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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: J.K.A.B., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: S.B., MOTHER :
:
:
:
: No. 4082 EDA 2017
Appeal from the Order Entered November 14, 2017
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Family Court at
No(s): CP-51-AP-0000775-2017,
CP-51-DP-0002461-2014
BEFORE: OTT, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED AUGUST 03, 2018
Appellant, S.B. (“Mother”), appeals the order entered by the
Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas granting the petition of the
Department of Human Services (“DHS”) and involuntarily terminating her
parental rights to her minor, dependent son, J.K.A.B. (“Child”), born in
October 2014, pursuant to the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2),
(5), (8), and (b).1 Although Mother is solely appealing the termination order
at docket number CP-51-AP-0000775-2017, her notice of appeal also
references the dependency docket, CP-51-DP-0002461-2014. We affirm the
____________________________________________
1 By separate order entered on August 28, 2017, the trial court involuntarily
terminated the parental rights of Child’s father, J.B. (“Father”) and of those of
unknown putative father. Father filed an appeal addressed by a separate
memorandum at Superior Court Docket No. 3435 EDA 2017. No unknown
father has filed an appeal or is a party to the instant appeal. In addition, at
the August 28, 2017 hearing, the court also ruled on dependency issues as to
Mother’s youngest child, A.J., who is not the subject of the instant appeal.
____________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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trial court’s order terminating Mother’s parental rights (docketed at CP-51-AP-
0000775-2017) and quash Mother’s appeal on the dependency docket (CP-
51-DP-0002461-2014).
The trial court summarized the relevant procedural and factual history,
in part, as follows:
On October 20, 2014, [DHS] received a General Protective
Services (“GPS”) report alleging that the Child and Mother tested
positive for marijuana at Child’s birth.[2] Child was placed in a
foster home through Tabor Child’s Services, where Child has
remained since placement.[3] An adjudicatory hearing was held
on February 23, 2015, before the Honorable Jonathan Irvine who
adjudicated [] Child dependent.
Throughout the involvement of DHS and later the
Community Umbrella Agency (“CUA”), the court held regularly
scheduled Permanency Review hearings to monitor the parent[s’]
compliance with court orders and the CUA Single Case Plan
(“SCP”). These SCP meetings were held to assist the family with
complying with all objectives and to provide any and all
appropriate services as an aid to facilitate reunification. On
November 7, 2014, CUA held the initial Single Case Plan (“SCP”)
meeting. The goal was reunification. The objectives for Mother
were the following: (1) to attend parenting classes; (2) to
participate in programs with Achieving Reunification Center
(“ARC”); (3) to visit Child; (4) to have a parenting capacity
evaluation (“PCE), and (5) to follow the recommendations of the
PCE. . . .
____________________________________________
2 The family had been known to DHS since at least February 2012 due to the
death of a child of Mother. During investigation, DHS learned that yet two
other children died in 2008 and 2009, respectively. Petition for Termination
of Parental Rights, 8/4/17, Exhibit “A,” Statement of Facts, ¶¶a-d. The cause
of the deaths of two of the three children were undetermined. Id.
3 As testified to by CUA case manager, Nick Sarro, Child was initially placed in
a foster home, then placed with Maternal Grandmother for four months, and
finally placed in his current foster home in January 2016. Notes of Testimony
(“N.T.”), 8/28/17, at 40.
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Trial Court Opinion (“T.C.O.”), 2/16/18, at 2-3.
On August 4, 2017, DHS filed separate petitions to involuntarily
terminate Mother’s and Father’s parental rights and for a goal change. The
trial court conducted hearings on August 28, 2017 and November 14, 2017.
