SYLLABUS
This syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the
Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the
Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized.
State v. Earnst Williams (A-33-18) (081283)
Argued September 10, 2019 -- Decided December 11, 2019
TIMPONE, J., writing for the Court.
The Court considers whether the trial court properly excluded evidence proffered
by defendant Earnst Williams, who shot and killed a victim during a purported drug deal.
The victim and his friend “Craig” had previously purchased oxycodone from a
supplier, “John.” On this occasion, John had no supplies but referred the victim to
defendant. When Craig and the victim arrived at the appointed location, the victim took
$900 in cash and followed defendant into the building. Craig heard gun shots and called
the police, who found the victim dead from gunshots to his abdomen and to the back of
his head, with $500 on his body.
On the night of the shooting, defendant made a series of admissions to several of
his cohorts: he never had any drugs to sell because his intent was to rob the victim; he
carried the gun to the transaction; a scuffle ensued when he attempted to rob the victim;
and he shot the victim in the leg, then in the head, took some of his money, and then ran.
The following day, Craig gave a statement to the police about the shooting and
disclosed the victim’s prior drug deals with John, all of which went “very smoothly.”
The police arrested defendant, who then asserted that the victim pulled a gun on
him and was killed when the gun went off in an ensuing struggle. In an effort to establish
that the victim brought the handgun used in the homicide, defendant later moved at a
pretrial hearing to cross-examine Craig about his statement to the police concerning his
and the victim’s prior drug transactions with John. Although Craig referenced multiple
drug deals in his statement to the police, the parties focused on one particular transaction
that allegedly transpired in December 2011 at a public mall.
At the hearing, defendant argued that the 2011 transaction demonstrated that the
victim purchased narcotics not from physicians but on the “streets,” from which one
could infer that the victim knew of the risks and dangers associated with purchasing
drugs on the “streets.” Defendant hypothesized that because the victim was aware of
those risks and dangers, the victim developed a self-protective pattern of carrying a
1
firearm with him when he purchased drugs on the “streets.” Defendant argued that
pattern supported his theory that the victim brought the handgun used in his own
homicide when he met with defendant to purchase narcotics in July 2012. All parties
agreed that neither the victim nor Craig nor John brought a handgun to the December
2011 transaction.
The trial court ultimately denied defendant’s motion, relying on State v. Cofield,
127 N.J. 328 (1992), and N.J.R.E. 404(b). A jury found defendant guilty of multiple
offenses. Defendant appealed his convictions and sentence, arguing that the trial court
erred by: (1) not allowing defendant to cross-examine Craig about his and the victim’s
December 2011 drug transaction; and (2) imposing an excessive sentence.
In reversing defendant’s convictions, the Appellate Division ruled that the trial
court erred by not allowing defendant to introduce relevant exculpatory evidence of the
victim’s prior drug purchase to support his self-defense claim. The Appellate Division
explained that Cofield and Rule 404(b) are inapplicable when a defendant seeks to
present other-crime evidence defensively and determined that defendant’s proffered
evidence should have been admitted because it was relevant. The appellate court did not
consider the sentencing claim.
The Court granted the State’s petition for certification. 236 N.J. 235 (2018).
HELD: The Court agrees with the Appellate Division’s determination that Rule 404(b)
was inapplicable here but finds that defendant’s proffered evidence failed to meet the
threshold requirement of admissibility: relevancy. It was therefore not admissible.
1. When, as here, a defendant seeks to use other-crime evidence defensively
-- sometimes referred to as reverse 404(b) evidence -- that defendant is free to present
such evidence unconstrained by the admissibility requirements promulgated in Cofield.
An accused is entitled to advance in his defense any evidence which may rationally tend
to refute his guilt or buttress his innocence of the charge made. To determine whether a
defendant may use other-crime evidence, courts must apply the relevance standard of
Rule 401. (p. 12)
2. Evidence must be relevant for it to be admissible. To be relevant, the evidence must
first have probative value -- it must have a “tendency in reason to prove or disprove” a
fact. N.J.R.E. 401. Necessarily, for evidence to be relevant, it must also be material. A
material fact is one which is really in issue in the case. (pp. 13-14)
3. Here, defendant sought to prove that the victim brought a handgun to the July 2012
transaction by introducing evidence about an earlier transaction to which the victim did
not bring a handgun. Defendant’s proffered evidence lacked probative value. Simply
put, it was speculative, unproven, and ultimately irrelevant; it could not reasonably give
2
rise to the inferences the defense sought to draw. Defendant failed to establish the
“logical connection” required for relevance purposes between the evidence he sought to
admit and the present case, and the evidence is therefore inadmissible under Rule 401.
