Filed 1/21/20
CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E070556
v. (Super.Ct.No. INF1500427)
SALVADOR YANEZ IV, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. James S. Hawkins, Judge.
Affirmed with directions.
Raymond Mark DiGuiseppe, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney
General; Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, and Daniel Rogers, Adrianne
Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105(b) and 8.1110, this opinion
is certified for publication with the exception of parts II C., III A.-C., and III E.
1
Denault and Christopher P. Beesley, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION
On March 11, 2015, Gilbert Lopez died from gunshot wounds following a verbal
argument with defendant and appellant, Salvador Yanez IV. Defendant was charged and
convicted by a jury of the second degree murder of Lopez (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a))1
and being a felon in possession of a firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)). The jury also found
true special allegations that defendant discharged a firearm and caused great bodily injury
or death in the commission of the murder. (§ 12022.53, subd. (d).) In a bifurcated
proceeding, the trial court found defendant had suffered a prior conviction for a serious or
violent felony pursuant to section 667, subdivision (a) and a prior strike conviction
pursuant to section 667, subdivisions (b) through (i). Defendant was sentenced to a total
of 60 years to life in state prison, representing 30 years to life for the murder conviction,
an additional 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement, and an additional consecutive
five years for the prior serious felony conviction.
On appeal, defendant contends: (1) the trial court abused its discretion in
admitting expert gang testimony which should have been excluded as unduly prejudicial
under Evidence Code section 352; (2) the prosecutor engaged in misconduct warranting
reversal by referencing jury deliberations during argument on defendant’s motion to
1 Unless otherwise noted, all undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
2
strike his firearm enhancement conviction; (3) defendant was not given constitutionally
adequate advisement when waiving his right to a jury trial on his prior conviction and
prior strike allegations; (4) the matter should be remanded to allow the trial court to
exercise discretion to impose a lesser, uncharged firearm enhancement pursuant to
section 12022.53, subdivision (h); and (5) the matter should be remanded to allow the
trial court to exercise its discretion to strike a five-year enhancement pursuant to recent
amendments made to sections 667 and 1385. We remand the matter for resentencing
pursuant to amended sections 667 and 1385. In all other respects, we affirm the
judgment.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Facts
On March 11, 2015, Gilbert Lopez became involved in a verbal argument with
defendant. Gilbert was visiting his brother, Angel Lopez, and the two were hanging out
on the balcony of Angel’s apartment when two men approached and called out to them
from below.2 Defendant was one of the two men.
Defendant looked up and initiated a verbal conversation with Angel by asking if
Angel had seen an individual named “Stoner.” When Angel responded that he had not
seen “Stoner,” defendant then asked Angel where he was from. Angel understood this to
be a question regarding what gang he was in, and in response replied: “‘I don’t bang.’”
2Because they share the same surnames, we will refer to Gilbert Lopez and Angel
Lopez by their first names for convenience and clarity, intending no disrespect.
3
However, Gilbert responded with: “‘Wait a minute’ . . . ‘[w]hy are you coming over here
and saying where are you from?’”
In response to Gilbert, defendant identified himself as “Downer” from “JT.”
Gilbert proceeded to walk downstairs to confront defendant and a verbal argument
ensued. Gilbert was heard saying: “‘Why are you coming over here gangbanging to my
brother?’” and “‘Let’s get down then.’” In response, defendant stated: “‘Nah, not with
all of these kids here.’” At some point, Gilbert pulled out a gun, to which defendant
responded: “‘What the fuck is wrong with you?’” Their verbal confrontation escalated
to a point where others in the apartment complex called their children inside. Eventually,
Gilbert returned to Angel’s apartment and explained he had been arguing with defendant
about gang-related activities like “not representing his hood.”
While in Angel’s apartment, Gilbert exchanged text messages with a friend.
During this text exchange, Gilbert asked if his friend knew “Downer from J-T”;
explained that he had been in a confrontation with Downer; stated that “I pulled out my
strap ‘cause I didn’t know who it was”; and expressed concern stating “on the real homes
if anything is—if anyone has beef to get at me on the street, Polfast.” Shortly after his
text exchange, Gilbert left Angel’s apartment.
Angel watched from the balcony of his apartment as Gilbert walked towards the
parking area of the apartment complex. Angel heard someone call out, “‘[h]ey,’”
watched as Gilbert turned in the direction of the voice, and watched Gilbert walk out of
sight. Angel exited his apartment to follow Gilbert and heard several gunshots while
4
doing so. As Angel ran toward the sound of the shots, he observed defendant run away
from the area, enter a white car, and drive away quickly. Angel saw a black object in
defendant’s hand as defendant was running toward the car, but could not specifically
identify the object. He then discovered Gilbert shot and called an ambulance.
