NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
______________
No. 19-2356
_______________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
TAQUAN WRIGHT,
Appellant
______________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. No. 3-17-cr-00229-001)
District Judge: Hon. Brian R. Martinotti
______________
Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
January 22, 2020
______________
Before: AMBRO, MATEY, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges.
(Opinion filed: January 23, 2020)
______________
OPINION *
______________
FUENTES, Circuit Judge.
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does not
constitute binding precedent.
Appellant Taquan Wright pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute heroin
and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking offense. The District
Court sentenced Wright to 106 months’ imprisonment. He now appeals his sentence,
arguing that the District Court failed to give adequate consideration to his mitigating
evidence and that his sentence was greater than necessary to meet the purposes of
sentencing. Because we conclude that the District Court’s sentence was procedurally and
substantively sound, we will affirm.
I.
In March 2017, Wright was pulled over by state law enforcement officers for
driving with tinted windows and an obstructed license plate. As one of the officers spoke
to Wright, he noticed an odor of marijuana emanating from the vehicle, causing the
officers to search the vehicle. The search revealed, inter alia, prescription pills, a sum of
U.S. currency, and a hidden compartment, which contained cocaine, heroin, and one
loaded Smith & Wesson 9mm handgun.
Wright was charged with one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon, 1 possession with intent to distribute 28 grams of cocaine base, 2 possession with
intent to distribute a detectable amount of heroin, 3 and possession of a firearm in
furtherance of a drug-trafficking offense. 4
1
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
2
21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B).
3
21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C).
4
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i).
2
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Wright pled guilty to possession with intent to
distribute heroin and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking offense.
Based on a total offense level of 21 and a criminal history category of III, he was subject
to an advisory U.S. Sentencing Guidelines range of 46 to 57 months on the drug offense.
However, because Wright was also subject to a consecutive, mandatory minimum
sentence of 60 months under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), he was subject to a total advisory
Guidelines range of 106 to 117 months.
At sentencing, Wright argued for a downward variance. In support, he relied on
the purported unfairness of the consecutive, mandatory minimum sentence required for
the firearm offense and provided evidence of his difficult upbringing, drug use, familial
support and responsibilities, post-offense rehabilitation, and expression of remorse.
Based on this evidence, Wright requested a sentence of 72 months, while the Government
sought a sentence within the Guidelines range.
After hearing from the parties, the District Court discussed Wright’s personal
history and characteristics and acknowledged the several letters from family and friends
submitted on his behalf. It also discussed the seriousness of the offense, Wright’s
“significant criminal history,” post-offense rehabilitative efforts, and expression of
remorse. 5
5
App. 114–20.
3
Having considered the parties’ submissions, arguments, and Wright’s statements
during the hearing, the District Court denied Wright’s request for a downward variance
and sentenced him to 106 months’ imprisonment. This appeal followed.
II. 6
Wright argues that the District Court erred by imposing a sentence that was both
procedurally and substantively unreasonable. We disagree.
We ordinarily review both the procedural and substantive reasonableness of a
sentence for abuse of discretion. 7 However, as Wright concedes, because he did not
object to the procedural error at sentencing, it is reviewed for plain error. 8 “The plain
error test requires (1) an error; (2) that is ‘clear or obvious’[;] and (3) ‘affected the
defendant’s substantial rights . . . .’” 9 “If these conditions are met, we will exercise our
discretion to correct the error if it ‘seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.’” 10
A. Procedural Reasonableness
Wright argues that the District Court’s sentence is procedurally unreasonable
because it failed to “meaningfully consider the mitigating evidence offered in support of
a variance.” 11 In particular, he asserts that the District Court failed to “meaningfully
6
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction under
18 U.S.C. § 3742.
7
United States v. Handerhan, 739 F.3d 114, 120 (3d Cir. 2014).
8
See United States v. Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d 253, 256–59 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc).
9
United States v. Azcona-Polanco, 865 F.3d 148, 151 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Molina-
Martinez v. United States, --- U.S. ---, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1343 (2016)).
10
Id. (quoting Molina-Martinez, --- U.S. ---, 136 S. Ct. at 1343).
11
Appellant’s Br. 11.
4
consider” the effect of his “upbringing or extensive history of substance abuse” on his
commission of the offenses. 12 This argument fails.
Part of a district court’s responsibility in imposing a procedurally sound sentence
is to consider the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 13 While a court must consider the
§ 3553(a) factors, it “need not make explicit ‘findings as to each of the § 3553(a) factors
if the record makes clear that the court took the factors into account in sentencing.’” 14
Further, “if a party raises a colorable argument about the applicability of one of the §
3553(a) factors, the district court may not ignore it. The court should address that
argument as part of its ‘meaningful consideration’ of the sentencing factors.” 15 Finally,
“the district court must furnish an explanation” for its sentence “sufficient for us to see
that the particular circumstances of the case have been given meaningful consideration
within the parameters of § 3553(a).” 16
The record demonstrates that the District Court did not commit procedural error.
At the outset, it noted that, although Wright faced a 60-month mandatory minimum
sentence under § 924(c), it had the discretion to vary from the Guidelines under the drug
count. It then proceeded to consider Wright’s request for a variance and explicitly
address arguments in support thereof.
