FILED
Jan 10 2020, 6:17 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Leanna Weissmann
Attorney General of Indiana Lawrenceburg, Indiana
Angela N. Sanchez
Assistant Section Chief, Criminal Appeals
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
State of Indiana, January 10, 2020
Appellant-Plaintiff, Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-JV-1659
v. Appeal from the Madison Circuit
Court
N.B., The Honorable G. George Pancol,
Appellee-Defendant, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
48C02-1811-JD-390
Robb, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-JV-1659 | January 10, 2020 Page 1 of 9
Case Summary and Issue
[1] The State filed a delinquency petition alleging that N.B. had committed acts
that, if committed by an adult, would constitute child molesting, a Class B
felony, and also filed a petition to waive juvenile jurisdiction. N.B. filed a
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to his age, and the
juvenile court granted the motion. The State appeals and presents one issue for
our review, which we restate as whether the juvenile court had subject matter
jurisdiction to entertain the State’s delinquency petition and request for waiver
of juvenile jurisdiction. Concluding the juvenile court had jurisdiction to
entertain the petition and determine whether N.B. should be waived to adult
criminal court, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] In June 2018, T.C. informed her therapist that her cousin, N.B., had fondled
her vagina about six years prior. T.C. stated that N.B. had been fifteen or
sixteen at the time of the offense and, at the time of her disclosure, N.B. was
twenty-one or twenty-two years old. Law enforcement began investigating
T.C.’s allegations.
[3] On November 5, 2018, the State filed a request for authorization to file a
petition alleging that N.B. is a delinquent child for committing acts that, if
committed by an adult, would constitute child molesting. See State’s Appendix
of Appellant, Volume II at 13. The same day, the juvenile court approved the
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-JV-1659 | January 10, 2020 Page 2 of 9
request and the State filed its petition alleging delinquency. On November 13,
N.B. pleaded guilty to criminal confinement resulting in bodily injury, a Level 5
felony, in an unrelated matter.1 The State subsequently filed a motion for
waiver of juvenile jurisdiction and the juvenile court scheduled a hearing on the
matter.
[4] While the State’s motion was pending, on February 26, 2019, the State filed an
amended motion for waiver of juvenile jurisdiction asserting that N.B. was a
child who had been previously convicted of a felony – specifically, N.B. had
been convicted of criminal confinement resulting in bodily injury, a Level 5
felony, on November 13, 2018. See id. at 33.2 The State subsequently submitted
a brief in which it argued that, due to N.B.’s prior felony conviction, the
juvenile court must waive N.B. to adult criminal court pursuant to Indiana
Code section 31-30-3-6.3 See id. at 48-49. The scheduled waiver hearing was
continued several times.
[5] On May 24, 2019, N.B. filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the juvenile court
lacked jurisdiction over him because he cannot be considered a “child” under
1
In March 2017, N.B. was charged with rape, incest, and sexual battery for acts allegedly committed against
his mother when he was nineteen years old. See State’s Appendix of Appellant, Volume II at 55-58.
However, on November 13, 2018, N.B. pleaded guilty to an amended charge of criminal confinement and
the remaining charges were dismissed. See id. at 54.
2
The State did not explicitly state in its amended motion that this conviction compelled mandatory waiver to
adult criminal court.
3
“Upon motion by the prosecuting attorney, the juvenile court shall waive jurisdiction if it finds that: (1) the
child is charged with an act which would be a felony if committed by an adult; and (2) the child has
previously been convicted of a felony or a nontraffic misdemeanor.” Ind. Code 31-30-3-6 (emphasis added).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-JV-1659 | January 10, 2020 Page 3 of 9
the delinquency statute as he was no longer under age twenty-one. See id. at 66.
