RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2677-18T2
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
RICKY ZUBER,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Argued telephonically March 23, 2020 –
Decided May 6, 2020
Before Judges Sabatino, Sumners and Geiger.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Essex County, Indictment Nos. 81-06-3729
and 81-06-3730.
James K. Smith, Jr., Assistant Deputy Public Defender,
argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora,
Public Defender, attorney; James K. Smith, Jr., of
counsel and on the briefs).
Frank J. Ducoat, Special Deputy Attorney
General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor,
argued the cause for respondent (Theodore N. Stephens
II, Acting Essex County Prosecutor, attorney; Frank J.
Ducoat, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
This case1 returns to us following a remand by our Supreme Court
directing the trial court to conduct a second resentencing to comport with the
Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution. See State v. Zuber, 227
N.J. 422, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 152 (2017).
In 1981, at the age of seventeen, Zuber and others sexually assaulted a
woman and a high school student in two separate incidents, after threatening to
kill those victims at knifepoint. He was waived to the adult criminal court and,
in two jury trials, was convicted of numerous offenses, including aggravated
sexual assault, kidnapping, and robbery.
The judge who presided over the trials initially imposed consecutive
prison sentences aggregating 150 years, subject to a 75-year aggregate period of
1
Because of some related issues, this appeal was argued back to back with two
other appeals that concern the constitutionality of lengthy sentences imposed on
minors who committed very serious crimes and were tried as adults, State v.
James Zarate, A-2001-17, and State v. Comer, A-1230-18. Comer's case was a
companion to Zuber's before the Supreme Court and was decided with Zuber's
in a consolidated opinion. 227 N.J. at 422, 453. We issue opinions in all three
cases today.
A-2677-18T2
2
parole ineligibility. We upheld Zuber's convictions on direct appeal, and they
are not contested here.
In 1988, the Supreme Court summarily remanded the matter for a first
resentencing to reconsider the imposition of the consecutive sentences under
state law, specifically State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627 (1985). State v. Zuber,
111 N.J. 650 (1988). At the first resentencing in 1988, the trial court revised
Zuber's sentence to an aggregate term of 110 years, with a 55-year parole
disqualifier. This first resentencing left intact much of the consecutive aspects
of the aggregate sentence.
After the United States Supreme Court held in Graham v. Florida, 560
U.S. 48 (2010), that sentencing a juvenile offender to life without parole for a
non-homicide offense violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the
Eighth Amendment, Zuber moved for relief in the trial court. He argued that his
aggregate 110-year term/55-year parole-ineligible sentence is the functional
equivalent of life without parole, and that the consecutive sentences imposed
upon him are unconstitutionally punitive.
The trial court in 2012 denied Zuber any further reduction of his sentence.
This court affirmed that ruling. We held that Zuber's sentence was not the
functional equivalent of life without parole, because life expectancy tables
A-2677-18T2
3
indicated that he has a realistic possibility of having several years of freedom
after serving his custodial term. State v. Zuber, 442 N.J. Super. 611, 627 (App.
Div. 2015). We also declined to set aside the consecutive aspects of Zuber's
sentence. Id. at 625.
In its opinion reversing and remanding this matter, the Court rejected this
court's reliance on life expectancy tables. Zuber, 227 N.J. at 450. The Court
determined that Zuber's then-existing lengthy sentence should be analyzed as
one that is the functional equivalent of life without parole, and thereby must
comport with associated Eighth Amendment limitations. Id. at 450-53. The
Court accordingly instructed the trial court to reconsider Zuber's lengthy
consecutive sentences, in light of the youth-related constitutional factors
prescribed by the United States Supreme Court in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S.
460 (2012), and its progeny. It also instructed the trial court to consider
consecutive terms for juveniles under the Yarbough guidelines with "a
heightened level of care." Zuber, 227 N.J. at 450.
Among other things, our Supreme Court directed the trial court to
"consider the Miller factors when it determines the [appropriate] length of his
sentences and when it decides whether the counts of conviction should run
A-2677-18T2
4
consecutively." Id. at 453. The Court further directed the trial court to "consider
any rehabilitative efforts since [Zuber's] original sentence" in 1983. Ibid.
On remand at the second resentencing in January 2019, a different trial
court judge endeavored to apply the Miller factors and concluded that a further
reduction of Zuber's sentence was constitutionally warranted. As part of his
written analysis, the judge expressly found, under what is known as the "fifth "
Miller factor, that Zuber is "not irreparably corrupt," and that "he presented
strong evidence of rehabilitative efforts." Even so, the judge was also persuaded
that other Miller factors weighed against Zuber's plea for immediate release.
Adopting a suggestion by the prosecutor, the judge resentenced Zuber to
an aggregate sentence of 86 years, with an aggregate 43-year period of parole
ineligibility. The judge found this altered sentence will provide Zuber "both a
meaningful opportunity to be released and hope that he will have a life outside
prison." According to Zuber's counsel, he is not eligible for parole under this
revised sentence until April 2025.
On his present appeal, Zuber, who is now age fifty-six and who has not
had a disciplinary infraction in prison in over a decade, argues that his continued
imprisonment is unconstitutional. He asserts the trial court misapplied the
Miller factors at the second resentencing.
