v. Payne

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.

SUMMARY
November 14, 2019

2019COA167

No. 18CA0283, People v. Payne — Criminal Law — Trials —
Closing Arguments

In the third issue of this opinion, a division of the court of

appeals considers whether a trial court erred by allowing a

prosecutor to waive the initial closing statement and then give a

rebuttal. Because Colorado law does not require a prosecutor to

give the initial closing statement, or necessitate that a prosecutor

waives rebuttal remarks by forgoing the initial closing, the division

concludes that a trial court does not abuse its discretion by

allowing the prosecutor to reserve her closing statement until

rebuttal absent prejudice to the defendant. Because the defendant

was not prejudiced here, the division affirms the judgment of

conviction.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2019COA167

Court of Appeals No. 18CA0283
Mesa County District Court No. 15CR653
Honorable Valerie J. Robison, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Cameron Scott Payne,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VII
Opinion by JUDGE FOX
J. Jones and Tow, JJ., concur

Announced November 14, 2019

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Frank R. Lawson, Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Jessica Sommer, Deputy State
Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Cameron Scott Payne, appeals the judgment of

conviction entered on jury verdicts finding him guilty of resisting

arrest, disorderly conduct, and second degree assault while lawfully

confined or in custody. Payne asserts that the trial court erred by

(1) allowing lay witness testimony that usurped the jury’s role; (2)

failing to provide a definitional jury instruction on “lawfully confined

or in custody”; (3) allowing the prosecutor to give a rebuttal closing

statement after waiving initial closing remarks; and (4) tolerating

prosecutorial misconduct when the prosecutor misstated the law in

rebuttal closing. Because none of Payne’s contentions of error

warrant reversal, we affirm the judgment of conviction.

I. Background

¶2 In May 2015, two Grand Junction police officers patrolling the

downtown area heard a man screaming and cursing in the street.

When the officers approached the man, later identified as Payne, he

aggressively turned toward the officers and ignored their commands

to stop. The officers placed him in handcuffs, called for backup,

and were escorting Payne out of the street and toward their police

car when he kicked one of the officers in the groin. A jury found

1
 Payne guilty of all charges except for second degree assault, bodily

injury on a peace officer. 1

II. Lay Witness Testimony

¶3 Payne contends that the trial court reversibly erred by

admitting lay witness testimony that he was “lawfully confined or in

custody,” thereby usurping the jury’s role to decide whether he was

confined or in custody. We disagree.

A. Additional Background

¶4 At trial, Officer Jason Evans testified as a lay witness for the

prosecution. In discussing Payne’s arrest, the following colloquy

occurred:

[Prosecutor]: Was . . . Payne, compliant when
you instructed him to stop and then had to go
and put handcuffs on him?

[Officer Evans]: No, ma’am.

[Prosecutor]: At this point did you consider
that he was lawfully confined or in custody?

[Officer Evans]: At that point he was not free to
leave.

1Payne was also charged with possession of drug paraphernalia,
but the trial court dismissed the charge at trial because the
prosecution presented no evidence to support it.
2
 [Prosecutor]: Did you consider that he was
lawfully confined or in custody?

[Officer Evans]: Yes, ma’am.

B. Preservation and Standard of Review

¶5 We review a trial court’s decision to admit testimony for an

abuse of discretion. People v. Robles-Sierra, 2018 COA 28, ¶ 23.

An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court’s ruling is

manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or if it misapplies the

law. People v. Casias, 2012 COA 117, ¶ 29.

¶6 Because Payne did not preserve this issue for appeal, we apply

plain error review. Hagos v. People, 2012 CO 63, ¶ 14. Thus, we

reverse only if any error was obvious and substantial, meaning the

error so undermined the fundamental fairness of the trial itself as

to cast serious doubt on the reliability of the judgment of

conviction. Id.

C. Law and Analysis

¶7 A testifying witness may not usurp the jury’s factfinding role.

Robles-Sierra, ¶ 24. However, CRE 704 provides that opinion

testimony that is “otherwise admissible is not objectionable because

it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.” In

3
 determining whether witness testimony usurped the function of the

jury, we may consider whether (1) the witness opined that the

defendant committed or likely committed the crime; (2) the

testimony was clarified on cross-examination; (3) the expert’s

testimony usurped the trial court’s function by expressing an

opinion on the applicable law or legal standard; and (4) the jury was

properly instructed on the law and that it could accept or reject the

witness’ opinion. People v. Rector, 248 P.3d 1196, 1203 (Colo.

2011). Payne does not challenge the third factor.