Gilbert had been shot five times, with gunshot wounds in his neck, torso, pelvis,
right thigh, and left arm. The shots appeared to have been fired at close range and most
of them indicated Gilbert had been shot from the backside. Gilbert died from these
gunshot wounds.
B. Charges
On December 31, 2015, defendant was charged in an information with one count
of murder (count 1; § 187, subd. (a)) and one count of unlawful possession of a firearm
(count 2; § 29800, subd. (a)(1)). The information further alleged that defendant
intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury or death in the commission
of count 1 in violation of sections 12022.53, subdivision (d) and 1192.7, subdivision
(c)(8). Finally, the information alleged that defendant had a serious felony prior (§ 667,
subd. (a)), as well as a prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (c), (e)(1), 1170.12, subd.
(c)(1)).
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C. Gang Evidence
Because the only evidentiary issue raised on appeal relates to the testimony of the
People’s gang expert,3 we summarize only those trial proceedings relevant to this issue.
1. Pretrial Motion on Gang Evidence
Prior to trial, the People requested that the court determine the admissibility of
gang monikers pursuant to Evidence Code section 402. The trial court, prosecutor, and
defense counsel reached an understanding following a discussion off the record. When
placing this understanding on the record, the trial court stated: “Okay. We discussed [the
People’s] second [Evidence Code section] 402 regarding using gang monikers ‘Downer’
and ‘Trece.’ I don’t know if there’s others, but there was—we all agree there will be
some testimony, basic testimony, about gangs and monikers can come in from both
sides.”
In response, defense counsel asserted the following objection: “I would initially
make an Evidence Code [section] 352 argument that, you know, any mention of gang
monikers or gang evidence could be more prejudicial than probative in this matter.
However, to the extent that the Court agrees that gang-related evidence would be relevant
to issues of the case, I would just argue what’s good for the goose is good for the gander.
If there’s going to be mention of [defendant’s] moniker and perhaps affiliation . . . then
Defendant’s opening brief challenges the introduction of “gang evidence”
3
without specifically identifying the testimony or evidence subject to this challenge.
However, the only evidence specifically referenced in his argument is testimony from the
prosecution’s gang expert. Accordingly, we consider defendant’s challenge as one
directed to the admission of this expert testimony.
6
those areas as to the victim . . . would be open as well, his moniker and his affiliation
with what’s been known to the Indio police officer an Indio gang.”
2. Expert Gang Testimony
At trial, the People called a detective with the street crimes unit of the Indio Police
Department as an expert to testify on Riverside County gangs. The detective opined that
criminal street gangs are three or more people in an ongoing association or organization
that share a name, common symbol or sign, and participate together in criminal activity.
The detective explained that tattoos bore particular significance in the street gang culture
because they signify that an individual has earned his place within the gang. He further
explained that street gangs use monikers or nicknames to identify individuals within a
gang, convey fear and intimidation, and to identify which individual committed a crime
without using real names.
The detective testified that in gang terminology, the phrase “hit up” refers to a
challenge which can be used to determine the identity of rival gang members or allies, or
show dominance over another gang member, or as a prelude to violence. A “hit up” is
alternatively referred to as “banging” or “gang-banging” and is typically initiated by
asking someone where they are from. The typical responses to the question range from
disclaiming any gang membership, identification of a gang affiliation, or immediate
violence.
The detective personally knew defendant, knew defendant to be affiliated with the
Jackson Terrace Street Gang, knew defendant bore tattoos associated with the Jackson
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Terrace Street Gang, and knew defendant’s moniker to be “Downer.” During this
questioning, defense counsel objected only to questions regarding defendant’s tattoos
based upon relevance. The detective was also familiar with Gilbert and knew him to be a
member of the Sur Town Locos street gang. He was unaware of any rivalry between Sur
Town Locos and Jackson Terrace Street Gang at the time of the shooting. Defense
counsel did not object to any of the questioning related to Gilbert’s gang affiliation.
Finally, the detective testified that in his experience, when crimes occur that are
gang related, witnesses can be reluctant to assist. He further explained that gang
members in custody who are known to have assisted police often face the prospect of
being assaulted or killed.
