J-S55014-19 & J-S55015-19
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: N.S., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
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APPEAL OF: D.S., BIRTH FATHER :
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:
: No. 714 WDA 2019
Appeal from the Order Entered April 25, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Orphans’ Court at
No(s): CP-02-AP-0000271-2018
IN THE INTEREST OF: N.S., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
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APPEAL OF: B.C., BIRTH MOTHER :
:
:
:
: No. 715 WDA 2019
Appeal from the Order Entered April 25, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Orphans' Court at
No(s): CP-02-AP-0000271-2018
BEFORE: MURRAY, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and COLINS, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 06, 2019
D.S. (Father) and B.C. (Mother) (collectively, Parents) appeal from the
order involuntarily terminating their parental rights to their minor daughter,
N.S. (born April 2017) (Child), pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (5),
(8), and (b) of the Adoption Act. After careful review, we affirm.
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S55014-19 & J-S55015-19
The trial court summarized the factual and procedural history of this
matter as follows:
[Child] was first brought by her parents to Passavant
Hospital [as an infant] for an auricular hematoma in her ear that
needed to be drained. [Child] was released from Passavant after
treatment that same day, []. Mother and Father brought [Child]
back to Passavant two days later when the hematoma refilled, at
which time Passavant then sent Mother, Father, and [Child] to
Children’s Hospital for further examination and treatment.
Upon assessment and admission at Children’s Hospital,
[Child] was seen by Child Advocacy Center physicians and
received a skeletal survey, which documented 24 rib fractures in
various stages of healing. Dr. Jennifer Wolford, an expert from
the Child Advocacy Center at Children’s Hospital who treated
[Child], stated that [Child] had the following injuries: a very large
hematoma in her ear, a torn frenulum, seven healing fractures on
the front of the right ribs, five fractures on the back right ribs, six
fractures on the front of the left ribs, and six fractures on the back
of the left ribs, and healing fractures on the left tibia and fibula.
Dr. Wolford testified that while parents may have initially
suggested this was the result of a bone disease, or disorder, the
parents never followed through with obtaining any additional
testing for any bone diseases or disorder. Furthermore, all of the
testing and examination done by the Child Advocacy Center on
[Child] failed to provide any evidence that she may have suffered
from a bone disease or disorder.
Dr. Wolford testified that [Child] could not have inflicted
these injuries upon herself because a baby at her age cannot
physically generate the force necessary to tear her mouth, create
a large ear hematoma, or break as many ribs as she presented
with. Dr. Wolford stated that there is not a single medical disease
today that would produce all of these injuries without trauma
being involved. Dr. Wolford testified that for such significant
trauma to exist in an 8-week old baby would have to be a direct
result from physical abuse. Dr. Wolford also testified that [Child]
was underweight at the time of the Child Advocacy Center’s
evaluation, and that this could be due in part to the fact that by
having so many rib fractures it would be uncomfortable to eat, or
because all of her calories that she was taking in w[ere] going
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towards trying to lay down new bone growth. Finally, Dr. Wolford
noted at that time in her evaluation that if [Child] were to be
returned to this violent environment that she would be at risk for
continued injury and even death.
As a result of the above discussed injuries and assessments,
[Child] came to the attention of CYF on May 31, 2017, who then
started their investigation. [Child] remained in the care of
Children’s Hospital until June 1, 2017. CYF obtained an
Emergency Custody Authorization (“ECA”) on June 1, 2017 and
[Child] was discharged to her maternal grandparents because of
the severity of [Child]’s injuries, and because after an interview
with her parents, neither parent could provide CYF with any clear
evidence as to how she obtained her injuries.
[Child] remained in the care of her maternal grandparents
until June 23, 2017. CYF moved [Child] due to allegations of
domestic violence between the maternal grandparents, as well as
allegations that maternal grandparents were allowing Mother in
the home for unscheduled visits. [Child] was placed in a Presley
Ridge foster home. [Child] was adjudicated dependent pursuant
to 42 Pa. C.S. § 6302(1) on or about July 21, 2017, at which time
the parents stipulated to what the medical testimony would be but
not that they caused the injuries, and this [c]ourt ordered [Child]
to remain in the Presley Ridge foster home, where she resides to
this day.