(pp. 14-16)
4. Even if it were relevant, the evidence would be subject to exclusion under Rule 403
because it would have resulted in the needless presentation of cumulative evidence --
other evidence had been admitted that tended to support the limited point for which
defendant wished to introduce the proffered evidence. (pp. 16-17)
The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED, defendant’s
convictions are REINSTATED, and the matter is REMANDED for consideration of
defendant’s sentencing claim.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON,
FERNANDEZ-VINA, and SOLOMON join in JUSTICE TIMPONE’S opinion.
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SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-33 September Term 2018
081283
State of New Jersey,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Earnst Williams, a/k/a
Ernest Williams,
Defendant-Respondent.
On certification to the Superior Court,
Appellate Division.
Argued Decided
September 10, 2019 December 11, 2019
Frank J. Ducoat, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting
Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for appellant
(Theodore N. Stephens, II, Acting Essex County
Prosecutor, attorney; Lucille M. Rosano, Special Deputy
Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel
and on the briefs).
Brian P. Keenan, Assistant Deputy Public Defender,
argued the cause for respondent (Joseph E. Krakora,
Public Defender, attorney; Brian P. Keenan, of counsel
and on the briefs).
Kayla E. Rowe, Deputy Attorney General, argued the
cause for amicus curiae Attorney General of New Jersey
(Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney; Kayla E.
Rowe, of counsel and on the brief).
1
JUSTICE TIMPONE delivered the opinion of the Court.
In the case before us, defendant Earnst Williams shot and killed the
victim at close range in the midst of a July 2012 drug transaction. At trial,
defendant offered a fulsome self-defense justification. He sought to buttress
that defense with evidence of the victim’s prior, unrelated drug deal with
another individual to establish the victim brought a handgun to the July 2012
transaction. The trial court precluded defendant from presenting such
evidence. The jury ultimately convicted defendant of aggravated manslaughter
and felony murder.
Defendant appealed the trial court’s evidentiary ruling and his sentence.
The Appellate Division reversed, finding the trial court erred by not permitting
defendant to present evidence of the victim’s prior drug purchase in a public
place. Having remanded the case for a new trial, the Appellate Division did
not address defendant’s sentencing issues.
We, in turn, now reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division, finding
defendant’s proffered evidence failed to meet the threshold requirement of
admissibility: relevancy. We remand to the Appellate Division for
consideration of defendant’s sentencing claims.
2
I.
At trial, the State and defendant agreed that defendant shot and killed the
victim during a purported drug purchase. Defendant claimed he acted in self-
defense in killing the victim. The State disputed that claim, arguing defendant
killed the victim during a robbery.
A recitation of the facts is in order, gleaned from the record below.
While home on summer break from college, the victim, his friend Craig, and a
few other friends sought out oxycodone pills to “get high.” Craig and the
victim had previously purchased oxycodone from a supplier, John. (We use
fictitious names for the witnesses.) John had no supplies but referred the
victim to defendant.
Defendant and the victim negotiated the price for the oxycodone and
arranged for the purchase. While Craig and the victim drove to meet
defendant, the victim and defendant text-messaged each other to finalize the
particulars of the location and the drug exchange. Defendant rejected the
victim’s suggestion that they meet in a public place, insisting instead on
meeting at an apartment building in Montclair. Defendant also demanded he
be given the money up front, after which he would “run upstairs” to retrieve
the drugs for the victim. Instead, the victim suggested he would drive up to
the building where the exchange could be made from the car. Defendant
3
rejected that idea and insisted that they make the exchange in the apartment
hallway.