On cross-examination, defense counsel elicited further testimony clarifying that
both Sur Town Locos and Jackson Terrace Street Gang were active street gangs in Indio,
that the gangs were separate gangs, and that no known rivalries existed between the two
gangs. The detective identified defendant as a longtime gang member or “OG,” and that
gang-related crimes include homicide, theft, and the sale of drugs. The detective
reconfirmed that the use of gang tattoos or verbal affiliation with a gang would be
unacceptable absent membership in the gang. He was asked to confirm that a “hit up”
was a challenge that could result in a verbal argument, physical confrontation, the use of
weapons, a shooting, or a homicide. He also conceded that it is possible nothing violent
occurs, depending on the reaction of the person being challenged.
8
On redirect examination, the detective explained that the concept of “respect” in
the gang culture is paramount. He clarified that “OG” refers to an original gangster,
someone who has grown up in the gang and put in work for the gang, earned his stripes
or considered a veteran of the gang. He confirmed that defendant was considered an
“OG” of his gang. No objections were made to this line of questioning.
D. Verdict and Sentencing
On March 1, 2018, a jury found defendant guilty of second degree murder on
count 1. The jury also found true the allegation that defendant discharged a firearm
causing great bodily harm or death in the commission of the murder. In a bifurcated
proceeding, the trial court found true the special allegations that defendant had been
previously convicted of a serious felony and strike offense.
Defendant requested that the court exercise its discretion to strike the firearm
enhancement and prior strike conviction pursuant to sections 12022.53, subdivision (h)
and 1385. The trial court denied both requests. Defendant was sentenced to 55 years to
life on count 1, representing 15 years on the murder conviction, doubled to 30 years for
the prior strike conviction and increased by an additional 25 years for the firearm
enhancement. Defendant was also sentenced to an additional five years for the prior
serious felony enhancement, to run consecutively with the sentence on count 1.4
4The trial court also sentenced defendant to four years on count 2, to run
concurrently with the sentence on count 1.
9
III. DISCUSSION
A. Defendant Has Not Shown Error in Admission of Gang Expert Testimony
Defendant contends the trial court erred in allowing the introduction of gang
evidence, arguing that the evidence was more prejudicial than probative. The argument
was forfeited for failure to assert sufficiently specific objections below and we would
find no error even if we were to consider the argument on the merits.
1. Defendant Failed to Preserve the Challenge Below
“[A] court may not reverse a judgment based on error in admitting evidence unless
‘an objection to or a motion to exclude or to strike the evidence . . . was timely made and
so stated as to make clear the specific ground of the objection or motion.’ ‘. . . [W]e have
consistently held that the “defendant’s failure to make a timely and specific objection” on
the ground asserted on appeal makes that ground not cognizable. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]
‘Although no “particular form of objection” is required, the objection must “fairly inform
the trial court, as well as the party offering the evidence, of the specific reason or reasons
the objecting party believes the evidence should be excluded, so the party offering the
evidence can respond appropriately and the court can make a fully informed ruling.”’”
(People v. Valdez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 82, 130.)
“‘The objection requirement is necessary in criminal cases because a “contrary
rule would deprive the People of the opportunity to cure the defect at trial and would
‘permit the defendant to gamble on an acquittal at his trial secure in the knowledge that a
conviction would be reversed on appeal.’”’” (People v. Williams (2008) 43 Cal.4th 584,
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620.) Thus, a general objection to the admission of gang evidence prior to trial without
identification of the specific evidence or testimony at issue is insufficient to preserve the
objection on appeal. (People v. Zepeda (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1183, 1208.)
Here, defendant did not file any pretrial motions seeking to exclude any gang-
related evidence on the ground that it was more prejudicial than probative. Nor does the
record disclose that defendant asserted this objection at any time during the testimony of
the People’s gang expert. In his opening brief, defendant directs us to a single instance in
which an objection to gang-related evidence was asserted on the basis that it could be
more prejudicial than probative. However, when viewed in context, this objection cannot
be reasonably interpreted as sufficient to preserve the issue on appeal.
First, the objection was prompted by the trial court’s statement that: “We
discussed [the prosecution’s] second [Evidence Code section] 402 regarding using gang
monikers ‘Downer’ and ‘Trece.’ I don’t know if there’s others, but there was—we all
agree there will be some testimony, basic testimony, about gangs and monikers can come
in from both sides.” Thus, the context indicates that the objection was made only to
evidence referencing gang monikers and symbols. There was no discussion on the record
and no indication by defendant that the objection was intended to extend to any and all
evidence which might reference gangs or explain gang culture generally.
