[Cite as State v. Taylor, 2020-Ohio-865.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
LAKE COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : OPINION
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
CASE NO. 2019-L-076
- vs - :
CLIFFORD D. TAYLOR, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
Criminal Appeal from the Lake County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 2014 CR
000715.
Judgment: Affirmed.
Charles E. Coulson, Lake County Prosecutor, and Jennifer A. McGee, Assistant
Prosecutor, Lake County Administration Building, 105 Main Street, P.O. Box 490,
Painesville, OH 44077 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).
Clifford D. Taylor, pro se, PID# A662-816, North Central Correctional Complex, 670
Marion-Williamsport Road, P.O. Box 1812, Marion, OH 43302 (Defendant-Appellant).
MATT LYNCH, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Clifford D. Taylor, appeals the denial of his motion to
withdraw a guilty plea. For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the court
below.
{¶2} On October 15, 2014, Taylor entered a plea of “guilty” by way of information
to two counts of Rape, felonies of the first degree in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2), in the
Lake County Court of Common Pleas.
{¶3} On November 12, 2014, a sentencing hearing was held. Taylor made an
oral motion to withdraw his guilty plea which the trial court denied. The court sentenced
Taylor to eleven years in prison for each count of Rape, to be served consecutively for an
aggregate prison term of twenty-two years.
{¶4} In State v. Taylor, 2015-Ohio-2080, 33 N.E.3d 123 (11th Dist.), this court
affirmed the denial of the oral motion to withdraw the guilty plea.
{¶5} On October 30, 2017, Taylor filed a Motion to Vacate Set Aside Illegal
Sentence/Invalid Indictment, on the grounds that his constitutional rights were violated by
post-indictment delay, denial of the right to counsel, denial of access to the law library,
and due process violations.
{¶6} On June 5, 2018, the trial court denied the Motion to Vacate.
{¶7} In State v. Taylor, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2018-L-091, 2019-Ohio-842, this
court affirmed the denial of the Motion to Vacate.
{¶8} On May 10, 2019, Taylor filed a Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea based on
ineffective assistance of counsel, the post-indictment infringement of constitutional rights
(denied “access to legal material, forced into overly restrictive cell, and denied exercise”),
and the plea being coerced and involuntary.
{¶9} On June 3, 2019, the trial court entered an Order Denying the Motion to
Withdraw Guilty Plea:
The court notes that the defendant appealed the court’s denial of his
motion to withdraw his guilty plea made prior to his sentencing, and
the court was affirmed by the court of appeals. Further, although the
matters the defendant now complains of are based on allegations
that the defendant would have been aware of prior to his plea and
sentencing, the defendant did not mention these complaints at either
hearing, which took place more than four years ago. Additionally,
the court conducted a painstaking plea colloquy. The defendant
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indicated that he had the opportunity to look at all the evidence in the
case, and that he discussed the evidence with his attorney to his
satisfaction. * * * He further indicated that his attorney did everything
that the defendant asked him to do, and that he was completely
satisfied with the legal representation provided to him.
{¶10} On August 2, 2019, Taylor filed a Notice of Appeal. On appeal, he raises
the following assignments of error:
{¶11} “[1.] Appellant was denied effective assistance of counsel prior to signing a
plea bargain.”
{¶12} “[2.] Appellant was denied due process of the 14th amendment when
arbitrarily placed in punitive cell.”
{¶13} “[3.] Appellant [was] denied [the] right to basic exercise while incarcerated
for six months.”
{¶14} “[4.] Appellant was denied access to legal material during punitive lock up
for 130 days.”
{¶15} “[5.] Appellant was subjected to trial court abuse of discretion which is on
record during change of plea hearing.”
{¶16} Criminal Rule 32.1 provides that “to correct manifest injustice the court after
sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw
his or her plea.” “A defendant who seeks to withdraw a plea of guilty after the imposition
of sentence has the burden of establishing the existence of manifest injustice.” State v.
Smith, 49 Ohio St.2d 261, 361 N.E.2d 1324 (1977), paragraph one of the syllabus. “This
term has been variously defined, but it is clear that under such standard, a postsentence
withdrawal motion is allowable only in extraordinary cases.” Id. at 264; State v. Straley,
__ Ohio St.3d __, 2019-Ohio-5206, __ N.E.3d __, ¶ 14 (“[a] ‘manifest injustice’ is a ‘clear
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or openly unjust act’”) (citation omitted).
