J-S46001-19
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: S.B. A/K/A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
S.A.A.B., A MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
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APPEAL OF: S.W., MOTHER :
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: No. 3664 EDA 2018
Appeal from the Order Entered November 15, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Family Court at
No(s): CP-51-AP-0000683-2018,
CP-51-DP-0002530-2016, FID: 51-FN-002433-2016
IN THE INTEREST OF: A.W. A/K/A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
A.I.W., A MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: S.W., MOTHER :
:
:
:
: No. 3666 EDA 2018
Appeal from the Order Entered November 15, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Family Court at
No(s): CP-51-AP-0000682-2018,
CP-51-DP-0002529-2016, FID: 51-FN-002433-2016
J-S46001-19
IN THE INTEREST OF: S.C. A/K/A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
S.A.C., A MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: S.W., MOTHER :
:
:
:
: No. 3667 EDA 2018
Appeal from the Order Entered November 15, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Family Court at
No(s): CP-51-AP-0000383-2018,
CP-51-DP-0002528-2016, FID: 51-FN-002433-2016
IN THE INTEREST OF: S.W. A/K/A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
S.M.W., A MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: S.W., MOTHER :
:
:
:
: No. 3668 EDA 2018
Appeal from the Order Entered November 15, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Family Court at
No(s): CP-51-AP-0000382-2018,
CP-51-DP-0002527-2016, FID: 51-FN-002433-2016
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and COLINS, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.: FILED OCTOBER 22, 2019
S.W. (“Mother”) appeals from the decrees entered November 15, 2018,
that granted the petitions of the Philadelphia Department of Human Services
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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(“DHS”), and involuntarily terminated her parental rights to her sons, S.M.W.
(born January 2006), S.A.C. (born January 2009), A.I.W. (born June 2012),
and S.A.A.B. (born May 2013) (collectively, “Children”).1 Mother also appeals
the orders entered the same day that changed Children’s permanent
placement goals to adoption. After careful review, we affirm.
The trial court set forth the factual and procedural history of this matter
as follows:
On November 15, 2016, the [c]hildren became known to the
Department of Human Services (“DHS”) when DHS received a
General Protective Services (“GPS”) report alleging that there was
no food in the parental home; that the home was heated with
electric space heaters; that the home had no hot water; and that
Mother and Children were residing in a shelter. The report also
alleged that Father was currently hospitalized recovering from a
bullet wound and that there was [a] history of domestic violence
between Mother and Father. On November 15, 2016, DHS visited
the home and found [c]hildren A[.]W[.] and S[.]B[.] with Mother.
DHS observed that the home was infested with bed bugs; the
stove [was] greasy; and the basement smelled of raw sewage.
Child A[.]W[.] and [c]hild S[.]B[.] lacked proper dental care and
had a foul o[dor]. As a result of the home visit, DHS obtained an
Order for Protective Custody (“OPC”) for the [c]hildren. On
November 30, 2016, following a hearing, the [c]hildren were
adjudicated dependent.
On March 9, 2017, a Single Case Plan (“SCP”) was created. The
parental objectives for Mother were to receive mental health
treatment and enroll in job counseling. The parental objectives of
Father were to enroll in parenting classes and mental health
treatment. On February 18, 2018, a revised SCP was created. The
____________________________________________
1 The court also involuntarily terminated the parental rights of T.B. (“Father”),
the father of A.I.W. and S.A.A.B. Father appealed the decrees terminating his
parental rights, and we address his appeal in a separate memorandum. The
fathers of S.M.W. and S.A.C. consented to the termination of their parental
rights and have not participated in this appeal.
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parental objectives for Mother were to visit the [c]hildren bi-
weekly separate from Father; (2) Mother was to attend anger
management classes; (3) Mother was to attend mental health
treatment; (4) Mother would make the house suitable for the
[c]hildren; and (5) Mother would seek employment and
appropriate housing. . . .
Trial Court Opinion, 5/8/19, at 2-4 (citations to the record omitted).