Trial Court Opinion, 6/20/19, at 4-6 (citations to the record omitted).
On December 31, 2018, CYF filed a petition to involuntarily terminate
the parental rights of Mother and Father to Child. The court conducted a
hearing on the petition on April 8, 2019.1 At the hearing, CYF presented the
testimony of Detective Daniel Honan of the City of Pittsburgh Bureau of Police,
who investigated the injuries to Child; Gerald Paris, Jr., Father’s juvenile
probation officer; Dr. Jennifer Wolford, a doctor at Children’s Hospital of
____________________________________________
1 By order dated February 25, 2019, the court appointed KidsVoice as counsel
for Child.
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Pittsburgh, who treated Child; Officer Sean Stafiej of the Ross Township Police
Department, who investigated an incident of domestic violence between
Mother and Father; Terry O’Hara, Ph.D., who conducted psychological
evaluations of Mother and Father; Kelly Hindman, Father’s visitation coach;
and Wendy Lyons and Samantha Holtz, CYF caseworkers. Parents testified on
their own behalf. On April 25, 2019, the court entered an order involuntarily
terminating Parents’ parental rights to Child. Parents filed timely notices of
appeal and concise statements of errors complained of on appeal.2
On appeal, Parents raise the following issues for our review:
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a
matter of law in granting the petition to involuntarily terminate
[Parents’] parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2),
(5), and (8)?
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a matter
of law in concluding that CYF met its burden of proving by clear
and convincing evidence that termination of [Parents’] parental
rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child
pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b)?
Mother’s Brief at 6.3
We review these claims mindful of our well-settled standard of review:
The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases
requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and
credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate
____________________________________________
2 We address Mother’s and Father’s appeals together for ease of disposition.
3 The only meaningful difference between Father’s issues and Mother’s issues
is that Father separated his challenge to the court’s findings under Section
2511(a) into two issues. See Father’s brief at 6-7.
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courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse
of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial
court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because
the record would support a different result. We have previously
emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand
observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks
omitted).
Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the
Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated analysis:
Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence
that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for
termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court
determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his
or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of
the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the
needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests
of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis
concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between
parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child
of permanently severing any such bond.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).
In this case, the trial court terminated Parents’ parental rights pursuant
to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (5), and (8), as well as (b). This Court may
affirm the trial court’s decision regarding the termination of parental rights
with regard to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as
Section 2511(b). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004)
(en banc). We focus our analysis on Section 2511(a)(2) and (b), which
provides as follows:
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§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may
be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
***
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect
or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without
essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary
for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and
causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot
or will not be remedied by the parent.
***
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2) and (b).
We first consider whether the trial court abused its discretion by
terminating Parents’ parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2).
. . . . In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2511(a)(2), the following three elements must be met: (1)
repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2)
such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the child to
be without essential parental care, control or subsistence
necessary for his physical or mental well-being; and (3) the
causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will
not be remedied.
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In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation
omitted). “The grounds for termination due to parental incapacity that cannot
be remedied are not limited to affirmative misconduct. To the contrary, those
grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental
duties.” In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citations
omitted).
Mother argues that the trial court erred in its analysis of Section
2511(a)(2) because she “had positive reports from several service providers,
the court’s psychological expert, and even the CYF caseworker[,] but was still
seen as a risk because Mother would not offer a plausible explanation for the
injuries to [Child].” Mother’s Brief at 19-20. Mother claims that she does not
know how Child was injured, and “therefore will never be able to provide a
plausible explanation of how [Child] was injured.” Id. Mother contends that
because she met all of her goals, it was inappropriate for the court to require
“Mother to provide this ‘last piece’. . . because it placed Mother in the
impossible position of requiring her to state that which she did not know.” Id.
at 21.
Similarly, Father argues that he met the goals established by CYF, and
termination of his parental rights was improper. Father’s Brief at 15-16.