¶8 While the second degree assault statute, section 18-3-

203(1)(f), C.R.S. 2019, does not define “lawfully confined or in

custody,” the terms have distinct meanings under Colorado law.

See People v. Olinger, 39 Colo. App. 491, 493, 566 P.2d 1367, 1368

(1977) (“It is apparent that the legislature intended the word

‘confined’ to have a meaning different from and to be more

restrictive than ‘custody[.]’”). A person is confined when detained in

an institution. Id. A person is in custody for section 18-3-203(1)(f)

purposes when a police officer has “applied a level of physical

control over the person being detained so as reasonably to ensure

4
 that the person does not leave.” People v. Rawson, 97 P.3d 315,

323 (Colo. App. 2004); see also People in Interest of D.S.L., 134 P.3d

522, 525 (Colo. App. 2006) (To be deemed to be in custody under

section 18-3-203(1)(f), “[a]ll that is required is that the ‘peace officer

must have applied a level of physical control over the person being

detained so as reasonably to ensure that the person does not

leave.’” (quoting Rawson, 97 P.3d at 323)); People v. Ortega, 899

P.2d 236, 238 (Colo. App. 1994) (concluding that a formal arrest

was not required; handcuffing the defendant to a wall was sufficient

to establish that he was in custody for purposes of section 18-3-

203(1)(f)).

¶9 Payne argues that Officer Evans’ testimony that Payne was not

free to leave and that he was “lawfully confined or in custody”

improperly usurped the jury’s role. He asserts that allowing the

testimony constituted reversible error because the testimony

expressed a legal opinion, Payne’s counsel did not clarify the

opinion on cross-examination, and the jury was never given a

definition for “lawfully confined or in custody.”

5
¶ 10 Although Payne’s counsel cross-examined Officer Evans, he

did not clarify Officer Evans’ testimony that Payne was in custody

after he was handcuffed. However, Officer Evans’ testimony fell

short of stating that Payne committed second degree assault while

lawfully confined or in custody. See Rector, 248 P.3d at 1203.

Rather, he stated that, in his opinion, Payne was not free to leave

and was in custody after he was handcuffed, addressing one

element of Payne’s second degree assault charge. See CRE 704; see

also Ortega, 899 P.2d at 238. While the jury was not given an

instructional definition for “lawfully confined or in custody,” that

alone does not render Officer Evans’ testimony improper, especially

given its brevity. See People v. Rivera, 56 P.3d 1155, 1164 (Colo.

App. 2002) (Even if a “witness opines with respect to an ultimate

issue, the jury retains its authority to determine the facts from the

evidence and accept or reject such opinions.”). And the jurors were

properly instructed that they were the “sole judges of the credibility

of each witness and the weight to be given to the witness’

testimony,” and that they were free to “believe all of the testimony of

a witness, part of it, or none of it.” See Rector, 248 P.3d at 1203

6
 (“[T]he jury was properly instructed on the law and its ability to

accept or reject” testimony.).

¶ 11 Whether Payne was in custody for purposes of committing

second degree assault was a factual determination for the jury to

decide. See People v. Armstrong, 720 P.2d 165, 169 (Colo. 1986) (“It

is for the trier of fact to determine after the evidence has been

presented at trial whether, under the totality of the circumstances,

[the defendant] may be guilty of . . . second degree assault[.]”).

Officer Evans’ description of Payne’s arrest was useful for the jury

to determine whether Payne was in custody at the time of the

charged assault.

¶ 12 Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by

allowing Officer Evans’ testimony, and thus we perceive no plain

error. See Hagos, ¶ 14; Rector, 248 P.3d at 1203.

III. Jury Instruction

¶ 13 Payne next argues that the trial court erred by failing to give a

jury instruction defining “lawfully confined or in custody.” We

disagree.

7
 A. Additional Background

¶ 14 Before closing arguments, the trial court instructed the jury

on the presumption of Payne’s innocence and that the prosecution

had to prove every element of each charged crime beyond a

reasonable doubt. Regarding the second degree assault charge,

lawfully confined or in custody, the trial court stated that the

prosecution had to prove each of the following elements beyond a

reasonable doubt:

(1) that the Defendant, (2) in the state of
Colorado, at or about the date and place
charged, (3) knowingly and violently, (4) while
lawfully confined or in custody, (5) applied
physical force against the person of a peace
officer engaged in the performance of his
duties (6) and the Defendant knew or should
have reasonably known that the victim was a
peace officer engaged in the performance of his
duties. 2

¶ 15 Although the jury was provided with some definitions — for

terms such as “voluntary act” and “bodily injury” — the jury was

not given a definition for “lawfully confined or in custody.” Payne’s

2Section 18-3-203(1)(f), C.R.S. 2019, provides that an individual
commits second degree assault when, while “lawfully confined or in
custody, he . . . knowingly and violently applies physical force
against the person of a peace officer . . . engaged in the performance
of his or her duties[.]”
8
 counsel had no objections or requests regarding the jury

instructions.

