NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 1 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SUKHMINDER SINGH, No. 19-71141
Petitioner, Agency No. A099-474-242
v.
MEMORANDUM*
WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted March 30, 2020**
Seattle, Washington
Before: McKEOWN, N.R. SMITH, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Sukhminder Singh, a native and citizen of India, petitions for
review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the
denial by an immigration judge (“IJ”) of his application for asylum, withholding of
removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Singh
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
sought immigration relief based on his alleged persecution in India for his
affiliation with the Shiromani Akali Dal Amritsar (“SADA” or “Mann”) Party. In
this petition, Singh contests the adverse credibility determination that underlies the
rejection of his claims for relief. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and
we deny the petition for review.
The IJ found Singh’s testimony not credible based on a series of
inconsistencies between his oral testimony, his written submissions, and his
credible fear interview. The IJ cited inconsistencies as to Singh’s membership in
the SADA Party; his degree of involvement with the SADA Party, including the
nature and regularity of his party activities; his knowledge of the principles and
goals of the SADA Party; the timing and number of threats he received; and the
way he identified his attackers as members of the rival Congress Party. When the
IJ confronted Singh about these inconsistencies, the IJ found Singh’s explanations
unsatisfactory and the inconsistencies “unresolved.”
The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision, explaining that the record substantiated
the IJ’s findings of material inconsistencies in Singh’s narrative. The BIA added
that the IJ “was not required to accept [Singh’s] bare assertions that he simply
made mistakes, or that he simply ‘didn’t know what to say, what to do’ at his
interview, as sufficient to reconcile the discrepancies in the record and establish his
credibility.” The BIA noted that the cited inconsistencies as to the timing and
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number of threats Singh received were “arguably minor,” but the adverse
credibility determination “was nevertheless supported by other permissible
considerations that . . . are supported by the record and are not clearly erroneous.”
Substantial evidence supports the adverse credibility finding. See Shrestha
v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir. 2010). For example, although Singh
testified at his merits hearing that he was a member of the SADA Party, he
previously stated he was “a low-level worker of the party” and not a member.
Singh also testified inconsistently about the nature and intensity of his involvement
with the SADA Party. In his credible fear interview, Singh said that he hung
posters for the party and attended rallies “[o]nce or twice,” but did not participate
in other party activities. Yet at his merits hearing, Singh testified that he engaged
in a broader array of party activities including “participat[ing] in the party rallies,”
“participat[ing] in the party pleading sessions,” “help[ing] arrange speeches for
the party,” “[p]reaching for the party,” “hanging up posters,” “decorating stages for
the party leaders,” and “during events, serv[ing] water [and] food to the
participant[s] during the gatherings.” Singh’s testimony similarly varied as to his
understanding and characterization of the goals of the SADA Party. Whereas some
of the inconsistencies cited by the IJ could be considered trivial, others (including
those referenced here) were more pronounced and went to the heart of Singh’s
claims for relief. And when the IJ confronted him, Singh failed to provide a
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substantive justification for the disparities in his testimony.
Although Singh now offers plausible alternative explanations for the
inconsistencies in his testimony, the record does not compel acceptance of his
account. A reasonable adjudicator could conclude that Singh’s inconsistencies
across time, coupled with his insistence that each inconsistency with which he was
confronted arose from his “mistake” and nothing more, evinced fabrication or, at
minimum, unreliable narration. Under such circumstances, we will not disturb the
administrative findings of fact. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (providing that “the
administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator
would be compelled to conclude to the contrary”); Rizk v. Holder, 629 F.3d 1083,
1087 (9th Cir. 2011) (“To reverse [an adverse credibility] finding we must find that
the evidence not only supports a contrary conclusion, but compels it.” (brackets
omitted) (quoting INS v. Elias–Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 n.1 (1992))). Absent
credible testimony, Singh is unable to sustain his burden to demonstrate
entitlement to asylum, withholding of removal, or CAT protection.
PETITION DENIED.
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