DHS presented the testimony of Nick Sarro, CUA case manager; Brianna
Randolph, CUA visitation coach; and Dr. William Russell, who conducted two
parenting capacity evaluations of Mother and was stipulated to be an expert
in assessing parenting capacity. Mother, who was present and represented
by counsel, testified on her own behalf. Child was represented by both a
Guardian Ad Litem (“GAL”) and legal counsel, who both supported the
termination of Mother’s parental rights.4
While the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights at the August
28, 2017 hearing, the court held its decision with respect to Child’s
permanency goal in abeyance for Mother to have the opportunity to sign a
voluntary relinquishment of her parental rights, and the matter was re-listed
for November 14, 2017.
____________________________________________
4 This Court has recently held that we will address sua sponte the responsibility
of an orphans’ court to appoint counsel pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. 2313(a).
See In re K.J.H., 180 A.3d 411, 413 (Pa.Super. 2018). In In re Adoption
of L.B.M., ___Pa.___, 161 A.3d 172, 180 (2017) (plurality), our Supreme
Court held that Section 2313(a) requires that counsel be appointed to
represent the legal interests of any child involved in a contested involuntary
termination proceeding. The Court defined a child’s legal interest as
synonymous with his or her preferred outcome. As the trial court in this case
appointed a GAL for to advocate for Child’s best interests and legal counsel to
advocate for Child’s legal interests, we find the trial court fulfilled its
responsibility to appoint counsel pursuant to Section 2313(a).
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At the November 14, 2017 hearing, after Mother declined to voluntarily
terminate her parental rights, the trial court placed its decision on the record
to involuntarily terminate Mother’s parental rights to Child pursuant to 23
Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b); this order was docketed at CP-
51-AP-0000775-2017. Further, by a separate order entered the same day,
the trial court changed Child’s permanency goal from reunification to
adoption; this order was docketed at CP-51-DP-0002461-2014.
On December 8, 2017, Mother filed one notice of appeal as well as a
concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).5 The notice of appeal indicated that Mother was
appealing “the order in this matter on the 14th day of November of 2017” on
Docket No. CP-51-AP-0000775-2017; however, there is also a handwritten
notation adding Docket No. CP- 51-DP-0002461-2014 to the notice of appeal.
Notice of Appeal, 12/8/17, at 1.
On appeal, Mother raises the following issues for our review:
1. Did [DHS] sustain the burden that Mother’s rights should be
terminated when there was evidence that Mother had completed
and/or had been actively completing her permanency goals?
2. Was there sufficient evidence presented to establish that it was
in the best interest of the child to terminate Mother’s parental
rights?
____________________________________________
5 Notably, counsel then submitted another and different Rule 1925(b)
statement with his appellate brief. As the Rules of Appellate Procedure do not
provide for the filing of an amended or second concise statement with the
brief, we do not consider this second statement.
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Mother’s Brief at 4.
As a preliminary matter, we must determine whether Mother properly
filed the appeal before this Court. At first glance, it appears that Mother
attempted to file a single notice of appeal of two separate orders on two
separate dockets: the termination order at docket number CP-51-AP-
0000775-2017 and the permanency review goal change order on the
dependency docket at CP-51-DP-0002461-2014. We note that the issues
decided in these orders are wholly distinct; this Court has clarified that:
Except in Philadelphia and Allegheny County, under the Juvenile
Act jurisdiction to determine the propriety of the placement goal
is vested exclusively in the juvenile division of the court of
common pleas. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302 and official comment thereto.
The jurisdiction of the Orphans' Court is to terminate parental
rights and is derived from a different statute. Pa.Stat.Ann. tit. 23,
§ 2102 and official comment thereto. Thus, the issues and
proceedings before the juvenile court, on one hand, and the
Orphans' Court on the other, are distinct.
In re Interest of M.B., 565 A.2d 804, 809 (Pa.Super. 1989). While in this
case the Philadelphia County Family Court Division resolved both issues, the
lower court filed separate orders on separate dockets.
