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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
MONTEZ DELMAR DIXON :
:
Appellant : No. 1029 WDA 2018
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 15, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-02-CR-0001829-2017
BEFORE: MURRAY, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and COLINS, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED OCTOBER 25, 2019
Montez Delmar Dixon (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of
sentence imposed after the trial court convicted him of persons not to possess,
use, manufacture, control, sell or transfer firearms; firearms not to be carried
without a license; tampering with or fabricating physical evidence; and defiant
criminal trespass.1 Upon review, we affirm.
The trial court recounted the evidence presented at trial as follows:
On December 28, 2016, at approximately 2:00 p.m.,
Detective Andrew Robinson of the City of Pittsburgh Police
Department was on patrol in the Beltzhoover area of Pittsburgh,
a known high crime area. Detective Robinson was driving down
Sylvania Way when he noticed Appellant, wearing black jeans, a
black hoodie sweatshirt, and a black tassel cap. As Detective
Robinson drove closer, Appellant observed the unmarked police
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6105(a)(1), 6106(a)(1), 4910(1), and 3503(b)(1)(iii).
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vehicle, quickly grabbed his right waist area with both hands
securing what the officer believed to be a concealed firearm.
Appellant fled while grasping his waistband area with both hands.
Appellant ran toward the rear of 428 Orchard Place.
Approximately three to five seconds later, Appellant emerged from
the rear of 428 Orchard Place, “pumping both of his arms as he
was running” and no longer grabbing his waistband area.
Appellant was able to flee the area without being apprehended.
Detective Robinson, based on his training and experience,
believed that Appellant had discarded a firearm in the rear of 428
Orchard Way. The detective checked the area where Appellant
emerged seconds before and discovered a loaded 9mm Glock 26
firearm. The firearm was recovered in plain view from a tarped
area on the ground at the opening of the garage at 428 Orchard
Way. Although Appellant successfully fled the area, Detective
Robinson knew Appellant from several previous encounters.
Appellant was not permitted to possess a license to carry a
concealed weapon.
Detective Robinson contacted probation and parole and
requested Appellant’s current address. After receiving the
information Detective Robinson applied for an arrest warrant for
Appellant, and he was subsequently apprehended and arrested at
the address provided by probation and parole. The firearm was
submitted to the Allegheny County Crime Lab and determined to
be operable; no latent fingerprints of value were recovered.
Additionally, the firearm was logged for DNA testing, but no test
was performed.
Mr. John Yochum, the owner of 428 Orchard Place at the
time of the incident, indicated his property had a chain link fence
and gate which was closed but not locked. Mr. Yochum further
indicated that there was a two car garage approximately fifteen
feet by twelve feet in size at the back of the property which could
only be accessed by the main door. On the date in question part
of the garage door was missing which he had covered with a tarp.
Mr. Yochum verified that the firearm recovered was not his
property, he had been in the garage the day before the incident,
and did not observe any firearm on his property.
Trial Court Opinion, 1/14/19, at 4-6 (citations to notes of testimony omitted).
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Based on this evidence, the trial court convicted Appellant of the
aforementioned crimes. Prior to sentencing, Appellant’s trial counsel filed a
motion to withdraw from representation. On January 22, 2018, the trial court
granted trial counsel’s motion and appointed current counsel, Kelvin L. Morris,
Esquire, to represent Appellant.
On February 15, 2018, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an
aggregate 3 to 6 years of incarceration. Appellant filed a timely post-sentence
motion, and subsequently, an amended post-sentence motion. The trial court
denied Appellant’s post-sentence motions on June 21, 2018. Appellant filed a
timely notice of appeal. Both Appellant and the trial court have complied with
Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925.
