J-A25017-19
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: S.A.P., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: C.L.M.H., MOTHER :
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:
:
: No. 672 MDA 2019
Appeal from the Decree Entered April 2, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Orphans' Court at No(s):
2017-0195a
IN THE INTEREST OF: S.A.P., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
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APPEAL OF: C.L.M.H., MOTHER :
:
:
:
: No. 713 MDA 2019
Appeal from the Order Entered April 3, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Juvenile Division at No(s):
CP-67-DP-0000024-2009
BEFORE: STABILE, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED: DECEMBER 23, 2019
C.L.M.H. (“Mother”) appeals from the orders changing the permanency
goal for S.A.P. (“Child”) to adoption and terminating her parental rights to
Child. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in changing the
permanency goal or in terminating Mother’s parental rights and therefore
affirm.
J-A25017-19
Child was born in July 2006 to Mother and W.C.P. (“Father”). In August
2016, York County Office of Children, Youth and Families (“CYF”) received a
referral regarding sexual abuse allegations made by Child’s half-sibling against
Mother’s boyfriend, A.M., Jr., with whom Mother and her children resided.
Mother did not permit Child to undergo a forensic interview at that time. A
CYF caseworker interviewed Child. Child did not disclose abuse, but the
caseworker had concerns that Child had been “coached.” Trial Court Opinion,
filed Apr. 2, 2019, at 9 (“1925(a) Op.”). Mother insisted Child’s half-sibling
was lying about the abuse.
In December 2016, CYF filed an application for emergency protective
custody of Child following allegations that A.M., Jr., sexually abused Child. The
court granted the application. Child underwent a forensic interview, where
Child disclosed abuse and indicated Mother instructed her to lie about it.
1925(a) Op. at 10. CYF filed a dependency petition, and in January 2017, Child
was adjudicated dependent. The initial permanency goal was return to parent
or guardian.
CYF filed a petition for involuntary termination of parental rights in
November 2017, but withdrew this petition. In July 2018, Mother filed a
petition for reunification. In August 2018, CYF filed a second petition for
involuntary termination of parental rights and a petition to change goal to
adoption. The court held a three-day hearing on the petitions.
The program coordinator for Family Engagement Services at Pressley
Ridge, Melanie Ferree-Wurster, testified. Pressley Ridge provided services to
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Mother from December 2017 through October 2018. N.T., 11/20/18, at 14.
During the time Pressley Ridge provided services, Mother participated in at
least 65 to 70 visits with Child and attended meetings. Id. at 16, 18.
The family engagement specialist at Pressley Ridge, Carla Arp,
supervised visits between Mother and Child and testified that Mother was
consistent with visits. Id. at 20. Arp testified that from December 2017
through May 2018, Mother had fully supervised visits. Id. at 22. Mother then
had five partially supervised visits. Id. The visits returned to fully supervised
after A.M., Jr., appeared at a partially supervised visit. Id. Mother then had
nine fully supervised visits, before the court again ordered that she could have
partially supervised visits. Id. Mother had nine partially supervised visits,
which returned to fully supervised after an unauthorized male was at a visit in
August 2018. Id.
Arp testified that it was “reported to [her] that [Mother] was continuing
to have some contact with [A.M., Jr.]” Id. at 22-23. In addition, Child
described times where A.M., Jr., would follow Child home from school in his
car. Id. at 39. The reports of A.M., Jr., following Child were outside of Mother’s
time with Child. Id.
Arp also testified regarding the man who was in Mother’s home during
the August 2018 visit. She stated that Child reported that a man, A.T., had
been at the visit. Id. at 26. Mother initially denied he was there, and later
stated that she spoke with her roommate, who informed her a man had been
there. Id. at 27. Arp testified that it was later reported to her, and there was
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testimony at permanency review hearing, that Mother “might possibly have a
romantic relationship with [A.T.].” Id. at 28. Child reported that she saw A.T.’s
name in Mother’s phone with hearts around it, and Arp later saw Mother’s
phone, with A.T.’s name surrounded by hearts. Id. Mother continued to deny
a romantic involvement with A.T. Id. at 28-29.
Arp further testified that although Child initially said she did not know
A.T., after a subsequent visit with Mother, Child stated she did not know “why
the team was causing her mother so much drama,” and she had known A.T.
since “she was in the womb.” Id. at 38.