B. Standard of Review, Preservation, and Applicable Law

¶ 16 We review de novo whether jury instructions accurately

informed the jury of the relevant governing law, People v. Carbajal,

2014 CO 60, ¶ 10, but a trial court has substantial discretion in

formulating jury instructions if “they are correct statements of the

law and fairly and adequately cover the issues presented,” People v.

Nerud, 2015 COA 27, ¶ 35 (citation omitted). Thus, we review a

trial court’s decision to give, or not to give, a particular jury

instruction for an abuse of discretion. Day v. Johnson, 255 P.3d

1064, 1067 (Colo. 2011).

¶ 17 The parties agree that this issue was not preserved for appeal.

We therefore review for plain error. See Hagos, ¶ 14.

¶ 18 A definitional instruction is not required for a term or phrase

familiar to a reasonable person of common intelligence, especially

when the term’s “meaning is not so technical or mysterious as to

create confusion in jurors’ minds.” People v. Thoro Prods. Co., 45

P.3d 737, 745 (Colo. App. 2001), aff’d, 70 P.3d 1188 (Colo. 2003).

9
 When a jury indicates no confusion about the meaning of a

statutory term, the trial court’s failure to issue such a definition

does not require a new trial. People v. Esparza-Treto, 282 P.3d 471,

480 (Colo. App. 2011).

C. Analysis

¶ 19 Payne argues that the trial court reversibly erred by failing to

instruct the jury on the meaning of “lawfully confined or in custody”

because the terms have technical, specific legal meanings that the

jury could not have understood without such an instruction.

¶ 20 The instructions the trial court gave matched Colorado’s model

criminal jury instruction for second degree assault, lawfully

confined or in custody. See COLJI-Crim. 3-2:13 (2018); see also

People v. Rester, 36 P.3d 98, 102 (Colo. App. 2001) (“Pattern jury

instructions . . . are intended as guidelines . . . [that] carry weight

and should be considered by a trial court[.]”). We agree with Payne

that using model instructions does not always ensure that the trial

court avoided plain error. See Garcia v. People, 2019 CO 64, ¶ 23

(recognizing that a jury instruction that tracked the model

instruction wasn’t enough to avoid plain error). But here, we

10
 cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by failing

to sua sponte provide a definitional jury instruction on confinement

and custody when the terms are not defined by statute and neither

Payne nor the jury requested such a definitional instruction.

¶ 21 Confinement and custody, for section 18-3-203(1)(f) purposes,

lack a statutory definition. See Thoro Prods. Co., 45 P.3d at 745;

see also People v. Harper, 205 P.3d 452, 456 (Colo. App. 2008)

(holding that the trial court did not commit plain error by failing to

define a statutory phrase, and instead instructing the jury to refer

to the term’s common meaning after the jury requested a definition,

because there was “no special statutory definition” of the phrase).

In fact, Colorado’s model criminal jury instructions note that

because custody and confinement have no statutory definition, a

trial court retains its discretion to draft a supplemental definitional

instruction. See COLJI-Crim. 3-2:13 cmt. 3 (“[A] court exercising

its discretion to draft a supplemental definitional instruction should

refer to precedent, which makes clear that the phrase ‘while

lawfully confined or in custody’ encompasses confinements that

occur in facilities, as well as custodial situations that take place in

11
 the field.”); see also People v. Marquez-Lopez, 952 P.2d 788, 789-90

(Colo. App. 1997) (rejecting defendant’s contention that section 18-

3-203(1)(f) could not apply to him “because he was neither confined

in an institution nor placed under arrest for a crime prior to the

assault”). Moreover, the jury never expressed confusion about the

meanings of confinement or custody. See Esparza-Treto, 282 P.3d

at 480; cf. People v. Atkins, 885 P.2d 243, 245 (Colo. App. 1994)

(holding that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to define

custody and confinement, as used in section 18-8-208, C.R.S.

2019, the escape statute, after the jury requested a definition,

because the terms have specific meanings, but concluding that its

failure to provide the requested instruction was not plain error).

