IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
In the Matter of the Marriage of )
) No. 80165-1-I
CHRISTINE CRABTREE, )
) DIVISION ONE
Respondent, )
) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
and )
)
DONALD CLINTON CRABTREE, )
)
Appellant. )
)
SMITH, J. — Donald Crabtree appeals an order finding him in contempt for
failing to pay child support and alimony to Christine Crabtree under a South
Carolina divorce decree. We hold substantial evidence supports the trial court’s
contempt findings and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering
Donald1 to pay a remedial sanction of $100 per day for each day that any past-
due amounts remained owing, after the date set forth in the court’s order.
Therefore, we affirm.
FACTS
Donald and Christine were married in Washington in 2000 and divorced in
South Carolina in January 2018. In its “Final Order and Decree of Divorce
1
Because the parties share a last name, we refer to them by their first
names for clarity.
Citations and pin cites are based on the Westlaw online version of the cited material.
No. 80165-1-I/2
(Amended),” entered January 26, 2018 (South Carolina Order), the South
Carolina family court imputed income to Donald in the amount of $80,000 per
year. It also ordered Donald to pay child support in the amount of $1,404 per
month and alimony in the amount of $1,600 per month. In dividing the marital
estate, the South Carolina court awarded the parties’ South Carolina home to
Christine; awarded a house in Medical Lake, Washington, to Donald; and
ordered Donald to make an equalization payment to Christine in the amount of
$37,957, payable on “the earlier of the refinance or sale of [the Medical Lake
property] or 120 days from the date this Order is filed.”
Donald appealed the South Carolina Order to the South Carolina appellate
court. In June 2018, after Donald filed his notice of appeal, the South Carolina
family court entered a consent order in which both parties indicated that they
intended to sell the property awarded to them but acknowledged that they were
prohibited from doing so while Donald’s appeal was pending. Specifically, the
consent order explained that “the effect of the [South Carolina Order] regarding
equitable distribution . . . is stayed pending the appeal.” In the consent order, the
parties agreed that notwithstanding the stay, Donald could list the Medical Lake
property for sale and that “the money owed to [Christine] shall be deducted from
any sale proceeds from the sale of this property and paid directly to [Christine] at
closing.” The parties also agreed that Donald “currently owes [Christine]
$64,588.66 ($37,957 by way of equitable division and $26,631.66 as attorney’s
fees, costs and reimbursement).” Donald later sold the Medical Lake property,
and in October 2018, Christine received $86,036.01 upon the sale of that
2
No. 80165-1-I/3
property. According to Christine’s later declaration, “[t]he breakdown of the
proceeds distributed to [her] was $28,881.66 for attorney fees, costs, appellate
fees, and other reimbursements; $37,957.00 in equitable distribution; $4,719.40
in past due child support; $12,295.75 in past due spousal support; and $2,182.20
in attorney fees from a contempt hearing in July, 2018.” Christine also declared
that Donald approved this breakdown, as evidenced by his signature on an
October 8, 2018, e-mail from the title closer for the sale of the Medical Lake
property.
At some point, Donald and Christine each moved to Washington. On
March 20, 2019, Christine filed in the trial court a request to register the South
Carolina Order, a notice of registration, and a motion for contempt. The same
day, she obtained an order directing Donald to appear and show cause with
regard to her contempt motion. The request to register, the notice of registration,
Christine’s motion, and the show cause order were served on Donald on March
21, 2019. In her motion for contempt, Christine alleged that Donald had not paid
child support or alimony for five months and, thus, was $7,020 behind on child
support and $8,000 behind on alimony. She also requested remedial sanctions,
including an order that Donald “[p]ay a fine for each day the court’s orders are
not followed.”
