TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-20-00181-CV
In re D’joulou K. Caldwell
ORIGINAL PROCEDING FROM TRAVIS COUNTY
MEMORANDUM OPINION
D’joulou K. Caldwell, acting pro se, filed a “notice of appeal” in this Court
challenging an administrative determination by the Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS)
that he must register as a sex offender under the Texas Sex Offender Registration Act in Chapter
62 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. arts. 62.001-62.408;
see also id. art. 62.003(a) (noting that “[f]or the purposes of this chapter, the department is
responsible for determining whether an offense under the laws of another state, federal law, the
laws of a foreign country, or the Uniform Code of Military Justice contains elements that are
substantially similar to the elements of an offense under the laws of this state”).
Additionally, it appears that Caldwell has filed a challenge to that administrative
determination in Travis County district court that remains pending. See id. art. 62.003(c) (“An
appeal of a determination made under this article shall be brought in a district court in Travis
County.”); Crabtree v. State, 389 S.W.3d 820, 827 & n.24 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (“Those who
wish to contest DPS’s determination that they must register under Chapter 62 may do so in
Travis County district court.”); Texas Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Anonymous Adult Tex., 382 S.W.3d
531, 533 (Tex. App.—Austin 2012, no pet.) (noting same). The record does not contain a final
judgment or an otherwise appealable order in the underlying case. Without a final judgment or
an otherwise appealable order, we may not exercise appellate jurisdiction. See Tex. Civ. Prac. &
Rem. Code § 51.014; Lehmann v. Har Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001).
On March 12, 2020, the Clerk of this Court sent a letter requesting that Caldwell
file a written response demonstrating this Court’s jurisdiction over his appeal and notifying him
that failure to respond subjected his appeal to dismissal. Caldwell filed an affidavit and brief in
response, stating that he is “seeking declaratory/injunctive/remedial relief” to reverse DPS’s
decision compelling him to register as a sex offender under section 62.001. Based on the
substance of Caldwell’s requested relief, we construe his filings as a petition for writ of
injunction. See Surgitek, Bristol-Myers Corp. v. Abel, 997 S.W.2d 598, 601 (Tex. 1999) (stating
that courts look to substance of party’s pleading rather than its caption or form to determine its
nature); see also Tex. Gov’t Code § 22.221 (addressing appellate courts’ writ power); Tex. R.
App. P. 52.1 (addressing original appellate proceedings seeking extraordinary relief including
writs of injunction).
However, this Court has limited injunctive powers. We have “no original
jurisdiction to grant writs of injunction, except to prevent the invasion of [our] jurisdiction over
the subject-matter of a pending appeal, or to prevent an unlawful interference with the
enforcement of [our] judgments and decrees.” In re Mem’l Park Med. Ctr., Inc., No. 03-18-
00749-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 10237, at *1-2 (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 13, 2018, orig.
proceeding) (citing Madison v. Martinez, 42 S.W.2d 84, 86 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1931, writ
ref’d)); see also Tex. Gov’t Code § 22.221 (“Each court of appeals or a justice of a court of
2
appeals may issue a writ of mandamus and all other writs necessary to enforce the jurisdiction of
the court.”). As we have noted, Caldwell does not have any final order or judgment for an
appeal to this Court, and he does not seek to prevent another party’s interference with a previous
judgment from this Court. Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction. See
Tex. Gov’t Code § 22.221; In re Mem’l Park Med. Ctr., 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 10237, at *1-2.
We dismiss Caldwell’s petition for want of jurisdiction. 1
__________________________________________
Jeff Rose, Chief Justice
Before Chief Justice Rose, Justices Baker and Triana
Dismissed for Want of Jurisdiction
Filed: April 7, 2020
1
Caldwell also filed a motion for temporary relief, see Tex. R. App. P. 52.10, which we
dismiss as moot.
3