12
Appellant’s Br. 23.
13
See United States v. Merced, 603 F.3d 203, 215 (3d Cir. 2010).
14
Id. (quoting United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 329 (3d Cir. 2006)).
15
Id. (quoting United States v. Ausburn, 502 F.3d 313, 329 (3d Cir. 2007)).
16
Id. at 216 (quoting United States v. Levinson, 543 F.3d 190, 196 (3d Cir. 2008)).
5
After hearing at length from Wright’s counsel, the District Court discussed
Wright’s personal history and characteristics, including his “troubled childhood,” lack of
parental guidance, and substance abuse. 17 In this regard, it recognized that Wright had
“minimal guidance and support” growing up, and that his “residence . . . was effectively a
drug den for his older aunts and uncles.” 18 However, while the District Court
acknowledged Wright’s upbringing and substance abuse, it found that this case did not
involve “a quick fix by someone that needed quick cash to support a habit”; rather,
Wright participated in a “calculated enterprise involving secret compartments in cars and
storage units, clearly in a scheme of distribution.” 19 The record thus contradicts Wright’s
assertion that the District Court failed to consider his upbringing and substance abuse.
Further, with regard to deterrence, the District Court briefly noted Wright’s
“significant criminal history.” 20 It also observed, however, that Wright had engaged in
post-offense rehabilitative efforts and expressed remorse for his conduct. Indeed, the
District Court commended Wright for altering his life and discussed his employment,
care for his children, and interest in obtaining a general equivalency diploma and
commercial driver’s license.
17
App. 115, 119.
18
App. 115.
19
App. 115–16.
20
App. 119. The PSR shows that Wright was convicted of several criminal offenses as
both a juvenile and an adult. His convictions as an adult include possession with intent to
distribute near a school and possession with intent to distribute near public housing, for
which he was sentenced in state court to a six-year period of incarceration.
6
While recognizing Wright’s commendable rehabilitative efforts, the District Court
also noted the very serious nature of the offense. Wright was caught driving in a vehicle
containing a hidden compartment, narcotics, and a loaded firearm, which, because of his
prior felony conviction, he was prohibited from possessing. Indeed, the District Court
was ready to sentence Wright to the top of the advisory Guidelines range because it
“found the conduct and the history so egregious,” but it declined to do so after hearing
Wright’s arguments and statements during the sentencing hearing. 21
The District Court’s statements indicate that it explicitly and thoroughly
considered the mitigating evidence, including Wright’s difficult upbringing and substance
abuse, but found the evidence “insufficient to warrant a sentence lower than the
Guidelines range.” 22 Accordingly, we conclude that Wright’s sentence was procedurally
reasonable and find no error, much less plain error.
B. Substantive Reasonableness
Wright also argues that his sentence was substantively unreasonable because the
District Court failed to properly consider the § 3553(a) factors and was therefore greater
than necessary to meet the purposes of sentencing. This argument also fails.
To determine whether a sentence is substantively reasonable, we must consider
“whether the record as a whole reflects rational and meaningful consideration of the
21
App. 120. The District Court also recognized the “harsh” penalty under § 924(c) and
Wright’s reliance on Dean v. United States, --- U.S. ---, 137 S. Ct. 1170 (2017), but its
statements during the hearing suggest that it found the loaded firearm near the drugs
sufficient to justify a Guidelines sentence. App. 116–18.
22
Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 358 (2007).
7
factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” 23 “[I]f the district court’s sentence is
procedurally sound, we will affirm it unless no reasonable sentencing court would have
imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the district court
provided.” 24 Where a sentence is procedurally sound, “reviewing courts are entitled to
presume that a sentence within the advisory Guidelines is reasonable.” 25 Finally, “the
party challenging the sentence bears the burden of proving the sentence’s
unreasonableness.” 26
Here, the District Court’s sentence was substantively reasonable. First, Wright
received a sentence at the bottom of the advisory Guidelines range. Second, as discussed
above, the District Court properly considered the § 3553(a) factors and mitigating
evidence that Wright submitted. It carefully weighed Wright’s upbringing, substance
abuse, criminal history, family circumstances, post-offense rehabilitative efforts, and
remorse. It also explained the seriousness of the offense, including that it was
“troubl[ed]” by the hidden compartment, narcotics, and loaded firearm in the vehicle. 27
Upon considering these circumstances, the District Court concluded that the mitigating
evidence did not warrant a variance on the drug count and that a 106-month sentence was
23
United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 571 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc).
24
United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).
25
See Handerhan, 739 F.3d at 124.
26
United States v. Friedman, 658 F.3d 342, 360 (3d Cir. 2011).
27
App. 114.
8
appropriate to meet the purposes of sentencing. Its denial of Wright’s motion for a
downward variance does not render the sentence substantively unreasonable. 28
We therefore conclude that Wright has not met his burden of showing that no
reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence. Under our
deferential standard of review, Wright’s challenge to the substantive reasonableness of
his sentence fails.
III.
For the reasons stated above, we will affirm.
28
See United States v. Bungar, 478 F.3d 540, 546 (3d Cir. 2007) (“Nor do we find that a
district court’s failure to give mitigating factors the weight a defendant contends they
deserve renders the sentence unreasonable.”).
9