Donald did not request a hearing to contest the validity or enforcement of
the South Carolina Order, but in a declaration filed April 10, 2019, he contended
that Christine was “up to speed on Child Support and Alimony.” He asserted,
specifically, that the $37,957 equalization payment under the South Carolina
3
No. 80165-1-I/4
Order was “automatically held in abeyance” pending his appeal and that because
he nonetheless paid that amount to Christine following the sale of the Medical
Lake property, Christine was “paid up with the [$]37,957 . . . up until Mid
December of 2019.” Donald further contended that Christine “has not provided
any statement or receipt that all financial contended matters have been satisfied
when she received the $86,036.01”; that in terms of employment, he was in the
process of “launching a platform for organizing volunteers for outreach” that was
“not a pipe-dream so to speak, [but] is at hand”; and that the South Carolina court
imputed income to him based on his being a “‘professional engineer’” even
though he was not. He also asserted that past psychological evaluations
“showed [him] to be candid and Christ[ine] to be exaggerating and many other
useful facts supporting [his] case.” He asked the trial court to give him an
“opportunity to file for a retro-active reduction in spousal support in accordance
with his limited earnings these years to make support payments sustainable for
both parties,” and he attached a copy of his opening brief in the appeal of the
South Carolina Order “so that the Court might understand the injustice [he’s]
suffered.” He also attached financial declarations purporting to show the debts
that the proceeds of the Medical Lake property were used to satisfy and why he
was unable to make payments as set forth in the South Carolina Order.
In her reply declaration, Christine pointed out that under the June 2018
consent order, the parties agreed that the $37,957.00 equalization payment
would be made notwithstanding the stay pending appeal. Christine also asserted
that even after closing costs, the proceeds paid to Christine, and a loan payoff,
4
No. 80165-1-I/5
Donald was left with $123,978.99 in proceeds from the sale of the Medical Lake
property. She asserted that in December 2018, Donald acknowledged by text
message that he continued to owe her support payments and even requested
her bank account information so that he could pay the support owing for October,
November, and December 2018. Thus, Christine contended, Donald “had the
ability to pay his ongoing support obligation, which he even expressed his intent
to do in December, 2018. Unfortunately, he simply chooses not to do so.”
Christine also declared that Donald “has been previously held in contempt three
separate times for failing to pay support and follow court orders: April 6, 2016,
May 23, 2017, and most recently on July 25, 2018.” Christine attached copies of
the relevant contempt orders to her declaration.
The trial court held a contempt hearing on April 26, 2019, and heard
argument from Christine’s counsel and from Donald, who appeared pro se. At
the hearing, the commissioner initially stated that she had “read everything.” But
when Donald asked the commissioner whether she had read the South Carolina
appeal brief that he attached to his declaration, the commissioner responded that
she had not, indicating that the brief was “irrelevant.”
Donald argued at the hearing that his ability to seek out employment had
been inhibited by an outstanding South Carolina bench warrant and indicated
that to have the warrant removed, “it would be good if [he] had something
notarized” from Christine saying that she had been paid for what she was owed
in 2018. Donald also argued that the income imputed to him under the South
Carolina Order was based on credentials he did not have and a job offer that
5
No. 80165-1-I/6
ultimately did not come to fruition. He acknowledged that he was “not up-to-date”
on payments to Christine but contended that he did not have the ability to pay her
and that his failure to pay was not willful. Donald offered to provide tax returns to
show his actual earnings, and the commissioner responded, “No because courts
can say different things about imputed earnings and whether you’re working up
to your [full potential].”
In response to Donald’s argument, Christine argued, through counsel, that
“[d]espite the fact that the warrant out of South Carolina may or may not be
preventing him from seeking employment, . . . the record is clear . . . that he just
has not sought employment over the last three years.” Christine pointed to
findings made by the South Carolina court in the prior contempt orders that were
attached to her reply declaration, contending, “they all say the same thing of
[Donald] just repeatedly saying that this is what my plan is and he unfortunately
just does not execute on that plan.”
The trial court ultimately found that Donald was able, but not willing, to
follow the South Carolina Order and held him in contempt. The court entered
judgment in Christine’s favor for $7,020.00 in past-due child support, $9,600.00
in past-due alimony, and $3,720.00 for attorney fees and costs.2 The court also
ordered that the “[j]udgment shall be paid in full within 30 days. If not, an
additional fine of $100 per day shall be imposed until the full judgment amount is
paid.” Donald appeals.
2 The amount of the money judgment took into account both (1) additional
past-due amounts that accrued after Christine filed her contempt motion and (2)
a single child support payment that Donald made before the contempt hearing.
6
No. 80165-1-I/7
ANALYSIS
Contempt Order
Donald contends that the trial court erred by finding him in contempt and
ordering him to pay $100 for each day that his payment of the contempt
judgment was late. We disagree.