On August 21, 2018, DHS filed petitions to involuntarily terminate the
parental rights of Mother and Father and to change Children’s permanent
placement goals to adoption. The court conducted hearings on the petitions
on September 14, 2018 and November 15, 2018.2
DHS presented the testimony of Jasmine Mitchell, the Community
Umbrella Agency (“CUA”) case manager for Turning Points for Children; Majita
Mohammad, a life skills and visitation coach; and Sakina Shaddiq, a visitation
coach. Father testified on his own behalf. On November 15, 2018, the court
entered decrees involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental rights to Children,
and orders changing Children’s permanent placement goals to adoption. On
December 14, 2018, Mother timely filed notices of appeal and concise
statements of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).3 This Court, acting sua sponte, consolidated Mother’s
appeals.
____________________________________________
2 Children were represented by Attorney James Martin as legal counsel and
Attorney Daniel Kurland as guardian ad litem.
3 The record suggests that Mother filed four notices of appeal, one for each
child, with the notices then being photocopied and filed in the termination and
dependency dockets for each child. In doing so, Mother failed to comply with
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On appeal, Mother raises the following issues for our review:
1. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt commit reversible error, when it deprived
[M]other of her due process rights and other Pennsylvania and
Federal constitutional rights by refusing to either continue or delay
the combined termination and goal change hearing to allow
[M]other to be present to testify and/or by refusing to allow
[M]other to testify when she arrived at the court prior to a final
order being issued?
2. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt commit reversible error, when it
involuntarily terminated Mother’s parental rights where such
determination was not supported by clear and convincing evidence
under the adoption act, 23 P[a].C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5),
[and] (8)?
3. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt commit reversible error, when it
involuntarily terminated Mother’s parental rights without giving
primary consideration to the effect that [. . .] the termination
would have on the developmental, physical and emotional needs
of the child[ren] as required by the adoption act, 23 P[a].C.S.A. §
2511(b)?
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the Official Note to Pa.R.A.P. 341, which provides, in relevant part, “Where . .
. one or more orders resolves issues arising on more than one docket or
relating to more than one judgment, separate notices of appeal must be filed.”
Pa.R.A.P. 341, Official Note. In Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969,
977 (Pa. 2018), our Supreme Court held that the failure to file separate notices
of appeal from an order resolving issues on more than one docket “requires
the appellate court to quash the appeal.” Following Walker, supra,
recognizing that “decisional law may have been unclear to this point,” a panel
of this Court declined to quash an appeal from an involuntary termination
decree based on noncompliance with Rule 341. In re M.P., 204 A.3d 976, 981
(Pa. Super. 2019). However, in M.P., the panel announced that this Court
would quash any noncompliant appeals filed after the date of that opinion,
that is, February 22, 2019. See M.P., 204 A.3d at 986. Because Mother filed
her notices of appeal on December 14, 2018, we decline to quash her appeal.
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4. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt commit reversible error, when it terminated
Mother’s parental rights and changed the child[ren]’s goal[s] to
adoption as substantial, sufficient, and credible evidence was
presented at the time of trial which would have substantiated
denying the Petition for Goal Change?
Mother’s brief at 4.4
We review these claims mindful of our well-settled standard of review:
The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases
requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and
credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate
courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse
of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial
court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because
the record would support a different result. We have previously
emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand
observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks
omitted).
Initially, Mother contends that the trial court deprived her of her due
process rights when it refused to either continue or delay the combined
termination and goal change hearing to allow Mother to testify despite Father’s
assertion that Mother was in transit. See Mother’s brief at 18-19. Further,
____________________________________________
4 We have re-ordered Mother’s issues for ease of disposition.
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Mother asserts that the trial court refused to allow Mother to testify when she
arrived at court at the end of the hearing on November 15, 2018. See id.5
With respect to a trial court’s decision whether to continue a hearing,
our Supreme Court has stated:
Appellate review of a trial court’s continuance decision is
deferential. The grant or denial of a motion for a continuance is
within the sound discretion of the trial court and will be reversed
only upon a showing of an abuse of discretion. As we have
consistently stated, an abuse of discretion is not merely an error
of judgment. Rather, discretion is abused when the law is
overridden or misapplied, or the judgment exercised is manifestly
unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will,
as shown by the evidence or the record. . . .