As the victim and Craig approached in their car, they spotted defendant
on the street waving them down. After defendant entered Craig’s car, he made
an additional demand: he would make the sale only if just one of them went in
the building with all the money. Agreeing, the victim took $900 in cash and
followed defendant into the building. Craig pulled the car around the block.
Moments later, Craig heard two gunshots coming from inside the
building. Craig waited a moment and called the victim’s cell phone. It went
unanswered. Afraid for his own life, Craig sped away and called the police.
Upon arrival, the police entered the hallway and found the victim dead
in the stairwell from gunshots to his abdomen and to the back of his head. The
gunshot to the victim’s head was fatal. The police recovered $500 from the
victim’s body.
On the night of the shooting, defendant made a series of admissions to
several of his cohorts: he never had any drugs to sell because his intent was to
rob the victim; he carried the gun to the transaction; a scuffle ensued when he
attempted to rob the victim; and he shot the victim in the leg, then in the head,
took some of his money, and then ran.
4
The following day, Craig gave a statement to the police about the
shooting, telling the officers about the victim’s agreement to meet with
defendant in Montclair to purchase oxycodone. Craig also disclosed the
victim’s prior drug deals with John, all of which went “very smoothly.” Craig
reviewed a photo array, positively identifying defendant as the individual he
picked up in his car and saw enter the building with the victim before hearing
two gunshots.
The police later arrested defendant and charged him in connection with
the homicide. After his arrest, and in full contradiction of the statements he
made to his cohorts, defendant told investigators he had planned to sell the
victim oxycodone all along, that he had stashed the pills in the building, and
when he took the pills out to make the exchange, the victim brandished a
handgun and attempted to “take my drugs.” According to defendant, he and
the victim wrestled for the weapon. During the ensuing struggle, the handgun
went off twice, striking the victim first in the leg and then in his head. After
the second shot, defendant picked up the gun and ran from the building. He
later discarded his shirt and the gun.
A grand jury indicted defendant for murder, felony murder, robbery,
conspiracy to commit robbery, and various weapon and drug offenses.
5
In an effort to establish that the victim brought the handgun used in the
homicide, defendant moved at a pretrial N.J.R.E. 104 hearing to cross-examine
Craig about his statement to the police concerning his and the victim’s prior
drug transactions with John. Although Craig referenced multiple drug deals in
his statement to the police, the parties focused on one particular transaction
that allegedly transpired in December 2011 at a public mall.
At the pretrial Rule 104 hearing, defendant argued that the victim’s
previous drug transaction with John demonstrated that the victim purchased
narcotics not from physicians but on the “streets,” from which one could infer
that the victim knew of the risks and dangers associated with purchasing drugs
on the “streets.” Defendant hypothesized that because the victim was aware of
those risks and dangers, the victim developed a self-protective pattern of
carrying a firearm with him when he purchased drugs on the “streets.”
Defendant argued that pattern supported his theory that the victim brought the
handgun used in his own homicide when he met with defendant to purchase
narcotics in July 2012.
When probed by the trial court, defense counsel candidly admitted that
he knew of no violent interaction that took place in any drug transaction
involving the victim or Craig. All parties agreed that neither the victim nor
Craig nor John brought a handgun to the December 2011 transaction.
6
The trial court ultimately denied defendant’s motion. Relying on State
v. Cofield, 127 N.J. 328 (1992), and N.J.R.E. 404(b), the trial court found
defendant’s proffered evidence inadmissible because the July 2012 transaction
and the December 2011 transaction were too dissimilar. The trial court was
skeptical the December 2011 sale occurred at all, explaining that defendant
could not verify the transaction had actually happened. The trial court
acknowledged that defendant’s purpose in presenting the evidence was to
establish the victim’s desperation as an alleged drug addict -- desperation that
would theoretically have led the victim to bring a handgun with him to meet
defendant. The trial court ruled there was nothing in the record to support
multiple inferences that because the victim was conjectured to be a drug
addict, having previously purchased drugs on the “streets,” he was desperate
enough to arm himself when meeting with defendant.