Because Christine registered the South Carolina Order in Washington, it
was “enforceable in the same manner and [was] subject to the same procedures
as an order issued by a tribunal of this state.” RCW 26.21A.510(2). To that end,
under the law of this state, “[i]f an obligor fails to comply with a support or
maintenance order, a petition or motion may be filed . . . to initiate a contempt
action as provided in chapter 7.21 RCW.” RCW 26.18.050(1). Under that
chapter, “[c]ontempt of court” means, as relevant here, “intentional . . .
[d]isobedience of any lawful judgment, decree, order, or process of the court.”
RCW 7.21.010(1)(b). If, in a contempt hearing involving a support or
maintenance order, “the obligor contends . . . that he . . . lacked the means to
comply with the . . . order, the obligor shall establish that he . . . exercised due
diligence in seeking employment, in conserving assets, or otherwise in rendering
himself . . . able to comply with the court’s order.” RCW 26.18.050(4).
Upon a finding of contempt, “[a] judge or commissioner of . . . the superior
court . . . may impose a sanction for contempt of court.” RCW 7.21.020. As
relevant here, on the motion of a person aggrieved by contempt, “[i]f the court
finds that [a] person has failed or refused to perform an act that is yet within the
person’s power to perform, the court may . . . impose . . . [a] forfeiture not to
7
No. 80165-1-I/8
exceed two thousand dollars for each day the contempt of court continues.”
RCW 7.21.030(2)(b). In reviewing a contempt order, “[w]e review the trial court’s
factual findings for substantial evidence and then determine whether the findings
support the conclusions of law.” In re Marriage of Myers, 123 Wn. App. 889, 893,
99 P.3d 398 (2004). “Evidence is ‘substantial’ when it is ‘sufficient to persuade a
fair-minded person of the truth of the matter asserted.’” In re Marriage of Black,
188 Wn.2d 114, 127, 392 P.3d 1041 (2017) (quoting In re Marriage of Chandola,
180 Wn.2d 632, 642, 327 P.3d 644 (2014)).
“Punishment for contempt of court is within the sound discretion of the trial
court, and this court will not reverse a contempt order absent an abuse of that
discretion.” In re Marriage of James, 79 Wn. App. 436, 439-40, 903 P.2d 470
(1995). “A trial court abuses its discretion by exercising it on untenable grounds
or for untenable reasons.” James, 79 Wn. App. at 440.
Here, the trial court’s contempt finding is supported by substantial
evidence. Specifically, Donald himself acknowledged at the contempt hearing, “I
don’t deny that I’m not up-to-date.” And although he contended that this was
because he lacked the means to pay the amounts set forth in the South Carolina
Order, substantial evidence in the record supports a finding that he did not
exercise due diligence in rendering himself able to comply with that order.
Specifically, Donald did not present any evidence to the commissioner to
contradict Christine’s declaration that Donald received more than $120,000 in
proceeds from the sale of the Medical Lake property. Furthermore, Christine
presented evidence, in the form of three prior contempt orders entered in South
8
No. 80165-1-I/9
Carolina, that Donald did not exercise due diligence in seeking employment. In
the first of these orders, from April 2016, the court found Donald in contempt for
failing to pay child support and the children’s tuition payments. In doing so, the
court also found that Donald “should have found employment by this time”; that
his “failure to find employment is through his own inaction”; and that “[t]he
marketing of his business prototype . . . has not been successful for over a year
although [Donald] has hopes that it will be successful.” The court also “d[id] not
believe there is a business of [Donald]’s, or hopes of a successful business, that
would be negatively impacted by his obtaining employment elsewhere
commensurate with his skills.”
In another order from May 2017, in which the court found Donald in
contempt for failing to make house payments as set forth in the South Carolina
Order, the court observed, “If [Donald] feels he can not afford to make these
payments, then he should seek employment commensurate with his education,
employment history, and ability to earn.” And in a third order from July 2018, in
which the court found Donald in contempt for failing to pay child support and
alimony, the court wrote, “[I]nstead of looking for employment based on his
educational background and past work experience, [Donald] continues to work
on developing computer software programs which have not resulted in much
income in the past three (3) years and he has the ability, experience and
educational background to earn sufficient income to timely pay his alimony and
child support obligations.”