But see People v. Thornton, 929 P.2d 729, 734 (Colo. 1996)

(disapproving of Atkins’ holding that the definition of “custody” from

section 16-1-104(9), C.R.S. 2019, also defines “custody” as used in

the escape statute).

¶ 22 From the evidence presented and the instructions given at

trial, the jury was aware that whether Payne was in custody was a

key element the prosecution had to prove. The jury was told the

12
 necessary elements that the prosecution was required to prove

beyond a reasonable doubt. See People v. Hayward, 55 P.3d 803,

805 (Colo. App. 2002) (“Jury instructions framed in the language of

statutes are generally adequate and proper.”); see also People v.

Reed, 2013 COA 113, ¶ 28 (“We presume the jury followed the

court’s instructions.”). And the jurors were instructed that they

were free to believe or disregard witness testimony, because

whether Payne was “lawfully confined or in custody” was a fact

issue for their determination. See Armstrong, 720 P.2d at 169; see

also Day, 255 P.3d at 1072 (“It is unnecessary to give an instruction

that is encompassed in other instructions given by the court.”

(quoting People v. Phillips, 91 P.3d 476, 483 (Colo. App. 2004)));

Harper, 205 P.3d at 456 (recognizing that a trial court should not

give additional instructions for “factual matters that the jury alone

could resolve”).

¶ 23 Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion when it did not offer, sua sponte, a supplemental

definitional instruction for “lawfully confined or in custody.” See

Day, 255 P.3d at 1067.

13
 IV. Rebuttal Closing

¶ 24 Payne next argues that the trial court reversibly erred by

allowing the prosecution to waive its initial closing statement and

then give a rebuttal closing argument. We disagree.

A. Additional Background

¶ 25 After the trial court instructed the jury, the prosecutor

informed the trial court that she would reserve her closing

argument time for rebuttal. Payne’s counsel did not object and gave

his closing statement, arguing that Payne was innocent of the two

second degree assault charges because (1) he was unable to form

the required intent for second degree assault, bodily injury on a

peace officer, as he was intoxicated; and (2) he was neither confined

nor in custody when he kicked Officer Evans. Regarding the second

degree assault charge, lawfully confined or in custody, Payne’s

counsel argued that Payne was not confined because he was not in

jail. And while Payne was in handcuffs, his counsel argued that

Payne was not yet in custody because multiple officers were needed

to complete the arrest before he bent down and kicked Officer

Evans.

14
¶ 26 In her rebuttal closing statement, the prosecutor reminded the

jury that “neither what [Payne’s counsel] nor I say right now is

ultimately evidence. You decide what the evidence in this case has

shown.”

B. Standard of Review and Preservation

¶ 27 Trial courts are afforded broad discretion over the presentation

of closing arguments and in determining whether closing arguments

are improper. People v. Brown, 218 P.3d 733, 740 (Colo. App.

2009), aff’d, 239 P.3d 764 (Colo. 2010); see also People v. Motley,

179 Colo. 77, 79, 498 P.2d 339, 340 (1972) (“It is fundamental in

Colorado that the scope of final argument rests in the sound

discretion of the trial court.”). “A trial court abuses its discretion if

its decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or if it

misconstrues or misapplies the law.” People v. Bohl, 2018 COA

152, ¶ 16. However, we review de novo whether the trial court

misapplied the law, People v. Jimenez, 217 P.3d 841, 859 (Colo.

App. 2008), by allowing the prosecution to give a rebuttal closing

argument after waiving initial closing.

15
¶ 28 Where defense counsel failed to object at trial, as here, we

review for plain error. See Hagos, ¶ 14.

C. Analysis

¶ 29 Payne asserts that because his counsel was forced to give his

closing statement first and was thus unable to respond to the

prosecutor’s closing remarks, his constitutional right to a fair trial

and to present a complete defense was violated. We disagree.

¶ 30 First, whether the trial court erred here — by allowing the

prosecutor to delay her closing statement until rebuttal — did not

implicate Payne’s constitutional right to a fair trial. 3 See People v.

Flockhart, 2013 CO 42, ¶ 20 (“Only those errors ‘that specifically

and directly offend a defendant’s constitutional rights are

“constitutional” in nature.’”) (citations omitted); People v. Davis, 280

P.3d 51, 53 (Colo. App. 2011) (observing that closing argument “is

broadly accepted as being subject to the discretion of the trial court,

3 Further, because closing statements are not evidence, but merely
allow counsel to highlight the significance of evidence, we also reject
Payne’s suggestion that the order of closing arguments affected his
right to present a defense. See People v. Rhea, 2014 COA 60, ¶ 68
(recognizing that closing argument is not evidence).
16
 and does not rise to the level of constitutional error”) (citation

omitted).