Arp testified that because someone who was not authorized was at the
home during a visit, CYF filed a motion to change the partially supervised visits
to fully supervised visits, and the court granted the motion. Id. at 21. After
the change to fully-supervised visits, Mother became difficult to work with, as
she would not look at or speak to Arp. Id. at 21. This created a hostile
environment, which was contrary to the goal of creating a positive visit for
Child and Mother, and Pressley Ridge discontinued services. Id.
Arp testified that Pressley Ridge had concerns during the entire service.
Id. at 63. The concerns included that Mother did not want to have contact
with Child’s half-sibling, who was transgender, and that Mother did not want
Child to have contact with her half-sibling. Id. In addition, at an October 2018
permanency review hearing, Arp testified that Mother began to teach Child
some “alarming” things, such as that “when you are in the grave after death,
your grave squeezes you and tortures you for the sins you committed when
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you were alive.” N.T., 10/11/18, at 46. She stated she was not “questioning
the veracity” of the belief, but “the method in which [Child] was told.” Id. at
46-47. Arp stated the way Mother “told [Child] was so scary to [Child] that
she got in the car and said she was freaked out.” Id. at 47. She clarified that
“to say things that give [Child] nightmares, that’s not the way to teach a child
at any age any religion.” Id. at 57.
The parties stipulated to the admission of a non-offending parent
evaluation prepared by Camilla Richesson and two exhibits prepared by
Juanita Jones from SpiriTrust Lutheran, who provided non-offending parent
counseling, in lieu of testimony. N.T., 11/20/18, at 81.1 The evaluation
prepared by Richesson included an assessment that the allegations were too
difficult for Mother to believe, providing that Mother:
[D]enie[d] that she has ever been fully informed of the
specific nature of the sexual abuse allegations regarding
[Child], which this evaluator finds difficult to believe.
Rather, it appears that the allegations are too difficult for
her to admit happening because she would then have to
place some culpability on herself for what was happening
‘right under my nose.’
Non-Offending Parent Evaluation, CYF Exh. 1, at 7. The evaluator believed
Mother’s disbelief added to Child’s trauma. Id. at 8. Jones’ report included
that to state Mother was “in denial was overly simplified. She was not so much
in denial as incredulous and just not understanding how sexual abuse could
have occurred.” SpiriTrust Report, dated Mar. 23, 2018, at 1.
____________________________________________
1 The parties further stipulated to the psychological evaluation of Child
prepared by Dr. Casey Flanscha.
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A mental health professional from Pressley Ridge, Mallary Hinkle, also
testified. Hinkle provided services for Child and Mother from May 2018 through
October 2018. Id. at 87. Mother was present for the counseling sessions and
Hinkle testified that communication between Child and Mother “seem[ed] to
have increased during the sessions,” and she worked with Child to create a
plan to implement if she felt unsafe. Id. Hinkle testified that Mother seemed
to recognize the issues posed by A.M., Jr., and his abuse of Child, and was not
in denial of the abuse. Id. at 90. Hinkle stated that Mother did claim that Child
had a tendency to lie. Id. Hinkle stated that Mother did not support Child
continuing to have visits with her half-sibling. Id. at 95.
A mobile therapist with Laurel Life, Rachel Cook, also testified. Cook
provided cognitive behavioral therapy to Child at school and at home,
beginning in October 2018. N.T., 11/20/18, at 73. She testified that Child’s
goals included increasing self-regulation and utilizing coping skills,
documenting things related to abuse and establishing healthy relationships,
and increasing compliance with rules. Id. at 75-76. Child is progressing at a
normal rate in therapy.
Child testified at the hearing. Child testified that she would like to live
with Mother or Father. Id. at 113. She stated she would like to live with Mother
because living with her makes Child “feel . . . like a bunch of things [are] in
front of [her].” Id. She testified Mother lived with a roommate and the
roommate’s daughters. Id. at 115. Child was unsure whether Mother was
married to A.T. Id. at 140-41.
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A youth advocate at Pennsylvania Comprehensive Behavioral Health,
Damaris Clark, testified at the hearing. N.T., 1/24/2019, at 11. She started to
work with Child in April 2018, and continued to work with her at the time of
the hearing. Id. at 11. She stated that Child “believes everything that Mom
says, and when it doesn’t happen the way Mom says, then [Child] gets angry
with everybody, and everybody is at fault.” Id. at 18.
