NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 29 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
COMFORT N. AGBOR, No. 19-71021
Plaintiff-Appellant, Agency No. A215-671-614
v.
MEMORANDUM*
WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted April 16, 2020**
Pasadena, California
Before: SCHROEDER and COLLINS, Circuit Judges, and BAYLSON,*** District
Judge.
Petitioner Comfort Agbor seeks review of the order of the Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the decision of the immigration judge (“IJ”)
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Michael M. Baylson, United States District Judge for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
denying her applications for political asylum and for withholding of removal under
the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), and for protection under the United
Nations Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252 and deny the petition for review.
“We review the denial of asylum, withholding of removal and CAT claims for
substantial evidence.” Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir.
2019). Review for substantial evidence permits reversal only if “the evidence not
only supports a contrary conclusion, but compels it—and also compels the further
conclusion that the petitioner meets the requisite standard for obtaining relief.”
Sanjaa v. Sessions, 863 F.3d 1161, 1164 (9th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted).
Petitioner first challenges the adverse credibility determination underlying the
denial of her applications for asylum and for withholding of removal. A credibility
determination should account for the “totality of the circumstances, and all relevant
factors,” which may include the applicant’s demeanor, candor, responsiveness,
inconsistency, and any falsehoods in her statements. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii);
see also id. § 1231(b)(3)(C). Here, the IJ’s adverse credibility finding was based on
ten specific factors, including observations about her demeanor as well as various
inconsistencies and implausibilities in Petitioner’s testimony. In affirming, the BIA
relied on four of the factors identified by the IJ. Because the BIA offered “a
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legitimate articulable basis” for upholding the adverse credibility determination, one
that was supported by “specific, cogent reason[s],” the BIA’s determination is
supported by substantial evidence. Gui v. INS, 280 F.3d 1217, 1225 (9th Cir. 2002);
see also Farah v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that a
petition for review must be denied unless the petitioner “present[s] evidence so
compelling that no reasonable factfinder could find that [s]he was not credible”
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
Since we uphold the adverse credibility determination, Petitioner’s challenges
to the denial of her applications for asylum and for withholding of removal fail.
Because Petitioner sought to sustain her burden on asylum through her testimony,
and because her testimony was validly rejected as not credible, she has not
demonstrated a “well-founded fear of persecution” based on a statutorily protected
ground. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). Since Petitioner failed to satisfy her burden on
asylum, she necessarily failed to satisfy the more stringent standard applied to claims
for withholding of removal. See Pedro-Mateo v. INS, 224 F.3d 1147, 1150 (9th Cir.
2000) (“A failure to satisfy the lower standard of proof required to establish
eligibility for asylum . . . necessarily results in a failure to demonstrate eligibility for
withholding of deportation.”).
Petitioner next challenges the denial of her application for CAT protection.
To establish eligibility for protection under the CAT, Petitioner bears the burden of
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establishing “it is more likely than not that . . . she would be tortured if removed to
the proposed country of removal.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). “[A]ll relevant
evidence” should be considered, including evidence that it is possible for Petitioner
to relocate within the country of removal. Maldonado v. Lynch, 786 F.3d 1155, 1164
(9th Cir. 2015) (referencing 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3)). Here, the BIA adopted the
reasoning of the IJ, who found that Petitioner’s testimony indicated she could
relocate safely within Cameroon. The IJ’s relocation finding, which informed the
denial of Petitioner’s CAT claim, is supported by substantial evidence. Petitioner
argues that the IJ and the BIA gave insufficient consideration to country reports and
news articles describing violence in Cameroon, but these reports do not “compel”
the conclusion that Petitioner herself will more likely than not be tortured if she
returns to Cameroon. Almaghzar v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d 915, 923 (9th Cir. 2006).
Therefore, the BIA did not err in rejecting Petitioner’s application for CAT
protection.
Petitioner’s final challenge is that the absence of a Pidgin English interpreter
at her immigration proceedings violated due process. To comport with the
requirements of due process, a merits deportation hearing “must be translated into a
language an alien can understand.” Khan v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 825, 829 (9th Cir.
2004). However, no due process violation occurs so long as the person facing
deportation can “participate meaningfully” in the deportation hearing despite the
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absence of a translator. Hartooni v. INS, 21 F.3d 336, 340 (9th Cir. 1994). In this
case, where Petitioner participated in numerous hearings and interviews in English
before notifying the IJ that Pidgin English was her best language, never explicitly
requested the services of a Pidgin English interpreter, and was able to answer the
questions asked of her (albeit sometimes with clarification), it cannot be said that
she was deprived of a “full and fair hearing.” Perez-Lastor v. INS, 208 F.3d 773,
778 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Kotasz v. INS, 31 F.3d 847, 850 n.2 (9th Cir. 1994)
(finding no due process violation where “[c]larification or repetition was at times
required” because the petitioners “were given a fair opportunity to relate their
version of events”). Therefore, the BIA correctly determined that Petitioner’s due
process rights were not violated by the absence of a Pidgin English interpreter.
The Petition for Review is DENIED. Petitioner’s Emergency Motion to Stay
Removal (Docket Entry No. 2) is denied as moot.
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