Father emphasizes that he attended Child’s medical appointments; completed
a parenting and visitation program; complied with the terms of his probation;
and attended visits. Id. at 15-18. Father asserts that the CYF caseworker
testified that he met all of the court-ordered goals, and he highlights
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testimony that he improved his parenting skills and did well with Child. Id.
at 16-18. Further, Father points to testimony from his probation officer that
Father has matured and progressed. Id. at 18-19. Accordingly, Father
contends there was insufficient evidence that “repeated and continued
incap[a]city, abuse, neglect or refusal exists.” Id. at 21. Father faults the
court for focusing on Parents’ failure to attain maturity and acknowledge their
role in failing to protect Child. Id. at 23-24. Father argues that the testimony
showed he had matured, and that he acknowledged Child was abused and
that he had a role in failing to protect her. Id. Ultimately, Father concludes
that the court erred because he met his goals, attained increased maturity,
and recognized Child’s abuse. Id. at 24.
With respect to Section 2511(a), the trial court recounted the testimony
presented at the hearing that showed, by and large, that Parents were
meeting the goals established by CYF. See Trial Court Opinion, 6/20/19, at
10-12. However, the court concluded that termination was appropriate,
reasoning at length:
Here, both Mother and Father have regrettably not remedied
the primary condition that led to [Child]’s removal. This [c]ourt
finds it unsettling that Mother and Father appear not to have
grasped the magnitude of the injuries that brought [Child] to
Children’s Hospital [as an infant], nor have they ever been able to
provide any plausible explanation or insight into how these injuries
were sustained while in their parental care. This [c]ourt
acknowledges and commends the parents for making progress on
other goals; however, there was no competent evidence or
testimony presented that Mother and/or Father have made the
acknowledgement and recognition necessary to ensure [Child]’s
long-term safety.
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To be clear, this [c]ourt was not asking that Mother or
Father admit criminal liability or take responsibility for something
that they did not actively do. Moreover, the fact that Mother
entered a no-contest on her Endangering the Welfare of a Child
charge and that Father entered an admission on his delinquency
Endangering the Welfare of a Child charge did not resolve the
issue of recognition or acknowledgement that was needed to
ensure safety, as noted by the expert witnesses. Dr. Wolford
commented in her testimony that, “I think it’s fair to say that we
all acknowledge that pleading guilty to different charges in no way
is a way to assume there is acknowledgement.”
This [c]ourt was transparent throughout the pendency of
the case, as reflected in permanency review orders, that
remedying this primary condition that led to removal would
require some evidence that parents had attained the maturity,
insight and/or ability to acknowledge their role in failing to protect
[Child] from this level of violence and some plausible explanation
for these serious injuries. See CYF Exhibit 5, [Permanency Review
Order (P.R.O.)] dated October 19, 2017 (“Parents believe [C]hild
suffers from brittle bone disease which they are making as the
excuse for over 20 rib fractures but even if this were true it would
not account for the left ear hematoma. The court has grave
concerns for this child’s safety and the lack of parental insight as
to what brought this child to the court’s attention.”); see also
P.R.O. dated February 2, 2018 (“This case remains concerning to
the court. While the parents are compliant with attending
treatment the court is not convinced that they have gained any
insight.”); see also P.R.O. dated May 2, 2018 (“This case remains
concerning to the court. While the parents are compliant with
attending treatment the court is not convinced they have gained
any insight.”); see also P.R.O. dated September 26, 2018 (“This
court does not believe either parent when they indicate they do
not know what happened. This is a huge concern for [Child’s]
safety.”); see also P.R.O. dated December 19, 2018 (“Mother
testified today that she does not know what happened. This court
does not believe either parent when they indicate that they do not
know what happened.”).
Furthermore, this [c]ourt takes note that at the time of the
termination proceeding Mother was 21 years old and Father was
19 years old. In the nearly twenty-three months that [Child] had
been in foster care, only Mother had progressed to the point of
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receiving unsupervised day visits and Father still had supervised
visitation. Our Superior Court has noted that “a child’s life cannot
be held in abeyance while a parent attempts to attain the maturity
necessary to assume parenting responsibilities. The court cannot
and will not subordinate indefinitely a child’s need for permanence
and stability to a parent’s claim of progress and hope for the
future.” In the Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 513 (Pa.