¶ 31 Second, Colorado procedure does not dictate a specific order

for closing arguments. Crim. P. 30 requires that a trial court

instruct the jury before closing arguments to allow counsel to

comment on instructions during closing but is silent regarding the

order for closing arguments. See also People v. Bastin, 937 P.2d

761, 764 (Colo. App. 1996). And we will not read requirements into

our procedural rules that are not there. See People v. Greer, 262

P.3d 920, 930 (Colo. App. 2011) (“[W]e are not free to depart from

the plain language of a supreme court rule.”); see also Humane

Soc’y of Pikes Peak Region v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 26 P.3d

546, 549 (Colo. App. 2001) (“[W]e may not read a nonexistent

provision into the statute.”). Because the trial court could not have

violated a nonexistent rule, it could not have misapplied the law in

allowing the prosecutor to conduct rebuttal closing after she waived

initial closing. Our conclusion is consistent with the broad

discretion trial courts are afforded in presiding over closing

17
 argument. See Motley, 179 Colo. at 79, 498 P.2d at 340; Brown,

218 P.3d at 740.

¶ 32 While Payne relies on Fed. R. Crim. P. 29.1 — which dictates

the order of closing arguments as follows: the government argues,

then the defense, and then the government rebuts — Colorado has

not adopted any similar rule. 4 And, even where the rule applies, a

defendant’s right to not give the initial closing statement under Fed.

R. Crim. P. 29.1 has not been interpreted as a constitutional right.

See, e.g., United States v. Cugno, 255 F. App’x 5, 12 (5th Cir. 2007)

(recognizing that “allowing the government to save its core

arguments for rebuttal may constitute an abuse of discretion” and

looking to whether the defendant could demonstrate prejudice); see

also Warren v. State, 636 S.E.2d 671, 673 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) (“As

4 Fed. R. Crim. P. 29.1 is silent on whether a prosecutor waives
rebuttal closing if she waives her initial closing statement. Payne
relies on Fed. R. Crim. P. 29.1’s advisory committee notes, which
state that the “Committee is of the view that the prosecutor, when
he waives his initial closing argument, also waives his rebuttal”
because the “fair and effective administration of justice is best
served if the defendant knows the arguments actually made by the
prosecution . . . before the defendant is faced with . . . what to
reply.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 29.1 advisory committee’s note B to 1975
enactment.

18
 construed by the federal courts, Rule 29.1 ‘does not establish a

constitutional doctrine[.]’”) (citation omitted).

¶ 33 Because the order of closing remarks does not implicate

Payne’s constitutional rights, and Colorado has not adopted a rule

like Fed. R. Crim. P. 29.1, federal precedent is not particularly

useful here. 5 See Warne v. Hall, 2016 CO 50, ¶ 17 (“[S]tate courts

are generally free to adopt procedural rules different from those

governing federal proceedings[.]”); cf. People v. Spykstra, 234 P.3d

662, 666 (Colo. 2010) (recognizing that federal court decisions are

not controlling when interpreting Colorado procedural rules, but

noting that federal case law was helpful in interpreting Colorado

Crim. P. 15(a) as Colorado’s rule was “patterned after the federal

rule”).

¶ 34 While our supreme court is free to adopt a rule similar to Fed.

R. Crim. P. 29.1, it has not done so. 6 See Strudley v. Antero Res.

5 To the extent Payne relies on foreign precedent from states that
have adopted a rule similar to Fed. R. Crim. P. 29.1, such case law
is also inapplicable here.
6 When Colorado’s criminal rules were first adopted in 1961, they

often paralleled the federal rules, with some deviations. See Civil
Rules Committee and the Rules of Criminal Procedure Committee, 33

19
 Corp., 2013 COA 106, ¶ 34 (recognizing that if our supreme court

had “intended to adopt a standard similar to that in the federal

rules, it could have done so by patterning C.R.C.P. 16 after the

federal rule”), aff’d, 2015 CO 26. Thus, we reject Payne’s argument

that the prosecutor waived her right to rebuttal closing when she

declined to give the initial closing statement. See People v. Rediger,

2018 CO 32, ¶ 39 (Waiver “is ‘the intentional relinquishment of a

known right or privilege,’” and we “indulge every reasonable

presumption against waiver.”) (citations omitted).

¶ 35 We next address whether a trial court abuses its discretion by

allowing a prosecutor to raise new arguments during rebuttal. See

Motley, 179 Colo. at 79, 498 P.2d at 340; Brown, 218 P.3d at 740.