A-2677-18T2
5
Among other things, Zuber contends the trial court failed to adhere to the
Supreme Court's direction that, in order to comply with the Eighth Amendment,
judges must "exercise a heightened level of care" when imposing "multiple
consecutive sentences on juveniles." Zuber, 227 N.J. at 450. He urges that we
order his immediate release or, alternatively, a further reduction of his sentence
and a prompt hearing before the Parole Board.
For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court in part with respect
to its denial of Zuber's request for immediate release, but remand in part for yet
another resentencing. Specifically, we instruct the court to reconsider the
application of the Miller factors to the consecutive aspects of Zuber's sentence
with a "heightened level of care," particularly as to the two robbery counts.
I.
Much has already been written about Zuber's case, and we need not repeat
all of the factual and procedural details here. We incorporate by reference the
background recited at length in our previous published opinion and the Supreme
Court's 2017 opinion.
A.
We begin our discussion with a recognition that Zuber acknowledges
today that he committed atrocious crimes on two occasions in November 1981
A-2677-18T2
6
and December 1981 at the age of seventeen. As described in the Supreme
Court's opinion:
Defendant Ricky Zuber participated in two separate
gang rapes in November and December 1981, when he
was seventeen years old. In the first, he and others
forced a woman at knife-point to drive to a nearby
cemetery, where the group raped her repeatedly and
threatened her with disfigurement. Afterward, the
group abandoned the woman naked in the cemetery. In
the second incident, Zuber and others abducted a
sixteen-year-old high school student, drove her to an
unknown location, and raped her repeatedly. Zuber was
the "ringleader" of both assaults.
[Id. at 430.]
Zuber's convictions, and corresponding sentences after they were first
revised on remand in 1988, were as follows. For the gang rape and related
crimes committed in November 1981:
• 20 years' imprisonment with 10 years of parole
ineligibility for first-degree kidnapping, N.J.S.A.
2C:13–1(b)(1);
• A consecutive term of 10 years' imprisonment with
5 years of parole ineligibility for second-degree
robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15–1;
• A second consecutive term of 20 years'
imprisonment with 10 years of parole ineligibility
for first-degree aggravated sexual assault by vaginal
penetration, N.J.S.A. 2C:14–2; and
A-2677-18T2
7
• A concurrent term of 20 years' imprisonment with
10 years of parole ineligibility for first-degree
aggravated sexual assault by anal penetration,
N.J.S.A. 2C:14–2—which the court originally
imposed as a consecutive term.
[Id. at 430-31.]
The aggregate sentence for the November 1981 offense after the first
resentencing was therefore 50 years of imprisonment, with 25 years of parole
ineligibility. Id. at 431.
As for the gang rape and related offenses that Zuber committed in
December 1981, the court on the first resentencing imposed the following terms:
• 20 years' imprisonment with 10 years of parole
ineligibility for first-degree kidnapping, N.J.S.A.
2C:13–1(b)(1);
• A consecutive term of 20 years' imprisonment with
10 years of parole ineligibility for first-degree
robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15–1;
• A second consecutive term of 20 years'
imprisonment with 10 years of parole ineligibility
for first-degree aggravated sexual assault by vaginal
penetration, N.J.S.A. 2C:14–2;
• A concurrent term of 20 years' imprisonment with
10 years of parole ineligibility for first-degree
aggravated sexual assault by anal penetration,
N.J.S.A. 2C:14–2—which the court had originally
imposed as a consecutive term;
A-2677-18T2
8
• A concurrent term of 20 years' imprisonment with
10 years of parole ineligibility for first-degree
aggravated sexual assault by oral penetration,
N.J.S.A. 2C:14–2; and
• A concurrent term of 5 years' imprisonment for
third-degree unlawful possession of a knife,
N.J.S.A. 2C:39–4(d).
[Ibid.]
Hence, the aggregate sentence for the December 1981 offense was 60 years'
imprisonment, with 30 years of parole ineligibility. Ibid.
At the first resentencing, the trial court ordered that the sentences for both
sets of sentences were to run consecutively. This produced a total sentence of
110 years, with a 55-year cumulative period of parole ineligibility. Ibid.
B.
We also need not repeat here the analysis of applicable United States
Supreme Court case law under the Eighth Amendment that is extensively set
forth in the Zuber decision. Id. at 438-446. Distilled to its essence, those cases
instruct that offenders who are minors, because of their immaturity, cannot be
sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole (or the functional
equivalent of such an "LWOP" sentence) unless the sentencing judge
sufficiently takes into account "how children are different, and how those
A-2677-18T2
9
differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison."
Miller, 567 U.S. at 480; see also Zuber, 227 N.J. at 445-46.
Those factors, which have come to be known as the "Miller factors,"
examine five considerations. Specifically, mandatory life without parole for a
juvenile, or its functional equivalent, unconstitutionally:
[1] precludes consideration of his chronological age
and its hallmark features — among them, immaturity,
impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and
consequences.
[2] It prevents taking into account the family and home
environment that surrounds him — and from which he
cannot usually extricate himself — no matter how
brutal or dysfunctional.