A CYF caseworker, Bryna Smith, testified. She stated that prior to the
December 2016 referral to CYF that started the current dependency
proceedings, CYF had received 26 prior referrals regarding the family. Id. at
21. Mother’s permanency goals included to support her own mental health
and to engage in mental health therapy for Child. Id. at 28. Smith testified
that Mother did attend some counseling sessions at Access York, but did not
complete a psychological evaluation that CYF requested. Id. at 69.
Smith testified that Mother had lived at various residences, and that CYF
often learned of the moves through collateral sources, not Mother. Id. at 31.
For her current residence, Mother advised CYF that she was residing with a
friend from church, and would be able to live there indefinitely. Id. at 32.
Smith testified that it was reported that the friend no longer lives there, and
that Mother lives there with her husband. Id. Although the home has space
for Child, Mother did not provide updated lease information after the
roommate moved. Id. at 32-33.
Smith also testified that Mother provided paycheck stubs from May and
April 2018, but has not provided paycheck stubs since that time, even though
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CYF had requested them. Id. at 40. Smith testified that after A.M., Jr.,
appeared at a partially supervised visits, Mother stated she would contact the
police, but did not do so. Id. at 45. Mother did report the incident to A.M, Jr.’s
probation officer. N.T., 7/24/18, at 21.
Smith testified that Mother was pregnant. N.T., 1/24/19, at 46. She
stated that Mother “never confirmed” her pregnancy with CYF, but CYF “ha[d]
been made aware” of the pregnancy. Id. She stated a Justice Works employee
informed Smith that Mother was in the hospital with contractions the week
before the hearing and that the week before that, Mother had taken Child
shopping for the baby during a supervised visit. Id. at 47-48.
Smith testified that Child has a bond with Mother, but it is an unhealthy
bond. Id. at 53. She stated that Child “wishes to please [M]other, even if it
sacrifices her own personal beliefs.” Id. She stated that Child “strives to
appease her mother, even though it . . . directly affects her mental health and
positions that she stands for such as her religion and maintaining contact
specific to her older [half-]sibling.” Id. Smith testified that Child’s “mental
health declines when she feels like she is not appeasing [M]other.” Id. at 61.
Smith testified that Child and her current foster mother, her aunt, were
“definitely bonded.” Id. at 63. She stated Child “did have a spike in behaviors,
and her aunt is somewhat structured, but, through her therapy and child prep,
she has very much . . . become bonded with her aunt and interacts with her
very well.” Id. at 63-64.
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Smith stated that CYF believed that it was in Child’s best interest to
change the permanency goal from reunification to adoption because “[i]t’s the
most permanent achievable goal for the child to be able to feel comfortable
and safe and stable knowing that this is her permanent home.” Id. at 71-72.
She stated Mother was not in a positon to take custody of Child, as Mother
continued to have supervised visits with Child due to questions concerning
“Mother’s protective capacities,” and the concerns would be better able to be
addressed had Mother had a mental health evaluation “to see that she would
be mentally sound to care for” Child.” Id. at 72-73.
Smith further testified that at an October court proceeding, Mother
testified that if she was reunified with Child, and after Father was released
from prison, she would send Child to live with Father, and Child would visit
her and her husband on the weekends. Id. at 74. Further, although Mother
participated in school-based therapy through Pressley Ridge, she did not want
Child to continue with the program during the summer because she did not
believe Child needed treatment. Id. at 75. Smith testified that Mother declined
to participate in therapy during visitations, and that Mother cooperated with
services but did not follow through with all the recommendations made by
CYF. Id. at 75, 97. She testified termination of parental rights would be in
Child’s best interest so that Child “knows that she is in a stable position to
gauge the rest of her life.” Id. at 98.
A school psychologist, Holly Ray, also testified. She testified that Child
“started out the year rough, and . . . gradually got better.” Id. at 80. She now
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was “better than she had been before.” Id. She stated that Child appeared to
have some stability since she had been placed with her aunt. Id. at 81. She
has been “more stable and more focused at school,” and Ray has seen Child
less for “just being upset or having drama with other people.” Id.