In the recent decision in Commonwealth v. Walker, ___ Pa. ___, ___
A.3d ___, 33 MAP 2017 (Pa. filed June 1, 2018), our Supreme Court held that
there is a bright-line requirement that a single notice of appeal will not be
adequate to appeal orders entered on more than one trial court docket; the
Walker court cited to the 2013 amendment to the Official Comment in
Pa.R.A.P. 341 which states “[w]here ... one or more orders resolves issues
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arising on more than one docket or relating to more than one judgment,
separate notices of appeals must be filed.” Pa.R.A.P. 341, Official Note.
However, in this case, although Mother’s notice of appeal lists two
different dockets, Mother’s indication that she was appealing the order entered
on November 14, 2017 refers to the trial court’s order terminating her parental
rights on docket number 0000775-2017 and not the order changing the
permanency goal from unification to adoption on docket number CP-51-DP-
0002461-2014. Mother does not challenge the goal change in the statement
of questions presented section of her appellate brief and does not develop any
argument with respect to this issue on appeal.6 Thus, due to this procedural
misstep, we quash Mother’s appeal at the dependency docket, CP-51-DP-
0002461-2014.
In matters involving involuntary termination of parental rights, our
standard of review is as follows:
The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases
requires appellate courts “to accept the findings of fact and
credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
by the record.” In re Adoption of S.P., [616 Pa. 309, 325, 47
A.3d 817, 826 (2012)]. “If the factual findings are supported,
____________________________________________
6 See Krebs v. United Refining Co., 893 A.2d 776, 797 (Pa.Super. 2006)
(stating that a failure to preserve issues by raising them in the concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal results in a waiver of those
issues)(citing Pa.R.A.P. 2116); see also In re W.H., 25 A.3d 330, 339 n.3
(Pa.Super. 2011), appeal denied, 611 Pa. 643, 24 A.3d 364 (2011) (quoting
In re A.C., 991 A.2d 884, 897 (Pa.Super. 2010)) (“[W]here an appellate brief
fails to provide any discussion of a claim with citation to relevant authority or
fails to develop the issue in any other meaningful fashion capable of review,
that claim is waived”); see also In re M.Z.T.M.W., 163 A.3d 462, 465-66
(Pa.Super. 2017).
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appellate courts review to determine if the trial court made an
error of law or abused its discretion.” Id. “[A] decision may be
reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of
manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.”
Id. The trial court’s decision, however, should not be reversed
merely because the record would support a different result. Id.
at [325-26, 47 A.3d at] 827. We have previously emphasized our
deference to trial courts that often have first-hand observations of
the parties spanning multiple hearings. See In re R.J.T., [608
Pa. 9, 26-27, 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (2010)].
In re T.S.M., 620 Pa. 602, 628, 71 A.3d 251, 267 (2013). “The trial court is
free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented and is likewise free
to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence.”
In re M.G. & J.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa.Super. 2004) (citation omitted).
“[I]f competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings, we will affirm even
if the record could also support the opposite result.” In re Adoption of
T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation omitted).
The termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the
Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, and requires a bifurcated analysis
of the grounds for termination followed by the needs and welfare of the child.
Our case law has made clear that under Section 2511, the court
must engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating parental
rights. Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The
party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds
for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court
determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his
or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of
the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the
needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests
of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis
concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between
parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child
of permanently severing any such bond.
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In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citations omitted). We have
defined clear and convincing evidence as that which is so “clear, direct,
weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear
conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re
C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa.Super. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Matter of
Adoption of Charles E.D.M., II, 550 Pa. 595, 601, 708 A.2d 88, 91 (1998)).
In the case sub judice, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights
pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). We have long
held that, in order to affirm a termination of parental rights, we need only
agree with the trial court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well
as Section 2511(b). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.Super. 2004)
(en banc). Here, we analyze the court’s termination decrees pursuant to
subsections 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as follows:
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a
child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the
following grounds:
...
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child
to be without essential parental care, control or
subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-
being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity,
abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be
remedied by the parent.
...
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the
rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare
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of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated
solely on the basis of environmental factors such as
inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and
medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent.