[3] It neglects the circumstances of the homicide
offense, including the extent of his participation in the
conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may
have affected him.
[4] Indeed, it ignores that he might have been charged
and convicted of a lesser offense if not for
incompetencies associated with youth — for example,
his inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors
(including on a plea agreement) or his incapacity to
assist his own attorneys.
[5] And finally, this mandatory punishment disregards
the possibility of rehabilitation even when the
circumstances most suggest it.
[Zuber, 227 N.J. at 445 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at
477-78).]
A-2677-18T2
10
These constitutional factors apply retroactively to juvenile offenders such
as Zuber who received lengthy adult sentences before the United States Supreme
Court issued its Miller opinion. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. ___, 136
S. Ct. 718, 734 (2016); Zuber, 227 N.J. at 446.
In its opinion remanding this matter for a second resentencing to apply the
Miller factors, our Supreme Court issued clear instructions to the trial court.
In light of the above analysis, Zuber is entitled to be
resentenced. At a new sentencing hearing, the trial
court should consider the Miller factors when it
determines the length of his sentence and when it
decides whether the counts of conviction should run
consecutively. In short, the court should consider
factors such as Zuber's "immaturity, impetuosity, and
failure to appreciate risks and consequences"; "family
and home environment"; family and peer pressures;
"inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors" or
his own attorney; and "the possibility of rehabilitation."
The sentencing judge should also "view Zuber as he
stands before the court" at resentencing and consider
any rehabilitative efforts since his original sentence.
[Zuber, 227 N.J. at 453 (citations omitted).]
As already noted, the Court's instructions also included the requirement
to apply a "heightened level of care" when deciding whether to sentence Zuber
to multiple consecutive sentences. Id. at 430.
A-2677-18T2
11
C.
With this backdrop in mind, we discuss the record that was developed at
the second resentencing proceedings on remand.
At the September 6, 2018 remand hearing, the trial court heard
presentations from defense counsel, the prosecutor, Zuber, Zuber's family
members and Pamela Benjamin from the New Jersey Parents Caucus/Juvenile
Justice Initiative. Neither victim appeared, as one was deceased and the other
could not be located.
The trial court also considered: a May 24, 2018 sex offender evaluation;
an August 17, 2018 sexually violent predator risk assessment; certifications
showing the prison programs Zuber had completed; two undated letters from
Zuber; and letters from Zuber's family requesting leniency.
Dr. Mark Frank, a licensed psychologist and Forensic Mental Health
Clinician who conducted a sex offender evaluation of Zuber, reported in May
2018 that Zuber admitted to sexually assaulting the first victim. He said that he
had sexually assaulted the first victim at the urging of his friends who were in
their twenties and that while he knew what he was doing was wrong, he wanted
to fit in.
With respect to the assault of the second victim, Zuber said he and his
A-2677-18T2
12
friends were joyriding in two stolen cars when his friends stopped and forced
her inside the car. Zuber said he was in a different car and did not assault her.
His friends implicated him because they believed he would receive a lesser
sentence as a juvenile. According to Dr. Frank: "He expressed what appeared
to be sincere remorse" for his behavior.
Zuber admitted to Dr. Frank to having a "volatile temper when he was
younger" but said that he had learned to control it. He also admitted to "hanging
with the wrong crowd" and committing crimes when he was younger, although
he downplayed the seriousness of his crimes to some extent, saying: "I was
robbing bikes and skateboards," "[n]othing real hard." Thinking about the
crimes he had committed, he said: "Looking back at that kid now, I would lock
that kid up . . . I'm a completely different person now. It was just horrible. The
way I live my life now is totally different. Now, I'm doing everything the right
way."
Dr. Frank noted that Zuber had "dedicated himself to helping younger
prison inmates adapt successfully to their imprisonment and said he tries to
guide them toward living a more prosocial, productive life." Zuber hoped to
continue his work with youth upon release.
Zuber described himself as "very easygoing," "very meek and
A-2677-18T2
13
unassertive," with "difficulty standing up for himself." The aspect of his life for
which he was most guilty was "[w]hat happen[ed] in the past when [he] was a
kid." On a test evaluating his "interest in and motivation for treatment" he
scored "somewhat below average compared to adults in the general population"
and "substantially lower than is typical of people in therapy."
Zuber showed low interpretive cognitive ability on a psychological test.
On a test that did not require reading, he scored in the average range. His
estimated IQ was "at the 26 th percentile." He showed no signs of psychosis or
neurological impairment, and "[h]e denied any current interest in forced sexual
practices" and did not provide "bizarre or irrational responses on the Sexuality
Questionnaire."
To aid in assessing Zuber's risk of committing another sex offense, Dr.
Frank administered the Static-99R, which "is an actuarial tool with moderate
accuracy in ranking offenders according to their relative risk for sexual
recidivism, without regard to factors such as type or severity of sexual offense."
Assuming that Zuber would be released at his current age, Zuber fell within the
above average risk category. However, Dr. Frank wrote "that the rate,
confidence interval and nominal category apply to the group and not to Mr.
Zuber, in particular. The degree to which the routine sample is congruent with
A-2677-18T2
14
characteristics of New Jersey offenders or adolescent offenders is unclear ."
