home overnight placement in any agency or institution that
shall provide care, treatment, supervision or rehabilitation of the
juvenile (“Out of Home Placement”), the juvenile may seek review
of that order pursuant to a petition for review under Chapter 15
(judicial review of governmental determinations). The petition
shall be filed within ten days of the said order.
(b) Content. A petition for review under subdivision (a) shall
contain: (i) a specific description of any determinations made by
the juvenile court; (ii) the matters complained of; (iii) a concise
statement of the reasons why the juvenile court abused its
discretion in ordering the Out of Home Placement; (iv) the
proposed terms and conditions of an alternative disposition for the
juvenile; and (v) a request that the official court reporter for the
juvenile court transcribe the notes of testimony as required by
subdivision (g) of this Rule. Any order(s) and opinion(s) relating
to the Out of Home Placement and the transcript of the juvenile
court's findings shall be attached as appendices. The petition shall
be supported by a certificate of counsel to the effect that it is
presented in good faith and not for delay.
(c) Objection to specific agency or institution, or
underlying adjudication of delinquency, is not permitted.
(1) A petition for review under subdivision (a) shall not
challenge the specific agency or specific institution that is the
site of the Out of Home Placement and instead shall be limited
to the Out of Home Placement itself.
(2) A petition for review under subdivision (a) shall not
challenge the underlying adjudication of delinquency.
(d) Answer. Any answer shall be filed within ten days of service
of the petition, and no other pleading is authorized. Rule 1517
(applicable rules of pleading) and Rule 1531 (intervention)
through 1551 (scope of review) shall not be applicable to a petition
for review filed under subdivision (a).
(e) Service. A copy of the petition for review and any answer
thereto shall be served on the judge of the juvenile court and the
official court reporter for the juvenile court. All parties in the
juvenile court shall be served in accordance with Rule 121(b)
(service of all papers required). The Attorney General of
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Pennsylvania need not be served in accordance with Rule 1514(c)
(service), unless the Attorney General is a party in the juvenile
court.
(f) Opinion of juvenile court. Upon receipt of a copy of a
petition for review under subdivision (a), if the judge who made
the disposition of the Out of Home Placement did not state the
reasons for such placement on the record at the time of disposition
pursuant to Rule of Juvenile Court Procedure 512(D), the judge
shall file of record a brief statement of the reasons for the
determination or where in the record such reasons may be found,
within five days of service of the petition for review.
(g) Transcription of Notes of Testimony. Upon receipt of a
copy of a petition for review under subdivision (a), the court
reporter shall transcribe the notes of testimony and deliver the
transcript to the juvenile court within five business days. If the
transcript is not prepared and delivered in a timely fashion, the
juvenile court shall order the court reporter to transcribe the notes
and deliver the notes to the juvenile court, and may impose
sanctions for violation of such an order. If the juvenile is
proceeding in forma pauperis, the juvenile shall not be charged
for the cost of the transcript. Chapter 19 of the Rules of Appellate
Procedure shall not otherwise apply to petitions for review filed
under this Rule.
(h) Non-waiver of objection to placement. A failure to seek
review under this rule of the Out of Home Placement shall not
constitute a waiver of the juvenile's right to seek review of the
placement in a notice of appeal filed by the juvenile from a
disposition after an adjudication of delinquency.
Pa.R.A.P. 1770.
When a court commits a juvenile to out-of-home placement, the court
is required to state on the record in open court,
the name of the specific facility or type of facility to which the child
will be committed and its findings and conclusions of law that form
the basis of its decision consistent with subsection (a) and section
6301, including the reasons why commitment to that type or type
of facility was determined to be the least restrictive placement
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that is consistent with the protection of the public and best suited
to the child's treatment, supervision, rehabilitation and welfare.
42 Pa.C.S. § 6352(c).
Similarly, Pennsylvania Rule of Juvenile Court Procedure 512(D)(4)
enumerates the considerations that a juvenile court must address in its
dispositional findings of fact and conclusions of law when the juvenile is
removed from the home. In pertinent part, Rule 512 provides:
The court shall enter its findings and conclusions of law into the
record and enter an order pursuant to Rule 515. On the record in
open court, the court shall state:
....
(4) if the juvenile is removed from the home:
(a) the name or type of any agency or institution that shall
provide care, treatment, supervision, or rehabilitation of the
juvenile;
(b) its findings and conclusions of law that formed the basis
of its decision consistent with 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 6301 and 6352,
including why the court found that the out-of–home
placement ordered is the least restrictive type of placement
that is consistent with the protection of the public and best
suited to the juvenile's treatment, supervision, rehabilitation,
and welfare; and
(c) the provision of educational services for the juvenile
pursuant to Rule 148[.]
