MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
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APPELLANT PRO SE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Nathan Hummel Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Westville, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Sierra A. Murray
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Nathan Hummel, April 22, 2020
Appellant-Petitioner, Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-MI-3091
v. Appeal from the LaPorte Circuit
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Thomas J.
Appellee-Respondent. Alevizos, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
46C01-1912-MI-2857
Najam, Judge.
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Statement of the Case
[1] Nathan Hummel appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for writ of
habeas corpus. Hummel presents one issue for our review, namely, whether the
court erred when it denied his petition. We affirm and remand with
instructions.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On April 23, 2012, Hummel pleaded guilty to one count of dealing in a narcotic
drug, as a Class B felony (Count 1); two counts of robbery, as Class B felonies
(Counts II and III); and one count of disarming an officer, as a Class C felony
(Count IV). In exchange for his guilty plea, the State agreed that Hummel
would be sentenced as follows: fifteen years for Count 1, ten years for Count II,
ten years for Count III, and two years for Count IV. The parties further agreed
that “the sentences in Count II, Count III, and Count IV shall run
concurrently.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 14 (capitalization removed).
Thereafter, the Starke Circuit Court accepted Hummel’s guilty plea and
sentenced Hummel on each count pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement.
The court then ordered that the “sentences imposed in Counts II, III, and IV
shall run concurrently” and that the “sentence imposed in Amended Count I
shall run consecutively to Counts II, III, and IV.” Id. at 16. Hummel was then
placed in a correctional facility in LaPorte County.
[3] On November 6, 2019, Hummel, pro se, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus
in the LaPorte Circuit Court. In his petition, Hummel asserted that his
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confinement was illegal because “there was no consecutive language in the
plea” and that, “absent clear language to the contrary[,] the sentence for Count
I should run concurrently.” Id. at 19. In essence, Hummel asserted that his
sentence “violate[d] the express terms” of his plea agreement and that he “has
done the time legally expressed in his plea.” Id. at 20. The LaPorte Circuit
Court found that Hummel had stated “no claim for relief.” Id. at 22.
Accordingly, the court denied Hummel’s petition. This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
[4] Hummel contends that the LaPorte Circuit Court erred when it denied his
petition for writ of habeas corpus. Specifically, Hummel asserts that he is being
“illegally detained” after the trial court made a “mistake of law” when it
ordered his sentence on Count I to run consecutive to his sentences on the other
counts because his plea agreement “is silent on the consecutive language.”
Appellant’s Br. at 5, 6. He further asserts that, had the court ordered his
sentence on Count I to run concurrent with the other counts as required by his
plea agreement, his aggregate sentence would have elapsed. Accordingly, he
maintains that he is entitled to an immediate release from custody.
[5] Indiana Code Section 34-25.5-1-1 (2019) provides that “[e]very person whose
liberty is restrained, under any pretense whatever, may prosecute a writ of
habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of the restraint, and shall be delivered
from the restraint if the restraint is illegal.” The purpose of the writ of habeas
corpus is to bring the person in custody before the court for inquiry into the
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cause of the restraint. Manley v. Butts, 71 N.E.3d 1153, 1156 (Ind. Ct. App.
2017). A petitioner is entitled to habeas corpus relief only if he is entitled to his
immediate release from unlawful custody. Martin v. State, 901 N.E.2d 645, 647
(Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
[6] Here, while Hummel claimed in his petition for writ of habeas corpus that his
confinement was illegal, his underlying argument was that the court did not
sentence him pursuant to the terms of his plea agreement. Thus, contrary to
Hummel’s assertion, the substance of his petition makes it clear that his petition
was, in fact, an attack on the validity of his sentence. Indeed, in his brief,
Hummel acknowledges that he is challenging the court’s imposition of
consecutive sentences. However, a petitioner “may not file a writ of habeas
corpus to attack his conviction or sentence.” Manley, 71 N.E.3d at 1156
(citations omitted). Rather, a petitioner who attacks the validity of his sentence
must file a petition for post-conviction relief. See id. Because Hummel’s
petition challenged the validity of his sentence, the LaPorte Circuit Court did
not err when it denied his petition for writ of habeas corpus.
[7] However, Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 1(1)(c) provides that, if a petitioner
files a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the county where the person is
incarcerated and challenges the validity of his sentence, “that court shall
transfer the cause to the court in which the conviction took place, and the latter
court shall treat it as a petition for [post-conviction relief] under this Rule.”
Because Hummel filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the county where
he is incarcerated and challenged the validity of his sentence, the LaPorte
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Circuit Court was required to transfer his petition to the Starke Circuit Court
for it to be treated as a petition for post-conviction relief. Accordingly, we
affirm the LaPorte Circuit Court’s denial of Hummel’s petition for writ of
habeas corpus, but we remand with instructions for the court to transfer
Hummel’s petition to the Starke Circuit Court.
[8] Affirmed and remanded with instructions.
Kirsch, J., and Brown, J., concur.
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