Therefore, N.B. argued that the juvenile court lacked personal jurisdiction over
him and the court “may not proceed in this matter and must dismiss it with
prejudice.” Id. at 68.4 N.B. attached to his motion a copy of this court’s
decision in M.C. v. State, 127 N.E.3d 1178 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), in which a
panel of this court agreed with the parties that the juvenile court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction to adjudicate a twenty-two year old defendant delinquent
and enter a disposition. The State filed a response and argued the following:
4. [N.B.] cites the case of M.C. v. State as support for his
Motion to Dismiss which is inapplicable to the case at bar.
5. M.C. [v]. State merely stands for the proposition that the
juvenile court lacks jurisdiction to enter an adjudication against
an adult over the age of twenty-one (21) years of age.
6. The State of Indiana is not seeking an adjudication of
[N.B.] in this case.
7. This case is a mandatory waiver matter pursuant to I.C.
31-30-3-6.
State’s App. of Appellant, Vol. II at 81. The juvenile court held a hearing on
June 18 and took the matter under advisement. The juvenile court
4
Although the substance of N.B.’s argument with respect to the juvenile court’s jurisdiction remains
unchanged, we note that N.B. argued to the juvenile court that it lacked personal jurisdiction over him, but
argues on appeal that the juvenile court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-JV-1659 | January 10, 2020 Page 4 of 9
subsequently entered an order in which it found that it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction in the matter and granted N.B.’s motion to dismiss. The State now
appeals.
Discussion and Decision
I. Standard of Review
[6] The State appeals from the juvenile court’s grant of N.B.’s motion to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Juvenile courts are courts of limited
jurisdiction and their jurisdiction must be invoked by establishing the statutory
jurisdictional prerequisites. M.B. v. State, 815 N.E.2d 210, 213 (Ind. Ct. App.
2004). “When jurisdictional facts are not in dispute, we apply a de novo
standard of review on the question of whether a lower court had jurisdiction
over a juvenile proceeding.” Id.
II. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
[7] The State argues the juvenile court improperly granted N.B.’s motion to dismiss
because the juvenile court did have subject matter jurisdiction to determine
whether waiver of jurisdiction is appropriate. Further, the State maintains that
if the juvenile court lacks jurisdiction, then jurisdiction must rest with the
criminal court. Relying on M.C. v. State, N.B. argues the juvenile court loses all
jurisdiction over juvenile offenses after the offender becomes twenty-one years
old. We agree with the State.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-JV-1659 | January 10, 2020 Page 5 of 9
[8] The issue here stems from an apparent confusion between the juvenile court’s
jurisdiction to enter an adjudication against an adult defendant and its ability to
accept and entertain a delinquency petition and waiver to adult court. Our court
recently clarified this very issue in D.P. v. State, a nearly identical case handed
down after the parties in this case submitted their briefs.5 No. 19A-JV-690,
2019 WL 6109276, at *2, *3 (Ind. Ct. App. Nov. 18, 2019). There, the State
had filed a delinquency petition alleging that when D.P. was sixteen years old,
he committed an act that would constitute child molesting as a Class B felony if
committed by an adult; the State also filed a request to waive jurisdiction to
adult criminal court. Id. at *1. At the time the State filed its petition, D.P. was
twenty-three years old. Id. In response, D.P. filed a motion to dismiss arguing
that the juvenile court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over him because he
was twenty-three years old at the time the petition was filed. Id. Specifically,
he argued that, pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-30-1-1, the juvenile court
has exclusive original jurisdiction over proceedings when a person is alleged to
be a delinquent child; however, the juvenile court’s jurisdiction continues only
until the child becomes twenty-one years old. Id. The juvenile court denied
D.P.’s motion, finding that it had original jurisdiction because the alleged crime
occurred when D.P. was sixteen years old and the State properly filed a
5
Indiana Appellate Rule 48 states, “[w]hen pertinent and significant authorities come to the attention of a
party after the party’s brief or Petition has been filed, . . . a party may promptly file with the Clerk a notice of
those authorities setting forth the citations.” (emphasis added). Although discretionary, we note that neither
party availed itself of the opportunity to present this significant precedent, which would have aided in our
review of this case.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-JV-1659 | January 10, 2020 Page 6 of 9
delinquency petition and requested waiver to adult court. Id. In its order, the
juvenile court found,
It would be against public policy and legislative intent . . . to
grant [D.P.’s motion]. If the court were to grant the [motion],
that would mean that the statute of limitations for this type of
crime for an 18 year old suspect would be approximately 20
years, while for a 17 year old the limitation would be 4 years –
clearly not the intent and full reading of the statutes.
