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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
SHARRAN DEV CHAKRAVORTY :
:
Appellant : No. 39 WDA 2019
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 6, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-02-CR-0009259-2018
BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., OLSON, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 14, 2020
Appellant, Sharran Dev Chakravorty, appeals from the judgment of
sentence entered on December 6, 2018 in the Criminal Division of the Court
of Common Pleas of Allegheny County. We affirm.
The trial court summarized the facts and procedural history in this
matter as follows.
On December 10, 2017[,] around 2:00 [a.m.,] Mt. Lebanon police
were dispatched to a [crashed vehicle] at St. Bernard’s Church
[along Washington Road in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania.].
The vehicle, a white Jaguar, was located, crashed in the parking
lot [of the church], while the driver was not present in the
immediate area. Police began a search of the area and located
[Appellant] walking on the sidewalk approximately 100 yards
away from the church parking lot. [A] police officer, while driving
up to [Appellant], noticed that [Appellant staggered] while he
walked. The officer pulled alongside [Appellant] and, through the
passenger side window, asked [Appellant] if he had been driving.
[Appellant] responded that he had not been driving. The police
officer then asked what [Appellant] was doing at that time, to
which [Appellant] responded that he was waiting for an Uber. The
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police officer then activated his rear warning lights, exited his
vehicle, and approached [Appellant] on the sidewalk. During the
interaction, the police officer smelled the odor of alcohol beverage
on [Appellant’s] breath. The police officer asked if [Appellant] had
wrecked his Jaguar, which [Appellant] denied. The police officer
followed-up by asking if [Appellant] wrecked his father’s Jaguar,
[to which Appellant admitted]. The police officer noticed that
there was blood dripping from [Appellant’s] right hand. A second
police officer arrived on the scene, allowing the first police officer
to return to St. Bernard’s parking lot to inspect the Jaguar. During
the inspection, it was noticed that the right steering wheel control
lever was damaged, and had a sharp edge on it. [Appellant] was
arrested following a field sobriety test.
****
At [docket number 9259-2018, Appellant] was charged with
driving under the influence of alcohol or controlled substance [75
Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(a)(1)], careless driving [75 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 3714(a)], and accident involving unattended vehicle or property
[75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3745(a)]. On December 6, 2018, a hearing was
held on [Appellant’s] motion to suppress[. Following the denial of
Appellant’s motion, a non-jury trial ensued and Appellant] was
found guilty of all charges. [Appellant] waived his presentence
report and was sentenced to [] thirty (30) days in the county
intermediate punishment program, six (6) months of probation,
and a fine of $750[.00 for] driving under the influence[.]
Post-sentence motions were not filed in this matter. A timely
notice of appeal was filed on January 4, 2019. [Appellant] was
ordered to file a [concise statement of errors] complained of on
appeal [and the trial court issued its opinion on June 6, 2019.]
Trial Court Opinion, 6/6/19, at 1-3 (not paginated; superfluous capitalization
omitted).
Appellant raises the following claim on appeal.
Did the trial court err in denying Appellant’s [m]otion to
[s]uppress when the uniformed officer exited his marked police
vehicle, which had either overhead or rear flashing lights
activated, to question Appellant because a seizure occurred and
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the officer did not have a reasonable suspicion to support the
seizure?
Appellant’s Brief at 4.
Appellant challenges a trial court order that denied his motion to
suppress. We review such claims using the following standard and scope of
review.
Our standard of review ... is whether the record supports the trial
court's factual findings and whether the legal conclusions drawn
therefrom are free from error. Our scope of review is limited; we
may consider only the evidence of the prosecution and so much
of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when
read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the record
supports the findings of the suppression court, we are bound by
those facts and may reverse only if the court erred in reaching its
legal conclusions based upon the facts.
Commonwealth v. Galendez, 27 A.3d 1042, 1045 (Pa. Super.
2011) (en banc) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 40 A.3d 120
(Pa. 2012). Additionally, “[a]ppellate courts are limited to
reviewing only the evidence presented at the suppression hearing
when examining a ruling on a pretrial motion to suppress.”
Commonwealth v. Bush, 166 A.3d 1278, 1281–1282 (Pa.
Super. 2017) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 176 A.3d 855. “It
is within the suppression court's sole province as factfinder to pass
on the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their
testimony.” Id. at 1282 (citation omitted).
Commonwealth v. Koonce, 190 A.3d 1204, 1211-1212 (Pa. Super. 2018).