Our supreme court has not, by procedural rules or precedent,

explicitly required prosecutors to limit their rebuttal closing

statements to issues that they addressed in their initial closing

Colo. Law. 75, 77 (Aug. 2004). However, the passage, deletion, or
modification of a federal criminal rule may, but will not necessarily,
trigger a rule change in Colorado. Id. Fed. R. Crim. P. 29.1 was
added in 1974 and became effective December 1, 1975. See 2A
Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 476,
Westlaw (4th ed. database updated Aug. 2019).
20
 statements or that the defendant’s counsel addressed in closing.

See People v. Allgier, 2018 COA 122, ¶ 52 (“Prosecutors also have

considerable latitude in replying to opposing counsel’s arguments

and in making arguments based on facts in evidence and

reasonable inferences that can be drawn from those facts.”). But

see People v. Gilmore, 97 P.3d 123, 131 (Colo. App. 2003) (holding

that the prosecutor’s rebuttal closing statement did not constitute

plain error where the comments “were in response to the defense

challenge to the quality of the police investigation”).

¶ 36 Whether a trial court abuses its discretion by allowing a

prosecutor to raise new arguments during rebuttal — new in the

sense that the prosecutor did not give the initial closing statement

or that the prosecutor’s rebuttal addressed issues not raised by

defendant’s counsel in closing — appears to be a matter of first

impression for our court. Accordingly, we look to other jurisdictions

without a rule similar to Fed. R. Crim. P. 29.1 for guidance. See

People v. Rail, 2016 COA 24, ¶ 22 (cert. granted Apr. 10, 2017); see

also Lewis v. State, 657 S.E.2d 854, 857 (Ga. 2008) (declining to

21
 adopt the federal practice and ruling that trial courts may allow the

prosecution to waive its initial closing).

¶ 37 Some of these jurisdictions have rejected the notion that a trial

court inherently errs by allowing the prosecution to reserve its

closing statement until rebuttal. See Commonwealth v. Seminara,

483 N.E.2d 92, 99 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985) (“That the drafters of the

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure have endorsed a different order

of argument does not . . . compel the Massachusetts courts to do

the same. . . . If defense counsel hears prejudicial error in the

prosecutor’s closing, there is an opportunity to object, request

curative instructions, or move for a mistrial.”); Margraves v. State,

56 S.W.3d 673, 684 (Tex. App. 2001) (rejecting defendant’s

contention that the trial court erred in allowing the State to reserve

its entire closing argument for rebuttal and noting that if “the

legislature intended the State to be required to open the closing

arguments, it could have easily indicated that intention [in the

Texas Code of Criminal Procedure]”); see also Porter v. United

States, 826 A.2d 398, 409 (D.C. 2003) (recognizing that while the

prosecutor should not develop new arguments on rebuttal, it “is not

22
 an inflexible rule, leaving to the trial court to determine, in its

discretion, how far the rebuttal may extend”); State v. Martinez, 651

A.2d 1189, 1195-96 (R.I. 1994) (“[T]he order of argument in a

criminal case lies within the sound discretion of the trial justice and

is subject to review only for abuse of that discretion.”).

¶ 38 Other jurisdictions often look to whether a defendant was

prejudiced. See Bailey v. State, 440 A.2d 997, 1001 (Del. 1982)

(holding that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the

prosecution, during its rebuttal, to discuss testimony not

mentioned by the defense or by the prosecution in its opening

closing statement); Presi v. State, 534 A.2d 370, 371 (Md. Ct. Spec.

App. 1987) (holding that the trial court abused its discretion in

allowing the prosecution to raise a new issue in its rebuttal because

the defendant was prejudiced by having no “opportunity to rebut

the State’s new argument”); State v. Hughes, 796 S.E.2d 174, 181

(S.C. Ct. App. 2017) (holding that the defendant failed to

demonstrate prejudicial error, where the trial court allowed the

prosecutor to delay most of his closing remarks until rebuttal,

because the prosecutor’s rebuttal closing “was confined to content

23
 that had already been raised in Hughes’s closing argument”). Given

that trial courts enjoy broad discretion concerning the scope of final

argument, see Motley, 179 Colo. at 79, 498 P.2d at 340, it is equally

reasonable to vest trial courts with discretion over the order of final

argument, see Martinez, 651 A.2d at 1195-96.

