[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
FILED
-------------------------------------------U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 06-10766 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
NOVEMBER 28, 2006
Non-Argument Calendar
-------------------------------------------- THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 04-00259-CR-J-32-TEM
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
COREY LAVALE MYERS,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(November 28, 2006)
Before EDMONDSON, Chief Judge, MARCUS and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Defendant-Appellant Corey Lavale Myers appeals his convictions for
possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base and 500
grams or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and
(b)(1)(B), and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). Myers specifically challenges the district
court’s denial of his motion to suppress based on the court’s determination that
officers had probable cause to arrest him. No reversible error has been shown; we
affirm.
A confidential informant (“CI”) informed law enforcement that Myers was a
cocaine distributor and that, on three different occasions when the CI visited
Myers at a house located at 1281 Turtle Creek Drive South in Jacksonville (the
“Turtle Creek house”), the CI had observed large quantities of cash wrapped in
plastic or hidden in a freezer. The CI also informed law enforcement that Myers
owned a custom pick-up truck with four wheels on its rear axle as well as several
motorcycles and all-terrain vehicles. To corroborate the CI’s statements, police
conducted a “trash pull” at the Turtle Creek house. In the trash, officers
discovered materials commonly used to wrap kilograms of cocaine, including
brown wrapping tape, black rubberized wrapping material, and clear plastic bags.
Officers also discovered marijuana stems, money wrappers in “$2,000
denominations,” and many pieces of discarded mail addressed to Myers. While
conducting surveillance of the Turtle Creek house, officers observed vehicles in
the driveway that were consistent with the CI’s description of Myers’s vehicles.
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Officers received a warrant to search the Turtle Creek house. Before
executing their search, police observed Myers exiting the house with a grocery bag
and driving away. Officers stopped Myers and returned him to the Turtle Creek
house.1 Myers consented to a search of the grocery bag in his car; the bag
contained wrapped currency totaling $61,000. Inside the Turtle Creek house, a
police officer saw kilo wrappers for cocaine; and Myers was read his Miranda
rights. Myers then told the officers that all the dope found in the house belonged
to him. He also pointed out a box containing powder cocaine and crack cocaine
and another box containing marijuana. After an officer asked Myers “where he
got the cocaine,” Myers responded, “It’s mine; it’s all mine.”2
Myers asserts that, because officers lacked probable cause to arrest him, the
district court should have granted his motion to suppress evidence of money
seized from him and the bag in his car as well as his statements to the police after
1
Myers’s wife and another person were at the Turtle Creek house when the police arrived with
Myers.
2
In searching the Turtle Creek house, officers also found a loaded pistol, a heat-sealing machine,
numerous heat-sealing bags, plastic zip bags, digital scales, and duct tape.
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he received Miranda warnings.3 Therefore, he contends that, although probable
cause supported a search of the Turtle Creek house, it did not support his arrest.
In considering the denial of a defendant’s motion to suppress, we review the
district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its application of law to those
facts de novo. United States v. Desir, 257 F.3d 1233, 1235-36 (11th Cir. 2001).
And we construe all facts in the light most favorable to the prevailing party: the
government. United States v. Boyce, 351 F.3d 1102, 1105 (11th Cir. 2003).
“[T]he Constitution permits an officer to arrest a suspect without a warrant
if there is probable cause to believe that the suspect has committed or is
committing an offense.” Michigan v. DeFillippo, 99 S.Ct. 2627, 2631 (1979).
“For probable cause to exist, . . . an arrest must be objectively reasonable based on
the totality of the circumstances.” Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1195 (11th Cir.
2002). “This standard is met when the facts and circumstances within the officer’s
knowledge, of which he or she has reasonably trustworthy information, would
cause a prudent person to believe, under the circumstances shown, that the suspect
has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense.” Id. (internal
quotation omitted). “[W]hen a group of officers is conducting an operation and
3
Myers notes that his motion to suppress did not attack the validity of the search warrant obtained
by police, nor did it seek suppression of evidence obtained from the Turtle Creek house pursuant to
the search warrant.
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there exists at least minimal communication between them, their collective
knowledge is determinative of probable cause.” United States v. Wilson, 894 F.2d
1245, 1254 (11th Cir. 1990).
Here, the totality of the circumstances indicates that officers had probable
cause to arrest Myers. The police were aware that a CI reported that Myers was a
cocaine distributor and that the CI had seen bundled cash at the Turtle Creek
house. The police observed vehicles at the Turtle Creek house that were
consistent with the CI’s description of Myers’s vehicles. In addition, a trash pull
at the Turtle Creek house revealed not only mail that indicated Myers lived at that
location but also marijuana and packaging materials consistent with cocaine
distribution. Therefore, officers had reasonably trustworthy information
indicating that Myers had committed an offense involving drug possession or
distribution. Because officers had probable cause to arrest Myers, the district
court did not err in denying Myers’s motion to suppress evidence obtained as a
result of his arrest.
AFFIRMED.
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