On appeal, Appellant challenges whether “the Commonwealth presented
sufficient evidence that Appellant, beyond a reasonable doubt, constructively
possessed the firearm related to the crimes charged.” Appellant’s Brief at 2.2
Our standard of review is well-settled:
[O]ur standard of review of sufficiency claims requires that we
evaluate the record in the light most favorable to the verdict
winner giving the prosecution the benefit of all reasonable
inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Evidence will be
deemed sufficient to support the verdict when it establishes each
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2 Appellant's Rule 1925(b) statement raises additional weight of the evidence
claims not presented in his appellate brief. See Rule 1925(b) Statement,
9/21/18, at *2. Appellant does not raise these claims in his brief and thus we
do not address them. See Appellant’s Brief at 2; see also Commonwealth
v. Briggs, 12 A.3d 291, 310 n.19 (Pa. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 267
(2011) (refusing to address claim appellant raised with trial court but
subsequently abandoned in brief).
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material element of the crime charged and the commission thereof
by the accused, beyond a reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, the
Commonwealth need not establish guilt to a mathematical
certainty. Any doubt about the defendant’s guilt is to be resolved
by the fact finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive
that, as a matter of law, no probability of fact can be drawn from
the combined circumstances.
The Commonwealth may sustain its burden by means of wholly
circumstantial evidence. Accordingly, the fact that the evidence
establishing a defendant’s participation in a crime is circumstantial
does not preclude a conviction where the evidence coupled with
the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom overcomes the
presumption of innocence. Significantly, we may not substitute
our judgment for that of the factfinder; thus, so long as the
evidence adduced, accepted in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, demonstrates the respective elements of a
defendant’s crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, the appellant’s
convictions will be upheld.
Commonwealth v. Sebolka, 205 A.3d 329, 336-37 (Pa. Super. 2019)
(citation omitted). We emphasize that the trial court — as the trier of fact —
is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence. Commonwealth v.
Melvin, 103 A.3d 1, 40 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted). In conducting
review, the appellate court may not weigh the evidence and substitute its
judgment for the fact-finder. Id. at 39-40.
On appeal, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the Commonwealth’s
evidence regarding his two firearms convictions, asserting that the evidence
did not support “constructive possession beyond a reasonable doubt . . . over
the firearm found at 428 Orchard Place, specifically, that Appellant had both
the power to control the firearm and the intent to exercise that control.”
Appellant’s Brief at 8. Appellant argues that there was insufficient evidence
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“for a judge to find him guilty . . . of person not to possess a firearm, carrying
a firearm without a license, and tampering with or fabricating physical
evidence,” and asserts that “the firearm was found on the property of a third-
party, a location that was accessible to anyone who passed the rear of 428
Orchard Place, and therefore, would not lead to the inference that Appellant
was the only one that could have placed it there or knew of its presence.” Id.
at 8, 14.
With regard to persons not to possess a firearm, Section 6105 of the
Uniform Firearms Act (UFA) provides:
(a) Offense defined.--
(1) A person who had been convicted of an offense enumerated
in subsection (b), within or without this Commonwealth,
regardless of the length of sentence or whose conduct meets the
criteria in subsection (c) shall not possess, use, control, sell,
transfer or manufacture or obtain a license to possess, use,
control, sell, transfer or manufacture a firearm in this
Commonwealth.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1) (emphasis added).
With regard to carrying a firearm without a license, Section 6106 states:
Except as provided in paragraph (2), any person who carries a
firearm in any vehicle or any person who carries a firearm
concealed on or about his person, except in his place of abode
or fixed place of business, without a valid and lawfully issued
license under this chapter commits a felony of the third degree.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106(a)(1) (emphasis added).
In addressing Appellant’s arguments as to both firearms convictions, the
trial court explained:
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Contrary to Appellant’s assertion, the evidence showed that
Appellant both possessed and concealed the firearm in question
and did not possess a license to carry said firearm. As such, the
evidence was sufficient to convict Appellant of possession of
firearm prohibited and firearms not to be carried without a license.
To wit, the evidence established that: (1) Detective Robinson
observed Appellant near Sylvania Way while on patrol in the
[Beltzhoover] area of Pittsburgh; (2) upon noticing the unmarked
police vehicle, Appellant grabbed his waist area with both hands
in an obvious attempt to conceal the firearm; (3) Appellant, while
still grasping his waistband, immediately fled the immediate area
running toward the property owned by Mr. Yochum; (4) three to
five seconds later Detective Robinson observed Appellant emerge
running from the rear of the property; (5) Appellant’s hands were
no longer grasping his waist area, but rather his arms were
“pumping” as he fled the scene; (6) Detective Robinson recovered
the loaded firearm from the area Appellant had just emerged from
seconds earlier; (7) the firearm was considered a valuable
commodity among individuals involved in criminal activity and not
likely to be abandoned in such a manner; (8) Detective Robinson
was able to identify Appellant from previous encounters; and (9)
the recovered loaded firearm was not the property of Mr. Yochum.