Following a trial, the jury found defendant guilty of aggravated
manslaughter as a lesser-included offense of first-degree knowing and
purposeful murder. The jury also found defendant guilty of felony murder,
robbery, and the remaining firearm and controlled dangerous substance
offenses of the indictment. At sentencing, the trial judge sentenced defendant
to fifty years imprisonment subject to an 85% parole disqualifier under the No
Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, for felony murder. The judge then
7
merged defendant’s remaining convictions into defendant’s felony murder
conviction.
Defendant appealed his convictions and sentence, arguing that the trial
court erred by: (1) not allowing defendant to cross-examine Craig about his
and the victim’s December 2011 drug transaction with John to support his self -
defense claim; and (2) imposing an excessive sentence.
In reversing defendant’s convictions, the Appellate Division ruled that
the trial court erred by not allowing defendant to introduce relevant
exculpatory evidence of the victim’s prior drug purchase to support his self -
defense claim. The Appellate Division determined that the trial court
erroneously applied Cofield and Rule 404(b) to exclude defendant’s proffered
evidence. The Appellate Division explained that Cofield and Rule 404(b) are
inapplicable when a defendant seeks to present other-crime evidence
defensively. Relying on State v. Weaver, 219 N.J. 131 (2014), the appellate
court reasoned a defendant is permitted to present other-crime evidence
defensively so long as the evidence is relevant under Rule 401 and not
excludable under Rule 403 of the New Jersey Rules of Evidence.
Applying that standard, the Appellate Division determined that
defendant’s proffered evidence should have been admitted because the
victim’s “state of enhanced vigilance, stemming from the drug transaction out
8
of public view, was somewhat supportive of the defense that [the victim]
brought a gun to the sale.” Because the Appellate Division reversed
defendant’s convictions and ordered a new trial, the court did not consider
defendant’s excessive sentencing claim.
We granted the State’s petition for certification. 236 N.J. 235 (2018).
We also granted the Office of the Attorney General’s motion for leave to
appear as amicus curiae.
II.
The State argues that the Appellate Division misapplied the Rules of
Evidence when it reversed the trial court’s decision to exclude evidence of the
victim’s previous drug transaction with John and Craig. The State contends
that defendant’s proffered evidence was irrelevant and, therefore, inadmissible
because the victim’s involvement in the December 2011 transaction did not
negate defendant’s guilt or support his theory that the victim carried a handgun
and was the initial aggressor in the July 2012 drug transaction. The State
asserts that the two drug transactions were too dissimilar and had no bearing
on defendant’s self-defense claim.
The Attorney General echoes many of the State’s arguments that
defendant’s proffered evidence was irrelevant and inadmissible. The Attorney
General also contends that the Appellate Division failed to properly defer to
9
the trial court’s factual findings and supplanted the trial court’s judgment with
its own.
Defendant contends that the trial court wrongfully excluded his
proffered evidence and asks this Court to affirm the Appellate Division’s
decision. Defendant argues that the trial court incorrectly applied the Cofield
standard to exclude his proffered evidence. Defendant asserts that the trial
court should have applied the simple relevance standard under Rule 401 to
determine if his proffered evidence was admissible. Defendant maintains the
evidence was relevant because it would have permitted the jury to infer that
the victim brought the handgun to the July 2012 transaction. According to
defendant, his proffered evidence would explain why the victim requested to
meet with defendant in a public place. Because the victim could not meet with
defendant in a public setting, defendant posits it is more likely the victim
brought the handgun with him as a safety precaution.
III.
Our legal system calls upon trial courts to perform the vital gatekeeping
function of ensuring “that unreliable, misleading evidence is not admitted.”
State v. Chen, 208 N.J. 307, 318 (2011). Ordinarily, we review a trial court’s
evidentiary rulings under a deferential standard and will “uphold [the trial
court’s] determinations ‘absent a showing of an abuse of discretion.’” State v.
10
Scott, 229 N.J. 469, 479 (2017) (quoting State v. Perry, 225 N.J. 222, 233
(2016)). Under that standard, “[a] reviewing court must not ‘substitute its own
judgment for that of the trial court’ unless there was a ‘clear error in
judgment’-- a ruling ‘so wide of the mark that a manifest denial of justice
resulted.’” Ibid. (quoting Perry, 225 N.J. at 233).
