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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 19-10792
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 3:18-cr-00045-BJD-JRK-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
JEMONE LAWRENCE WALKER,
Defendant - Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(October 30, 2019)
Before TJOFLAT, WILSON, and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Jemone Lawrence Walker appeals his conviction and sentence for being a
felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e).
He first contends that his conviction should be vacated because § 922(g) is
unconstitutional, as it does not require the government to prove that the firearm he
possessed had a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Second, he argues that
the district court improperly concluded that he was an armed career criminal under
the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) because the elements clause of the ACCA
is unconstitutional and, regardless, a conviction under Florida’s robbery statute
does not constitute a “violent felony” under the elements clause. And third, he
asserts that the district court deprived him of an opportunity to allocute at
sentencing, and therefore he is entitled to a new sentencing hearing.
Our precedent bars Walker’s first argument, as we have repeatedly and
unreservedly rejected arguments that § 922(g) exceeds Congress’s Commerce
Clause authority. We also reject Walker’s argument that the elements clause is
unconstitutional. And—as both our court and the Supreme Court have held—we
conclude that a Florida conviction for armed robbery constitutes a violent felony
under the elements clause of the ACCA. However, we agree with Walker that the
district court erred when it failed to address him personally and provide him with
an opportunity to allocute. So, although we affirm his conviction, we vacate his
sentence and remand for resentencing so that Walker may allocute.
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BACKGROUND
Walker was charged in a one-count indictment. Before his trial, Walker
moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that § 922(g) was unconstitutional both
facially and as applied to him because that section does not require the government
to prove that a firearm had a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Citing our
precedent, the district court denied the motion.
The case went to trial. There, the government called Special Agent John
Prowley of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms to present evidence that
Walker was in possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a felony.
Agent Prowley testified that he had received special training on how to examine
firearms and determine where they were made and how they were made. He
testified that he examined the firearm in question and determined that it was a
Rohm Model RG10, which is a German-made firearm. He further stated that he
was able to determine that the firearm was made in Germany based on the “made
in Germany” stamp on the barrel and two quality-control stamps on the frame of
the firearm. He also said that the firearm was likely made before 1968 since the
Gun Control Act banned the importation of that firearm.
After the close of evidence, Walker moved for a judgment of acquittal,
arguing that the government presented insufficient evidence that he possessed a
firearm that affected foreign commerce in any way. The court denied the motion.
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And it denied another motion for judgment of acquittal and to dismiss the
indictment. A jury then found Walker guilty.
Citing multiple prior felonies, Probation designated Walker as an armed
career criminal under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4. Probation listed the following convictions
to support this enhancement: armed robbery and attempted armed robbery
committed on June 6, 2004, unarmed robbery committed on January 18, 2011, and
attempted robbery committed on February 14, 2011. Walker objected to this
enhancement, arguing that Florida robbery—armed or not—does not qualify as a
“violent felony” under the ACCA’s elements clause. And he noted that the issues
he raised were pending before the Supreme Court. See Stokeling v. United States,
584 U.S. ___,138 S. Ct. 1438 (2018) (granting petition for a writ of certiorari).
Before his sentencing, the Supreme Court issued a decision in Stokeling v.
United States, 586 U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 544 (2019) (holding that Florida robbery
qualifies as a violent felony under the elements clause of the ACCA). Walker then
filed a supplemental memorandum in support of his objection to the presentence
report’s (PSR) classification of him as an armed career criminal. He argued that
even after Stokeling he was still not an armed career criminal because the elements
clause itself was unconstitutionally vague under the Supreme Court’s reasoning in
Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2563 (2015). He further
argued that even if the elements clause of the ACCA passed constitutional muster,
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he was still not an armed career criminal, because robbery by “putting in fear” did
not satisfy the elements clause, as it did not require the “threatened use” of
physical force. And even though we said in United States v. Lockley, 632 F.3d
1238, 1244 (11th Cir. 2011), that “putting in fear” qualified under the elements
clause, Walker argued that Stokeling compelled a different result. The district
court overruled Walker’s objection, concluding that Stokeling and our precedent
required as such.