In short, and although the commissioner’s findings on this point should
9
No. 80165-1-I/10
have been more thorough, there is substantial evidence in the record to support
the trial court’s finding of contempt. Therefore, the trial court did not err by
finding Donald in contempt for failing to pay child support and alimony as set
forth in the South Carolina Order. Furthermore, Christine expressly requested
remedial sanctions in her contempt motion. Given Donald’s documented history
of failing to comply with the South Carolina Order, his documented lack of
diligence in seeking employment, and the absence of any evidence that he made
efforts to seek employment, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
imposing sanctions of $100 per day for each day that any part of the contempt
judgment was late.
Donald raises a number of arguments in support of reversal, but none of
them are persuasive.
First, Donald contends that his failure to comply with the South Carolina
Order was not willful because he lacked the means to comply. To this end, he
also argues that the South Carolina bench warrant “eclipses all his standard
opportunities for the type of income being demanded of him.” But as discussed,
an obligor who contends that he lacked the means to comply with a support order
has the burden of establishing that he “exercised due diligence in seeking
employment, in conserving assets, or otherwise in rendering himself . . . able to
comply.” RCW 26.18.050(4). Donald points to no evidence that he made an
effort, bench warrant notwithstanding, to seek employment or otherwise render
himself able to comply with the South Carolina Order. He also points to no
evidence to support his assertion that employment was denied to him as a result
10
No. 80165-1-I/11
of the bench warrant. Therefore, his contention fails.
Donald also argues that the amount of income the South Carolina court
imputed to him was unfair and not valid. He argues further that he has “been
enduring ongoing mischaracterizations and claims that have prevented him from
succeeding” and points to the psychological evaluations that he asserts show
Christine as being not credible and Donald as being candid. He asserts that the
South Carolina Order was contrary to this “manifold evidence that [Christine] is
not credible.” But Donald’s complaints about the South Carolina Order are not
properly before the court in a proceeding for violation of that order. See RCW
26.21A.530(1)(e) (providing, as relevant here, that a party contesting the validity
or enforcement of a registered support order has the burden of proving that
“[t]here is a defense under the law of this state to the remedy sought”); see also
In re J.R.H., 83 Wn. App. 613, 616, 922 P.2d 206 (1996) (“According to
Washington’s ‘collateral bar’ rule, ‘a court order cannot be collaterally attacked in
contempt proceedings arising from its violation, since a contempt judgment will
normally stand even if the order violated was erroneous or was later ruled
invalid.’” (quoting State v. Coe, 101 Wn.2d 364, 369-70, 679 P.2d 353 (1984))).
Donald next argues that the trial court was biased because the
commissioner told him that his defense regarding ability did not matter. He
contends in support of this argument that “[i]f the [South Carolina O]rder put its
basis for imputed income upon a unrealized and informal job offer that did not
pan out, then the Court must be willing to re-address the income upon the
change of circumstance, especially during enforcement, because the foundations
11
No. 80165-1-I/12
to the basis of that ruling have changed.” But this contention amounts to an
assertion that the trial court should have considered retroactively modifying the
South Carolina Order. Yet, even setting aside the fact that retroactive
modifications are disfavored, see In re Marriage of Cummings, 101 Wn. App.
230, 234, 6 P.3d 19 (2000), Donald did not petition to modify the order.
Therefore, the trial court was without authorization to do so. See
RCW 26.21A.510(3) (“Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, a tribunal of
this state shall recognize and enforce, but may not modify, a registered support
order if the issuing tribunal had jurisdiction.”); see also RCW 26.21A.550, .560
(setting forth the requirements for modification of a foreign child support order).
Thus, by steering Donald away from his ability argument and toward the
arguments that it could actually consider, particularly given that Donald had only
five minutes to make his argument, the trial court did not exhibit bias.