Super. 2006). The totality of the record clearly demonstrated that
the parents’ current lack of acknowledgement and/or insight of
the role that they played, be it actively or passively, had not been
remedied at the time of the termination proceeding and this
[c]ourt lacked any confidence that either parent would quickly
progress towards such remedy.
Trial Court Opinion, 6/20/19, at 16-18 (some citations to the record omitted).
Our review of the record supports the trial court’s conclusion. Dr.
Wolford, an attending physician in the Division of Child Advocacy at Children’s
Hospital of Pittsburgh (CHP), testified regarding Child’s injuries and care.
N.T., 4/8/19, at 40-41. Dr. Wolford testified that Parents brought Child to
CHP when she was eight weeks old. Id. at 45-46. Child had a large hematoma
on her ear, a bruise on her face, a torn frenulum, 24 broken ribs, and healing
fractures of the left tibia and fibula. Id. at 43-44, 75. Dr. Wolford opined
that Child could not have caused the injuries herself. Id. at 44. Further,
because Child’s injuries consisted of tissue injuries and bone injuries, Dr.
Wolford did not believe a single disease would account for both types of
injuries. Id. at 46. Instead, Dr. Wolford opined that the injuries were the
result of physical abuse. Id. Additionally, Dr. Wolford believed that Child was
likely abused on more than one occasion, and if Child were to return to the
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violent environment, she was at risk for continued injury and even death. Id.
at 48-50.
Dr. Wolford spoke with Parents regarding her belief that Child suffered
abuse, but Parents were more interested in testing for bone diseases and
discussing various bone diseases. Id. at 69-70. Further, the medical records
described a “flat affect” for Parents, and neither parent interacted with Child
or looked at her. Id. at 76-77. Mother had no emotion when shown Child’s
x-rays, and when told that someone hurt Child, Mother showed no emotion
and had no questions. Id.
Dr. Wolford further observed that Child was small and had not been
gaining weight, but once she was removed from Parents’ care, Child started
to heal and gain weight. Id. at 46-47. Dr. Wolford emphasized that Child’s
low weight was successfully treated by placing her in a safe environment. Id.
Although Parents suggested a bone disease may have caused the fractures,
Dr. Wolford rejected the suggestion, noting that Child had tissue injuries that
were not bone related, the fractures healed normally, and Child did not have
any new fractures after she was placed out of her family’s care. Id. at 53-57.
Similarly, Dr. Wolford opined that Child’s broken bones did not arise from
Child’s birth. Id. at 68-69.
Dr. Wolford summarized her concern:
[I]f you don’t make changes, this child is going to end up in my
ICU with an abusive head trauma and die[,] or there’s the risk for
that, I should say.
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And so while that is -- somebody could say that that is an estimate
or a guess. The truth is that research shows us that is a risk, and
I make that statement so that we can understand the gravity of
the danger that this eight-week old, who has 24 rib fractures, a
torn mouth and a torn ear is living in.
***
So if we don’t make intervention, if there isn’t rehabilitation to
develop coping skills, if there isn’t an acknowledgement, an
awareness that there’s been violence, then we’ve done nothing to
change this child’s environment and thereby she remains at all of
that risk.
So I am one piece of a multi-moving part system, but part of the
reason that my dialogue with the family and the part that I tried
to do to ensure [Child]’s safety is to make sure there’s absolute
clarity that this child has been the victim of abuse, that she has
been -- that this eight-week old enduring 24 rib fractures and
multiple skin and face injuries was the victim of abuse on more
than one occasion, and if the adults in her life cannot acknowledge
that and be willing to work towards safety to ensure that she
doesn’t end up injured again, then we -- then as a pediatrician, I
will tell you I have a difficult time sleeping because I haven’t done
my job to make sure that there is an acknowledgement that we
have to do better for this kid.
Id. at 50-52.
