[Cite as In re K.C., 2020-Ohio-836.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
WOOD COUNTY
In re K.C. Court of Appeals No. WD-19-066
Trial Court No. 2018 JA 0421
DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Decided: March 6, 2020
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Autumn D. Adams, for appellant.
Paul A. Dobson, Wood County Prosecuting Attorney, Charles S.
Bergman, Chief Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, and David T.
Harold, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
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PIETRYKOWSKI, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, K.C., appeals the August 2, 2019 judgment of the
Wood County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, which found that appellant
qualified as a mandatory registrant and classified him as a Tier I offender which requires
him to provide in-person verification for ten years. Because we conclude that the
juvenile sex offender registry and the age-based classification system under R.C.
2152.83(A) is constitutional, we affirm.
{¶ 2} On May 29, 2018, appellant, then 17 years old, was charged with one count
of rape, a felony of the first degree if committed by an adult. The charge stemmed from
sexual contact with a minor victim under the age of 13. On July 17, 2018, appellant was
adjudicated a delinquent child and the matter was set for disposition.
{¶ 3} The dispositional hearing was held on July 24, 2018. Thereafter, on July 25,
2018, appellant was ordered committed to the Ohio Department of Youth Services (DYS)
for a minimum period of one year and a maximum not exceeding his 21st birthday.
{¶ 4} Following appellant’s release from the DYS, a sexual registration and
classification hearing was held on August 1, 2019. Because of his age at the time of the
offense, the court classified appellant as a Tier I juvenile offender registrant under R.C.
2152.83, which required that he register annually for a period of ten years.
{¶ 5} Appellant commenced the instant appeal and raises the following two
assignments of error for our review:
Assignment of Error I: The juvenile sex offender registry is
unconstitutional as it is not rationally related to a legitimate governmental
interest because the registry provides minimal notice, if any at all, to the
general public of the juvenile’s status of a sex offender.
2.
Assignment of Error II: Appellant’s status as a mandatory sex
offender registrant under Revised Code section 2152.83(A) violates the
Equal Protection Clause of the United States and Ohio Constitution[s]
because it creates classes of similarly situated children who are treated
differently.
{¶ 6} When the issue of the constitutionality of a statue is raised on appeal, our
review is de novo. David P. v. Kim D., 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-06-1164, 2007-Ohio-1865,
¶ 15, citing Andreyko v. Cincinnati, 153 Ohio App.3d 108, 2003-Ohio-2759, 791 N.E.2d
1025, ¶ 11 (1st Dist.). Because statutes are presumed constitutional, any challenge must
be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id., citing Beagle v. Walden, 78 Ohio St.3d 59, 61,
676 N.E.2d 506 (1997).
{¶ 7} This court has recently addressed identical assignments of error in an appeal
following an appellant’s designation as a Tier I juvenile sexual offender. In re N.W., 6th
Dist. Wood No. WD-19-051, 2020-Ohio-290. In N.W., the juvenile appellant, 16 years
old, was adjudicated a delinquent child on one count of gross sexual imposition involving
a 15-year-old victim. Id. at ¶ 2.
{¶ 8} Rejecting appellant’s assignments of error challenging the constitutionality
of the age-based, tiered classification system under R.C. 2152.83, we noted:
We find that the age-based juvenile sex offender classification
system set forth in R.C. 2152.83 can reasonably be found to reflect
consideration of a greater of risk of recidivism and a higher level of
3.
seriousness of offenses as the age of the offender rises, and, therefore, the
interest in protecting the public increases as the age of the juvenile sex
offender increases.
As such, the juvenile sex offender classification consequences
escalate as the age of the juvenile offender increases towards the age of
majority. This system can reasonably be found to reflect a rational
relationship between the statutory provisions and a legitimate government
interest in protection of the public from offenders.
Id. at ¶ 16-17. See In re J.R., 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-15-075, 2016-Ohio-4751; In re
D.S., 146 Ohio St.3d 182, 2016-Ohio-1027, 54 N.E.3d 1184. Reviewing this case,
de novo, and upon application of this court’s and the Supreme Court of Ohio’s precedent,
we reject appellant’s first and second assignments of error.
{¶ 9} On consideration whereof, we find that appellant was not prejudiced or
prevented from having a fair proceeding and the judgment of the Wood County Court of
Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, is affirmed. Pursuant to App.R. 24, appellant is
ordered to pay the costs of this appeal.
Judgment affirmed.
4.
In re K.C.
C.A. No. WD-19-066
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
Mark L. Pietrykowski, J. _______________________________
JUDGE
Christine E. Mayle, J.
_______________________________
Gene A. Zmuda, P.J. JUDGE
CONCUR.
_______________________________
JUDGE
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.
5.