IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION ONE
IN THE MATTER OF THE PERSONAL No. 80891-5-I
RESTRAINT OF
OPINION DENYING
ABDULLAHI NOOR, EMERGENCY MOTION
FOR RELEASE UNDER
Petitioner. RAP 16.15(b)
PER CURIAM – Petitioner Abdullahi Noor is serving an indeterminate life
sentence after being convicted of rape, witness intimidation, assault in the fourth
degree, harassment and three counts of misdemeanor violation of a court order.
This court affirmed his conviction and sentence in 2018. See State v. Noor, 4 Wn.
App.2d 1009, review denied, 192 Wn.2d 1003 (2018). On December 18, 2019,
Noor filed a personal restraint petition raising eight claims he contends justify
reversal of his convictions. This court has requested a response from the State,
the deadline for which is May 4, 2020.
On April 14, 2020, Noor filed an emergency motion seeking to be released
from prison on personal recognizance or on conditions of release under RAP
16.15(b), claiming that the coronavirus pandemic presents him with an undue risk
of infection. This court requested a response to this motion, which the State filed
on April 21, 2020. A panel of this court, having reviewed the motion and response,
DENIES Noor’s emergency motion.
Citations and pin cites are based on the Westlaw online version of the cited material.
No. 80891-5-I/2
RAP 16.15(b) provides:
(b) Release by Appellate Court of Person in Custody. The
appellate court may release a petitioner on bail or personal
recognizance before deciding the petition, if release prevents further
unlawful confinement and it is unjust to delay the petitioner’s release
until the petition is determined. The appellate court or the superior
court in its decision on the merits, or by separate order after a
decision on the merits, may release a petitioner on bail or on
personal recognizance. The appellate court may direct the release
of petitioner with the conditions of release to be determined by a trial
court.
RAP 16.15(b) does not contemplate the release of a defendant convicted and
sentenced to life in prison before the court had addressed the merits of that
defendant’s petition. The first sentence of this rule was intended to facilitate
release of a petitioner in advance of the time required to prepare and circulate an
opinion. 3 TEGLAND, WASHINGTON PRACTICE: RULES PRACTICE RAP
16.15 (8th ed. 2014). Release is generally authorized under RAP 16.15(b) only
when the defendant has demonstrated a “clearly meritorious case.” 1 Wash. State
Bar Ass’n, Washington Appellate Practice Deskbook §24.7(13) (4th ED. 2016).
We are not in a position to make such a determination on an emergency basis,
particularly when the State has not even had the opportunity to address the merits
of Noor’s petition.
Under RCW 9.95.062(2), Noor was ineligible from being released during his
direct appeal. Now that his convictions have been affirmed on direct appeal and
are final, we find his argument for release pending consideration of a collateral
attack to be even less compelling. Absent statutory authority, there is no right to
release on bail once a conviction is final. State v. Reese, 15 Wn. App. 619, 621-
22, 550 P.2d 1179 (1976). Noor’s convictions became final in 2018 when the
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No. 80891-5-I/3
Supreme Court denied his petition for review after this court rejected his direct
appeal. Until relief is granted in a personal restraint petition, the convictions are
considered final for all purposes. State v. LaBeur, 33 Wn. App. 762, 764, 657 P.2d
802 (1983).
In order to warrant release from prison pending the resolution of a habeas
petition, a federal petitioner must show “substantial question” making the
application for release “exceptional and deserving of special treatment in the
interests of justice.” Aronson v. May, 85 S.Ct. 3, 5, 13 L. Ed. 2d 6 (1964); Martin
v. Solem, 801 F. 2d 324, 329 (8th Cir. 1986).
Noor has not demonstrated any special circumstances warranting his
release pending our consideration of the merits of his collateral attack. We
recognize that the novel coronavirus pandemic has raised concerns about the risk
of infection that the prison population faces. Whether the Department of
Corrections (DOC) is taking adequate steps to mitigate this risk is pending before
our Supreme Court in a mandamus action brought by a group of inmates, Colvin
v. Inslee, No. 98317-8. But Noor does not fall within any of the populations at high
risk of infection. He has presented no evidence that he has any increased risk
factors under current standards set by the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention. 1 And as of April 23, 2020, the DOC facility in which Noor is confined,
Coyote Ridge Corrections Center, reports no confirmed infections among
incarcerated individuals. 2
1
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extra-precautions/people-at-higher-risk.html
2
https://www.doc.wa.gov/news/covid-19.htm#status
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No. 80891-5-I/4
Further, according to the DOC website, on April 13, 2020, Governor Inslee
and the DOC began to implement steps in response to the COVID-19 pandemic
to mitigate any risk to its incarcerated population, including emergency
commutations of sentences for certain low-risk, non-violent offenders, 3 early
release of certain incarcerated individuals through furloughs or emergency medical
releases, 4 and allowing others to serve the remainder of their sentences in the
community. 5 While Noor, who is serving an indeterminate sentence for rape, does
not appear to qualify for release under any of these programs, the stated goal is to
reduce the overall prison population, thereby mitigating any risks Noor may
continue to face while incarcerated.
Based on the record before us, Noor’s motion for emergency release is
DENIED.
3
https://www.governor.wa.gov/sites/default/files/COVID-19%20-
%20Commutation%20Order%204.15.20%20%28tmp%29.pdf
4
https://www.governor.wa.gov/sites/default/files/proclamations/20-50%20-%20COVID-
19%20Reducing%20Prison%20Population.pdf
5
https://www.doc.wa.gov/news/2020/04162020p.htm
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