With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection
(a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by
the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which
are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), and (b).
With regard to termination of parental rights pursuant to Section
2511(a)(2), we have indicated:
In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §
2511(a)(2), the following three elements must be met: (1)
repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2)
such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the child to
be without essential parental care, control or subsistence
necessary for his physical or mental well-being; and (3) the
causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will
not be remedied.
In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation
omitted). “The grounds for termination due to parental incapacity that cannot
be remedied are not limited to affirmative misconduct. To the contrary, those
grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental
duties.” In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1216 (Pa.Super. 2015)
(quoting In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa.Super. 2002)). “Parents are
required to make diligent efforts towards the reasonably prompt assumption
of full parental responsibilities. . . . [A] parent’s vow to cooperate, after a
long period of uncooperativeness regarding the necessity or availability of
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services, may properly be rejected as untimely or disingenuous.” In re
A.L.D., 797 A.2d at 340 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Further, as to Section 2511(b), our Supreme Court has stated as
follows:
[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are met, a
court “shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23
Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2511(b). The emotional needs and welfare of the
child have been properly interpreted to include “[i]ntangibles such
as love, comfort, security, and stability.” In re K.M., 53 A.3d
781, 791 (Pa.Super. 2012). In In re E.M. [a/k/a E.W.C. &
L.M. a/k/a L.C., Jr.], [533 Pa. 115, 123, 620 A.2d 481, 485
(1993)], this Court held that the determination of the child’s
“needs and welfare” requires consideration of the emotional bonds
between the parent and child. The “utmost attention” should be
paid to discerning the effect on the child of permanently severing
the parental bond. In re K.M., 53 A.3d at 791. However, as
discussed below, evaluation of a child’s bonds is not always an
easy task.
In re T.S.M., 620 Pa. at 628-29, 71 A.3d at 267. “In cases where there is no
evidence of any bond between the parent and child, it is reasonable to infer
that no bond exists. The extent of any bond analysis, therefore, necessarily
depends on the circumstances of the particular case.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d
753, 762-63 (Pa.Super. 2008) (citation omitted).
When evaluating a parental bond, “[T]he court is not required to use
expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as
well. Additionally, Section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding
evaluation.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121 (internal citations omitted).
Moreover,
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While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a major
aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is
nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the
court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.
[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can
equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and
should also consider the intangibles, such as the love,
comfort, security, and stability the child might have
with the foster parent. . . .
In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d at 1219 (quoting In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d
95, 103 (Pa.Super. 2011)) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
In the case at bar, in finding grounds for termination pursuant to Section
2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8), and that termination was in Child’s best
interests pursuant to Section 2511(b), the trial court reasoned:
Child was born [in] October [], 2014 and adjudicated
dependent on February 23, 2015. The record demonstrated
Mother’s ongoing unwillingness to provide care or control for []
Child; to perform any parental duties and a failure to remedy the
conditions that brought [] Child into care in a reasonable period
of time. Specifically, two Parenting Capacity Evaluations in 2015
and 2017 opined that Mother lacked the capacity to parent [] Child
due to significant cognitive impairment. It was unlikely that these
impairments could be addressed in a reasonable period of time or
that any possible government service could ameliorate Mother’s
condition or give her the ability to parent [] Child. The record also
demonstrated that three (3) children had previously died in the
care of Mother. The causes that precipitated the deaths of these
three children were unknown. [] Child had been in foster care
throughout [] Child’s entire life. As a result, [] Child’s parenting
bond was not with the Mother but rather [] Child’s foster parent.
The evidence was clear and convincing that the Child’s foster
parent met all of [] Child’s daily needs. The facts provided to the
[c]ourt at the Termination of Parental Rights Hearing
demonstrated clear and convincing evidence that termination of
Mother’s parental rights would be in the best interest of [] Child
pursuant to 23 Pa. C.S.A. §§2511(a)(1)[,] (2)[,] (5)[,] (8) and 23
Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b).
