FILED
Dec 12 2019, 8:38 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES
David Paul Allen R. Cordell Funk
Hammond, Indiana Funk & Wendlinger, LLC
Schererville, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
In the Matter of the December 12, 2019
Guardianship of A.Y.H. (Minor Court of Appeals Case No.
Child) 19A-GU-1759
Yahya Hemaid (Father), Appeal from the Lake Superior
Court
Appellant-Petitioner,
The Honorable Alexis Vazquez
v. Dedelow, Special Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
Rosegina Wheeler and Randall 45D06-1110-GU-152
Wheeler (Guardians),
Appellees-Respondents
Crone, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-GU-1759 | December 12, 2019 Page 1 of 11
Case Summary
[1] Yahya Hemaid (“Father”) appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition to
terminate a permanent guardianship order designating Rosegina Wheeler and
Randall Wheeler (collectively “Guardians”) as guardians of his eight-year-old
child A.Y.H. (“Child”). We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Child was born to Father and Robynleigh Hemaid (“Mother”) in October 2010.
Shortly after his birth, he began living with Guardians, who are his maternal
great aunt and uncle. Father was incarcerated from February 2011 through
February 2012. In October 2011, Guardians filed a petition for permanent
guardianship, and Mother signed a consent to the appointment. The trial court
issued a permanent guardianship order in November 2011. In February 2012,
Mother and Father dissolved their marriage. In the ensuing three years, neither
Mother nor Father visited or provided financial support for Child.
[3] In 2015, Father filed a petition to terminate the guardianship. The matter
remained unresolved until November 2017, when Father and Guardians
executed an agreed order pursuant to which Guardians agreed to forgo
pursuing adoption of Child, and the parties agreed that the guardianship would
continue until Child’s eighteenth birthday. The agreed order also provided that
Father would have phased-in parenting time that would eventually lead to
parenting time pursuant to the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines, with
overnight and alternating-weekend visits.
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[4] On November 5, 2018, Father filed a second petition to terminate the
guardianship. The trial court conducted hearings over two days, after which
the parties submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions thereon
pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 52(A). On July 3, 2019, the trial court issued an
order with findings of fact and conclusions thereon denying Father’s petition to
terminate the guardianship. Father now appeals. Additional facts will be
provided as necessary.
Discussion and Decision
[5] Father asserts that the trial court erred in denying his petition to terminate the
guardianship. Guardianship proceedings are guided by Indiana Code Section
29-3-12-1(c)(4), which reads, “The court may terminate any guardianship if …
the guardianship is no longer necessary[.]”
[6] We review the trial court’s order in guardianship proceedings for an abuse of
discretion, with a preference for granting latitude and deference to our trial
judges in family law matters. In re Guardianship of M.N.S., 23 N.E.3d 759, 765-
66 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). Where the trial court issues findings of fact and
conclusions thereon, we typically employ a two-tiered standard of review,
determining first whether the evidence supports the findings and then whether
the findings support the judgment. In re Guardianship of L.R.T., 979 N.E.2d 688,
689 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied (2013). While we review the trial court’s
conclusions de novo, we will not set aside the findings unless they are clearly
erroneous, meaning that our review of the record leaves us firmly convinced
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that a mistake has been made. In re Guardianship of B.W., 45 N.E.3d 860, 866
(Ind. Ct. App. 2015). In conducting our review, we neither reweigh evidence
nor reassess witness credibility but rather consider the evidence and reasonable
inferences most favorable to the judgment. Matter of Guardianship of I.R., 77
N.E.3d 810, 813 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).
[7] As a preliminary matter, we note that Father has not provided us a copy of the
transcript of the trial court proceedings. Indiana Appellate Rule 9(F)(5)
requires the appellant’s Notice of Appeal to include “[a] designation of all
portions of the Transcript necessary to present fairly and decide the issues on
appeal.” Rule 9(F)(5) also specifies that “[i]f the appellant intends to urge on
appeal that a finding of fact or conclusion thereon is unsupported by the
evidence or is contrary to the evidence, the Notice of Appeal shall request a
Transcript of all the evidence.” Father claims that he intentionally omitted the
transcript because he does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting any of the findings. However, he lists certain findings in his brief
and asserts that they are incomplete, insufficient, or incorrect. We have no
basis for evaluating such claims, given the deficient record before us. Thus,
Father has waived any allegations of error pertaining to the accuracy and/or
adequacy of the findings. See Lifeline Youth & Family Servs., Inc. v. Installed Bldg.
