NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 17 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
PEYMAN PAKDEL; SIMA CHEGINI, No. 17-17504
Plaintiffs-Appellants, D.C. No. 3:17-cv-03638-RS
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN
FRANCISCO; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Richard Seeborg, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted September 13, 2019
San Francisco, California
Before: GOULD, BEA, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiffs-Appellants (“Plaintiffs”) challenge the City of San Francisco’s
Expedited Conversion Program (“ECP”), which allows property owners to convert
a tenancy-in-common property into a condominium property on the condition that
they offer any existing tenants lifetime leases in units within the converted
property. Plaintiffs allege that this “Lifetime Lease Requirement” effectuates an
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
unreasonable seizure of their property in violation of the Fourth Amendment and
abridges their constitutional right to privacy in violation of the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court held
that these contentions failed to state a claim and thus dismissed them under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Reviewing the district court’s dismissal of
Plaintiffs’ claims de novo, Gant v. County of Los Angeles, 772 F.3d 608, 614 (9th
Cir. 2014), we affirm.1
1. The district court did not err in dismissing with prejudice Plaintiffs’
Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure claim. There is no seizure of property
when an individual “voluntarily transfer[s] any possessory interest he may have
had in the [property].” Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 469 (1985); see United
States v. Sherwin, 539 F.2d 1, 7 (9th Cir. 1976). Plaintiffs made the choice to offer
their tenant a lifetime lease in exchange for the benefits of expedited condominium
conversion under the ECP. That a preexisting private agreement between Plaintiffs
and the other co-owners of their building obligated Plaintiffs to apply for
conversion does not transform this voluntary exchange into a seizure by the City.
The Fourth Amendment reaches only state action, United States v. Jacobsen, 466
U.S. 109, 113 (1984), and the City had no involvement in the formation of this
1
We resolve Plaintiffs’ other claims in a concurrently filed opinion.
2
agreement between the tenants in common, see Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991,
1004 (1982).
2. Nor did the district court err in dismissing Plaintiffs’ substantive due
process and equal protection claims with prejudice. A regulation challenged as
violating substantive due process or equal protection is reviewed for a rational
basis so long as it does not implicate a suspect class or impinge on fundamental
rights. See Bowers v. Whitman, 671 F.3d 905, 917 (9th Cir. 2012); Kawaoka v.
City of Arroyo Grande, 17 F.3d 1227, 1234 (9th Cir. 1994). The Lifetime Lease
Requirement does not implicate a suspect class. And Plaintiffs do not have a
fundamental right under California’s Ellis Act to exclude people from their home
once it has been converted into a condominium. The Ellis Act prohibits the
government from forcing property owners to offer accommodations for rent. Cal.
Gov’t Code § 7060(a). But the Ellis Act does not apply to condominiums. See
Valnes v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd., 270 Cal. Rptr. 636, 638-39 (Ct. App.
1990). Nor does it apply, per its express terms, when the government is enforcing
an “agreement by which an owner of residential real property has agreed to offer
the accommodations for rent or lease in consideration for a direct financial
contribution.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 7060.1(a). Here, Plaintiffs acknowledged in a
written agreement with the City that they were offering their tenant a lifetime lease
3
in consideration for the financial benefits of expedited condominium conversion.
We thus review the Lifetime Lease Requirement for a rational basis.
The Lifetime Lease Requirement is rationally related to the legitimate
government goal of preventing existing tenants from being displaced by
widespread condominium conversions under the ECP. It therefore does not violate
substantive due process or equal protection.
AFFIRMED.
4