Case: 18-14861 Date Filed: 02/24/2020 Page: 1 of 4
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 18-14861
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 2:17-cr-00024-ECM-GMB-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
LAVARIS DEANDRE YOUNGBLOOD,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama
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(February 24, 2020)
Before ED CARNES, Chief Judge, MARTIN, and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Lavaris Youngblood pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a
firearm and ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He was sentenced
to 120 months in prison. As part of his written plea agreement, Youngblood
waived his right to appeal his “conviction or sentence,” with three exceptions: if
his counsel was ineffective, if the prosecutor committed misconduct, or if the
government appealed.
During his change of plea hearing, the magistrate judge placed him under
oath and questioned him to ensure that his plea was knowingly and voluntarily
given. He testified that he was competent to make the plea, that he understood the
charges against him, and that he made the plea voluntarily. He also testified that
he understood the trial rights he was giving up by pleading guilty. The magistrate
judge specifically asked if he understood that he was giving up his right to appeal,
and Youngblood testified that he did.
At sentencing, Youngblood objected to the presentence investigation report
finding that he qualified for three criminal history points; he asserted that his state
court convictions did not count because he never served any time for them. He
also objected to the suggested four-level enhancement for possessing a firearm in
connection with another offense and the inclusion of three of his prior offenses as
“relevant conduct.”
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The district court overruled those objections and calculated a guidelines
range of 135 to 168 months. It sentenced him to 120 months in prison, the
statutory maximum. The court also held that, even if it had sustained his
objections, it would still have varied up to 120 months based on the severity of the
crime, his criminal history, and the danger his crimes posed to the community.
Youngblood appeals and contends that the district court erred by overruling
his objections to the PSR. He also contends that his sentence is “procedurally
unreasonable” because the court imposed an enhancement for conduct that he
argues is irrelevant. In response, the government invoked Youngblood’s appeal
waiver contained in his plea agreement.
An appeal waiver is enforceable if it is knowingly and voluntarily given by
the defendant. United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343, 1352 (11th Cir. 1993).
We review de novo the validity of an appeal waiver. Id. “Where a district judge
clearly states that [she] would impose the same sentence, even if [she] erred in
calculating the guidelines, then any error in the calculation is harmless.” United
States v. Barner, 572 F.3d 1239, 1248 (11th Cir. 2009).
Youngblood’s waiver was knowingly and voluntarily given. He testified
that he was competent to make the plea. He testified that he understood the
charges against him. He testified that he knew he was giving up his right to
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appeal. And he testified that he made the plea voluntarily. None of the three
exceptions to his appeal waiver apply here, so he has waived his right to appeal.
And even if Youngblood had not waived his right to appeal, his arguments
would still fail. The district court clearly stated that it would have imposed the
same sentence even if it had sustained his objections to the PSR. If the district
court had sustained Youngblood’s objections and had varied upward to impose the
same 120-month sentence, that sentence would have been substantively reasonable.
Under these circumstances, any error the court may have made was harmless. See
United States v. Keene, 470 F.3d 1347, 1349 (11th Cir. 2006).
DISMISSED.
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