In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
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NO. 09-19-00168-CV
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2004 CHEVROLET Z71 PICKUP VIN:1GCEK19T14E213891 (JIMMY
JENKINS), Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
__________________________________________________________________
On Appeal from the 411th District Court
Polk County, Texas
Trial Cause No. CIV32472
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is an appeal from a civil forfeiture proceeding brought by the State of
Texas against appellant Jimmy Jenkins and his interest in a 2004 Chevrolet Z71
Pickup Vin: 1GCEK19T14E213891. Jenkins, appearing pro se, appeals the trial
court’s order granting the State’s motion for summary judgment for forfeiture of his
pickup. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
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Background
In January 2019, the State filed a notice of seizure and intended forfeiture of
a 2004 Chevrolet Z71 Pickup Vin: 1GCEK19T14E213891 pursuant to Chapter 59
of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure and identified Jenkins as the possessor and
owner of the pickup. See Tex. Code Crim Proc. Ann. arts. 59.01-.14. The State
alleged that the pickup was contraband as defined by Article 59.01 of the Texas Code
of Criminal Procedure and subject to forfeiture because it was used or intended to
be used in the commission of a felony, it was the proceeds gained from the
commission of a felony listed in Article 59.01, or it was acquired with proceeds
gained from the commission of a felony listed in Article 59.01. See id. art.
59.01(2)(A), (B)(i). As required by Article 59.04(b) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, the State attached to its notice the affidavit of Officer Billy Duke. See id.
art. 59.04(b).
In his affidavit, Officer Duke stated that based on a tip from a confidential
informant that Jenkins was transporting narcotics, Officer David Ramsey stopped
Jenkins’s pickup, and Ramsey arrested Jenkins because he became belligerent and
failed to identify. Duke stated that Ramsey reported that Jenkins admitted that he
owned the pickup and claimed that he had bought it with money he had won. Duke
explained that when Ramsey conducted an inventory of the pickup, Ramsey noticed
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the passenger side air bag had been tampered with. According to Duke, Ramsey
located a clear baggy containing methamphetamine hidden behind the passenger side
airbag and arrested Jenkins for possessing a controlled substance. Duke averred that
based on the totality of the circumstances, he had formed the opinion that Jenkins
was engaged in criminal activity that included the sale or trafficking of a felony
amount of illegal narcotics and the pickup was utilized to transport said narcotics.
Jenkins, acting pro se, filed an answer stating that he had pleaded not guilty
and requesting the return of his pickup. The State filed a motion for summary
judgment, arguing that it had proved all the essential elements of its cause of action
for forfeiture of property as a matter of law. The trial court found that the pickup
was contraband subject to forfeiture and granted the State’s motion for summary
judgment. Jenkins appealed.
Standard of Review
We review summary judgment orders de novo. Provident Life & Accident Ins.
Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2003). The party moving for traditional
summary judgment must establish that no genuine issue of material fact exists and
it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); Randall’s Food
Mkts., Inc. v. Johnson, 891 S.W.2d 640, 644 (Tex. 1995). If the moving party
produces evidence entitling it to summary judgment, the burden shifts to the
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nonmovant to present evidence that raises a material fact issue. Walker v. Harris,
924 S.W.2d 375, 377 (Tex. 1996). In determining whether there is a disputed issue
of material fact precluding summary judgment, we take evidence favorable to the
nonmovant as true. Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex.
1985). We review the summary judgment record “in the light most favorable to the
nonmovant, indulging every reasonable inference and resolving any doubts against
the motion.” City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 824 (Tex. 2005).
Analysis
Jenkins filed a pro se brief arguing that the allegations against him are false
and that his pickup should be returned. We note that the Texas Rules of Appellate
Procedure require an appellant to “state concisely all issues or points presented for
review” and to make a “clear and concise argument” for each issue raised, “with
appropriate citations to authorities and to the record.” Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(f), (i).
Our review of Jenkins’s brief shows that the briefing on the issues does not contain
any citations to any legal authority or the record. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i). Even
interpreting Jenkins’s brief liberally, we cannot conclude that the issues are
adequately briefed. See Proctor v. White, 155 S.W.3d 438, 441 (Tex. App.—El Paso
2004, pet. denied) (concluding appellants waived challenge to summary judgment
on several claims because their argument consisted of several pages referring to
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evidence in support of their factual allegations without a single reference to relevant
case law or legal principle).
Despite Jenkins’s inadequate briefing, we conclude that the State conclusively
established that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that it was entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); Johnson, 891 S.W.2d at
644. The State’s summary-judgment proof, the affidavit of Officer Duke, is clear,
positive, and direct; credible and free from contradictions and inconsistencies; and
could have been readily controverted by Jenkins. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c).
Accordingly, the State met its initial burden of establishing that the pickup, which
was owned by Jenkins and used to transport narcotics in violation of Texas law, was
contraband that was subject to forfeiture. See State v. One (1) 2004 Lincoln
Navigator, 494 S.W.3d 690, 701 (Tex. 2016) (stating that the State’s burden is
proving the property is subject to forfeiture, which includes proving probable cause);
State v. Ninety Thousand Two Hundred Thirty-Five Dollars and No Cents in U.S.
Currency, 390 S.W.3d 289, 293 (Tex. 2013) (stating that probable cause is a
reasonable belief that a substantial connection exists between the property to be
forfeited and the criminal activity defined in the statute). Thus, the burden shifted to
Jenkins to raise a material fact issue that would preclude summary judgment. See
Walker, 924 S.W.2d at 377. However, the record shows that Jenkins failed to file a
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response to the State’s motion for summary judgment, and thus failed to challenge
any of the State’s summary judgment evidence. We conclude that the trial court did
not err in granting the State’s motion for summary judgment. We overrule Jenkins’s
issues on appeal and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
AFFIRMED.
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STEVE McKEITHEN
Chief Justice
Submitted on January 21, 2020
Opinion Delivered March 26, 2020
Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger and Johnson, JJ.
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