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At the hearing, DHS introduced testimony of Dr. William
Russell which included his opinion that Mother lacked the capacity
to parent Child. During the hearing on August 28, 2017, which
was later incorporated into the November 14, 2017 hearing, Dr.
Russell testified that he had completed Parenting Capacity
Evaluations in 2015 and 2017. The opinion of both evaluations
was that Mother lacked the capacity to parent Child because she
suffered from a major depressive disorder and lacked the
necessary insight as to parent responsibly and effectively. Mother
also had borderline cognitive function which made it difficult to
make plans for herself or to make decisions. Dr. Russell testified
that Mother’s employment was sporadic and housing unstable. Of
great concern was Mother’s inability to develop a significant
insight as to causes that precipitated the deaths of three of her
children. As a result, Dr. Russell was able to testify with a
reasonable degree of medical certainty that Mother was unable to
provide safety and permanency to [] Child in the foreseeable
future. The CUA [r]epresentative also testified that Child’s foster
parent provided safety and stability for Child and that the foster
parent provided for [] Child’s daily needs. The testimony of the
CUA [r]epresentative and Dr. Russell was deemed to be credible
and accorded great weight. Based upon this testimony and the
documents in evidence, this [c]ourt found clear and convincing
evidence to terminate Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23
Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(1)[,] (2)[,] (5) and (8). This [c]ourt further
concluded that termination of [] Mother’s parental rights would be
in the best interest of Child pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b).
This [c]ourt also concluded that Child had a bond with his foster
parents who were able to provide for all of [] Child’s needs.
T.C.O. at 4-6 (citations to record omitted) (footnotes omitted).
Mother, however, vaguely argues as to subsection (a) that she was
complying with her single case plan objectives, as well as the
recommendations of the parenting capacity evaluation. Mother’s Brief at 10-
11. Moreover, Mother additionally maintains that she was not provided any
services to assist with her cognitive impairment. Id. at 11. We disagree.
A review of the record supports the trial court’s finding of grounds for
termination under Section 2511(a)(2). Despite treatment, Mother failed to
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alleviate concerns with regard to her mental health and possessed borderline
cognitive functioning. N.T., 8/28/17, at 49-52. As noted by Dr. Williams,
Mother was diagnosed with major depressive disorder, and, although she was
attending treatment, she was not participating as she should. Despite Dr.
Williams’s recommendations, Mother was not discussing the deaths of her
children who had passed for reasons undetermined, and was not discussing
her prior sexual abuse. Id. at 49-53, 57-58.
As expressed by Dr. Williams, “[t]he significant mental health issue
combined with her borderline cognitive functioning to begin with certainly
leaves her in a very precarious position when she doesn’t have any sort of
very concrete set of alternatives to turn to where she’s going to have to plan
and make plans herself looking at alternatives. She doesn’t do alternative
thinking very well.” Id. at 53-54. Dr. Williams further found the medication
aspect of Mother’s treatment was inconsistent. Id. at 51. In addition, Mother
lacked stable housing and steady employment. Id. at 53, 69.
Moreover, Dr. Williams observed no improvement in the time between
Mother’s evaluations and suggested that he did not have reason to believe
Mother would be able to provide for Child’s safety and permanency within a
reasonable time. Id. at 54-55. Mr. Sarro additionally raised concerns due to
Mother’s domestic violence history and Mother’s continued “on and off”
relationship with her youngest child’s father. Id. at. 63-64. As we discern
no abuse of discretion or error of law, we do not disturb the court’s findings.
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As this Court has stated, “[A] child’s life cannot be held in abeyance
while a parent attempts to attain the maturity necessary to assume parenting
responsibilities. The court cannot and will not subordinate indefinitely a child’s
need for permanence and stability to a parent’s claims of progress and hope
for the future.” In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 513 (Pa.Super.