Pa.R.J.C.P. 512(D).
Finally, where, as here, a juvenile files a petition with this Court for
expedited review of out-of-home placement, and the juvenile court did not
state the reasons for placement on the record at the time of disposition
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pursuant to Rule 512(D), Pa.R.A.P. 1770 mandates that the court “file of
record a brief statement of the reasons for the determination or where in the
record such reasons may be found, within five days of service of the petition
for review.” Pa.R.A.P. 1770(f).
Herein, the juvenile court belatedly entered its findings of facts and
conclusions of law on September 9, 2019.6 The court noted its consideration
of the circumstances surrounding the firearm offenses, D.W.’s education and
mental health history, his substance abuse problem, his family’s involvement
with CYF, the danger to the public, and most importantly, his treatment,
supervision, rehabilitation and welfare. See Findings of Fact and Legal
Conclusions, 9/9/19, unnumbered at 8-9.
The juvenile court, in its role as the ultimate arbiter of fact, highlighted
the history of D.W.’s persistent truancy during the 2018-2019 academic year
when he missed approximately one-half of the 186 school days. N.T.,
7/22/19, at 13. It also considered the fact that D.W.’s educational needs were
not being satisfied at home and that the juvenile lacked accountability or adult
supervision. These concerns are exemplified by Mother’s validation of D.W.’s
failure to return to school during Spring 2019, including missing his final
exams, following a ten-day suspension from school for the disorderly conduct
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6 Having failed to file its statement of the reasons for its determination within
the required period, on August 20, 2019, this Court entered a per curiam order
directing the court to comply with Rule 1770(f) within seven days. The
juvenile court entered its rationale twenty days later.
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that was the genesis of the additional charges leveled at juvenile action
number 879. The juvenile court noted Mother’s concession during the juvenile
proceeding that “A lot of him missing school was all my doing. Like I said, I
didn’t enroll him in school right away. I had a problem with sending him to
that school.” N.T., 7/22/19, at 14. In this vein, we also observe that, while
Mother testified that D.W. had made the honor roll, his drug and alcohol
evaluation revealed that, “Based on his report card, [his] performance in
school is relatively low. . . . He has C's and D's in English, Geometry, Algebra,
Physics, Chemistry.” Drug/Alcohol Assessment Results, 7/15/19, at 3.
Likewise, the record contradicts Mother’s sentiments that D.W.’s
biological father was among the individuals who would be available to
occasionally supervise the juvenile at home. Mother testified, “I have a 24-
year-old daughter that’s there, and [D.W.’s] father is also there sometimes.”
N.T., 7/2/19, at 8. However, the psychiatric report reveals that D.W. “does
not have any contact with his biological father.” Psychiatric Evaluation,
7/12/19, at 3.
In addition to the foregoing problems with Mother’s credibility, the
juvenile court was also concerned that Mother did not intercede in her son’s
decision to carry a firearm. In sum, the court determined that, after weighing
the testimony presented by Mother, Probation Officer Gray, and the CYF case
worker, and considering the psychiatric and substance abuse evaluations, in-
home placement would not achieve the treatment and rehabilitative concerns
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outlined in the Juvenile Act. See Findings of Fact and Legal Conclusions,
9/9/19, unnumbered at 9. For the following reasons, we agree.
None of the foregoing considerations that the juvenile court identified in
support of out-of-home placement equates to an abuse of discretion, even
when viewed in the light cast by the probation department’s recommendation
of in-home placement, and the psychiatrist’s apparent endorsement of that
position. Phrased differently, the record supports the court’s determination
that in-home placement is inappropriate under the particular circumstances of
this case.
While Mother claimed to have familial support, and CYS confirmed that
it offered the family in-home services for approximately eighteen months, to
date, those resources proved ineffectual in meeting D.W.’s needs. D.W. was
chronically truant from school and he regularly carried a firearm while under
Mother’s supervision. Mother’s decisions to engineer her son’s truancy and
accept, if not tacitly endorse, his illegal possession of a handgun, erode the
underpinnings of the probation officer’s recommendation for in-home
placement.
Similarly, the juvenile court consistently cited the fact that D.W.
presented a danger to himself and a risk to the community. The juvenile’s
history with gun violence is ensconced in the record. He witnessed the
shooting death of a close acquaintance, his stepfather died as a result of gun
violence, and he was shot in the leg approximately seven months prior to the
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instant arrest. D.W. suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of
being shot.