After the district court addressed the parties’ objections to the PSR and the
parties made their arguments in support of their proposed sentences, the district
court asked if there was any reason why the sentence should not be pronounced.
Walker’s attorney responded, “no.” However, immediately thereafter, the court
stated, “I’m sorry. I just want to make sure. Does Mr. Walker want to make a
statement to the Court?” In response, Walker’s attorney stated, “[h]e does not.”
The district court stated, “[v]ery good,” and sentenced Walker to 188 months’
imprisonment, followed by 3 years of supervised release. Walker then objected to
“the sentence and the manner in which it was imposed,” which the district court
overruled.
DISCUSSION
I.
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Generally, we review the constitutionality of a statute de novo, as it is a
question of law. United States v. Wright, 607 F.3d 708, 715 (2010). But under our
prior-precedent rule, we are bound to follow a prior binding precedent “unless and
until it is overruled by this court en banc or by the Supreme Court.” United States
v. Brown, 342 F.3d 1245, 1246 (11th Cir. 2003).
Walker believes that § 922(g) is facially unconstitutional because it does not
require the government to prove that the firearm he possessed had a substantial
effect on interstate commerce. Yet “[w]e have repeatedly held that Section
922(g)(1) is not a facially unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s power under the
Commerce Clause because it contains an express jurisdictional requirement.”
United States v. Jordan, 635 F.3d 1181, 1189 (11th Cir. 2011); see also United
States v. Scott, 263 F.3d 1270, 1273–74 (11th Cir. 2001) (concluding that the
jurisdictional element of the statute immunizes § 922(g)(1) from facial
constitutional attack); United States v. McAllister, 77 F.3d 387, 390 (11th Cir.
1996) (holding that § 922(g)(1) is constitutional because of its jurisdictional
element). Through the statute, Congress specifically prohibits any person “who
has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year . . . to . . . possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or
ammunition.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (emphasis added). By including the phrase
words “in or affecting commerce,” Congress indicated its “intent to assert its full
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Commerce Clause power.” Wright, 607 F.3d at 715. Therefore, the express
jurisdiction requirement in § 922(g) defeats Walker’s facial challenge to the
constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) because it is a regulation of guns with an explicit
connection to interstate commerce. See McAllister, 77 F.3d at 390. Undoubtedly,
“[w]hen viewed in the aggregate, a law prohibiting the possession of a gun by a
felon stems the flow of guns in interstate commerce to criminals.” Id.
Alternatively, Walker argues that § 922(g) is unconstitutional as applied
because it does not require the government to prove that the firearm he possessed
had a substantial effect on interstate commerce. We have categorically rejected
similar arguments and do so again today. See Jordan, 635 F.3d at 1189-90; Scott,
263 F.3d at 1274; McAllister, 77 F.3d at 390. There is no requirement for an
individualized showing of a “substantial” effect on interstate commerce.
McAllister, 77 F.3d at 390. Instead, Ҥ 922(g) only requires that the government
prove some minimal nexus to interstate commerce,” and the government may meet
its burden by showing that the particular firearm “traveled in interstate commerce.”
Wright, 607 F.3d at 715 (internal quotations marks omitted).
The government met that burden here. Special Agent Prowley presented
evidence that Walker was in possession of a Rohm Model RG10, a German-made
firearm. The firearm was made in Germany, based on the stamp on its barrel and
two quality-control stamps on its frame. It manifestly traveled through interstate
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commerce and therefore satisfied the minimal nexus requirement. And contrary to
Walker’s arguments, United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) does not change
our analysis. See McAllister, 77 F.3d at 389–90 (rejecting appellant’s argument
that Lopez implicates § 922(g)).
In sum, we conclude that Walker’s challenges to the constitutionality of
§ 922(g) (both facially and as applied) lack merit and thus do not establish
reversible error. And as the government presented evidence that the firearm
Walker possessed traveled in interstate commerce, we further conclude that the
minimal-nexus requirement was satisfied in this case. Accordingly, we affirm in
this respect.