Commonwealth v. Brooks, 104 A.3d 466, 469 (Pa. 2014) (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted).
____________________________________________
5 Mother also contends that she did not receive appropriate notice of the
November 15, 2018 hearing. See Mother’s brief at 18-19. However, Mother
did not assert a lack of notice in her Rule 1925(b) statement. Instead, Mother
asserted: “The [t]rial [c]ourt committed reversible error, when it deprived
[M]other of her due process rights and other Pennsylvania and Federal
constitutional rights by refusing to either continue or delay the combined
termination and goal change hearing to allow [M]other to be present and
testify and/or by refusing to allow [M]other to testify when she arrived at the
court prior to a final order being issued.” Rule 1925(b) Statement, 12/14/18,
at 2. Because Mother failed to include an assertion regarding a purported lack
of notice, we conclude that she waived this issue. See Krebs v. United
Refining Company of Pennsylvania, 893 A.2d 776, 797 (Pa. Super. 2006)
(holding that an appellant waives issues that are not raised in both his or her
concise statement of errors complained of on appeal and the statement of
questions involved in his or her brief on appeal). Moreover, we observe that
both Father and the CUA caseworker testified that Mother was aware of the
date and time of the November 15, 2018 hearing, and, in fact, Mother
appeared at the hearing, albeit late. See N.T., 11/15/18, at 16, 22, 24, 34.
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Here, Mother appeared for the first day of the termination hearing on
September 14, 2018, but did not testify. When Mother was not present at the
start of the hearing on November 15, 2018, which was listed for 11:30 a.m.
but did not begin until 12:30 p.m., her counsel suggested that the court
“proceed on [F]ather’s case and then hold off for [M]other’s case to give her
some time to get her[e] if she really is on her way.” See N.T., 11/15/18, at
3-4. When Father concluded his testimony and Mother had still not arrived,
Mother’s counsel requested a continuance. See id. at 25.
The trial court denied counsel’s request to continue the hearing, noting,
“[i]t’s 12:54. This case has been bifurcated[,] [Mother]’s had every
opportunity to get her[e]. She’s not here. She wasn’t available for the worker
this morning and I’m not giving her anymore courtesies.” See id. Given the
wide discretion given to a trial court to grant or deny a continuance, we do
not discern an abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to deny Mother’s
request for a continuance.
We next address Mother’s argument that the trial court erred in
precluding her from testifying when she appeared in the courtroom following
the court’s pronouncement that it would terminate Mother’s parental rights.
At the conclusion of the November 15, 2018 hearing, the following discussion
took place:
[Counsel for Mother]: Your Honor, just for the record, [M]other
has arrived at this moment.
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The Court: Yes, she’s arrived after the hearing, and after
argument. She’s been in the courtroom for approximately a
minute. It’s now 1:05 p.m. and the [c]ourt’s order stands.
[Counsel for Children]: Yes, [Y]our Honor. Your Honor, I ask to be
vacated.
[Counsel for Father]: Your Honor, please note [F]ather’s objection
for the record.
(Multiple voices, incoherent.)
The Court: Sheriff, if you escort the parents out.
The Sheriff: Yes, [Y]our Honor.
N.T., 11/15/18, at 34.
Although Mother contends that the court precluded her from testifying,
the transcript of the hearing shows that, following Mother’s arrival, Mother’s
counsel did not attempt to have Mother testify.
In order to preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must
make a timely and specific objection at the appropriate stage of
the proceedings before the trial court. Failure to timely object to
a basic and fundamental error will result in waiver of that issue.
On appeal the Superior Court will not consider a claim which was
not called to the trial court’s attention at a time when any error
committed could have been corrected. In this jurisdiction . . . one
must object to errors, improprieties or irregularities at the earliest
possible stage of the adjudicatory process to afford the jurist
hearing the case the first occasion to remedy the wrong and
possibly avoid an unnecessary appeal to complain of the matter.
Thompson v. Thompson, 963 A.2d 474, 475–476 (Pa. Super. 2008)
(citation omitted).