Further, the test result had to be "interpreted with caution" because
according to the Static-99R Coding Rules Manual, the instrument's ability to
predict recidivism rates for juvenile offenders was unclear. The Manual
instructed:
There is a very real theoretical question about whether
juvenile sex offending is the same phenomena as adult
sex offending in terms of its underlying dynamics and
our ability to effect change in the individual, with
research increasingly concluding that adults and
adolescents who commit sex offenses are meaningfully
different . . . In general, the research literature leads us
to believe that adolescents who commit sex offenses are
not necessarily younger versions of adult sex offenders.
In comparison to adult sex offenses, the sex offenses
committed by juveniles are more likely to involve peers
as co-offenders, lack planning, and lack indicators of
deviant sexual interests. Developmental, family and
social factors would be expected to impact on
recidivism potential. We have reason to believe that
people who commit sex offenses only as
children/young people are a different profile than adults
who commit sex offenses. In cases such as these, we
recommend that Static-99R score be used with caution
and only as part of a more wide-ranging assessment of
sexual and criminal behavior.
Dr. Frank concluded that
there was no evidence to be able to conclude that Mr.
Zuber felt irresistibly compelled to commit the sex
offenses for which he is incarcerated. His offense
behavior appears to have resulted from a number of
A-2677-18T2
15
factors including immaturity, poor judgment, negative
peer influence, low self-esteem and an antisocial
personality orientation.
Given the absence of a clear finding of compulsive
sexual behavior, Mr. Zuber is not eligible for
sentencing under the purview of the New Jersey Sex
Offender Act.
On two dates in July 2018, Dr. Kristi Corcoran, Psy.D., interviewed Zuber
for a sexually violent predator risk assessment. Again, he denied sexually
assaulting the second victim but admitted to assaulting the first victim. He said
that he and his friends were driving in a car when they saw the first victim's car
at the side of the road. His friend stopped to help her but then "all good
intentions went crooked . . . things got out of hand . . . went downhill ." His co-
defendants said they were going to rob her "and then things went totally
sideways." His friends pressured him to sexually assault her, telling him that he
could not "be with us" if he refused. He denied being sexually aroused by the
assault, expressed remorse for his actions and said, "the whole thing was just
terrible . . . disgusted with the whole thing." He said that after his grandmother
died twenty-seven years ago, he decided "I need to get my life together" and
"take responsibility for everything I did." He said he was "truly sorry" for his
actions.
Dr. Corcoran wrote that, according to the probation department, Zuber's
A-2677-18T2
16
juvenile record was "one of if not the most extensive juvenile records in the
Essex County history." His record began at age ten with a truancy charge and
escalated to thirty-eight delinquency complaints between the time he was fifteen
and seventeen, which included burglary and robbery charges. He did not comply
with probation and escaped from a juvenile detention facility. The
"overwhelming majority of victims" were women.
According to Dr. Corcoran, Zuber minimized his criminal behavior,
explaining that everyone he associated with was older and he usually served as
the look-out or driver of the get-away car because he "was too little." He denied
escaping from the youth detention facility, saying that the facility was more like
a campus and he simply walked away. He also denied that most of his victims
were women.
Zuber denied to Dr. Corcoran that he had any deviant sexual interests or
fantasies. Besides the first victim, he reported having sexual relations with three
girls around his age when he was a teenager.
Dr. Corcoran also administered the Static-99R instrument to assess
Zuber's risk of reoffending. Like Dr. Frank, Dr. Corcoran underscored that the
results should be "interpreted with caution" because "[j]uvenile offenders are
meaningfully different than adult sex offenders and the danger in using Static-
A-2677-18T2
17
99R is that it may be over-estimating their risk of re-offense." Zuber again
scored in the above average category for risk of reoffending.
Dr. Corcoran noted that while in prison, Zuber had incurred no major
infractions, and he completed a number of programs aimed at changing negative
behavior and obtaining skills. He also consistently maintained a sanitation job
and supervised a crew of men.
Dr. Corcoran concluded that Zuber's minimization of his juvenile criminal
conduct "may suggest the presence of ongoing antisocial attitudes," which is a
risk factor for "general criminality and is also associated with sexual recidivism
in related research." But Dr. Corcoran did not believe that Zuber was a sexually
violent predator who required treatment prior to reentering society. She
suggested that parole supervision would likely be beneficial upon release .
In the first letter that Zuber submitted to the trial court for consideration
in the second resentencing, he explained how prison had taught him
responsibility and remorse. He discussed the sanitation job that he acquired
soon after his incarceration, which developed into a supervisory position that
required him to "lead a crew of five men." He also discussed two programs he
was taking to aid in his decision-making process entitled "Thinking for a
Change" and "Cage Your Rage." He expressed a desire to positively influence
A-2677-18T2
18
young inmates and showed remorse and understanding for his actions.
In his second letter, Zuber wrote that he had a "full understanding" of his
actions, held himself accountable for them and wished to apologize to his
"victims" and his family. He wrote:
Everyday for the past thirty years of my life there has
come a point within the day when I couldn't distract
myself with anything that went on behind these walls
and I found myself alone to face my thoughts. When I
closed my eyes I was that young reckless child again.