¶ 39 We adopt the prejudice approach and conclude that because

Colorado law does not require the prosecutor to give the initial

closing statement, and a prosecutor does not waive rebuttal

remarks by forgoing the initial closing, a trial court abuses its

discretion by allowing the prosecutor to reserve her closing

statement until rebuttal only when the prosecutor’s rebuttal

remarks prejudice the defendant, and the court fails to remedy

such prejudice, such as by striking the argument or allowing

surrebuttal by the defense. We perceive no such prejudice here.

¶ 40 During the prosecutor’s rebuttal statement, she responded

only to Payne’s counsel’s closing arguments. Specifically, her

statements disputed Payne’s counsel’s argument that Payne was

not confined or in custody. Further, the prosecutor’s rebuttal

remarks were tied to evidence admitted during trial or to reasonable

24
inferences from admitted evidence. See Martinez v. People, 244 P.3d

135, 142 (Colo. 2010) (“[W]e do not require prosecutors to follow a

rigid or formulaic method when referencing evidence in the record.

The prosecutor must nonetheless make some reference to evidence

[admitted at trial.]”). Accordingly, although Payne’s counsel was

unable to respond to the prosecutor’s closing remarks, Payne was

not prejudiced by them. See Bailey, 440 A.2d at 1001; Presi, 534

A.2d at 371; Hughes, 796 S.E.2d at 181; see also Motley, 179 Colo.

at 79, 498 P.2d at 340. If Payne’s counsel believed the prosecutor’s

rebuttal argument exceeded the scope of defense’s closing, he could

have objected, requested surrebuttal, requested a curative

instruction, or moved for a mistrial. 7 See Cugno, 255 F. App’x at

12; Seminara, 483 N.E.2d at 99. Moreover, we cannot say that the

prosecutor’s rebuttal statement impermissibly shifted the burden of

7 Of course, in making the tactical decision to waive initial closing,
the prosecutor risks the possibility that a defendant may also waive
closing. See, e.g., Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 6 (2003)
(acknowledging that “it might sometimes make sense [for defense
counsel] to forgo closing argument altogether”); Moore v. Reynolds,
153 F.3d 1086, 1104 (10th Cir. 1998) (concluding that defense
counsel was not ineffective by waiving closing argument because it
“was the product of a strategic decision . . . designed to prevent the
district attorney from giving a second summation”).
25
 proof to Payne where (1) the prosecutor’s rebuttal remarks did not

exceed the scope of Payne’s counsel’s closing argument, and (2) the

prosecutor reminded the jury that closing statements are not

evidence.

¶ 41 For the same reasons — that the prosecutor’s rebuttal

remarks did not exceed the scope of Payne’s counsel’s closing

remarks and the prosecutor properly reminded the jury that closing

arguments did not constitute evidence, see People v. Trujillo, 2018

COA 12, ¶ 40 — and because Payne’s counsel failed to object to the

prosecution reserving its closing statement until rebuttal, see

People v. Lovato, 2014 COA 113, ¶ 65, we conclude that Payne was

not prejudiced, see Bailey, 440 A.2d at 1001; Presi, 534 A.2d at

371; Hughes, 796 S.E.2d at 181. Therefore, under the facts of this

case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the

prosecutor to reserve her closing statement until rebuttal. See

Bohl, ¶ 16; People v. Krueger, 2012 COA 80, ¶ 51.

26
 V. Prosecutorial Misconduct

¶ 42 Payne last argues that the trial court reversibly erred by

allowing the prosecutor to misstate the custody and confinement

law during closing. We disagree.

A. Additional Background

¶ 43 Regarding whether Payne was confined or in custody, the

prosecutor stated,

What does your reason and common sense tell
you about custody or confinement. . . . [Y]ou
see someone being approached on the street.
That person is told by law enforcement,
“Police, stop.” They . . . are handcuffed,
detained, not free to leave, as the officer
testified, an officer on each hand and they’re
being walked to sit down while they’re giving
identifying information about themselves.
Handcuffed, ordered to stop, two police officers
hands on with them. I would argue to you
your reason and common sense is fairly clear.
That person is clearly in custody or
confinement. Now [Payne’s counsel] would ask
you to believe that confinement must refer to
only someone who was in a detention facility.
That’s not in the jury instructions. That’s not
the law the judge has given to you. Custody or
confinement means what your reason and
common sense tells you those words mean.

27
 B. Standard of Review and Preservation

¶ 44 Our review of a prosecutorial misconduct claim involves a two-

step analysis. First, we determine whether the prosecutor’s

conduct was improper based on the totality of the circumstances;

second, we determine whether the conduct warrants reversal under

the proper standard of review. Wend v. People, 235 P.3d 1089,

1096 (Colo. 2010).