Second, even if the objection was intended to extend to all gang evidence
generally, such an objection was not sufficiently specific. When the trial court expressed
the opinion that “we all agree” at least some testimony about gangs would be admitted,
11
defendant did not object or attempt to correct that understanding. In response, defense
counsel simply noted that unspecified gang evidence “could” be more prejudicial than
probative, but did not identify any specific evidence, let alone explain the reason why any
unspecified evidence would be prejudicial. In fact, defendant concedes on appeal that at
least some gang evidence was properly admitted. Clearly, an objection is overbroad and
not sufficiently specific where defendant himself concedes that it encompassed evidence
and testimony which he did not intend to challenge. It was incumbent upon defendant to
make specific objections to the specific testimony or evidence to allow the trial court to
make an informed determination on the merits. Absent a specific objection, the challenge
is deemed forfeited.
Finally, even if the objection had been properly raised, the record discloses that a
significant amount of the testimony which defendant now argues was unduly prejudicial
was, in fact, elicited by defense counsel on cross-examination. The testimony regarding
the role of “hit ups” in the gang culture and defendant’s status as a veteran or “OG” was
elicited on cross-examination by defense counsel. Accordingly, “the testimony about
which defendant now complains was elicited by his own counsel . . . [and] any error was
invited, and defendant may not challenge that error on appeal.” (People v. Williams
(2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 587, 620.) For all of the above reasons, we conclude that any
challenge to the admission of expert gang testimony was forfeited for failure to assert a
proper objection below.
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2. The Admission of Gang Expert Testimony Was Not Erroneous
Furthermore, even in the absence of forfeiture, we would conclude that the
admission of expert gang testimony here was not erroneous.
(a) General Legal Principles and Standard of Review
“California courts have long recognized the potential prejudicial effect of gang
evidence. . . . Because gang evidence creates a risk that the jury will infer that the
defendant has a criminal disposition and is therefore guilty of the charged offense, ‘trial
courts should carefully scrutinize such evidence before admitting it.’ [Citation.]”
(People v. Samaniego (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1148, 1167.) “Nonetheless, evidence
related to gang membership is not insulated from the general rule that all relevant
evidence is admissible if it is relevant to a material issue in the case other than character,
is not more prejudicial than probative, and is not cumulative.” (Ibid.) A trial court’s
decision to admit gang evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (People v. Carter
(2003) 30 Cal.4th 1166, 1194.) “‘The admission of gang evidence over an Evidence
Code section 352 objection will not be disturbed on appeal unless the trial court’s
decision exceeds the bounds of reason. . . .’” (People v. Gonzalez (2005) 126
Cal.App.4th 1539, 1550.)
(b) Analysis
“Gang evidence is relevant and admissible when the very reason for the
underlying crime, that is the motive, is gang related.” (People v. Samaniego, supra, 172
Cal.App.4th at p. 1167.) “Since at least 1980, our courts have recognized that evidence
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of gang sociology and psychology is beyond common experience and thus a proper
subject for expert testimony. [Citations.] [¶] The People are entitled to ‘introduce
evidence of gang affiliation and activity where such evidence is relevant to an issue of
motive or intent.’ [Citation.] ‘[B]ecause a motive is ordinarily the incentive for criminal
behavior, its probative value generally exceeds its prejudicial effect, and wide latitude is
permitted in admitting evidence of its existence.’” (People v. Gonzalez, supra, 126
Cal.App.4th at p. 1550; see also People v. Olguin (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 1355, 1384 [“It
is difficult to imagine a clearer need for expert explication than that presented by a
subculture in which . . . mindless retaliation promotes ‘respect.’”].)
This case arose out of a homicide which occurred following a rapidly escalating
series of interactions involving defendant and Gilbert. The interaction between these two
apparent strangers was permeated by references to words and phrases which would be
entirely unknown by those unfamiliar with gang culture. Given such, the People
introduced expert testimony which identified Gilbert and defendant as members of
different gangs, explained the general relationship between their respective gangs,
explained the meaning attributed to certain phrases in the gang subculture, and explained
the importance and means of earning respect through confrontation within the gang
subculture. This testimony was clearly relevant to the issue of motive. Such testimony
could assist the jury in making sense of the facts, explained a potential reason why
defendant’s otherwise innocuous question to Angel would trigger such a seemingly
disproportionate response from Gilbert, and explained why the verbal interaction could
14
create a potential for subsequent violence. To the extent defendant now argues that the
expert’s testimony was unconvincing, self-contradicting, or incomplete, these are issues
of weight and credibility for the jury and do not impact its probative value with respect to
the central issue of motive.
