J-A24015-19
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
ADAM JAMES MOORE :
:
Appellant : No. 472 EDA 2019
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 8, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-15-SA-0000431-2018
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., DUBOW, J., and COLINS, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED FEBRUARY 05, 2020
Appellant, Adam James Moore, appeals from the judgment of sentence
of a $200 fine and $452.48 in restitution, which was imposed after he was
found guilty, following a summary appeal, of a violation of the Dog Law, 3 P.S.
§§ 459-101 - 459-1205. After review, we conclude that this appeal is within
the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth Court and, thus, we order that the
appeal be transferred.
The facts underlying this case are not pertinent to our disposition. We
only note that, according to Appellant, on March 25, 2018, he was issued a
citation by the Chester County Animal Control authorities for violating 3 P.S.
§ 459-502(a) (Dog bites; detention and isolation of dogs). See Appellant’s
Brief at 6. Following a summary trial before the magisterial district court,
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A24015-19
Appellant was acquitted of that offense. However, the district court convicted
him of violating 3 P.S. § 459-305(a)(1) (Confinement and housing of dogs not
part of a kennel), which the court deemed to be a ‘lesser-included offense’ of
the charged section 459-502(a) violation.
Appellant filed a timely summary appeal to the Court of Common Pleas
of Chester County. Prior to his trial de novo, he filed a “Motion to Quash
Conviction of 3 P.S. § 459-305(a)(1) as Void Ab Initio,” which the court
denied. Following Appellant’s trial de novo, the court upheld his conviction
under section 459-305(a)(1). Appellant was thereafter sentenced to the
above-stated fine and restitution.
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and complied with the trial
court’s order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors
complained of on appeal. The trial court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion on April
18, 2019. Herein, Appellant states three issues for our review:
I. Did the magisterial district court err by finding Appellant guilty
of 3 P.S. § 459-305(a)(1), incorrectly classifying it as a “lesser[-]
included offense” of that which was originally charged?
II. Did the [trial] court … err by denying Appellant’s Motion to
Quash Conviction of 3 P.S. § 459-305(a)(1) as Void Ab Initio?
III. Did the [trial] court … lack the authority to conduct a trial de
novo on the offense of 3 P.S. § 459-305(a)(1) since that offense
was neither originally charged nor a lesser[-]included offense of
the originally charged offense?
Appellant’s Brief at 5.
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Before we consider any of Appellant’s issues, we must determine
whether this case should be transferred to the Commonwealth Court under 42
Pa.C.S. § 762. That statute provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
§ 762. Appeals from courts of common pleas
(a) General rule.--Except as provided in subsection (b),
the Commonwealth Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of
appeals from final orders of the courts of common pleas in
the following cases:
***
(2) Governmental and Commonwealth
regulatory criminal cases.--All criminal actions or
proceedings for the violation of any:
(i) Rule, regulation or order of any
Commonwealth agency.
(ii) Regulatory statute administered by any
Commonwealth agency subject to Subchapter A
of Chapter 5 of Title 2 (relating to practice and
procedure of Commonwealth agencies). The
term “regulatory statute” as used in this
subparagraph does not include any provision of
Title 18 (relating to crimes and offenses).
42 Pa.C.S. § 762(a)(2).
In Commonwealth v. Hake, 738 A.2d 46 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999), the
Commonwealth Court declared that it has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals
under the Dog Law, because that statute “is not a penal statute under the
Crimes Code (Title 18), but is a regulatory statute, administered and enforced
by the Department of Agriculture (Title 7, Chapter 27 of the Pa.Code).” Id.
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at 47 n.3. Nevertheless, we recognize that, because the Commonwealth has
not raised any issue with this Court’s jurisdiction over the present appeal, “it
is within our discretion to transfer the matter to the Commonwealth Court or
retain jurisdiction.” Lara, Inc., v. Dorney Park Coaster Co., Inc., 534
A.2d 1062, 1066 (Pa. Super. 1987); see also 42 Pa.C.S. § 704 (providing for
an exception to exclusive jurisdiction of the Commonwealth Court if the
appellee does not object to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Superior Court).
In Lara, Inc., we explained that,
[i]n exercising this discretion, we must examine the question on
a case by case basis. This [C]ourt may retain jurisdiction over
cases that should have been appealed to the Commonwealth
Court in the interest of judicial economy. However, … the interest
of judicial economy must be weighed against other interests, one
of which is the possibility of establishing conflicting lines of
authority.
Lara, Inc., 534 A.2d at 1066. Notably, we cautioned in Lara, Inc., that “we
should be most cautious in assuming jurisdiction over matters that properly
belong before the Commonwealth Court.” Id. (footnote omitted).
Here, we conclude that the preferable course is to transfer this appeal
to the Commonwealth Court. Jurisdiction of issues under the Dog Law is
properly vested in the Commonwealth Court, see Hake, 738 A.2d at 47 n.3,
and the Court’s experience in this area is evident from the appeals it has
entertained involving claims under that statute. We also seek to avoid the
risk of establishing conflicting lines of authority. Therefore, we transfer this
case to Commonwealth Court.
Case transferred to Commonwealth Court. Jurisdiction relinquished.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/5/20
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