Donald also argues that the trial court was biased because the
commissioner refused to consider his tax records, did not read his South
Carolina appeal brief, “did not approach a foreign order with caution, even one on
appeal,” repeatedly interrupted him during the hearing, and admitted when
questioned that she had not read everything. But Donald did not file any tax
records with the court, and in any event, the commissioner correctly observed
that those records were not relevant to whether Donald was in contempt. And
Donald cites no authority for the proposition that foreign orders, even those that
are on appeal, must be approached “with caution.” Rather, once registered, such
orders are “enforceable in the same manner . . . as an order issued by a tribunal
12
No. 80165-1-I/13
of this state.” RCW 26.21A.510(2). Additionally, it is clear from the hearing
transcripts that the commissioner interrupted Donald on multiple occasions not
because she was biased against him, but in an attempt to redirect him, in the
limited time he had to make his argument, toward arguments the court could
actually consider in the context of a contempt proceeding. Finally, the
commissioner was correct that the South Carolina appeal brief was not relevant
to the sole issue before the court, i.e., whether Donald was in contempt. Thus,
although the commissioner should have reviewed all of the materials presented
to her, a failure to do so under these circumstances does not constitute evidence
of bias. For these reasons, Donald fails to establish that the trial court exhibited
reversible bias. Tatham v. Rogers, 170 Wn. App. 76, 96, 283 P.3d 583 (2012)
(observing, in context of the appearance of fairness doctrine, that because trial
court is presumed to perform its functions without bias or prejudice, the party
asserting bias “‘must produce sufficient evidence demonstrating bias, such as
personal or pecuniary interest on the part of the decision maker’” (quoting In re
Pers. Restraint of Haynes, 100 Wn. App. 366, 377 n.23, 996 P.2d 637 (2000))).
Donald next contends, as he did below, that the equalization payment he
made to Christine upon the sale of the Medical Lake property should be treated
as an advance on child support and alimony until Christine provides proof that
the amounts she received were applied as contemplated in the title closer’s
October 8, 2018, e-mail. But he cites no authority for the proposition that
Christine is required to provide such proof, much less that her failure to do so
13
No. 80165-1-I/14
should excuse him from complying with the South Carolina Order. Therefore, his
contention fails.
Donald next argues that the court acted “vengefully versus justly” in
imposing the $100 per day sanction for each day that payment of the contempt
judgment was late. But as discussed, Christine expressly requested remedial
sanctions in her contempt motion. Furthermore, under the circumstances
presented here, those sanctions were well within the trial court’s discretion to
impose in order to coerce Donald to comply and thus avoid paying the sanction.
Therefore, Donald’s argument is not persuasive.
Finally, Donald contends that the South Carolina Order is unlawful. He
asserts, in essence, that because it was “founded on the novel idea of religious
abuse,” the order—and thus the enforcement thereof—infringe on his
constitutionally protected rights to free exercise of religion and freedom of
speech. But this argument is being raised for the first time on appeal. See
RAP 2.5(a) (“The appellate court may refuse to review any claim of error which
was not raised in the trial court.”). Furthermore, it is not adequately briefed to
discern whether any alleged constitutional error was manifest, much less to
warrant consideration on the merits. Therefore, Donald’s contention fails. See
RAP 2.5(a)(3) (party may raise for the first time on appeal a manifest error
affecting a constitutional right); Norcon Builders, LLC v. GMP Homes VG, LLC,
161 Wn. App. 474, 486, 254 P.3d 835 (2011) (appellate court “will not consider
an inadequately briefed argument”); see also Westberg v. All-Purpose Structures
Inc., 86 Wn. App. 405, 411, 936 P.2d 1175 (1997) (pro se litigants are held to
14
No. 80165-1-I/15
same standards as attorneys).
Attorney Fees
Christine requests attorney fees on appeal. Under RCW 26.18.160, the
prevailing party in an action to enforce a support or maintenance order “is entitled
to a recovery of costs, including an award for reasonable attorney fees.” This
entitlement applies to appellate fees. In re Paternity of M.H., 187 Wn.2d 1, 13,
383 P.3d 1031 (2016).
Because Christine is the prevailing party, we grant her request for attorney
fees subject to her compliance with RAP 18.1.3
We affirm.
WE CONCUR:
3Because Christine is entitled to fees under RCW 26.18.160, we do not
address her contention that she is also entitled to fees under RAP 18.9 because
Donald’s appeal is frivolous. We note, however, that although Donald’s
arguments ultimately do not entitle him to relief on appeal, it was not, as Christine
contends, “difficult to ascertain” the reasons why Donald believed the trial court’s
order was erroneous.
15