I've asked him time and time again why, but he has no
answer for me. I would tell him that you were raised
by women and the things that you did were wrong and
that's why your mother, aunts and other family
members don't come see you now, they are ashamed of
you and rightfully so. Sometimes I thought that if I
stayed awake or didn't lock inn [sic] that I wouldn't
have to face him again or have those conversations with
him but then I realized that I couldn't hide and that this
child will always be a part of me and he needed to be
healed, I needed to be healed. It was these
conversations that have helped me to move forward and
see that I was a confused, angry, and most importantly
hurt child. As a man I know that my pain doesn't give
me the right to project my feelings onto others. I say
this with the full understanding of the pain that I caused
all of my victims. If I see the things I see and feel the
way I feel when I close my eyes there is no doubt in my
mind that my victims have gone through worse. I don't
know if apologizing could ever help but I am sorry for
my actions. . . . [A]s a man I am still held accountable
for those actions and after thirty years of confinement I
feel that I am ready to re-enter society but I [k]now that
because of my actions I gave up [the] right to make that
determination.
A-2677-18T2
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With respect to Miller factor one (lack of maturity and ability to appreciate
risks), defense counsel urged the court to find that at age seventeen Zuber failed
to appreciate the nature and consequences of his actions. Counsel quoted from
a January 6, 1984 Avenel report submitted shortly after his convictions (not
included in the record on appeal) that said Zuber "does not learn from
experience. He has no sense of perspective, and lives almost exclusively in the
present."
On Miller factors two and three (family and home environment and extent
of Zuber's participation in the crime and the way familial and peer pressures
may have influenced him), counsel said that Zuber was born to a fourteen-year-
old mother, and he never knew his father. His mother had two children with
another man who was a long-distance truck driver and "was never around." She
was rarely home because she worked long hours and attended nursing school.
Zuber was forced to raise his younger brothers, and no one raised him.
By age ten, Zuber was involved in the juvenile justice system for truancy.
By either the ninth or tenth grade Zuber dropped out of school and was
committing crimes in the middle of the night. He claimed that he was influenced
by older boys, and with respect to the sexual assaults in this case, counsel
underscored that one of the co-defendants was eighteen years old. Counsel
A-2677-18T2
20
noted that this co-defendant and another co-defendant had already completed
their sentences.
On Miller factor four (ability to deal with police and attorneys) counsel
questioned why Zuber did not enter a plea agreement with the State, particularly
since the evidence against him was overwhelming and included testimony from
co-defendants. Counsel also questioned the propriety of the verdict that the jury
had reached after only fifteen minutes of deliberation, and which had formed the
basis for trial counsel's motion for a new trial. He underscored that Zuber did
not appeal that decision or either of his convictions and urged the court to find
that these circumstances showed that Zuber did not appreciate the nature of the
charges and evidence against him and was unable to effectively aid in his
defense.
On the final Miller factor (possibility of rehabilitation), counsel claimed
that Zuber had matured into a "calm" and "responsible" fifty-four-year-old man
"with an understanding of the harm" he had caused. Counsel argued that both
were reflected in two letters that Zuber had submitted to the court expressing
remorse and concern for his victims and their families and discussing the
internal process he had gone through to understand why he had committed such
horrible crimes as a child.
A-2677-18T2
21
Counsel stressed that Zuber never had a drug or alcohol problem and was
not under the influence of either at the time of the crimes. He also did not suffer
from any mental problems and he was not a compulsive and repetitive sex
offender and did not pose a threat to society.
Zuber's prison record was described by his counsel as "excellent." He
worked at various locations as a supervisor in the sanitation unit, and he
completed courses to better himself and prepare for release. In the last eleven -
and-one-half years he had no infractions, and the few that he had prior to that
were for minor offenses like possession of a water bottle, hair clippers, zip ties
and a Walkman radio.
With respect to Zuber's plans upon release, counsel said that Zuber had
strong family support and that his brother had agreed to give him a place to live,
and his nephew had agreed to give him a job. Counsel requested the court
impose a sentence that would allow for Zuber's immediate release or release in
the near future.
The State asserted that while Zuber showed remorse for his actions, he
continued to deny that he had sexually assaulted the second victim. It disputed
defense counsel's claim that at age seventeen Zuber did not appreciate the
consequences of his actions, underscoring his extensive history with the juvenile
A-2677-18T2
22
justice system. The State noted that when Zuber committed these crimes, he
was an escapee from a juvenile detention facility. The State also disputed
Zuber's claim that he was influenced by others because the evidence
overwhelmingly showed that Zuber was the "ringleader" of these crimes and the
first to sexually assault both victims.
The State conceded that Zuber's prison record was "excellent" and that his
prospects for successful adjustment after release were good.
The State urged the trial court to find that concurrent terms were not
appropriate because the crimes involved two separate victims of kidnapping and
gang rape. It suggested decreasing the length of the sentences to give Zuber the
benefit of the mitigating youth factors, while also ensuring that Zuber remains
in prison for additional years to protect society.