D.W.’s several protestations do not provide a basis for relief. First, we
reject his bare assertion that the juvenile court applied a blanket imposition
of commitment simply because the juvenile was found in possession of the
gun. Essentially, D.W. assails the juvenile court for what it views as the court’s
decision to commit him to out-of-home placement based solely on the court’s
“deterrent-based policy to order such commitment of any juvenile whose case
involves a firearms possession charge.” Post-Submission Communication
Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2501(a) at 10 (treble emphasis in original) (footnote
omitted). In actuality, the juvenile court’s principal concerns throughout these
proceedings focused on D.W.’s individualized needs and the consequences of
the juvenile’s unsettling behavior on the community. The juvenile court’s
consideration of D.W.’s possession of a concealed weapon exceeded the
simple fact that a minor possessed a gun. In reality, the juvenile court
considered how gun violence affected D.W. in particular and determined that
those specific considerations militated in favor of out-of-home placement.
Next, although the juvenile court neglected to explicitly delineate the
reasons for finding that out-of-home commitment was the least restrictive
placement alternative, the reasons are clear from the record. Stated plainly,
the rehabilitative needs and program services are outlined in the psychiatric
and substance abuse evaluations, and the juvenile court did not accept D.W.’s
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position that he could satisfy those needs at home. Similarly, while we do not
condone the fact that the juvenile court neglected to specifically state whether
either Abraxas or the Summit Academy had a drug and alcohol treatment
program that satisfied the requirements that Ms. Welsh outlined in her report,
in the context of the juvenile court’s palpable unease with D.W.’s all-
consuming substance abuse, we interpret the court’s directive of placement
with “appropriate treatment” as satisfying the descriptions outlined in §
6352(c) and Pa.R.J.C.P. 512(D)(4)(a). See Juvenile Court Order, 7/29/19.
Furthermore, we are not persuaded by the juvenile’s assertion that
placement is unnecessary because D.W. can access services outside of a
residential facility. As we outlined supra, the juvenile court emphasized D.W.’s
need to complete mental health treatment and to initiate drug and alcohol
treatment. N.T., 7/9/19, at 81-82. Although D.W. argues that he can
participate in both of those programs through CISP without the necessity of
residential placement, the fact that out-patient treatment is also available to
him does not render the juvenile court’s decision to commit the minor to a
residential facility manifestly unreasonable, without support in the record, or
a misapplication of the law. Thus, no relief is due.
Finally, to the extent that Probation Officer Gray sought leniency
because it was D.W.’s first experience with the juvenile justice system, this
rationale overlooks the fact that D.W. was arrested for disorderly conduct
approximately one-month before he elected to smoke marijuana in a parked
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car while carrying a concealed firearm. While the juvenile’s prior conduct did
not result in an adjudication of delinquency due to the victim’s failure to attend
the hearing, it undermines the probation officer’s perspective that D.W. was
new to delinquency proceedings and, more importantly, it further illustrates
D.W.’s need for a level of supervision and rehabilitation that he cannot receive
at home. Similarly, by engaging in this behavior one month before the instant
arrest, D.W.’s actions refute his argument that the juvenile court abused its
discretion in declining to adopt the probation officer’s recommendation in favor
of leniency. Although in-home placement is undoubtedly the least restrictive
disposition, it is not an effective alternative. The record simply does not
sustain D.W.’s contention that returning home will satisfy his need for
treatment, supervision, and rehabilitation, or protect the public welfare. In
this vein, we clarify that the psychiatrist did not explicitly endorse CISP over
out-of-home placement. Instead, he merely noted that CISP, which had been
identified as the recommended placement alternative, “seem[ed] to be a good
option.” Psychiatric Evaluation, 7/12/19, at 5.
Mindful of the juvenile court’s role as fact finder and our deference for
the court’s conclusions that the record supports, we do not disturb the court’s
determination that D.W.’s rehabilitative and treatment needs would not be
satisfied at home and that out-of-home placement was warranted pursuant to
the Juvenile Act. Herein, the juvenile court considered the evidence presented
during the two juvenile court hearings, evaluated the particular circumstances
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of this case, and fashioned a disposition that suited D.W.’s rehabilitative needs
under the Juvenile Act. We do not discern an abuse of discretion. See
K.M.- F., supra at 350 (court did not abuse discretion when it considered
information presented and fashioned a disposition that it believed suited the
circumstances best). Accordingly, upon review of the petition for expedited
review of out-of-home placement, we deny the juvenile’s request for relief.
Petition for expedited review of out-of-home placement granted; relief
is denied. Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/1/2019
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