{¶17} “A motion made pursuant to Crim.R. 32.1 is addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial court, and the good faith, credibility and weight of the movant’s
assertions in support of the motion are matters to be resolved by that court.” Smith at
paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶18} Taylor’s arguments are barred by res judicata. “Under the doctrine of res
judicata, a final judgment of conviction bars a convicted defendant who was represented
by counsel from raising and litigating in any proceeding except an appeal from the
judgment, any defense or any claimed lack of due process that was raised or could have
been raised by the defendant at the trial, which resulted in that judgment of conviction, or
on an appeal from that judgment.” State v. Perry, 10 Ohio St.2d 175, 226 N.E.2d 104
(1967), paragraph nine of the syllabus.
{¶19} “Ohio courts of appeals have applied res judicata to bar the assertion of
claims in a motion to withdraw a guilty plea that were or could have been raised at trial or
on appeal.” State v. Ketterer, 126 Ohio St.3d 448, 2010-Ohio-3831, 935 N.E.2d 9, ¶ 59;
Straley at ¶ 23 (“[r]es judicata generally bars a defendant from raising claims in a Crim.R.
32.1 postsentencing motion to withdraw a guilty plea that he raised or could have raised
on a direct appeal”); State v. Rock, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2018-L-135, 2019-Ohio-2796, ¶
10.
{¶20} In his direct appeal, Taylor challenged trial counsel’s representation and the
denial of his original motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Taylor argued his actual
innocence and claimed that trial counsel urged him to lie to the trial court in order to have
his plea accepted. Taylor, 2015-Ohio-2080, 33 N.E.3d 123, at ¶ 34. In the present Motion
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to Withdraw, the same issues are raised albeit under different facts: trial counsel was
ineffective because he opposed having the minor victim testify; and Taylor’s plea was
involuntary on account of the circumstances of his post-indictment detention. As noted
by the trial court, nothing prevented Taylor from raising these specific arguments either
at the time of his oral motion to withdraw his guilty plea or in his direct appeal. As these
arguments were raised or could have been raised before the trial court and on appeal,
Taylor is barred from raising them in his successive Motion to Withdraw.
{¶21} Taylor counters that “Res Judicata does not bar post-conviction petitions
supported by evidence that is outside the record.” State v. Watson, 126 Ohio App.3d
316, 324-325, 710 N.E.2d 340 (3d Dist.1998) (“[a]n exception to the res judicata bar is
when the petitioner presents competent, relevant, and material evidence outside the
record that was not in existence and available to the petitioner in time to support the direct
appeal”). The authority cited by Taylor applies to petitions for postconviction relief rather
than Criminal Rule 32.1 motions. We note that a postconviction motion was the subject
of the 2018 appeal the denial of which was affirmed for being untimely. Taylor, 2019-
Ohio-842, at ¶ 13. Timeliness is also relevant to the consideration of whether a defendant
should be allowed to withdraw a guilty plea. “Although the rule itself does not provide for
a time limit after the imposition of sentence, during which a motion to withdraw a plea of
guilty must be made, it has been held that an undue delay between the occurrence of the
alleged cause for withdrawal and the filing of the motion is a factor adversely affecting the
credibility of the movant and militating against the granting of the motion.” Smith, 49 Ohio
St.2d at 264, 361 N.E.2d 1324. In the present case, over four years elapsed between
Taylor’s plea and the filing of his Motion to Withdraw.
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{¶22} Ultimately, the standard for the postconviction motion to withdraw Taylor’s
plea remains that of manifest injustice. The trial court did not abuse its discretion finding
that Taylor failed to satisfy that standard in light of his statements made at the time he
entered his pleas:
The court: And you have been able to discuss all of the evidence
that the State has in this case against you?
Taylor: Yeah.
The court: And you’ve discussed it with your attorney to your
satisfaction?
Taylor: Yes, I did.
The court: And you’ve had enough time to do this?
Taylor: Yeah.
The court: Although this may be your attorney’s recommendation
for you to plea guilty by way of information to these two counts of
felony one rape, is this your own decision and voluntary act to do so?
Taylor: Yeah.
The court: Has your attorney done everything you’ve asked him to
do for you in this case?
Taylor: Yeah.
The court: Can you think of anything that your attorney has failed
or neglected to do that you think he should have done?
Taylor: No, sir.
The court: Are you completely satisfied with the legal
representation provided by * * * your attorney?
Taylor: Yes, sir.
{¶23} The assignments of error are without merit.
{¶24} For the foregoing reasons, the denial of Taylor’s Motion to Withdraw Guilty
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Plea is affirmed. Costs to be taxed against appellant.
TIMOTHY P. CANNON, P.J.,
MARY JANE TRAPP, J.,
concur.
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