Zuber addressed the trial court at the remand hearing, apologizing to the
victims and their families. He said that he could not explain why he had
committed the crimes but claimed that he was a changed man. He said: "There
is no excuse for what I did, so I offer none because it would only be disrespectful
and self-serving. I hope that life has somehow restored to them, that which I
robbed [of] them." He said that as a child, he did not understand what love was,
and he lacked self-worth. He now understood that he had taken from his victims
A-2677-18T2
23
"exactly what was missing in myself. I took their ability to trust in others, which
I now understand to be crucial to a happy life." He said he was "fully aware and
remorseful" of his actions.
With respect to Zuber's family, his brother Maurice requested leniency for
Zuber in resentencing, explaining that Zuber was a changed man. He also said
that upon release Zuber would live with him and his family. Zuber's cousin
Quesean Williams also asserted that Zuber had changed, and he promised to
employ Zuber at his trucking company upon release. Zuber's aunt said that when
Zuber was a teenager, his mother tried to get him the help he needed, but the
family court did not help her.
Benjamin from the New Jersey Parents Caucus/Juvenile Justice Initiative
said that Zuber had been working with the organization for the past three-to-four
years and that he was "an outstanding member" of the caucus. He was
"committed to improving the lives of those involved with the juvenile justice
system." She said he "has proven that he is committed to bettering his life and
is taking legitimate steps towards rehabilitation." He "has not just wanted what
is best for himself, but he has encouraged those around him to seek out [the]
organization so they [have] a chance to receive the support and strength to
improve their situation."
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The judge reserved decision but did observe that, based on Zuber's prison
record and sex-offender evaluations, he "does not fall within that slim class of
juvenile defendant[s] that cannot be rehabilitated."
D.
On January 14, 2019, the trial court held another hearing where it placed
some findings on the record and imposed sentence. It later supplemented those
findings with its written decision.
The court began by saying that "this has to be the most difficult case [the
court has] ever had, because on one hand" the crimes Zuber committed were
"almost war crimes," but on the other hand Zuber "is not the same person that
he was at age seventeen."
With respect to the Miller factors, the court gave little weight to factor
one (the juvenile's lack of maturity and undeveloped sense of responsibility
leading to reckless behavior) based on Zuber's extensive juvenile record, which
included "six adjudications for offenses that escalate[d] in severity over time,"
and the fact that he was an escapee when he committed the two sexual assaults
in this case. Further, Zuber "seemed to have been the leader or instigator of both
incidents," which, the court noted was different from the fourteen-year-old
defendant in Miller, who "was swept up in a robbery he had never planned to be
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25
a part of." Unlike that juvenile, Zuber "had already had several adjudications
for robberies and similar crimes and knew of the consequences."
In its written decision, the court added that while the status of being a
juvenile mitigated punishment in many cases,
[t]his court has a hard time believing, however, that
immaturity or recklessness can be blamed for the
abduction and sexual assault of a helpless female. It is
even less persuasive that these characteristics mitigate
the defendant doing it again [a] little over a week later
to a different victim in just as violent a fashion. This
court also cannot find that punishing this sort of crime
with lengthy prison terms would not deter juveniles
from this kind of depraved conduct simply because of
their impetuous nature.
On Miller factor two (family and home environment and influence by
others), the court recognized that Zuber's family situation did not include an
adult to parent Zuber on a regular basis. This appeared to be "the main reason
why [Zuber] was in the streets and began committing crimes at such a young
age." However, the court said that Zuber was not "abused or mistreated," and
there was no evidence that he witnessed more violence as a child than any other
child in a similar environment. The court concluded in this regard: "For the
acts as reprehensible as [Zuber's], the mere subpar upbringing has a limited
effect in the Court's decision."
The court added that while Zuber's "upbringing may very well mitigate
A-2677-18T2
26
many of the robberies and other crimes he committed, . . . it is extremely difficult
to assess how much of a factor a less-than-ideal upbringing can be when we are
dealing with the horrific crimes that Mr. Zuber committed. For acts as
reprehensible as Mr. Zuber's, a merely subpar upbringing has a limited
mitigating effect."
With respect to Miller factor three (extent of Zuber's participation in the
crime and the way familial and peer pressures may have influenced him), the
court found that Zuber was "either the instigator or leader or both" and "was
heavily involved" in these crimes. Thus, this factor had "limited" applicabili ty.
In its written decision, the court said this factor had "no mitigating effect ."
With respect to Miller factor four (inability to deal with police officers,
prosecutors, and his own counsel) the court underscored that Zuber "was no
stranger to the juvenile criminal justice system." The court said that it was
unclear why Zuber chose to go to trial when his co-defendants had agreed to
testify against him. It was also unclear whether the State had offered him a plea
agreement. Because the court did not know the answer to those questions, it
said that it would give Zuber the benefit of the doubt and conclude that Zuber
may have accepted a plea offer if he had been more mature.
Finally, on Miller factor five (possibility of rehabilitation), the court found
A-2677-18T2
27
that Zuber had demonstrated rehabilitation. In the thirty-five years that he had
been incarcerated, he had incurred only a few minor infractions, the last of which
was a 2007 infraction for possession of a water bottle. He held multiple jobs in
prison that required leadership skills and responsibility. He also completed
programs aimed at preparing inmates to rejoin society. Indeed, the State
conceded that his prison record was "excellent." Zuber also acknowledged his
guilt and apologized to both victims. Upon release, he had a plan to live with
his brother and work for his cousin.