Dr. Wolford rejected the notion that Parents’ pleading guilty amounted
to an acceptance of responsibility, noting, “I think it’s fair to say that we all
acknowledge that pleading guilty to different charges in no way is a way to
assume that there is acknowledgment . . . .” Id. at 58.
Detective Daniel Honan testified regarding his investigation of Child’s
injuries. His investigation revealed that Child’s ear injury was caused within
24 hours of Parents’ bringing Child to the hospital, and that Parents were the
only caregivers during that time period. Id. at 13-14. Further, he determined
that Parents cared for Child for all but 11 hours of her life. Id. Mother had
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no explanation for the injuries, speculating they may have been caused by a
bone disease or Child tugging at or sleeping on her ear. Id. Father claimed
the injuries were the result of a metabolic bone disease. Id. The detective
described Mother’s reaction as “flat” and emotionless, while Father’s reaction
was more animated, although both parents questioned the validity of what the
doctors reported. Id. at 16. The detective noted that Child suffered no new
injuries after she came into care. Id. at 17. Further, Father ultimately pled
guilty to endangering the welfare of children and Mother pled no-contest. Id.
at 13.
Samantha Holtz, a CYF caseworker, testified that CYF received a Child
Protective Services (CPS) report regarding Child’s injuries, and then
interviewed Parents, who had no explanation for the injuries. Id. at 168.
Parents only identified themselves, the maternal grandparents, and Father’s
stepfather as caregivers for Child. Id. Child was discharged from the hospital
to her maternal grandparents pursuant to an emergency custody
authorization. Id. However, Child was removed from the maternal
grandparents on June 23, 2017, because of allegations of domestic violence
between the maternal grandparents, the maternal grandparents allowed
Mother to visit Child, and CYF determined that Child spent more time with the
maternal grandparents prior to her injuries than originally indicated. Id. at
169. Accordingly, in June 2017, CYS moved Child to her current foster home.
Id. On July 21, 2017, Child was adjudicated dependent. Id. at 190.
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Mother’s goals were to resolve her criminal matter, complete and attend
parenting and non-offender classes, comply with CYF and service providers,
and attend a program addressing domestic violence. Id. at 173-74. Father’s
goals were to resolve his criminal matter, obtain his GED, comply with CYF
and his probation, attend parenting and domestic violence programs, and
attend visits. Id. at 181. Ms. Holtz confirmed that the goals were established
to fully address Parents’ incapacity. Id. at 174, 199.
Ms. Holtz testified that Mother’s participation and cooperation was
substantial, and that Mother did what was asked. Id. at 173-79. Further,
Mother attended Child’s medical appointments and interacted well with Child’s
foster parents. Id. at 180. Mother visited Child three times per week. Id. at
179. Ms. Holtz acknowledged that there was never a specific goal to explain
how the injuries to Child occurred. Id. at 208.
With respect to Father, Ms. Holtz described his compliance and progress
as minimal to moderate. Id. at 181. Ms. Holtz expressed concerns about
Father’s parenting because he was slowly learning, and although he made
progress, there was no explanation for Child’s injuries. Id. at 182. However,
Ms. Holtz agreed that Father was generally compliant with his goals, except
for the time-period when Father moved to Florida between August 2018 and
October 2018. Id. at 183-84, 190-196. Ms. Holtz further testified that Father
attended the majority of Child’s medical appointments and Father’s parenting
improved. Id. at 194.
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Ms. Holtz testified that although Parents were compliant and making
progress, CYF sought to terminate their parental rights because neither
offered a satisfactory explanation for Child’s injuries. Id. at 188-89, 196.
Without a plausible explanation for how Child was injured, CYF could not
ensure Child’s safety in Parents’ care. Id. at 172. Further, Ms. Holtz testified
that there were no additional services CYF could provide to remedy the
condition. Id. at 188.
Father testified that he was meeting the goals established by CYF. Id.
at 213-16. Further, Father obtained employment and was working toward his
GED. Id. at 216-17. With respect to Child’s injuries, Father testified, “I don’t
exactly know how it happened[,] but something definitely happened.” Id. at
213.