II.
We review de novo whether a prior conviction is a “violent felony” within
the meaning of the ACCA. United States v. Howard, 742 F.3d 1334, 1341 (11th
Cir. 2014). But again, our prior-precedent rule binds us to our past decisions
unless and until they are overruled by the Supreme Court or this court sitting en
banc. Brown, 342 F.3d at 1246.
Walker argues that he was erroneously sentenced as an armed career
criminal under the ACCA. His view is that the elements clause is
unconstitutionally vague for the same reasons the Supreme Court has held the
residual clause to be invalid. We disagree.
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The Supreme Court struck down the ACCA’s residual clause as
unconstitutionally vague in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. at 2563. It held
that “the indeterminacy of the wide-ranging inquiry required by the residual clause
both denie[d] fair notice to defendants and invite[d] arbitrary enforcement by
judges” and therefore denied defendants sentenced pursuant to the residual clause
their due-process rights. Id. at 2557. But the Court noted that its decision did not
“call into question [the] application of the [ACCA] to the four enumerated
offenses, or the remainder of the [ACCA]’s definition of a violent felony,”
including the elements clause. Id. at 2563. So, the holding of Johnson does not
support Walker’s claim.
Even so, Walker insists that we use Johnson’s logic to invalidate the
elements clause. He says that Stokeling compels this result as it demonstrates that
the elements clause is “unworkable.” We do not agree. In Stokeling, the Supreme
Court reasoned that because a robbery offense that requires a criminal to overcome
the victim’s resistance necessitates the use of physical force, it constitutes a
predicate violent felony under the ACCA’s elements clause. See Stokeling 139 S.
Ct. at 549–54. Because Florida robbery requires physical force, the Court held that
it categorically qualifies as a violent felony under the elements clause. Id. at 555.
The decision is Stokeling was thus premised on the elements clause. And we
refuse to read a case that finds that Florida robbery qualifies as a violent felony
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under the elements clause as also bringing the elements clause’s constitutionality
into doubt.
We also reject Walker’s contention that, even after Stokeling, Florida
robbery should not qualify as a violent felony. But even if Stokeling did not
mandate this outcome, our own precedent would foreclose this argument. See
Lockley, 632 F.3d at 1241–43, 1245 (finding that a robbery conviction under Fla.
Stat. § 812.13(1) is categorically a crime of violence under § 4B1.2(a)’s
enumerated-offenses and elements clauses); United States v. Fritts, 841 F.3d 937,
940–943 (11th Cir. 2016) (applying Lockley to hold that a Florida robbery
conviction under Fla. Stat. § 812.13 categorically qualifies as a violent felony
under the ACCA).1
Walker is aware of our precedent but contends that Lockley should not be
binding because it failed to consider then-existing Supreme Court precedent in
Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004) (holding that petitioner’s conviction under
Fla. Stat. § 316.193(3)(c)(2) for driving under the influence of alcohol was not a
crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16). Moreover, he believes both Lockley and
Fritts were abrogated by Elonis v. United States, 575 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2001
1
Note that we have repeatedly read the definition of a violent felony under § 924(e) of the
ACCA as virtually identical to the definition of a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2.
United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2008). Because of this strong similarity,
we consider cases interpreting one as authority in cases interpreting the other. See United States
v. Alexander, 609 F.3d 1250, 1253 (11th Cir. 2010).
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(2015). He is wrong on both counts. Leocal does not undermine Lockley because
“[u]nder this Court’s prior panel precedent rule, there is never an exception carved
out for overlooked or misinterpreted Supreme Court precedent.” Fritts, 841 F.3d
at 942. As for Elonis, nothing in that case abrogates our decisions in Lockley or
Fritts. In Elonis, the Supreme Court determined whether a federal threat statute
required proof that the defendant was “aware of the threatening nature of the
communication, and—if not—whether the First Amendment requires such a
showing.” Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2004. It did not address the ACCA. See generally
id.