Given that the expert gang testimony here was directly relevant to the issue of
motive, admission of this evidence was not an abuse of discretion unless its probative
value was outweighed by the risk of prejudice. While the admission of any gang
evidence comes with some degree of prejudice, the expert here did not offer any specific
opinion on defendant’s motives based on the facts of the case, did not discuss any
specific prior criminal history of defendant, and did not discuss any prior criminal history
involving the gang with which defendant was affiliated.
Furthermore, the trial court gave the jury a limiting instruction in the form of
CALCRIM No. 1403, instructing the jury of the limited purpose for which they could
consider any gang evidence. “Because the gang evidence was highly probative in this
case, and the trial court gave a limiting instruction designed to lessen the risk of undue
prejudice, we cannot say the trial court’s decision to allow the gang affiliation evidence
exceeded the bounds of reason.” (People v. Montes (2014) 58 Cal.4th 809, 860.)
Accordingly, even if defendant had preserved this challenge on appeal, we find no abuse
of discretion in the trial court’s decision to admit the gang evidence at issue. Since we
find no error, we need not discuss defendant’s arguments that he would have obtained a
more favorable verdict in the absence of such evidence.
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B. Defendant Has Not Shown Prejudice Resulting from Alleged Prosecutorial
Misconduct
Defendant also argues that the prosecutor engaged in reversable misconduct by
referencing information gathered about the jury’s deliberative process during oral
argument on defendant’s motion to strike his firearm enhancement pursuant to section
12022.53, subdivision (h). Even assuming the prosecutor’s reference was improper, we
conclude that defendant has not shown resulting prejudice warranting reversal.
“‘“A prosecutor’s misconduct violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution when it ‘infects the trial with such unfairness as to make the
conviction a denial of due process.’ . . . [T]he misconduct must be ‘of sufficient
significance to result in the denial of the defendant’s right to a fair trial.’”’” (People v.
Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 1009.) “A prosecutor’s misconduct that does not render a
trial fundamentally unfair nevertheless violates California law if it involves ‘the use of
deceptive or reprehensible methods to attempt to persuade either the court or the jury.’”
(Id. at pp. 1009-1010.) Furthermore, “‘[a] defendant’s conviction will not be reversed for
prosecutorial misconduct, however, unless it is reasonably probable that a result more
favorable to the defendant would have been reached without the misconduct. . . .’” (Id. at
p. 1010.)
Here, the single statement by the prosecutor that 11 members of the jury believed
the crime was first degree murder, which defendant now contends constituted
misconduct, was a reference made during oral argument on a motion before the trial
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judge outside the presence of the jury. “‘“A trial judge hears many items during the
course of a trial which are inadmissible . . . . The fact that [s]he has heard these things
does not mean that [s]he cannot divorce them from [her] mind.”’” (Hayward v. Superior
Court (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 10, 60, citing People v. Beaumaster (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d
996, 1009.) “‘“As an aspect of the presumption that judicial duty is properly performed
[citation], we presume . . . that the court . . . is able to distinguish admissible from
inadmissible evidence, relevant from irrelevant facts, and to recognize those facts which
properly may be considered in the judicial decisionmaking process.” [Citation.] Stated
another way, a trial court is presumed to ignore material it knows is incompetent,
irrelevant, or inadmissible.’ [Citation.] ‘Only proof that the evidence actually figured in
the court’s decision will overcome these presumptions. . . .’” (Hayward v. Superior
Court, supra, at pp. 60-61; see also People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 151 [even
where trial court reviewed improper evidence, “we assume the court was not improperly
influenced thereby, absent evidence in the record to the contrary.”].)
There is nothing in this record which demonstrates that the trial court relied on the
prosecutor’s reference to the jury’s initial vote regarding first degree murder in exercising
its discretion whether to strike the firarm enhancement. The prosecutor argued and the
trial court heard many appropriate factors to consider in the exercise of its discretion,
including, but not limited to, defendant’s violent criminal past and the egregious
circumstances of the crime. Thus, regardless of whether the reference to jury deliberation
was proper, we presume the trial court properly performed its judicial duty and
17
disregarded any such argument in ruling on the motion to strike defendant’s firearm
enhancement. Absent any indication that the trial court relied upon improper argument as
a basis for its ruling, defendant has not shown prejudice warranting reversal.