Father’s service providers confirmed his progress. Kelly Hindman, a
Holy Family visit coach for Father, testified that Father did well, followed
instructions and suggestions, cooked meals, and engaged with Child. Id. at
149-51. Father’s schedule prevented him from attending visit coaching at the
time of the hearing, but Father was able to meet his goals at visitations. Id.
at 151-52. Gerald Paris, Jr., Father’s probation officer, similarly testified that
Father made progress with respect to his probation, abstained from drugs and
alcohol, took 17 negative drug tests, completed aggression replacement
therapy, obtained employment, and worked toward his GED. Id. at 26-27.
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Mother also offered testimony asserting that she believed Child’s leg
fractures occurred during birth. Id. at 230. However, Mother testified that
she no longer believed the other injuries were genetic, stating, “I understand
after everyone said it’s something, something -- someone physically hurt her.”
Id. at 251. However, she still had no explanation. Id. at 252. With respect
to her no-contest plea, she explained, “I wasn’t trying to take to deal with
[sic] because I wasn’t trying to plead any type of guilty, whatever, but it was
either that or I pled to a Felony 3 charge, and he said the worst I could -- the
easiest I could get with that was years in jail and I wouldn’t want to go to jail
and miss out on my kid’s life.” Id. at 249-50. Mother contended that she had
matured and gained insight, and that she did everything that was asked of
her. Id. at 239-41, 248-49.
Terry O’Hara, Ph.D., testified regarding psychological evaluations he
conducted in April 2018, and March and April 2019. Id. at 91-92. During the
evaluations, neither parent stated that they knew what happened to Child, nor
did they have an explanation for Child’s injuries. Id. at 105. Father initially
questioned whether Child was actually abused, but during the most recent
evaluation, acknowledged, “something did happen.” Id. However, Father
claimed he had no idea what happened, while minimizing the time he spent
with Child, despite Mother’s assertion Father was present half of the time. Id.
Dr. O’Hara noted that Child did well in Mother’s care and Mother made
progress. Id. at 110, 124-25. Dr. O’Hara also observed that Child did well in
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Father’s care, and that Father’s parenting skills improved. Id. at 120-21.
While Dr. O’Hara believed that Child would benefit from having more time with
Mother, he expressed reservations because Child sustained life-threatening
injuries while in Parents’ care and there was no explanation for the injuries.
Id. at 110. Further, Dr. O’Hara expressed concern regarding Father’s risk
factors for violence and believed Father’s visits with Child should be
supervised. Id. at 107-09.
Dr. O’Hara testified that Parents needed to acknowledge the severity of
the injuries to Child. Id. at 110-11. While both parents acknowledged Child’s
injuries, neither recognized that the injuries were extensive and substantial.
Id. at 111. This was particularly concerning because Parents failed to
acknowledge that Child was at risk of death from her injuries. Id. Moreover,
because Parents could not explain the injuries to Child, there could be no
accountability,4 and thus, no ability to sufficiently address the issues that led
to Child’s injuries. Id. at 96-97. Dr. O’Hara considered Parents’ insight and
judgment to be very poor. Id. at 98. Dr. O’Hara summarized his opinion as
follows:
I think I testified to this earlier. If there’s no accountability to
[Child’s] injuries, which were very significant and extensive and a
physician has indicated that she’s at risk of death if she were to
return to the environments where she sustained these injuries, if
____________________________________________
4Dr. O’Hara acknowledged that both parents pled guilty to criminal charges,
observing that “reflects a partial responsibility, but in no way any sort of
comprehensive responsibility for what happened to [Child].” N.T., 4/8/19, at
97.
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there’s been no accountability to this, there’s no way to address
the underlying issues, which would have constituted or
contributed to [Child’s] injury.
Id. at 104-05.