Mother testified at the hearing. N.T., 2/1/19. Mother testified that she
does not have contact with A.M., Jr., the individual who abused child. Id. at
42. Mother testified she believes A.M., Jr., was grooming Child and that she
“never had any disbelief.” Id. at 42-43. She claims she did not know the
details of the allegations, which were kept from her until her non-offender
sessions with Jones. Id. at 43. Mother testified she completed the non-
offender treatment, through sessions with Jones, and she completed domestic
violence counseling. Id. at 43-44. Mother testified that she believed Child
would benefit from counseling, stating it would help with Child’s “anger, how
to process it, instead of just lashing out. Help her to express herself a little bit
better.” Id. at 44. She would be willing to continue treatment if reunified with
Child. Id.
Mother testified that she currently lives with A.T., her husband. Id. at
54-55. Mother testified that she completed a treatment assessment and
domestic violence and non-offender counseling, she attended visits with Child,
had positive and supportive interactions with Child, and did not discuss the
allegations of abuse with the other children. Id. at 55-57. Mother did not
provide CYF with documentation that she completed domestic violence
counseling. Id. at 80-81. She stated she never told Child that Child was lying
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or being dishonest. Id. at 58. Mother also testified that she signed the
necessary releases, obtained housing separate from A.M., Jr., and completed
parenting coaching. Id. at 59-60. Mother also testified that she maintained
contact with CYF and informed it of household composition changes. Id. She
informed the court and CYF at the October hearing she was living with A.T.
and provided his information. Id. at 65. She participated with school-based
therapy, where she apologized to Child. Id. at 61. Mother testified that she
currently supports visits between Child and Child’s half-sibling. Id. at 79.
Mother testified that she has a job at the Susquehanna Nursing Home,
but was not able to work at the time of the hearing due to sciatic pain. Id. at
65-66. Mother testified that she no longer intends to give custody of Child to
Father. Id. at 96.
The trial court changed Child’s permanency goal to adoption and granted
CYF’s petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights to Child.2 Mother filed
timely notices of appeal from the orders. Child also filed notices of appeal, but
subsequently withdrew the appeals.
Mother raises the following issues on appeal:
I. Did the trial court err when it changed the court ordered
goal from reunification to adoption?
II. Did the trial court err when it involuntarily terminated the
parental rights of [Mother]?
____________________________________________
2The trial court also terminated Father’s parental rights to Child. Father has
not filed an appeal.
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III. Did the trial court err in determining that termination of
parental rights would be in the best interest of the child?
Mother’s Br. at 4.
Mother first challenges the order changing the permanency goal to
adoption. She argues that the evidence did not support a goal change to
adoption. Rather, Mother claims she satisfactorily completed every task asked
of her, but CYF “continued to pile up task upon task and held actions outside
of her control against Mother.” Mother’s Br. at 18. Mother argues she had
completed the service plan, had an appropriate home, and Mother and Child
were ready and excited for reunification. The circumstances that necessitated
placement were dealt with when A.M., Jr., moved from the home. Id. at 19.
“We review an order regarding a placement goal of a dependent child
under an abuse of discretion standard.” In re H.J., 206 A.3d 22, 25 (Pa.Super.
2019) (citing In re B.S., 861 A.2d 974, 976 (Pa.Super. 2004)). We conclude
a court abused its discretion only where “the court’s judgment was manifestly
unreasonable, . . . the court did not apply the law, or . . . the court’s action
was a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, as shown by the record.”
Id. (quoting In re N.C., 909 A.2d 818, 822-23 (Pa.Super. 2006)).
“[W]e are bound by the facts as found by the trial court if they are
supported by the record.” Id. (citing In re K.J., 27 A.3d 236, 241 (Pa.Super.
2011)). The trial court must “evaluate the credibility of the witnesses and
resolve any conflicts in the testimony.” Id. (citing In re N.C., 909 A.2d at
823). Where “the trial court’s findings are supported by competent evidence,
this Court will affirm, ‘even if the record could also support an opposite
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result.’” Id. (quoting In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 506 (Pa.Super.
2006)).
“[T]he focus of all dependency proceedings, including goal change
proceedings, is on the safety, permanency, and well-being of the child and the
best interests of the child must take precedence over all other considerations.”
Id. (citing In re A.K., 936 A.2d 528, 534 (Pa.Super. 2007)). “At each
dependency review hearing, the trial court must consider, inter alia, the
continuing necessity for and appropriateness of the [c]hild’s placement, and
the appropriateness and feasibility of the current placement goal for the child.”