Appellant claims that his encounter with the police ripened from a mere
encounter into an investigative detention when the officer activated his rear
warning lights, exited his vehicle in a no parking zone, and approached
Appellant to make further inquiries. Under these circumstances, Appellant
maintains that no reasonable person would feel free to leave. See Appellant’s
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Brief at 12. Appellant further contends that the officer lacked reasonable
suspicion to support the detention because, at the moment when the officer
encountered Appellant staggering along the sidewalk, Appellant was
equidistant from the crash scene and several bars and restaurants on
Washington Road and the officer did not know when the accident occurred or
whether Appellant was operating the vehicle involved in the crash. Id. at
11-12. The Commonwealth argues that the interaction was a mere encounter
that required no particular level of suspicion or, alternatively, that reasonable
suspicion supported Appellant’s detention.
Contrary to the Commonwealth’s first contention, we assume, solely for
purposes of this appeal, that the interaction constituted an investigative
detention since the officer activated the rear emergency lights on his cruiser.
See Commonwealth v. Livingstone, 174 A.3d 609, 621 (Pa. 2017)
(activation of police vehicle’s overhead lights and sirens to initiate a traffic
stop constitutes an investigative detention since reasonable people would not
assume they are free to leave when confronted with such signals).1 After
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1 Although neither party cited or discussed Livingstone in this appeal, we
acknowledge there may be grounds for distinguishing Livingstone’s
application in this case. In Livingstone, our Supreme Court reasoned that
the activation of police overhead lights and sirens was universally understood
by motorists as a command to pull over or, if already stopped, to remain in
place. See Livingstone, 174 A.3d at 621. As such, the initiation of a traffic
stop through the activation of police lights constitutes an investigative
detention. Id. at 619. Obviously, the present case does not involve a traffic
stop or the activation of police sirens. Nevertheless, in the absence of
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careful review, we agree with the trial court that reasonable suspicion
supported Appellant’s detention.
Having [concluded that Appellant was subject to an investigative
detention], we must now determine whether [the police] had
reasonable suspicion to detain [Appellant]. An officer may stop
and briefly detain a person for investigatory purposes when that
officer has “reasonable suspicion, based on specific and articulable
facts, that criminal activity may be afoot.” Commonwealth v.
Allen, 725 A.2d 737, 740 (Pa. 1999). “[T]he fundamental inquiry
is an objective one, namely, whether the facts available to the
officer at the moment of the intrusion warrant a man of reasonable
caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate.”
Commonwealth v. Gray, 784 A.2d 137, 142 (Pa. Super. 2001).
We must consider the totality of the circumstances, including such
factors as “tips, the reliability of the informants, time, location,
and suspicious activity, including flight.” Id., citing
Commonwealth v. Freeman, 757 A.2d 903, 908 (Pa. 2000).
Commonwealth v. Smith, 172 A.3d 26, 33 (Pa. 2017).
The record emerging from Appellant’s suppression hearing shows that
at approximately 2:00 a.m. on December 10, 2017, the Mt. Lebanon Police
Department received a report of a vehicle crash in the parking lot of St.
Bernard’s Church on Washington Road. Thereafter, an officer responded to
the scene and confirmed that a white Jaguar had been involved in the accident
and that the vehicle was unattended. Having confirmed significant details of
the incoming report, the officer possessed reason to believe that the crash
occurred recently and that the driver remained on foot in the local vicinity.
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advocacy concerning the application of Livingstone, we shall treat the instant
case as involving an investigative detention that required reasonable
suspicion.
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Armed with this information, the officer drove north past the church parking
lot and, within 100 yards, observed Appellant staggering along the sidewalk
adjacent to Washington Road. In response to the prosecutor’s question
concerning why he initially stopped and approached Appellant, the officer
testified: “He was within a very close distance to a crash where nobody was
still in the car, and there’s very little foot traffic [in the area at 2:00 a.m.] in
the morning, and he was staggering when I saw him.” N.T. Suppression
Hearing, 12/6/18, at 22-23. Based upon the totality of the circumstances,
including the verified information in the initial report, the late hour, the
sparsity of foot traffic in the area, Appellant’s close proximity to the accident,
and Appellant’s drunken gait, we are satisfied that the officer possessed
reasonable suspicion to initiate a detention when he parked his police cruiser
and approached Appellant to make further inquiries. Hence, Appellant’s
challenge to the trial court’s suppression ruling merits no relief.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/14/2020
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