Upon review, the record substantiates the trial court’s conclusion that
Parents’ repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal has
caused Child to be without essential parental control or subsistence necessary
for her physical and mental well-being. See In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825
A.2d at 1272. As this Court has stated, “a child’s life cannot be held in
abeyance while a parent attempts to attain the maturity necessary to assume
parenting responsibilities. The court cannot and will not subordinate
indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and stability to a parent’s claims of
progress and hope for the future.” In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502,
513 (Pa. Super. 2006). Here, Parents cannot or will not remedy their
incapacity as it pertains to the gravity of Child’s injuries. As noted above, in
order to affirm a termination of parental rights, we need only agree with the
trial court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a) before assessing the
determination under Section 2511(b), and we therefore need not address any
further subsections of Section 2511(a). In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d at 384.
Next, we consider whether Child’s needs and welfare will be met by
termination pursuant to Section 2511(b). See Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121. “In
this context, the court must take into account whether a bond exists between
child and parent, and whether termination would destroy an existing,
necessary and beneficial relationship.” Id. The court is not required to use
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expert testimony, and social workers and caseworkers may offer evaluations
as well. Id. Ultimately, the concern is the needs and welfare of a child. Id.
We have stated:
Before granting a petition to terminate parental rights, it is
imperative that a trial court carefully consider the intangible
dimension of the needs and welfare of a child—the love, comfort,
security, and closeness—entailed in a parent-child relationship, as
well as the tangible dimension. Continuity of the relationships is
also important to a child, for whom severance of close parental
ties is usually extremely painful. The trial court, in considering
what situation would best serve the child’s needs and welfare,
must examine the status of the natural parental bond to consider
whether terminating the natural parents’ rights would destroy
something in existence that is necessary and beneficial.
Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121 (quoting In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1202 (Pa. Super.
2000)). The trial court may equally emphasize the safety needs of the child
and may consider intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security, and stability
the child might have with the foster parent. See In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95,
103 (Pa. Super. 2011). “[A] parent’s basic constitutional right to the custody
and rearing of . . . her child is converted, upon the failure to fulfill . . . her
parental duties, to the child’s right to have proper parenting and fulfillment of
[the child’s] potential in a permanent, healthy, safe environment.” In re
B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 856 (Pa. Super. 2004) (internal citations omitted). A
parent’s abuse and neglect are likewise relevant to this analysis:
[C]oncluding a child has a beneficial bond with a parent simply
because the child harbors affection for the parent is not only
dangerous, it is logically unsound. If a child’s feelings were the
dispositive factor in the bonding analysis, the analysis would be
reduced to an exercise in semantics as it is the rare child who,
after being subject to neglect and abuse, is able to sift through
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the emotional wreckage and completely disavow a parent . . . Nor
are we of the opinion that the biological connection between [the
parent] and the children is sufficient in of itself, or when
considered in connection with a child’s feeling toward a parent, to
establish a de facto beneficial bond exists. The psychological
aspect of parenthood is more important in terms of the
development of the child and [his or her] mental and emotional
health than the coincidence of biological or natural parenthood.
In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 535 (Pa. Super. 2008) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted). We have stated, “a parent’s basic constitutional
right to the custody and rearing of . . . her child is converted, upon the failure
to fulfill . . . her parental duties, to the child’s right to have proper parenting
and fulfillment of [the child’s] potential in a permanent, healthy, safe
environment.” In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d at 856 (internal citations omitted).
With respect to Section 2511(b), Father contends that the testimony
established that there would be “some psychological detriment” to Child if her
bond with Parents were severed, and that Child interacted well with Father.
Father’s Brief at 27-28. Father faults the trial court for focusing on Dr.
O’Hara’s testimony that although Child would suffer “some psychological
detriment” if Father’s parental rights were terminated, Child’s relationship with
her foster parents would mitigate the loss of the relationship with Father. Id.
at 28. Father contends that the court’s reasoning improperly elevates Child’s
relationship with her foster parents to a basis for terminating Father’s parental
rights. Id. Father argues that the fact Child may be better off with her foster
parents is an insufficient reason to terminate his parental rights. Id. at 29-
31. Father also contends “[t]here are many less penal options which would
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permit the child to maintain her bond with the foster parents as well as her
bond with her father.” Id. at 29. Father analogizes this case to a custody
case, contending “the parent with the stronger bond may be awarded primary
custody[,]” but the noncustodial parent would still be permitted to see “his/her
child again. . . .” Id.