Id. (citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(f)(1), (4)). Where a court finds “reunification
with the child’s parent is not in a child’s best interest, the court may determine
that [a]doption is the appropriate permanency goal.” Id. (citing 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 6351(f)(1)-(2)). Further, “[w]hen the child welfare agency has made
reasonable efforts to return a foster child to his or her biological parent, but
those efforts have failed, then the agency must redirect its efforts towards
placing the child in an adoptive home.” Id. (citing In re N.C., 909 A.2d at
823).
Here, the trial court concluded that CYF proved by clear and convincing
evidence that it is in Child’s best interest to change the goal placement to
adoption. The court noted that CYF had “extensive involvement in the past”
with Mother, Child, and Mother’s other children. 1925(a) Op. at 9. It noted
that Child’s half-sibling was sexually abused by A.M., Jr., and Mother refused
to allow Child to undergo a forensic interview at that time. Id. A CYF
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caseworker interviewed Child, and had concerns that Child had been coached.
Id. Mother insisted Child’s half-sibling was lying, and did not permit the half-
sibling to return home. Id. About five months later, CYF received a referral
regarding alleged sexual abuse of Child by A.M., Jr. Id. At a forensic interview,
Child disclosed sexual abuse and indicated that Mother instructed her to lie
about it. Id. at 9-10.
The court further noted that the non-offending parent evaluation
conducted in June 2017 stated that Mother continued to believe both children
made up the sexual abuse. Id. at 10. The court noted that Mother denied
being informed of the specific nature of the abuse and noted that it appeared
the allegations were “too difficult for [Mother] to admit.” Id. (alteration in
original). The evaluator stated that Mother added to the trauma of Child by
her non-belief. Id.
The court noted Mother attended the SpiriTrust Lutheran Domestic
Abuse Program, and the counselor stated that Mother was not in denial of the
abuse to Child but that she “could not comprehend how the abuse could have
occurred.” Id. at 11.
The court also noted that at an October 2017 permanency review
hearing, Mother stated she never denied Child was abused and denied telling
Child to lie about the abuse. At a February 2019 hearing, Mother stated she
never called Child a liar. These statements contradicted her earlier testimony
and prior statements from Child. Id.
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The court noted Mother’s numerous inconsistent statements—including
her inconsistent statements regarding her marital status, her pregnancy
status, and her living/roommate situation. Id. at 12-13. It found Mother
remarried without informing CYF or Child, and that her spouse did not
participate in any of the dependency proceedings. Id. at 13.
The Court noted it was “highly concerned about Mother’s ability to
appropriately protect [Child], including as it relates to [Child’s] emotional and
mental health.” Id. The court noted that, although Mother at times had
unsupervised or partially supervised visits, they were returned to fully
supervised visits after Child’s report of a man in Mother’s home and Mother’s
subsequent attempts to deny or explain the man’s presence. Id. at 14-15.
The court concluded:
Overall, Mother has made minimal to moderate progress
towards alleviating the circumstances which caused [Child]
to be placed. . . . [Mother has not] assumed any major
parental duties for [Child] since approximately December,
2016, over twenty-seven (27) months ago. [Child] has been
in placement for approximately twenty-seven (27) months
and adjudicated dependent for approximately twenty-six
(26) months. [Child] needs a permanent, safe and stable
environment. As such, the Court finds that [Child’s] best
interests demand that the goal be changed from
reunification with a parent to placement for adoption.
Id. at 16.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining it would be in
Child’s best interest to change the permanency goal to adoption. Although
Mother had completed many of her goals, CYF and the trial court continued to
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have concerns about her ability to protect Child from future abuse. Although
Mother was no longer living with A.M., Jr., she now was married to a man that
CYF and the court had not met. She continued to provide testimony that
contradicted earlier testimony, and continued to provide inconsistent
information as to her marital status and whether she was pregnant.
Mother next argues the trial court erred in terminating her parental
rights.
A party seeking to terminate parental rights has the burden of
establishing grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence. In re
Adoption of K.C., 199 A.3d 470, 473 (Pa.Super. 2018). Clear and convincing
evidence means evidence “that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as
to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitation, of
the truth of the precise facts in issue.” Id. (quoting In re Z.S., 946 A.2d 726,
728 (Pa.Super. 2008)).