C. Defendant Knowingly Waived the Right to a Jury Trial on the Prior Conviction
Allegations
Defendant also argues the trial court failed to properly obtain a waiver of his right
to a jury trial on the prior conviction enhancement allegations, requiring reversal on that
issue. There is no question that defendant expressly stated on the record that he gave up
his right to a jury trial on the prior conviction enhancements. However, defendant argues
that the record does not affirmatively disclose proper admonishment or advisement by the
trial court when putting his waiver on the record. Thus, the issue before us is not whether
the waiver was voluntary, but rather whether the waiver was knowing and intelligent.
While the process used here to confirm defendant’s waiver on the record was not ideal,
we find no error given the totality of the circumstances.
“Under the federal Constitution and our state Constitution, a defendant in a
criminal prosecution has a right to a jury trial. [Citations.] However, a ‘jury may be
waived in a criminal cause by the consent of both parties expressed in open court by the
defendant and the defendant’s counsel.’ [Citation.] Waiver must be ‘expressed in words
. . . and will not be implied from a defendant’s conduct.’ [Citation.] . . . ‘[W]hether or
not there is an intelligent, competent, self-protecting waiver of jury trial by an accused
must depend upon the unique circumstances of each case.’” (People v. Sivongxxay
18
(2017) 3 Cal.5th 151, 166.) Given the importance of ensuring a voluntary, knowing, and
intelligent waiver, our Supreme Court has strongly suggested that trial courts use a
“robust oral colloquy” which specifically advises a defendant “of the basic mechanics of
a jury trial.” (Id. at p. 169.)
Nevertheless, our Supreme Court has continued to affirm that no specific colloquy
or admonishments are required, explaining: “‘[T]he United States Supreme Court has
never held that a defendant, when waiving the right to a jury, constitutionally is entitled
to be canvassed by the trial court, let alone to require a specifically formulated canvass’
[citations] and we have never insisted that a jury waiver colloquy invariably must discuss
juror impartiality, the unanimity requirement, or both for an ensuing waiver to be
knowing and intelligent.” (People v. Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 168.) We have
similarly expressed the same view that “there is no requirement that the trial court explain
to a defendant every aspect that he is giving up in entering a waiver to a jury trial.”
(People v. Doyle (2016) 19 Cal.App.5th 946, 952-953.) Instead, we look to the totality of
the circumstances unique to each case in order to determine whether a waiver was
knowing and intelligent. (People v. Sivongxxay, supra, at pp. 166-167.)
We initially note that defendant expressly waived his right to a jury trial on the
record. Despite the fact that the waiver placed on the record did not itself include any
specific mention of the mechanics of a jury trial, we cannot ignore the fact that the waiver
was taken almost immediately following the conclusion of defendant’s jury trial on the
underlying offense. Defendant was present and personally witnessed every aspect of his
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jury trial. Thus, defendant personally witnessed the fact that a jury is made up of 12
members of the community, personally observed his counsel’s ability to participate in
jury selection, personally heard the court instruct the jury that its duty was to impartially
determine the facts, and personally heard the court advise the jury that any verdict
required unanimity. The waiver at issue here was taken shortly after the jury retired to
deliberate and the trial court did advise defendant that by waiving his right to a jury,
defendant was electing to have the truth of his prior conviction allegations determined by
a judge.
Given the unique timing of the waiver in the context of this case, it would be
unreasonable to conclude that defendant was unaware of the basic mechanics of a jury
trial at the time his waiver was otherwise voluntarily given. Defendant has not shown
that his waiver in this case was unknowing or unintelligent given the timing and
circumstances presented in this case.
D. Remand of the Firearm Enhancement Sentence Is Not Warranted
Defendant requested that the trial court exercise its discretion to strike his firearm
enhancement pursuant to section 12022.53, subdivision (h) and the request was denied.
Nevertheless, defendant contends that the matter must be remanded to allow the trial
court to exercise its discretion to potentially impose a lesser, uncharged firearm
enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivision (h), relying on People v. Morrison
(2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 217 as authority for such “newly-granted discretion.” We
respectfully disagree with the reasoning set forth in that opinion and conclude that the
20
statute does not afford any such discretion. We therefore decline to remand the matter on
this basis.