Id. at *2. Relying on M.C. v. State, D.P. appealed and asserted that the juvenile
court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over him due to his age. Id. The
State argued that the juvenile court had jurisdiction to waive the case to adult
criminal court and if the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction, the criminal court
must have it. Id.
[9] A panel of this court held the juvenile court had subject matter jurisdiction to
determine whether to waive D.P. to adult court and reasoned:
Ind. Code § 31-30-1-1 provides that “[a] juvenile court has
exclusive original jurisdiction . . . in . . . [o]ther proceedings
specified by law,” Ind. Code § 31-30-1-4, specifies that a juvenile
court lacks jurisdiction over certain offenses but does not list the
relevant allegation of child molesting as a class B felony, Ind.
Code § 31-30-3-5, provides “[e]xcept for those cases in which the
juvenile court has no jurisdiction in accordance with IC 31-30-1-
4, the court shall, upon motion of the prosecuting attorney and
after full investigation and hearing, waive jurisdiction” under
certain circumstances. Ind. Code § 31-30-1-11, provides that if a
court having criminal jurisdiction determines that a defendant is
alleged to have committed a crime before the defendant is
eighteen (18) years of age, the court shall immediately transfer
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-JV-1659 | January 10, 2020 Page 7 of 9
the case to the juvenile court. In light of these statutory
provisions, we conclude that the juvenile court had jurisdiction to
determine whether D.P. should be waived to adult criminal
court. We cannot say it was the legislature’s intent for an act that
would constitute child molesting as a class B felony if committed
by an adult to go entirely unpunished. See C.C. v. State, 907
N.E.2d 556, 559 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (“From a common sense
standpoint, if we were to follow C.C.’s reasoning to its illogical
conclusion, his misdemeanor violation of the firearm statute
would not fall within the jurisdiction of either the juvenile court
or the adult criminal court and thus would go unpunished. We
do not think this was the legislature’s intent.”).
Id. at *3 (footnotes omitted). Further, the court noted that M.C. was
distinguishable because the juvenile court did not adjudicate D.P. a delinquent
and enter a disposition; it “merely entered an order approving the filing of the
delinquency petition and scheduled a hearing on the motion to waive juvenile
jurisdiction.” Id. at *3 n.2. Such is the case here.
[10] M.C. concerned the juvenile court’s ability to adjudicate a defendant over age
twenty-one a delinquent child and enter a disposition, 127 N.E.3d at 1178,
whereas D.P. and this case concern the juvenile court’s ability to entertain a
delinquency petition and waive juvenile jurisdiction, 2019 WL 6109276, at *2.
Together M.C. and D.P. stand for the proposition that a juvenile court has
subject matter jurisdiction to entertain a delinquency petition and waive a
defendant to adult criminal court but does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate a
defendant over age twenty-one a delinquent child and enter a disposition.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-JV-1659 | January 10, 2020 Page 8 of 9
[11] Applying that proposition here, we conclude the juvenile court in this case had
subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the State’s delinquency petition and
determine whether to waive N.B. to adult criminal court. The juvenile court,
however, would not have jurisdiction to adjudicate N.B. a delinquent and enter
a disposition.
Conclusion
[12] We conclude the juvenile court had jurisdiction to accept and entertain the
State’s delinquency petition and determine whether N.B. should be waived to
adult criminal court. Therefore, the juvenile court erred in granting N.B.’s
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, we
reverse the juvenile court’s judgment and remand to the juvenile court with
instructions to rule on the State’s motion for waiver.
[13] Reversed and remanded.
Bradford, C.J., and Altice, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-JV-1659 | January 10, 2020 Page 9 of 9