Because counsel did not attempt to call Mother as a witness once she
arrived, we reject Mother’s argument that the trial court precluded Mother
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from testifying. The failure to attempt to call Mother as a witness results in
the waiver of this claim. Accordingly, we conclude that Mother’s first issue
fails.
We next address Mother’s arguments relating to the involuntary
termination of her parental rights. Termination of parental rights is governed
by Section 2511 of the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2101-2938, which
requires a bifurcated analysis:
Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence
that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for
termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court
determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his
or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of
the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the
needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests
of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis
concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between
parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child
of permanently severing any such bond.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).
In this case, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant
to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8), as well as (b). This Court may
affirm the trial court’s decision regarding the termination of parental rights
with regard to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as
Section 2511(b). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en
banc). Here, we will focus our analysis on Section 2511(a)(2) and (b), which
provides as follows:
§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
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(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may
be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
***
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect
or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without
essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary
for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and
causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot
or will not be remedied by the parent.
***
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2) and (b).
Our Supreme Court set forth our inquiry under Section 2511(a)(2) as
follows:
As stated above, § 2511(a)(2) provides statutory grounds for
termination of parental rights where it is demonstrated by clear
and convincing evidence that “[t]he repeated and continued
incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the
child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence
necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions
and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or
will not be remedied by the parent.” . . .
This Court has addressed incapacity sufficient for termination
under § 2511(a)(2):
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A decision to terminate parental rights, never to be made
lightly or without a sense of compassion for the parent, can
seldom be more difficult than when termination is based upon
parental incapacity. The legislature, however, in enacting the
1970 Adoption Act, concluded that a parent who is incapable of
performing parental duties is just as parentally unfit as one who
refuses to perform the duties.
In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 827 (Pa. 2012) (citations omitted).
To satisfy the requirements of Section 2511(a)(2), the moving party
must produce clear and convincing evidence regarding the following elements:
(1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) such
incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal caused the child to be without essential
parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-
being; and (3) the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot
or will not be remedied. See In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272
(Pa. Super. 2003). The grounds for termination of parental rights under
Section 2511(a)(2) are not limited to affirmative misconduct; to the contrary,
those grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform
parental duties. See In re A.L.D. 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002).
This Court has long recognized that a parent is required to make diligent
efforts towards the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental
responsibilities. See id. A parent’s vow to cooperate, after a long period of
uncooperativeness regarding the necessity or availability of services, may
properly be rejected as untimely or disingenuous. See id. at 340.
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Mother asserts the trial court erred in terminating her parental rights
pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2) because Mother worked to meet her SCP
goals. See Mother’s brief at 12-13. Mother contends that she remedied any
deficiency in her housing, obtained employment, and consistently visited with
Children. See id. Accordingly, Mother argues it was improper for the court to
involuntarily terminate her parental rights. See id.
The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section
2511(a)(2), reasoning that Mother failed to timely obtain appropriate housing,
complete mental health treatment, parenting classes, or anger management.
See Trial Court Opinion, 5/8/19, at 5-7. Further, the court credited testimony
that Mother demonstrated impulse control problems and was hostile to
caseworkers during her visitation, including an incident shortly before the
termination hearing when Mother was escorted from the visit by security. See
id. at 5. Moreover, Mother was inconsistent with her visits and did not
appropriately interact with Children during the visits she did attend. See id.
The trial court also noted that Mother failed to obtain a parenting capacity
evaluation. See id. at 8. Accordingly, the court determined that DHS met its
burden of proof with respect to Section 2511(a)(2).
The record supports the trial court’s conclusion. Jasmine Mitchell, the
CUA caseworker, testified that the family initially came to DHS’s attention due
to allegations involving the family home having a broken water heater, a lack
of food and supervision, and poor hygiene. See N.T., 9/14/18, at 18. Children
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were adjudicated dependent November 30, 2016, and have been in placement
since that time. See id. Mother’s SCP objectives were to complete a mental
health evaluation; attend a parenting program; maintain contact with CUA;
and attend the Achieving Reunification Center (“ARC”) for parenting,
employment, and education programs. See id. at 20.