Section 12022.53 provides three different sentence enhancements for the personal
use of a firearm in the commission of enumerated offenses: a 10-year enhancement for
the personal use of a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)); a 20-year enhancement for the
personal and intentional discharge of a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)); and a 25-year-to-
life enhancement for the personal and intentional discharge of a firearm causing great
bodily injury or death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). Recently, the Legislature amended the
statute to include the following: “The court may, in the interest of justice pursuant to
Section 1385 and at the time of sentencing, strike or dismiss an enhancement otherwise
required to be imposed by this section. . . .” (§ 12022.53, subd. (h).)
Thus, the question we consider here is whether the statute, as amended, provides
authority for a trial court to exercise discretion to impose a lesser included, uncharged
enhancement in the interests of justice pursuant to section 1385, notwithstanding a
finding by the trier of fact in support of a greater enhancement. In Morrison, our
colleagues in the First District concluded that it does, analogizing to cases recognizing
the trial court’s discretionary authority to impose a lesser included, uncharged
enhancement where a greater enhancement found true by the trier of fact is determined
either legally inapplicable or unsupported by sufficient evidence. (People v. Morrison,
supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at pp. 222-223.) More recently, our colleagues in the Fifth District
reached the opposite conclusion in People v. Tirado (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 637,
21
concluding that the statute contained no language suggesting the Legislature intended to
grant such discretion in sentencing. (Id. at pp. 642-644.) After conducting our own
independent analysis of section 12022.53, subdivision (h), we agree with the conclusion
reached in Tirado.
“‘“When we interpret a statute, ‘[o]ur fundamental task . . . is to determine the
Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose. We first examine the statutory
language, giving it a plain and commonsense meaning. We do not examine that language
in isolation, but in the context of the statutory framework as a whole in order to
determine its scope and purpose and to harmonize the various parts of the enactment. If
the language is clear, courts must generally follow its plain meaning unless a literal
interpretation would result in absurd consequences the Legislature did not intend.’”’”
(Hassell v. Bird (2018) 5 Cal.5th 522, 540.) In construing any statute, “we may not
broaden or narrow the scope of the provision by reading into it language that does not
appear in it or reading out of it language that does. ‘Our office . . . “is simply to ascertain
and declare” what is in the relevant statutes, “not to insert what has been omitted, or to
omit what has been inserted.”’ [Citation.] ‘“‘A court . . . may not rewrite the statute to
conform to an assumed intention which does not appear from its language.’”’” (Doe v.
City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 545.)
Here, nothing in the plain language of sections 1385 or 12022.53, subdivision (h)
suggests an intent to allow a trial court discretion to substitute one sentencing
enhancement for another. We agree with our colleagues in the Fifth District that under a
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plain reading, the Legislature’s use of the words “strike” or “dismiss” indicates the
court’s power pursuant to these sections is binary. (People v. Tirado, supra, 38
Cal.App.5th at p. 643.) We note that our colleagues in Division Three of this district
reached the same conclusion when considering the plain meaning of the term “strike” in
the context of a similar drug sentencing enhancement statute in People v. Harvey (1991)
233 Cal.App.3d 1206. There, the court analyzed Health and Safety Code section
11370.4, subdivision (e), which provides the trial court may “strike” an enhancement if it
determines that there are circumstances in mitigation. (People v. Harvey, supra, at p.
1229.) In concluding that the word “strike” did not include discretion to impose a lesser
enhancement, the court explained: “The wording of the section makes it clear that the
sentencing court has only two alternatives. If the court does not feel there are mitigating
circumstances sufficient to justify the striking of the enhancement, it must impose the
enhancement. Otherwise, if it finds that mitigating circumstances do exist which would
justify striking the enhancement, it may be stricken. Nowhere does the section indicate
the court may impose only a portion of the enhancement. In interpreting the statute, the
Legislature is presumed to have meant what it said, and the plain meaning of the
language governs. [Citation.] Nowhere in the statute does it indicate the court has any
discretion besides either imposing the full enhancement or striking it in its entirety.” (Id.
at pp. 1229-1230.) The same reasoning would apply here.
Further, even if the wording of section 12022.53, subdivision (h) were ambiguous,
“we apply ‘reason, practicality, and common sense to the language at hand’ [citation]
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. . . consider[ing] the consequences that will flow from a particular interpretation” in
order to reach a proper interpretation of the statute. (MacIsaac v. Waste Management
Collection & Recycling, Inc. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1084.) Here, we must
consider the impact any proposed interpretation of section 12022.53, subdivision (h) may
have on the separation of powers. “‘The California Constitution (art. III, § 3) provides
that “the powers of state government are legislative, executive, and judicial. Persons
charged with the exercise of one power may not exercise either of the others except as
permitted by [the] Constitution.” [¶] It is well settled that the prosecuting authorities,
exercising executive functions, ordinarily have the sole discretion to determine whom to
charge with public offenses and what charges to bring. [Citations.] . . . The
prosecution’s authority in this regard is founded, among other things, on the principle of
separation of powers, and generally is not subject to supervision by the judicial branch.’”