The court noted that in Zuber's initial sex offender evaluations which
occurred in 1983 and 1984 (neither of which is in the record on appeal), Zuber
maintained his innocence. However, at his second resentencing hearing he
accepted responsibility for his actions and apologized to all victims.
As the court also noted in relation to the May 2018 evaluation, Dr. Frank
explained that Zuber's crimes appeared to "have resulted from a number of
factors including immaturity, poor judgment, negative peer influence, low self -
esteem and an anti-social personality orientation" and that he was not eligible
for sentencing under the New Jersey Sex Offender Act. Dr. Corcoran similarly
concluded that Zuber showed no signs of deviant sexual interest or arousal,
which suggested a low risk for reoffending.
A-2677-18T2
28
In summarizing the Miller factors as applied to Zuber, the court wrote:
It is clear that Mr. Zuber is not the violent and troubled
young [man] that he once was almost 38 years ago. The
Court stated in Roper that it is difficult even for experts
to look at a juvenile's crimes and decide that the
juvenile is irreparably corrupted, as opposed to the
crimes being a product of the transient immaturity that
accompanies youth. Mr. Zuber is an example of this
difficulty. He had a troubled childhood in which he
acquired dozens of juvenile complaints. He committed
two abhorrent crimes - the facts of which being heinous
and shocking enough to outweigh most mitigating
factors and put him in prison for the last 35-plus years.
And yet, he stands before us a seemingly matured and
rehabilitated man. Mr. Zuber has demonstrated that he
is likely fit to rejoin society.
[emphasis added.]
With respect to the Yarbough guidelines,2 the court found that they
weighed in favor of consecutive terms. On the first guideline (whether the
crimes and their objectives were independent), the court said: "These were two
separate aggravated sexual assaults, gang sexual assaults, separated by one
week." But in the written decision, the court said that the sentence for the sexual
assault of the second victim should run concurrently with the kidnapping
conviction because the kidnapping was not independent of the sexual assault .
The court did not believe this to be the case for the sexual assault of the first
2
Yarbough, 100 N.J. at 643-44.
A-2677-18T2
29
victim because that kidnapping and rape occurred at different times, in different
locations and with different objectives. The court believed it could "be assumed
from the facts that the decision to abduct [the first victim] was a spontaneous,
impetuous decision," but in the second attack, "[i]t is likely that the objective of
[the] kidnapping was to commit another sexual assault." With respect to
Yarbough guidelines two through five (whether the crimes involved separate
acts of violence at different times against different victims and whether t he
convictions were numerous), the court found that Zuber had committed two acts
of violence against two victims at two different times and that the convictions
were numerous. The fact that the crimes involved two victims weighed heavily
in favor of consecutive terms.
With respect to the aggravating and mitigating sentencing factors, the
court noted that at the initial sentencing no mitigating factors existed, and
aggravating factors one (nature and circumstances of the offense), two
(seriousness of harm to the victim), three (risk defendant will reoffend), six
(extent of defendant's prior record) and nine (need to deter) were found. Based
on the current circumstances, the court found that aggravating factors one, two,
six and nine still applied, that aggravating factor three no longer applied and
mitigating factor nine (defendant is unlikely to reoffend) was now applicable.
A-2677-18T2
30
In conclusion, the court said that although Miller factors one through four
did not weigh in Zuber's favor, factor five "significantly" weighed in his favor.
To account for that factor, the court (1) reduced the sentence on the second-
degree robbery of the first victim from ten years with a five-year parole bar to
six years with a three-year parole bar, and (2) changed the consecutive term for
the aggravated sexual assault of the second victim by vaginal penetration to a
concurrent term.
II.
A.
On this appeal, Zuber argues his resentence is unsupported by a rationale
that clearly explains the court's basis for imposing maximum terms on nearly all
convictions, fifty-percent parole bars on all sentences except the weapons
offense, and five consecutive terms, for an aggregate sentence of 86 years of
imprisonment with 43 years of parole ineligibility.
Zuber argues that, in imposing five consecutive terms, the court failed to
apply the required "heightened" Yarbough standard prescribed by the Supreme
Court. He contends that, in light of his rehabilitative efforts and the court's
finding that he was not incorrigible, he should be released from prison now, or,
at the very least, after a prompt parole hearing.
A-2677-18T2
31
Zuber concedes that two of the consecutive terms were appropriate
because he committed two sexual assaults against two victims at different times,
but disputes that the remaining three consecutive terms were appropriate.
Indeed, he asserts that the robberies "were something of an afterthought," and
notes that the court did not even mention those crimes in orally imposing the
revised sentence.
B.