¶ 45 “We review the district court’s determination whether a

prosecutor engaged in misconduct for an abuse of discretion. We

will not disturb the court’s ruling absent a showing of a gross abuse

of discretion resulting in prejudice and a denial of justice.” Krueger,

¶ 51 (citations omitted). Where defense counsel failed to object at

trial, as here, we review for plain error. See Hagos, ¶ 14. “To

constitute plain error, prosecutorial misconduct must be flagrant or

glaringly or tremendously improper, and it must so undermine the

fundamental fairness of the trial as to cast serious doubt on the

reliability of the judgment of conviction.” People v. McMinn, 2013

COA 94, ¶ 58.

28
 C. Applicable Law

¶ 46 We evaluate claims of improper argument in the context of the

argument as a whole and in light of the evidence before the jury.

People v. Conyac, 2014 COA 8M, ¶ 132. During closing remarks,

prosecutors have wide latitude in the language and style they

choose to employ. Domingo-Gomez v. People, 125 P.3d 1043, 1048

(Colo. 2005). Additionally, “because arguments delivered in the

heat of trial are not always perfectly scripted, reviewing courts

accord prosecutors the benefit of the doubt when their remarks are

ambiguous or simply inartful.” People v. Samson, 2012 COA 167,

¶ 30. However, a prosecutor may not misstate the evidence or the

law. People v. Robles, 302 P.3d 269, 279 (Colo. App. 2011), aff’d,

2013 CO 24.

¶ 47 In determining whether a closing argument was improper, we

may consider the language used, the context of the statements, the

strength of the evidence, and whether the prosecutor repeated the

misconduct. Lovato, ¶ 64; see also Trujillo, ¶ 40 (A “reviewing court

may consider whether proper jury instructions mitigated the

prejudicial effect of prosecutorial misconduct.”). Defense counsel’s

29
 failure to object is also a factor that we may consider when

examining the impact of a prosecutor’s argument, as it may

“demonstrate defense counsel’s belief that the live argument,

despite its appearance in a cold record, was not overly damaging.”

Lovato, ¶ 65 (quoting People v. Wallace, 97 P.3d 262, 269 (Colo.

App. 2004)).

D. Analysis

¶ 48 Payne asserts that the prosecutor’s rebuttal statement

misstated the law, lowered the burden of proof, and misled the jury

by implying that Payne’s counsel wrongly stated that confinement

refers only to someone in a detention facility and that confinement

and custody have a broader meaning rather than a specific, legal

definition. We disagree.

¶ 49 When viewed in context, the prosecutor’s remarks did not

constitute plain error. Although the prosecutor wrongly suggested

that confinement was not limited to someone in a detention facility,

the jury could properly find Payne guilty of second degree assault if

it found confinement or custody. See Marquez-Lopez, 952 P.2d at

789-90 (rejecting defendant’s contention that section 18-3-203(1)(f)

30
 could not apply to him “because he was neither confined in an

institution nor placed under arrest for a crime prior to the assault”);

see also Ortega, 899 P.2d at 238. And while divisions of this court

have interpreted custody to mean some exercise of physical control

to reasonably ensure that a person is unable to leave, the

prosecutor’s statement that custody means “what your reason and

common sense tells you” merely invited the jury to decide whether,

here, the level of control applied to Payne amounted to custody.

See Armstrong, 720 P.2d at 169. Thus, while the prosecutor’s

statement regarding confinement may have been ambiguous or

inartful, see Samson, ¶ 30, we cannot conclude that the prosecutor

misstated the law regarding second degree assault, lawfully

confined or in custody. Nor can we conclude that the prosecutor

lowered the burden of proof given that the jury was properly

instructed that the prosecutor’s closing statement did not

constitute evidence and was instructed that the prosecution had to

prove every element beyond a reasonable doubt. See Trujillo, ¶ 40.

¶ 50 Ultimately, given that (1) the prosecutor’s confinement

statement was brief, see Lovato, ¶ 64; (2) Payne’s counsel did not

31
 object, see Trujillo, ¶ 65; and (3) the prosecutor had wide latitude to

respond to Payne’s counsel’s arguments that Payne was not

“lawfully confined or in custody,” see Domingo-Gomez, 125 P.3d at

1048, we conclude that allowing the prosecutor’s statements did

not constitute plain error, see id. at 1053; McMinn, ¶ 58.

VI. Conclusion

¶ 51 We affirm the judgment of conviction.

JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE TOW concur.

32