Accordingly, the district court properly classified Walker as an armed career
criminal and we affirm in that respect.
III.
We review the legality of a criminal sentence de novo. United States v.
Prouty, 303 F.3d 1249, 1251 (11th Cir. 2002). The right of allocution requires a
sentencing court to “address the defendant personally in order to permit [him] to
speak or present any information to mitigate the sentence.” Fed. R. Crim. P.
32(i)(4)(A)(ii). The right to allocution is “firmly entrenched in our criminal
jurisprudence.” United States v. Machado, 886 F.3d 1070, 1087 (11th Cir. 2018).
“It provides a defendant the opportunity to plead personally with the district court
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for leniency in sentencing and to state any potentially mitigating factors for
consideration.” Id.
“[A] district court’s failure to afford a defendant the right of allocution will
be reviewed only for plain error where the defendant did not timely object.”
Prouty, 303 F.3d at 1251. To properly object, the defendant must do so in a way
that is “sufficient to apprise the trial court and the opposing party of the particular
grounds upon which appellate relief will later be sought[,]” and “[t]he objection
must be raised in such clear and simple language that the trial court may not
misunderstand it.” United States v. Straub, 508 F.3d 1003, 1011 (11th Cir. 2007)
(internal quotation mark omitted).
Under the plain error rule, we reverse only if “there is: (1) error, (2) that is
plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights, and if (4) the error seriously affects the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v.
Doyle, 857 F.3d 1115, 1118 (11th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted).
An error is some “deviation from a legal rule.” Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S.
129, 135 (2009) (alteration accepted). That error is plain when the legal rule is
already clearly established. United States v. Hesser, 800 F.3d 1310, 1325 (11th
Cir. 2015) (per curiam). A defendant who has not been given his allocution right
will generally receive a presumption of prejudice for the third prong of plain error
review, even if the defendant received a sentence at the low end of his guideline
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range, because of the possibility of variances below the guideline range. Doyle,
857 F.3d at 1120–21. We have held that an allocution error automatically satisfies
the fourth prong if the third requirement is met because of the central role
allocution plays in sentencing. See id. at 1118; United States v. Perez, 661 F.3d
568, 586 (11th Cir. 2011).
We have previously found that a district court committed plain error when it
directed the question of whether the defendant would be allocating to the
defendant’s attorney rather than to the defendant. See, e.g., Machado, 886 F.3d at
1087 (reasoning that the district court’s failure to address the defendant personally
about his right to allocution constituted a plain error); Perez, 661 F.3d at 584
(holding that the district court plainly erred by directing the question, “will the
defendant be allocating?” to the defendant’s attorney, even though the defendant’s
attorney conferred with the defendant (alterations accepted)).
Although he contends that he objected to the manner in which the district
court imposed his sentence, such objection was insufficient to apprise the court of
the particular grounds upon which appellate relief would later be sought—that he
was deprived of his opportunity to allocute.
Substantively, and as the government concedes, the district court committed
plain error by not addressing Walker personally to inquire if he would like to speak
in allocution. This error was plain in light of our prior precedent and Federal Rule
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of Criminal Procedure Rule 32. See Machado, 886 F.3d at 1087; Perez, 661 F.3d
at 584. Walker was prejudiced because he was sentenced to 188 months’
imprisonment, which was 8 months above the statutory minimum sentence. And
because the third requirement is satisfied, the fourth is automatically satisfied. See
Doyle, 857 F.3d at 1120–21. Accordingly, we vacate Walker’s sentence and
remand so that Walker may be afforded his right of allocution.
CONCLUSION
In summary, we reject Walker’s argument that § 922(g) exceeds Congress’s
Commerce Clause authority and reject Walker’s challenges to his designation as an
armed career criminal. But we find that the district court plainly erred when it
failed to address him personally and provide him with an opportunity to allocute.
Therefore, we affirm Walker’s conviction but vacate his sentence and remand for
resentencing consistent with this opinion.
AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED FOR
FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.
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