Mitchell testified that Mother began mental health treatment with
Warren E. Smith for a short time before transferring to the Wedge for
treatment. See id. at 21. Mother began treatment in April 2017 and stopped
in October 2017. See id. at 22. However, her treatment was inconsistent. See
id.
The Wedge attempted to reengage Mother in January 2018 but Mother
did not initially respond. See id. at 22-23. After Mother reengaged in
treatment, Mitchell described Mother’s attendance as inconsistent. See id.
Mother attended therapy eleven times from April 2017 to September 2018,
despite being scheduled once per week. See id. at 91. Mother was not
attending mental health therapy at the time of the termination hearing. See
id. at 22.
Further, Mother did not participate in the ARC programs, failing to even
attend the intake. See id. at 28. Mother did not attend the parenting program
and only obtained suitable housing shortly before the termination hearing.
See id. at 23. Mother was ordered to attend anger management and was
minimally compliant. See id. at 29. Additionally, Mother did not obtain
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employment throughout the life of the case. See id. After Mother was
assigned a life skills coach, Mother was non-compliant with the life skills coach
and was eventually discharged. See id. at 28-29, 81-84.
Mother did not visit Children from November 2016 until February 2017
because she could not be contacted. See id. at 23-24. After February 2017,
Mitchell described Mother’s visits as inconsistent, noting Mother had the “bare
minimum compliance with visitation.” Id. at 24-25. During the visit Mitchell
observed, Mother watched Children play on their electronic devices, did not
speak to them about school, and did not bring food. See id. at 25-26. Mitchell
noted that visits were always supervised because of Mother’s lack of impulse
control and anger. See id. at 26. Mother was ordered to obtain a parenting
capacity evaluation, but did not appear for the appointment. See id. at 28.
Majita Mohammad testified regarding Mother’s visits with Children,
noting that from August 2017 through February 2018, Mother was offered
approximately twenty-five visits and attended four. See id. at 102-03. After
February 2018, Mother’s attendance became more consistent. See id. at 108.
At visits, Mother primarily watched Children play on their phones. See id. at
105.
Sakina Shaddiq testified regarding a visit that occurred shortly before
the termination hearing, recalling that Mother arrived late for the visit and
then left to get food for Children. See id. at 125. Mother came back with 10
minutes left and, when the foster parent did not want to bring the food in the
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car, Mother became irate and security needed to escort her out of the building.
See id. at 125-26. Mother reentered the building and continued yelling in front
of Children before being removed again. See id.
As this Court has stated, “a child’s life cannot be held in abeyance while
a parent attempts to attain the maturity necessary to assume parenting
responsibilities. The court cannot and will not subordinate indefinitely a child’s
need for permanence and stability to a parent’s claims of progress and hope
for the future.” In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 513 (Pa. Super.
2006). The record substantiates the conclusion that Mother’s repeated and
continued incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal has caused Children to be
without essential parental control or subsistence necessary for their physical
and mental well-being. See In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d at 1272.
Moreover, Mother cannot or will not remedy this situation. As noted above, in
order to affirm a termination of parental rights, we need only agree with the
trial court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a) before assessing the
determination under Section 2511(b), and we, therefore, need not address
any further subsections of Section 2511(a). In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d at 384.
We next consider whether the trial court abused its discretion by
terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(b).
Section 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental rights
would best serve the developmental, physical, and emotional
needs and welfare of the child. As this Court has explained,
Section 2511(b) does not explicitly require a bonding analysis and
the term ‘bond’ is not defined in the Adoption Act. Case law,
however, provides that analysis of the emotional bond, if any,
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between parent and child is a factor to be considered as part of
our analysis. While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child
is a major aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis,
it is nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the
court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.
[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can
equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and
should also consider the intangibles, such as the love,
comfort, security, and stability the child might have
with the foster parent. Additionally, this Court stated
that the trial court should consider the importance of
continuity of relationships and whether any existing
parent-child bond can be severed without detrimental
effects on the child.
In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quotation
marks and citations omitted).