If the trial court fails to apply the proper legal standard in determining
the admissibility of proffered evidence, we review the trial court’s evidentiary
rulings de novo. See, e.g., State v. Garrison, 228 N.J. 182, 194 (2017)
(applying de novo review when the trial court failed to analyze other-crime
evidence under Rule 404(b)); State v. Darby, 174 N.J. 509, 519 (2002) (same);
accord Konop v. Rosen, 425 N.J. Super. 391, 401 (App. Div. 2012) (“‘When
the trial court fails to apply the proper test in analyzing the admissibility of
proffered evidence,’ our review is de novo.” (internal brackets removed)
(quoting Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 4.6 on R. 2:10-2
(2012))).
Applying those standards to the facts of this case, we agree with the
Appellate Division that the evidence rules and case law relied on by the trial
court were not apt. We find, however, that the proffered evidence was not
relevant under Rule 401, and so, the evidence was inadmissible.
11
A.
When, as here, a defendant seeks to use other-crime evidence
defensively -- sometimes referred to as reverse 404(b) evidence -- that
defendant is free to present such evidence unconstrained by the admissibility
requirements we promulgated in Cofield. “When a person charged with a
criminal offense seeks to use other-crimes evidence defensively, the Cofield
standard does not govern because ‘an accused is entitled to advance in his
defense any evidence which may rationally tend to refute his guilt or buttress
his innocence of the charge made.’” Weaver, 219 N.J. at 150 (quoting State v.
Garfole, 76 N.J. 445, 453 (1978)). A defendant is permitted to use other -crime
evidence defensively so long as such evidence “tends, alone or together with
other evidence, to negate his guilt” or support his innocence of the charges
against him. Garfole, 76 N.J. at 453. To determine whether a defendant may
use other-crime evidence, courts must apply the “simple” relevance standard of
Rule 401. State v. Cook, 179 N.J. 533, 566 (2004) (quoting Garfole, 76 N.J. at
452-53).
We therefore agree with the Appellate Division’s determination that the
trial court should have considered the admissibility of the evidence under Rule
401 rather than Rule 404(b). We part ways with the appellate court’s
determination that the evidence was relevant and therefore admissible.
12
B.
“Relevancy is the hallmark of admissibility of evidence.” Darby, 174
N.J. at 519. “Evidence must be relevant for it to be admissible,” State v.
Scharf, 225 N.J. 547, 568 (2016), and “all relevant evidence is admissible”
unless excluded by the Rules of Evidence or other law, N.J.R.E. 402.
Evidence is relevant if it has “a tendency in reason to prove or disprove any
fact of consequence to the determination of the action.” N.J.R.E. 401. There
are two components to relevance: probative value and materiality. State v.
Buckley, 216 N.J. 249, 261 (2013); accord 1 McCormick on Evidence § 185
(7th ed. 2013).
To be relevant, the evidence must first have probative value -- it must
have a “tendency in reason to prove or disprove” a fact. N.J.R.E. 401; see also
Perry, 225 N.J. at 237 (“[T]he ‘probative value’ of evidence is determined by
‘its tendency to establish the proposition that it is offered to prove.’” (quoting
State v. Garron, 177 N.J. 147, 167 n.2 (2003))). To determine whether
evidence has probative value, courts should “focus on the logical connection
between the proffered evidence and a fact in issue, or the tendency of [the]
evidence to establish the proposition that it is offered to prove.” Griffin v.
City of East Orange, 225 N.J. 400, 413 (2016) (internal quotation marks and
brackets in original omitted) (quoting Green v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 160 N.J.
13
480, 492 (1999)). “To say that ‘evidence is irrelevant in the sense that it lacks
probative value’ means that it ‘does not justify any reasonable inference as to
the fact in question.’” Verdicchio v. Ricca, 179 N.J. 1, 33-34 (2004) (quoting
State v. Allison, 208 N.J. Super. 9, 17 (App. Div. 1985)).
Necessarily, for evidence to be relevant, it must also be material.