Similarly, Mother contends that the trial court erred in terminating her
parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(b) because Mother and Child share
a bond, and the termination of Mother’s parental rights would be detrimental
to Child. Mother’s Brief at 22-23. Mother highlights testimony from Dr. O’Hara
that Child would benefit from spending more time with Mother. Id. at 23.
Mother also argues that Child should be protected from the psychological
detriment of losing Mother by restoring Mother’s parental rights. Id.
In concluding that termination of Parents’ parental rights was in Child’s
best interest, the trial court noted testimony from the CYF caseworkers that
Child is happy and well cared for in her foster parents’ home, and that there
is a bond between Child and her foster parents. Trial Court Opinion, 6/20/19,
at 20. The court further observed that while Dr. O’Hara noted positive
interactions between Child and Mother and Father, he also testified that
Parents continued to show poor insight and judgment. Id. at 21. The court
referenced Dr. O’Hara’s testimony that there would be a detriment to Child if
Parents’ rights were terminated, but that the relationship Child shares with
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her foster parents would mitigate any harm to Child. Id. Ultimately, the court
concluded:
[T]he Court was within its discretion when it determined that
severing [Child]’s bond with Mother or Father would not cause
extreme emotional consequences for the child, and any negative
consequences would be mitigated by the strong, healthy and
secure bond that [Child] had established with the foster parents
that she had resided with most of her entire life. Therefore, the
evidence established that termination will be able to provide
[Child] with much needed stability and permanence at her young
age and this [c]ourt concludes that the developmental, physical
and emotional needs and welfare of Child would be best served by
terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights.
Id. at 21-22.
Our review of the record supports the trial court’s conclusion. For
example, Wendy Lyons, a CYF caseworker, testified to visiting Child in the
foster home, and observing Child to be very comfortable and secure there.
N.T., 4/8/19, at 161. Ms. Lyons testified that Child interacts well with her
foster parents and their biological children, and has a strong attachment to
them. Id. at 161-62. Ms. Holtz observed that Child is bonded with her foster
parents and their children, and is happy in their home. Id. at 187. Further,
Child’s foster parents are a pre-adoptive resource. Id. Although Ms. Holtz
expressed concern about the impact to Child of terminating Parents’ parental
rights, she explained that CYF requested termination to assure Child’s safety.
Id. at 189.
Mother testified that she had no concerns regarding the care the foster
parents provide Child, and recognized Child has a good relationship with her
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foster family. Id. at 243-44. However, Mother also testified to having
successful unsupervised visits with Child in which she picks Child up in the
morning and goes home. Id. at 242. She makes lunch for Child and they eat
and play before going out, returning for bath time before Mother returns Child
to her foster parents. Id.
Father testified that Child always smiles when she sees him and is happy
to see him. Id. at 220. Father cooks for Child, and he also reads to her. Id.
at 220.
Consistent with the foregoing, Dr. O’Hara opined that Child interacted
well with Parents, and would suffer “some psychological detriment” from
termination; however, he also opined that the detriment would be mitigated
by Child’s relationship with her foster parents, who demonstrated “very good
parenting skills” and with whom Child has a secure relationship. Id. at 112-
13, 144. Further, Dr. O’Hara noted that Child was interactive, engaging, calm,
and relaxed with her foster parents. Id. at 113-14.
The testimony credited by the trial court support’s its conclusion that it
would best serve the needs and welfare of Child to involuntarily terminate
Parents’ parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(b). Contrary to Parents’
arguments, the court considered Child’s bond with Parents, as well as Child’s
relationship with her foster parents. Preserving Parents’ parental rights would
serve only to deny Child the permanence and stability to which she is entitled.
See In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d at 1220 (“Clearly, it would not be
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in [the child’s] best interest for his life to remain on hold indefinitely in hopes
that Mother will one day be able to act as his parent.”). See also Trial Court
Opinion, 6/20/19, at 21-22 (“the evidence established that termination will .
. . provide [Child] with much needed stability and permanence at her young
age . . .”. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in terminating Parents’
parental rights to Child pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2) and (b).
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/06/19
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