MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Dec 26 2019, 9:15 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Christopher Kunz Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Sierra A. Murray
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Artiemisha Rhodes, December 26, 2019
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-CR-1508
v. Appeal from the
Marion Superior Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable
Appellee-Plaintiff Linda E. Brown, Judge
The Honorable
Peggy Hart, Magistrate
Trial Court Cause Nos.
49G09-1904-CM-13658
49G09-1904-CM-14819
Vaidik, Chief Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1508 | December 26, 2019 Page 1 of 5
Case Summary
[1] Artiemisha Rhodes appeals her criminal-trespass convictions, arguing that the
evidence is insufficient to prove that she did not have a contractual interest in
her mother’s house. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] In January 2019, thirty-seven-year-old Rhodes was released from jail. After her
release, she stayed “on and off” at her mother Alma Turner’s house, keeping a
“few belongings there.” Tr. p. 25. On April 8, Turner asked Rhodes to leave
her house. Although it’s unclear why Turner asked Rhodes to leave, it is
apparent that there were “a lot of issues . . . about their relationship and
[Turner] didn’t want [Rhodes] in her house or around her property.” Id. at 16.
When Rhodes told her mother that she didn’t have to leave, Turner called the
police. The police responded and told Rhodes that she had to leave. Rhodes
left but returned a couple hours later. Turner again called the police. When
Rhodes told the police that she didn’t have to leave, she was arrested for
criminal trespass and taken to Eskenazi Hospital.
[3] Rhodes was released from the hospital on April 16 and returned to her mother’s
house to “find out . . . if [she] could stay [there].” Id. at 33. Turner told Rhodes
to leave because she couldn’t “deal with the situation anymore.” Id. at 24.
When Rhodes did not leave, the police were called to Turner’s house. Turner
again told Rhodes to leave and explained to the police that Rhodes did not live
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1508 | December 26, 2019 Page 2 of 5
there. The police told Rhodes to leave. Turner went inside her house, and the
police left. When Turner later looked out her window, she saw that Rhodes
had returned. Turner called the police, and Rhodes was arrested for criminal
trespass.
[4] Thereafter, the State charged Rhodes with two counts of criminal trespass, one
for April 8 and the other for April 16. At trial, Turner testified that Rhodes
didn’t have any interest in her house on either April 8 or 16, that Rhodes did
not pay rent, and that she did not want Rhodes there on either occasion. Id. at
21, 25. Rhodes testified that she “used to pay rent” at her mother’s house but
that she didn’t in April. Id. at 34. The trial court found Rhodes guilty on both
counts.
[5] Rhodes now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[6] Rhodes contends that the evidence is insufficient to support her criminal-
trespass convictions. In order to convict Rhodes of criminal trespass as charged
here, the State had to prove that she (1) did not have a contractual interest in
Turner’s real property and (2) knowingly or intentionally entered Turner’s real
property having been denied entry by Turner. See Ind. Code § 35-43-2-2(b)(1);
Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 14, 78. Rhodes only challenges whether the State
proved that she did not have a contractual interest in Turner’s real property.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1508 | December 26, 2019 Page 3 of 5
[7] As defined by our Supreme Court, a “contractual interest in the property” as
required by Section 35-43-2-2 means “a right, title, or legal share of real
property arising out of a binding agreement between two or more parties.”
Lyles v. State, 970 N.E.2d 140, 143 n.2 (Ind. 2012). The State need not disprove
every conceivable contractual interest, but it must disprove contractual interests
that are reasonably apparent from the context and circumstances under which
the trespass allegedly occurred. Id. at 143.
[8] Here, the State proved that Rhodes did not have a contractual interest in her
mother’s house. At trial, Turner confirmed multiple times that Rhodes didn’t
have “any interest” in her house, didn’t own any part of it, and didn’t pay rent.
Tr. p. 21. In addition, Turner testified that although Rhodes had stayed at her
house “on and off” since she was released from jail in January, she was no
longer welcome there. Nevertheless, Rhodes claims that she had “an unwritten
living agreement” with her mother that allowed her to stay there. Appellant’s
Br. p. 8. Although the record shows that Turner had allowed Rhodes to stay at
her house “on and off” after she was released from jail, there was no binding
agreement between them. Cf. Apollos v. State, 59 N.E.3d 266, 268 (Ind. Ct. App.
2016) (“In this case, both Apollos and Francois understood that an agreement
existed, pursuant to which Apollos would live at Francois’s residence in
exchange for rent and/or childcare services for Francois’s daughter. The
precise terms may not have been agreed upon, but both parties understood that
an agreement existed.”). Instead, it appears that Turner allowed Rhodes to stay
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1508 | December 26, 2019 Page 4 of 5
at her house by her good graces and not pursuant to any binding agreement
between them.
[9] Finally, Rhodes argues that this case “strongly resembles” Semenick v. State, 977
N.E.2d 7 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. Appellant’s Br. p. 13. In that case,
the defendant got into an argument with another worshipper at a Sunday
morning church service. An off-duty police officer working security asked the
defendant to leave. The defendant refused and was arrested for criminal
trespass. On appeal, we reversed the defendant’s conviction, explaining as
follows:
[T]here is uncontroverted testimony that [the defendant] was a
church member, and an absence of evidence that [the officer] had
authority to demand, without more, that a worshipper leave the
sanctuary during Sunday services. Effectively, he intervened
between parishioners who presumably had equal interests in the
premises, and chose who would stay and who would go.
Semenick, 977 N.E.2d at 10. That is simply not the case here. Turner and
Rhodes did not have “equal interests” in the house; rather, it is undisputed that
Turner owned the house. We therefore affirm Rhodes’s convictions for
criminal trespass.
[10] Affirmed.
Najam, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.
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