Mother argues that the trial court erred in its analysis of Section 2511(b)
because Mother and Children share a beneficial bond, and breaking the bond
is not in the best interests of Children. See Mother’s brief at 16. Further,
Mother asserts that her regular visits and progress towards reunification
establish that there are no safety issues for Children. See id.
The trial court found that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in
the best interests of Children pursuant to Section 2511(b). See Trial Court
Opinion, 5/8/19, at 4. The court emphasized Children’s need for stability and
continuity. See N.T., 11/15/18, at 33-34.
The record supports the trial court’s conclusion. Mohammad testified
that, during visits, Children hug and kiss Mother but do not say they miss her.
See N.T., 9/14/18, at 104-05. Mohammad observed a bond between Mother
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and S.A.A.B. and noted that Children were affectionate and called Mother
“mom.” See id. at 116. Children seemed excited to see Mother, but Children
do not cry when she leaves and do not suggest they want to leave with Mother.
See id. at 121-22. Moreover, counsel for Children indicated that S.A.A.B. and
A.I.W. are happy living with their paternal grandmother, and did not indicate
they wanted to return to Mother. See N.T., 11/15/18, at 27. The two older
children, S.M.W. and S.A.C., indicated they love Mother, but understand they
cannot return to her care. See id. at 28. S.M.W. and S.A.C. want to live with
their aunt. See id.
The record confirms that it would best serve the needs and welfare of
Children to involuntarily terminate Mother’s parental rights pursuant to
Section 2511(b). Preserving Mother’s parental rights would serve only to deny
Children the permanence and stability to which they are entitled. See In re
Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d at 1220 (“Clearly, it would not be in [the
child’s] best interest for his life to remain on hold indefinitely in hopes that
Mother will one day be able to act as his parent.”). Accordingly, the trial court
did not err in terminating Mother’s parental rights to Children pursuant to
Section 2511(b).
In her final issue, Mother argues the trial court erred in changing
Children’s permanent placement goals to adoption. The Juvenile Act governs
proceedings to change a child’s permanent placement goal. See 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§§ 6301-6375. Trial courts must apply the following analysis:
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Pursuant to [42 Pa.C.S.A.] § 6351(f) of the Juvenile Act, when
considering a petition for a goal change for a dependent child, the
juvenile court is to consider, inter alia: (1) the continuing
necessity for and appropriateness of the placement; (2) the extent
of compliance with the family service plan; (3) the extent of
progress made towards alleviating the circumstances which
necessitated the original placement; (4) the appropriateness and
feasibility of the current placement goal for the children; (5) a
likely date by which the goal for the child might be achieved; (6)
the child’s safety; and (7) whether the child has been in placement
for at least fifteen of the last twenty-two months. The best
interests of the child, and not the interests of the parent, must
guide the trial court. As this Court has held, a child’s life simply
cannot be put on hold in the hope that the parent will summon
the ability to handle the responsibilities of parenting.
In re A.B., 19 A.3d 1084, 1088-89 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations and quotation
marks omitted). We review the court’s ruling to ensure it is supported by
evidence of record and to determine if it constitutes an abuse of the court’s
discretion. See In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010).
Mother argues that the court erred in changing Children’s permanency
goals to adoption, asserting that the revised permanency goals were not in
Children’s best interests. See Mother’s brief at 17. In support, Mother claims
that she shares a beneficial bond with Children and made substantial progress
towards reunification. See id.
Although the trial court did not specifically address this issue in its
opinion, our review of the record supports the trial court’s orders changing
Children’s permanent placement goals to adoption. At the time of the
proceedings, Children had been in foster care for nearly two years. Mother
failed to demonstrate an ability to parent Children during their time in care.
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Accordingly, it is clear that Mother will not be in a position to provide Children
with a safe and permanent home at any point in the foreseeable future.
Therefore, we discern no abuse of discretion by the court in changing
Children’s permanent placement goals from reunification to adoption.
Accordingly, we affirm the decrees involuntarily terminating Mother’s
parental rights, and the orders changing Children’s permanent placement
goals to adoption.
Decrees affirmed. Orders affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/22/19
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