Prods., Inc., 996 N.E.2d 808, 814 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (“Although not fatal to
the appeal, failure to include a transcript works a waiver of any specifications of
error which depend upon the evidence.”) (quoting In re Walker, 665 N.E.2d 586,
588 (Ind. 1996). Accordingly, we limit our discussion to whether the findings
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support the judgment. T.B. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 971 N.E.2d 104, 110
(Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied.
[8] The trial court found in pertinent part as follows: 1
4. [M]ore than three years after this Court had appointed
Guardians over Child, Father filed a Motion to Terminate
Guardianship.
5. On November 3, 2017, the parties filed an Agreed Order
wherein “the guardians agree not to seek an adoption based on
either parent’s failure to visit or support” and “the guardianship
shall remain in place until Child reaches the age of eighteen
(18).” Furthermore, the Agreed Order set out Father’s parenting
time to be phased in for a period of eight (8) weeks, after which
Father would have parenting time pursuant to the Indiana
Parenting Time Guidelines.
6. On November 5, 2018, Father filed a Petition to Terminate
Guardianship[.]
….
8. Child is eight (8) years old and has lived with Guardians since
birth.…
9. Father spent twelve (12) months in Lake County Jail
commencing in February of 2011.…
10. Father … did not file his first Motion to Terminate
Guardianship until March 2015, more than two years after his
1
To the extent that the trial court used proper names or other designations for the parties, for consistency’s
sake, we refer to them as previously designated.
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release from jail.
11. Father did not see Child for approximately six (6) years,
from the time he was incarcerated in 2011 until December of
2017. Father did not provide child support for Child throughout
those six (6) years.
….
13. Pursuant to the parties’ Agreed Order … Father began his
phased in parenting time in December 2017. After Father saw
Child at Guardian’s (sic) home, Father had …. [several] day time
visits with Child …. [and] overnight visits of two or more days
about 20 times; which included, some extended overnights of
three to five days.…
14. Prior to the phased in parenting time that began in December
2017, Child had not seen or heard from Father since he was less
than a year old. Child is experiencing issues adjusting to seeing
Father for the first time since he was an infant …. Child is
currently in counseling …. Father was invited to participate with
said counseling, but only attended one session. Father believes
that Child’s counselor is biased and Father did not want to
continue to participate with Child’s counseling.
15. Child also participates in counseling with his school
counselor….
16. …. Father has … told Child that he will take him to the
police if he does not behave.
….
18. Although Father has access to the teachers and counselors at
school, Father has not reached out to either teachers or Child’s
school counselor.… Father has also had the opportunity to meet
with Child at school and have lunch with Child but Father has
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not participated in said lunch. Guardians have provided Father
with medical records and school records.
19. Child has been in the care of Guardians since birth.
Guardians have provided the day-to-day care of Child and have
supported Child since birth. Child has bonded well with
Guardians and is thriving in their care.
Appealed Order at 1-3. Because Father has waived any challenge to the
findings, they stand as proven. See McMaster v. McMaster, 681 N.E.2d 744, 747
(Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (unchallenged findings are accepted as true).
[9] As we consider whether the trial court’s findings support the judgment, we are
mindful that Father’s appeal involves a parent seeking to gain custody of his
child, who has been under the guardianship of a third party/nonparent. As
such, we note the following with respect to the relative burdens of the parties:
Indiana courts have long held that even when a parent initiates
an action to reobtain custody of a child that has been in the
custody of another, the burden of proof does not shift to the
parent ... rather, the burden of proof is always on the third party.
There is a strong presumption that a child’s interests are best
served by placement with the natural parent. A parent’s burden
to show a modification of custody is justified is minimal, and
after meeting this minimal burden of persuasion to terminate the
guardianship, the third party has the burden to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the child’s best interests are
substantially and significantly served by placement with another.
I.R., 77 N.E.3d at 813 (citations, quotation marks and brackets omitted).