When we review termination of parental rights cases, we “accept the
findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are
supported by the record.” In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (quoting
In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826 (Pa. 2012)). “If the factual findings
have support in the record, we then determine if the trial court committed an
error of law or abuse of discretion.” In re Adoption of K.C., 199 A.3d at 473.
A trial court decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion “only upon
demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-
will.” In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 826.
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Our Supreme Court has explained the reasons for applying an abuse of
discretion standard of review in termination of parental rights cases:
[U]nlike trial courts, appellate courts are not equipped to
make the fact-specific determinations on a cold record,
where the trial judges are observing the parties during the
relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other
hearings regarding the child and parents. Therefore, even
where the facts could support an opposite result, as is often
the case in dependency and termination cases, an appellate
court must resist the urge to second guess the trial court
and impose its own credibility determinations and
judgment; instead we must defer to the trial judges so long
as the factual findings are supported by the record and the
court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an error of law
or an abuse of discretion.
Id. at 826-27 (citations omitted).
Termination of parental rights is controlled by Section 2511 of the
Adoption Act. In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007). Under Section
2511, the trial court must engage in a bifurcated analysis prior to terminating
parental rights:
Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory
grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only
if the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants
termination of his or her parental rights does the court
engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to
Section 2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare of
the child under the standard of best interests of the child.
One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis
concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond
between parent and child, with close attention paid to the
effect on the child of permanently severing any such bond.
Id. (citations omitted).
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In the present case, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights
pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (5), and (8) and § 2511(b) of the
Adoption Act. To affirm the termination of parental rights, this Court need only
agree with the trial court’s decision as to any one subsection of Section
2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b). In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384
(Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc). Here, we affirm that the trial court properly
terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Sections 2511(a)(2) and (b).
We will first review the trial court’s conclusion that termination was
proper under Section 2511(a)(2), which provides:
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a
child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the
following grounds:
...
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect
or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without
essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for
his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and
causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or
will not be remedied by the parent.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2).
To terminate parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2), the moving
party must produce clear and convincing evidence of the following: “(1)
repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) such
incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the child to be without
essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or
mental well-being; and (3) the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or
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refusal cannot or will not be remedied.” In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d
1266, 1272 (Pa.Super. 2003); 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2).
Mother argues that CYF presented no competent evidence to support a
finding of “repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal” that
“caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence
necessary for his physical or mental well-being” or that the “conditions and
causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be
remedied.” Mother’s Br. at 22. She argues that there was no evidence that
Mother knew A.M., Jr., would appear at a visit, and that Mother had no control
over his actions. Id. She claims that the court’s use of this incident against
her should be “enough to overturn the court’s findings as bias.” Id. at 23.
The trial court found CYF establish by clear and convincing evidence that
grounds for termination exist under Section 2511(a)(2):
The Court finds that the conditions which led to [Child’s]
placement outside the care and custody of Mother and
Father continue to exist. [Child] has been in placement for
approximately twenty-seven (27) months and adjudicated
dependent for approximately twenty-six (26) months.
[Child] is safe, loved, and well-bonded to the kinship
mother.
The Court continued to have significant concerns regarding
Mother’s ability to appropriately parent and protect [Child].
Despite Mother’s most recent statements to the contrary,
the Court fully believes that Mother still does not believe
that [Child] was sexually abused by [A.M., Jr.].
[Child] has been in placement for approximately twenty-
seven (27) months and adjudicated dependent for
approximately twenty-six (26) months. Despite the length
of [CYF’s] involvement with the family, Mother [has] failed
to progress to fully unsupervised visits with [Child].
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1925(a) Op. at 20.
The court further re-iterated the findings it made to support the goal
change. It noted Mother did not believe the sexual abuse allegations made by
Child or her half-sibling, that the allegations were “too difficult for [Mother] to
admit,” and that Mother added to Child’s trauma by not believing her. Id. at
22. It noted Mother’s testimony that she never stated Child had not been
abused or that Child was lying, which was contradicted by her prior testimony.