McCormick, § 185; see also Garron, 177 N.J. at 167 n.2. “The ‘materiality’ of
evidence concerns the strength of the relation between the proposition for
which it is offered and an issue in the case.” Garron, 177 N.J. at 167 n.2; see
also McCormick, § 185, at 994 (stating that materiality “looks to the relation
between the propositions that the evidence is offered to prove and the issues in
the case”). “A material fact is one which is really in issue in the case.”
Buckley, 216 N.J. at 261 (quoting State v. Hutchins, 241 N.J. Super. 353, 359
(App. Div. 1990)).
Here, defendant sought to prove that the victim brought a handgun to the
July 2012 transaction by introducing evidence about an earlier transaction to
which the victim did not bring a handgun. Before the trial court, defense
counsel focused on the evidence’s potential to support the argument that
defendant was aware of the dangers posed by “street” transactions and so he
armed himself for protection when he made those deals. Defendant now
asserts that, unlike the December 2011 transaction, the victim could not
14
negotiate the location of his transaction with defendant, was concerned for his
safety, and therefore brought the handgun used in the shooting as a safety
precaution.
Against the backdrop of the Rule 401 standards previously set forth,
defendant’s proffered evidence was not relevant because it lacked probative
value -- that is, the evidence did not have a tendency to prove the proposition
for which it was offered. See Perry, 225 N.J. at 237. Defendant’s evidence
could not tend to prove that the victim brought a handgun to the July 2012
“street” transaction because there was no evidence that the victim brought a
firearm to the December 2011 “street” transaction. See Griffin, 225 N.J. at
413. Indeed, the victim’s transaction with John in December 2011 was a brief,
nonviolent drug deal. There was no evidence that the victim brought a
handgun to the December 2011 transaction or any of the other transactions
mentioned in Craig’s statement to the police. And, there was no evidence that
those transactions were violent in nature.
Nor did the victim’s unarmed, nonviolent transaction with John support
the theory advanced by defense counsel before this Court -- that because the
victim could not meet with defendant in a public place, he armed himself for
protection when he met with defendant. In the context of this case, the failure
to carry a weapon in one situation, without more, cannot reasonably support an
15
inference that a weapon was carried in another situation. Simply put,
defendant’s proffered evidence was speculative, unproven, and ultimately
irrelevant; it could not reasonably give rise to the inferences the defense
sought to draw. Defendant failed to establish the “logical connection” required
for relevance purposes between the evidence he sought to admit and the
present case, and the evidence is therefore inadmissible under Rule 401.
And even if it were relevant, the evidence would be subject to exclusion
under Rule 403, which requires courts to exclude relevant evidence “if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of (a) undue prejudice,
confusion of issues, or misleading the jury or (b) undue delay, waste of time,
or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”
Admitting defendant’s proffered evidence would have resulted in the
needless presentation of cumulative evidence. The text messages between the
victim and defendant before the July 2012 drug deal -- which were read to the
jury -- demonstrated the victim’s apprehensions about meeting with defendant.
The messages revealed that the victim wanted to meet in a public place and
when defendant rebuffed the victim’s request, the victim told defendant he did
not want to meet inside the residence defendant suggested. From those text
messages, the jury could have readily inferred the victim’s safety concerns and
his desire to take precautions to ensure his safety -- such as conducting the
16
transaction in a public setting -- without reference to any of the victim’s prior
drug transactions with John. Because other evidence had been admitted that
tended to support the limited point for which defendant wished to introduce the
proffered evidence, his evidence was subject to exclusion. See State v.
Stevens, 115 N.J. 289, 303 (1989) (requiring trial courts to consider whether
other evidence can serve the same purpose for which other-crime evidence is
proffered when determining the admissibility of the other-crime evidence).
Although we find the evidence cumulative in a limited respect, our
determination that it is speculative and ultimately irrelevant suffices to end the
analysis there. In sum, we agree with the Appellate Division’s determination
that Rule 404(b) was inapplicable here, but we agree with the trial court’s
ultimate conclusion that the evidence was inadmissible.
IV.
We reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division, reinstate defendant’s
convictions, and remand to the Appellate Division for consideration of
defendant’s sentencing claim.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN,
PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, and SOLOMON join in JUSTICE
TIMPONE’S opinion.
17