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[10] In determining whether the third party has presented clear and convincing
evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption in favor of the natural parent,
the trial court will consider evidence presented by the third party as to the
parent’s “(a) unfitness, (b) long acquiescence, or (c) voluntary relinquishment
such that the affections of the child and the third party have become so
interwoven that to sever them would seriously mar and endanger” the child’s
future happiness. K.I. ex rel. J.I. v. J.H., 903 N.E.2d 453, 459 (Ind. 2009)
(quoting In re Guardianship of B.H., 770 N.E.2d 283, 286 (Ind. 2002)). But the
trial court’s inquiry is not limited to these three factors. B.H., 770 N.E.2d at
287. Ultimately, the court’s determination must rest on “whether the important
and strong presumption that a child’s interests are best served by placement
with the natural parent is clearly and convincingly overcome” by the third
party’s evidence concerning the child’s best interests. Id.
[11] With respect to the trial court’s conclusions of law, Father first contends that
the trial court committed reversible error by failing to specify in its order that
the Guardians were subject to a “clear and convincing” standard of proof.
However, the case that he cites does not support the proposition that the trial
court must specify the standard of proof in its findings or conclusions. See
M.N.S., 23 N.E.3d at 766 (stating that third party must meet clear and
convincing evidence standard of proof). Thus, the case cited by Father does not
support the proposition for which it was cited, and he therefore has waived this
allegation of error by failing to support his proposition with a citation to
relevant authority as required by Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(8). Even so, we
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note that trial courts are presumed to have considered the relevant factors and
followed the applicable law, and the party challenging the trial court’s
conclusion must overcome this strong presumption. Del Priore v. Del Priore, 65
N.E.3d 1065, 1072 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied (2017).
[12] Father also challenges paragraphs 6 and 7 of the trial court’s conclusions,
essentially claiming that they are more accurately characterized as findings of
fact, which he claims to be inaccurate, incomplete, or inconsistent with the
court’s labeled findings. As discussed, the findings themselves stand as proven
due to Father’s waiver for failing to request a transcript of the proceedings
below. Notwithstanding, we find these paragraphs to be ultimate
findings/conclusions – the application of the relevant facts to the law – which
trial courts commonly include in their comprehensive orders. 2 In short,
paragraphs 6 and 7 list the salient reasons for the trial court’s decision to deny
Father’s termination petition. These include: Father’s failure to visit and
failure to support Child for nearly seven years of his eight-year life; Father’s
acquiescence by failing to challenge the guardianship for three years after his
2
Father’s briefs include vitriolic language impugning the motives of both the trial court and Guardians. See,
e.g., Appellant’s Br. at 25 (“it cannot be reasonably maintained that the deficiencies in the trial court’s
conclusions of law were inadvertent.”); Reply Br. at 7 (“A rational inference is that the trial court knew full
well the mentioned legal standards but failed to mention them for the want of evidence satisfying those
standards.”); id. at 6 (“Guardians have taken indecent liberties with Father’s Argument.”); id. at 5-6 (“[The
Agreed Order’s existence is testament to the vileness of extracting such a concession from a noncustodial
Father”). We remind counsel that the purpose of appellate briefs is to present this Court with concise
arguments supported by statutory law, case law, and the record. Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8). “Invectives
are not argument, and have no place in legal discussion ....” Brill v. Regent Commc’ns, Inc., 12 N.E.3d 299, 301
n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Muncie & Portland
Traction Co., 166 Ind. 466, 468, 77 N.E. 941, 942 (1906)), trans. denied.
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release from jail; Father’s failure to communicate with Child until the agreed
order was executed in 2017; Child’s confusion, fear, and emotional problems
that resulted from Father repeatedly telling him during parenting time that he
would be removed from Guardians and would come to live with him soon; the
fact that Guardians are the only parents Child has ever known; the strong bond
between Child and Guardians that is “so interwoven that to attempt to uproot []
Child from his home environment would seriously mar and endanger the safety
and stability of [] Child”; Guardians’ stable lifestyle, which allows Child to
“thrive and properly develop physically, cognitively, and socially”; and the
detriment to Child’s mental and emotional health and development if removed
from Guardians. Appealed Order at 4-5.
[13] In sum, the trial court’s findings and conclusions support the strong
presumption that the trial court followed the applicable law and employed the
presumption favoring the natural parent over the third parties but simply
rendered a decision that is contrary to Father’s desired outcome. We find no
abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of Father’s petition to terminate the
guardianship. 3 Accordingly, we affirm.
3
Because we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision, we need not address Guardians’
alternate argument that Father is contractually bound by the agreed order’s provision that the guardianship
shall continue until Child is eighteen.
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[14] Affirmed.
May, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
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