2006). Hence, the record substantiates the conclusion that Mother’s repeated
and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal has caused Child to be
without essential parental control or subsistence necessary for his physical
and mental well-being. See In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d at 1272.
Moreover, Mother cannot or will not remedy this situation. See id.
As to subsection (b), Mother argues that there was “insufficient evidence
to establish that it was in the best interest of the child to be adopted.”
Mother’s Brief at 13. Mother points to the lack of a bonding evaluation and
the fact that the court relied only on the testimony of the agency worker. Id.
We again disagree.
Upon review, we discern no abuse of discretion as to the trial court’s
finding that the Child’s developmental, physical and emotional needs and
welfare favor termination of Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section
2511(b). Significantly, aside from the safety and permanency concerns
addressed above, Child was removed from Mother when he was just days old.
N.T. at 65. At the time of the hearing, Child had been in care for
approximately three years, essentially his entire life, and in his current pre-
adoptive foster home for approximately one and a half years. Id. at 18, 24,
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26, 64. As described by CUA case manager, Nick Sarro, Child’s primary
parental bond was with his foster parents, who provide love, safety, and
stability and meet his general, medical, and developmental needs. Id. at 64-
65. Further, there is another child in the home who Child views as a sibling
and with whom Child is bonded. Id. at 66-67.
While Mother maintained regular visitation with Child, such visitation
never progressed beyond supervised visitation. Id. at 62, 72. In addition,
Brianna Randolph, the CUA visitation coach who supervised the visitation
between Mother and Child, testified, while Child acknowledged Mother as his
mother, there were no problems separating at the end of visits. Id. at 70-71.
Ms. Randolph further indicated that the interaction between Mother and Child
during visits was “minimal to [] moderate,” noting that Mother was
“observ[ant]” and “attentive,” but not physically interactive. Id. at 72-73.
As such, Mr. Sarro and Ms. Randolph testified that they had no reason
to believe it would cause any harm to child to terminate Mother’s parental
rights and change Child’s goal to adoption. Id. at 65, 71-72. Likewise, Child’s
legal counsel, Carla Beggin, Esquire,7 noted that she observed Child in his
foster home and offered as follows:
I did see [Child] in [his foster] home yesterday. He seems like a
very happy, healthy three-year-old. He seemed very bonded with
the foster parents. He lives in a lovely home. He has lots of toys.
Lots of educational toys and games. So I would be in full support
of [Child] staying where he is and for adoption.
____________________________________________
7 We observe that counsel refers to herself as the Child Advocate and that
counsel and the GAL are at times referred to with differing terminology.
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Id. at 35-36.
Thus, as confirmed by the record, termination of Mother’s parental
rights serves the Child’s developmental, physical and emotional needs and
welfare and was proper pursuant to Section 2511(b). While Mother may
profess to love Child, a parent’s own feelings of love and affection for a child,
alone, will not preclude termination of parental rights. In re Z.P., 994 A.2d
at 1121. As indicated, at the time of the hearing, Child had already been in
care for approximately three years, and residing in his current pre-adoptive
foster home for approximately a year and a half, and is entitled permanency
and stability. As we stated, a child’s life “simply cannot be put on hold in the
hope that [a parent] will summon the ability to handle the responsibilities of
parenting.” Id. at 1125. Rather, “a parent’s basic constitutional right to the
custody and rearing of his child is converted, upon the failure to fulfill his or
her parental duties, to the child’s right to have proper parenting and fulfillment
of his or her potential in a permanent, healthy, safe environment.” In re B.,
N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 856 (Pa.Super. 2004) (citation omitted).
Accordingly, based upon our review of the record, we find no abuse of
discretion and conclude that the trial court appropriately terminated Mother’s
parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2) and (b), and changed Child’s
permanency goal to adoption.
Order at CP-51-AP-0000775-2017 affirmed. Appeal at CP-51-DP-
0002461-2014 quashed.
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J-S33033-18
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/3/18
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