Detective Robinson, with seven and a half years’ experience
in law enforcement, indicated based on his training and that
experience as a City of Pittsburgh Police Officer, that Appellant’s
specific actions of grabbing his waist area with both hands upon
noticing the unmarked police vehicle was entirely consistent with
securing a firearm so that he could flee while retaining its
possession. This was of course corroborated by Appellant’s
subsequent conduct after discarding the weapon when he
emerged from the garage area “running with both arms pumping.”
See Commonwealth v. Hewlett, 189 A.3d 1004, 1010 (Pa.
Super. 2018) (holding evidence was sufficient to convict
defendant of possession of a firearm and carrying a firearm
without a license where police witnessed defendant flee a vehicle
involved in a high-speed chase clutching his waistband and
observed defendant crouching behind parked vehicles where they
later recovered a firearm).
Trial Court Opinion, 1/14/19, at 8-9 (citations to notes of testimony omitted).
We agree. Our review reveals that Appellant did not testify nor did he
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present any witnesses in his defense. The Commonwealth presented two
witnesses: Detective Robinson and Mr. Yochum. The evidence presented by
the Commonwealth was that Detective Robinson saw Appellant grab his waist
with both hands while running toward Orchard Place. N.T., 10/23/17, at 12.
Detective Robinson opined that Appellant appeared to be grabbing a firearm.
Id. at 13-14. Detective Robinson testified that a few seconds later, Appellant
reappeared, running with both of his arms “pumping,” and no longer reaching
toward his waist. Id. at 15.
Because Detective Robinson recognized Appellant and believed he had
discarded a firearm, Detective Robinson proceeded to the yard behind 428
Orchard Place, where he recovered a Glock model 26 firearm protruding from
under a tarp. N.T., 10/23/17, at 16-18. Mr. Yochum, the owner of 428
Orchard Place, testified that the gun did not belong to him, and he had never
seen it before. Id. at 35-36. Further, Appellant stipulated that he was not
permitted to carry a firearm. Id. at 22.
It is well-settled that the Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proof
“by means of wholly circumstantial evidence.” Sebolka, 205 A.3d 336. Thus,
the record supports the trial court’s conclusion that the “only reasonable
inference that flows from this instance is that [Appellant] was in possession of
a firearm[, fled] from the police[, and discarded] it in the face of police
presence.” N.T., 11/15/17, at 4.
Appellant also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence pertaining to
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his tampering with physical evidence conviction relative to his actions in
discarding the firearm. Section 4910(1) reads:
A person commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if,
believing that an official proceeding or investigation is pending or
about to be instituted, he . . . alters, destroys, conceals or
removes any record, document or thing with intent to impair its
verity or availability in such proceeding or investigation[.]
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4910(1).
The trial court succinctly but accurately rejected this claim, stating:
The [t]rial [c]ourt carefully reviewed all the evidence and
determined that the Commonwealth established beyond a
reasonable doubt that Appellant fled the area upon observing the
police and concealed said firearm in his waistband, later discarding
it by the garage in an attempt to impair its recovery by the
officers. As such, the evidence was clearly sufficient to support
Appellant’s conviction for tamper with/fabricate physical evidence.
See Commonwealth v. Toomer, 159 A.3d 956, 962 (Pa. Super.
2017) (holding that the evidence was sufficient to convict
defendant of tampering with evidence where defendant concealed
the firearm with the intent to impair its availability).
Trial Court Opinion, 1/14/19, at 10.
Again, our review of the record and pertinent legal authority supports
the trial court’s conclusions where the evidence, viewed in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth, was that Appellant tampered with evidence
by discarding the firearm while running from Officer Robinson. See Sebolka,
205 A.3d at 336.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/25/2019
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