Id. at 23. The court noted it did not find Mother credible, due to the many
inconsistent and misleading statements she made during the course of the
proceedings. Id. The court noted it was “highly concerned about Mother’s
ability to appropriately protect [Child], including as it relates to [Child’s]
emotional and mental health.” Id. at 25. It noted that A.M., Jr., appeared
outside one of Child’s visits, and Mother informed Child she would contact the
police. Mother did not contact the police, but did testify that she contacted
A.M., Jr.’s probation officer twice – the day following the incident and four
days after the incident. Id. It further noted Mother’s inconsistent statements
concerning the man Child reported seeing at a visit, who was her husband.
The court further noted that Mother was speaking to Child about concerning
topics, such as being tortured for sins. Id. at 26. The court further noted that
Mother did not provide information to verify her place of employment or salary
or her residence. Id. at 27. In addition, the court noted that Mother testified
that, because of her religious beliefs, she intended to turn custody over to
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Father. Although Mother later testified that she would not do so, the Court did
not find Mother’s recantation credible. Id.
The court concluded:
Overall, Mother [has] failed to remediate the conditions
which led to [Child’s] placement and [has] failed to provide
substantial parental duties on behalf of [Child]. In
consideration of this testimony, the Court [found] that [CYF]
clearly and convincingly establish that termination of
parental rights is justified pursuant to Section[] 2511(a)(2).
1925(a) Op. at 28.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding termination proper
under Section 2511(a)(2). Mother provided inconsistent testimony, including
inconsistent testimony concerning her marital status and housing situation.
Her inability to believe Child was sexually abused, coupled with this
inconsistent testimony, supports the finding that Mother is not able to protect
Child. The court’s mention that A.M., Jr., arrived during one of Child’s visits
with Mother, even though Mother may not have known he would do so, does
not establish the court was biased. It was one of many pieces of relevant
information the court used to determine that termination was proper under
Section 2511(a)(2).
Mother next argues the court erred in finding that termination of her
parental rights was in Child’s best interests.
Pursuant to Section 2511(b), the trial court must determine the needs
and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests of the child. The
focus under Section 2511(b) is not on the parent, but on the child. In re
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Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d at 508. Pursuant to Section 2511(b), the trial
court must determine “whether termination of parental rights would best
serve the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the
child.” In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 1286 (Pa.Super. 2005). This Court has
explained that “[i]ntangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are
involved in the inquiry into [the] needs and welfare of the child.” Id. at 1287.
The trial court “must also discern the nature and status of the parent-child
bond, with utmost attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing
that bond.” Id. Importantly, “[t]he mere existence of an emotional bond does
not preclude the termination of parental rights.” In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95,
103 (Pa.Super. 2011). Instead, the trial court “must examine the status of the
bond to determine whether its termination would destroy an existing,
necessary and beneficial relationship.” Id. (quotation marks and citation
omitted). Further, “[c]ommon sense dictates that courts considering
termination must also consider whether the children are in a pre-adoptive
home and whether they have a bond with their foster parents.” In re T.S.M.,
71 A.3d at 268.
The trial court found termination was in Child’s best interest:
The Court has thoroughly evaluated [Child’s] relationships
in this matter. The Court finds that [Child] has a relationship
with mother . . . but [it is not] strong, safe, stable, or
healthy for [Child]. . . . Mother’s bond with [C]hild is . . .
unhealthy. Mother has consistently been untruthful with
[C]hild as it relates to Mother’s current marriage and
pregnancy. Mother is also unsupportive of [C]hild’s
relationship with her half-sibling. As such, the Court find
that [Child] has a healthier parental bond with the kinship
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mother and that [Child] gains safety and stability from the
kinship mother. It is the kinship mother who provides for
[Child’s] daily needs as well as her specialized
developmental, education, and medical needs.
The Court also finds that the bond between [Child] and
kinship mother is strong and healthy. Testimony established
that [C]hild is happy and feels comfortable in the kinship
mother’s care. The bond that [Child] has with the kinship
mother can provide safety, security and permanency for
[C]hild. Termination of parental rights will best meet the
needs of [Child] and permit [C]hild to achieve the stability
she deserves.
1925(a) Op. at 28-29.
The trial court’s factual findings are supported by the record and it did
not abuse its discretion in finding termination would be in Child’s best interest.
Although Child has a bond with Mother, the bond is not a healthy one. Mother
did not believe Child when Child informed her she was sexually abused, and
Mother provided inconsistent information to Child regarding important life
matters, such as marriage and pregnancy.
Orders affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/23/2019
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