(People v. Andreotti (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1263, 1268, citing People v. Birks (1998) 19
Cal.4th 108, 134.) In light of such, we decline to adopt an interpretation of section
12022.53, subdivision (h) which would vest the trial court with discretionary power to
essentially modify a charge brought by the prosecutor despite sufficient evidence to
support such a charge.
Here, the People charged defendant with a sentencing enhancement pursuant to
section 12022.53, subdivision (d) and the jury found those allegations true. There is no
suggestion that the jury’s verdict was unsupported by the law or the evidence as would
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justify the imposition of a lesser offense5. Because we reach a conclusion contrary to that
in Morrison, we decline to remand the matter for resentencing on the ground that the trial
court has newly granted discretion to impose a lesser, uncharged enhancement.
Finally, we note that even if we were to adopt a different interpretation and find
section 12022.53, subdivision (h) vests the trial court with discretion to modify a charge
otherwise supported by sufficient evidence, we would find that defendant forfeited the
argument in this case. “A party in a criminal case may not, on appeal, raise ‘claims
involving the trial court’s failure to properly make or articulate its discretionary
sentencing choices’ if the party did not object to the sentence at trial.” (People v.
Sperling (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1094, 1100.) The amended statute became effective
January 1, 2018 and defendant was not sentenced until May of 2018. While the
defendant requested the trial court strike the enhancement pursuant to the amended
statute, there was no request to modify or reduce the enhancement. Accordingly, even if
we were to hold that the amended statute gave the trial court discretion to impose a lesser
enhancement, any such argument was forfeited by failing to raise the issue below.
E. Remand to Exercise Discretion to Strike the Prior Conviction Enhancement
Finally, defendant contends that his sentencing should be remanded to permit the
trial court to exercise its discretion to strike a five-year enhancement pursuant to recent
5 To the extent the Legislature has provided statutory authority for a trial court to
modify a verdict in order to impose a lesser offense or lesser punishment than that found
true by a jury, it has specified that such should occur only when the verdict is contrary to
the law or evidence. (§ 1181.)
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amendments made to sections 667 and 1385. The People concede that the amendments
to sections 667, subdivision (a) and 1385, subdivision (b) embodied in Senate Bill No.
1393 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) which permit a trial court to exercise discretion to dismiss
or strike a five-year consecutive term imposed for prior serious felony convictions applies
here because his conviction is not yet final. (People v. Garcia (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th
961, 971.) Nevertheless, the People argue that remand is not necessary because the
record is clear the trial court would not have exercised its discretion to strike the prior
serious felony conviction even if it had been given the opportunity to do so. We disagree.
“We are not required to remand to allow the court to exercise its discretion if ‘the
record shows that the trial court clearly indicated when it originally sentenced the
defendant that it would not in any event have stricken [the] . . . enhancement’ even if it
had the discretion.” (People v. Jones (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 267, 272-273.) “The trial
court need not have specifically stated at sentencing it would not strike the enhancement
if it had the discretion to do so. Rather, we review the trial court’s statements and
sentencing decision to infer what its intent would have been.” (Id. at p. 273.)
However, we are not convinced that the record here allows us to draw that
inference. The trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to strike his prior strike
conviction and denial of defendant’s motion to strike his firearm enhancement certainly
allows us to infer that the trial court intended to impose a significant sentence. However,
when sentencing on the unlawful possession conviction, the trial court imposed only the
middle term and further allowed the sentence to run concurrently with the sentence on the
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murder conviction, indicating some desire for leniency. Accordingly, the record does not
clearly indicate that the trial court would not have exercised its discretion to strike the
serious prior felony conviction if it had been given the opportunity to do so. We remand
the matter to allow the trial court an opportunity to exercise its discretion to do so,
without expressing any opinion as to how such discretion should be exercised.
IV. DISPOSITION
The conviction is affirmed. The matter is remanded to permit the trial court to
determine whether to strike the enhancement under section 667, subdivision (a) and to
resentence defendant accordinatly. In all other respects the judgment is affirmed.
CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION
FIELDS
J.
We concur:
CODRINGTON
Acting P. J.
RAPHAEL
J.
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