NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 13 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
WILLIAM CURRY, JR., No. 18-36098
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:17-cv-06010-RJB
v.
MEMORANDUM*
TAMMY BOYLAN, Mail Room; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Robert J. Bryan, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 7, 2020**
Before: TASHIMA, BYBEE, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
Washington pretrial civil detainee William Curry, Jr. appeals pro se from the
district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging
constitutional violations relating to his legal mail. We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
(9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Curry’s access-to-
courts claim because Curry failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to
whether defendants actively interfered with his habeas petition. See Silva v. Di
Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1103 (9th Cir. 2011) (a prisoner has a right to litigate
claims “without active interference by prison officials”), overruled on other
grounds by Richey v. Dahne, 807 F.3d 1202, 1209 n.6 (9th Cir. 2015).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Curry’s retaliation
claim because Curry failed to raise a triable dispute as to whether defendants took
an adverse action against him because of his protected conduct. See Brodheim v.
Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir. 2009) (elements of a retaliation claim under
§ 1983).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Curry’s equal
protection claim because Curry failed to raise a triable dispute as to whether he
was intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated. See Thornton v.
City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1167 (9th Cir. 2005) (elements of an equal
protection “class of one” claim).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Curry’s motion to
compel discovery because Curry failed to include a certification that he conferred
or attempted to confer with defendants. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1) (motion to
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compel discovery must include a certification that the movant conferred or
attempted to confer with the opposing party); Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751
(9th Cir. 2002) (standard of review).
Contrary to Curry’s contention, the district court did not err by allowing the
Attorney General to represent defendants. See Wash. Rev. Code §§ 4.92.060,
4.92.070 (discussing circumstances under which a state officer is entitled to the
Attorney General’s legal representation).
We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.
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