UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 19-4380
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JUSTIN MICHAEL OXENDINE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at
Raleigh. Louise W. Flanagan, District Judge. (5:18-cr-00448-FL-1)
Submitted: February 14, 2020 Decided: March 23, 2020
Before HARRIS and RUSHING, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
G. Alan DuBois, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon, Assistant Federal Public
Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Raleigh, North Carolina,
for Appellant. Robert J. Higdon, Jr., United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker,
Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Justin Michael Oxendine appeals his 46-month prison sentence after pleading guilty
to making a bomb threat by telephone in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(e) (2018). On appeal,
he contends that the district court abused its discretion by upwardly departing two levels
under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2A6.1 cmt. n.4(B)(iv) for multiple victims
after applying a four-level enhancement under USSG § 2A6.1(b)(4). We affirm.
“As a general matter, in reviewing any sentence whether inside, just outside, or
significantly outside the Guidelines range, we review for an abuse of discretion.” United
States v. Bolton, 858 F.3d 905, 911 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). We
first ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural error “such as failing
to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as
mandatory, failing to consider the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based
on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence—including
an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range.” Gall v. United States, 552
U.S. 38, 51 (2007). If a sentence is procedurally reasonable, we consider its substantive
reasonableness, “tak[ing] into account the totality of the circumstances, including the
extent of any variance from the Guidelines range.” Id.
If the sentence is outside the Guidelines range, we “may consider the extent of the
deviation, but must give due deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a)
factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance.” Id. “[A] major departure should be
supported by a more significant justification than a minor one.” Id. at 50. “In reviewing a
departure from the advisory Guidelines range, we ‘defer to the trial court and can reverse
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a sentence only if it is unreasonable, even if the sentence would not have been [our]
choice.’” United States v. McCoy, 804 F.3d 349, 351 (4th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted).
“Because the circumstances surrounding threats vary substantially, § 2A6.1 gives
district courts latitude to depart from the Guidelines.” United States v. Spencer, 848 F.3d
324, 327-28 (4th Cir. 2017). “Given the dearth of guidance for capturing the seriousness
of such a factually variable offense, the considerations underlying a departure in a threats
case converge with those underlying a variance to an unusual degree.” Id. An upward
departure under § 2A6.1 may be warranted for multiple victims. See USSG § 2A6.1 cmt.
n.4(B)(iv); cf. United States v. Stokes, 347 F.3d 103, 105-06 (4th Cir. 2003).
We have reviewed the record and conclude that the district court did not err or abuse
its discretion in upwardly departing under USSG § 2A6.1 cmt. n.4(B)(iv) and Oxendine’s
sentence is procedurally and substantively reasonable. While the court applied a four-level
increase under USSG § 2A6.1(b)(4) for substantial disruption of public, governmental, or
business functions or services, and/or a substantial expenditure of funds to respond to the
offense, it reasonably determined a two-level departure for multiple victims was warranted
“in view of the multitude of people and businesses, individuals that were profoundly
affected by [Oxendine’s] actions,” and his Guidelines range of 30 to 37 months did not
take that factor “into consideration fully.” Alternatively, the court explained it would have
reached the same range by departing under USSG § 4A1.3(a), and a 46-month sentence
was also necessary to accomplish the purposes of sentencing under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
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Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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