As a general matter apart from constitutional mandates, a sentence should
only be disturbed when the trial court failed to follow sentencing g uidelines,
when the aggravating and mitigating factors are not supported by the evidence,
or when the facts and law show "such a clear error of judgment that it shocks
the judicial conscience." State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 364 (1984). Accord State
v. Case, 220 N.J. 49, 65 (2014). In weighing the aggravating and mitigating
factors, the court must conduct a qualitative, not quantitative, analysis and
provide a "clear explanation" of how it weighed the factors and applied them to
the sentencing range. State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 73 (2014). The court may
not "double count" a fact that established an element of the offense as a basis to
support an aggravating or mitigating factor. Id. at 74-75. However, the court
may consider conduct in excess of that required to commit the crime without
A-2677-18T2
32
offending the rule against double counting. Id. at 75. "[I]f the trial court fails
to identify relevant aggravating and mitigating factors, or merely enumerates
them, or forgoes a qualitative analysis, or provides little 'insight into the
sentencing decision,' then the deferential standard will not apply." Case, 220
N.J. at 65 (quoting State v. Kruse, 105 N.J. 354, 363 (1987)).
In considering the sentencing factors, "a defendant should be assessed as
he stands before the court on the day of sentencing." State v. Jaffe, 220 N.J.
114, 116 (2014). In the context of a remand, unless the reviewing court limited
the resentencing procedure, the sentencing court must consider the defendant's
post-offense conduct, including any conduct that occurred after the initial
sentence began. State v. Randolph, 210 N.J. 330, 354 (2012). "The State,
likewise, is not limited in its presentation. The only restriction placed on both
parties is that the evidence presented be competent and relevant." Case, 220
N.J. at 70.
Where the aggravating factors preponderate, the term should be at the high
end of the sentencing range, and where the mitigating factors preponderate, the
sentence should be at the low end of the range. Fuentes, 217 N.J. at 73. N.J.S.A.
2C:43-6(b) permits the court to impose a discretionary parole bar not to exceed
one-half of the sentence imposed if the court is "clearly convinced that the
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33
aggravating factors substantially outweigh the mitigating factors." 3 Pursuant to
N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(1), the court must "specifically place on the record the
aggravating factors . . . which justify the imposition of a minimum term."
Discretionary parole bars are the exception and should not be routinely imposed.
Case, 220 N.J. at 66.
Having considered these principles and the constitutional factors
mandated by the Supreme Courts of the United States and this State, we
conclude the trial court generally adhered to the law in resentencing Zuber, with
one significant exception. That exception concerns the continued imposition of
consecutive sentences for the two robbery counts, one of which is quite lengthy.
More specifically, we affirm the trial court's rejection of Zuber's request
for immediate release based upon the finding of rehabilitation as to Miller factor
five. Nothing in the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Miller or its
related opinions instructs that this fifth factor is all-encompassing and
dispositive. Nor did our own State Supreme Court make such a proclamation.
3
Except for the third-degree weapons offense, all of the crimes for which Zuber
was convicted are now No Early Release Act ("NERA") crimes, subject to a
mandatory eighty-five percent parole bar. But Zuber is not subject to NERA
because that statute was not enacted until 1997, long after Zuber's crimes
occurred. L. 1997, c. 112. Because NERA would impose a harsher sentence
than the one Zuber faced at the time of his crimes, the Ex Post Facto Clause
prohibits its application to Zuber.
A-2677-18T2
34
To be sure, what the trial court described as the juvenile offender's "likely"
capacity for rehabilitation is of great importance. But that cannot nullify the
significance of the other four Miller factors, the first three of which Zuber does
not even challenge. We also agree with the trial court that the evidence on factor
four (the alleged "incompetencies of youth") weighs in the State's favor, not the
defense.
That said, we do not minimize Zuber's admirable track record in
improving his behavior during his many decades in prison, and in largely, if not
fully, coming around to acknowledge his very serious wrongdoing. The trial
court rightly took those positive developments into account by considerably
reducing the aggregate parole ineligibility period by a dozen years from 55 years
to 43 years.
However, we are not persuaded that the trial court sufficiently carried out
the Supreme Court's mandate to apply "heightened" care with respect to the
continued imposition of certain consecutive aspects to the sentences,
particularly as to the two robbery counts.
Under state law, a sentencing court must consider the following guidelines
in deciding whether to run sentences consecutively or concurrently:
(1) there can be no free crimes in a system for which
the punishment shall fit the crime;
A-2677-18T2
35
(2) the reasons for imposing either a consecutive or
concurrent sentence should be separately stated in the
sentencing decision;
(3) some reasons to be considered by the sentencing
court should include facts relating to the crimes,
including whether or not:
(a) the crimes and their objectives were predominantly
independent of each other;
(b) the crimes involved separate acts of violence or
threats of violence;
(c) the crimes were committed at different times or
separate places, rather than being committed so
closely in time and place as to indicate a single period
of aberrant behavior;
(d) any of the crimes involved multiple victims;
(e) the convictions for which the sentences are to be
imposed are numerous;
(4) there should be no double counting of
aggravating factors;
(5) successive terms for the same offense should not
ordinarily be equal to the punishment for the first
offense; and
(6) there should be an overall outer limit on the
cumulation of consecutive sentences for multiple
offenses not to exceed the sum of the longest terms
(including an extended term, if eligible) that could be
imposed for the two most serious offenses.
[Yarbough, 100 N.J. at 643-44.]
A-2677-18T2
36
Yarbough guideline number six has been superseded by a 1993 amendment to
N.J.S.A. 2C:44-5(a), which provides that there "shall be no overall outer limit
on the cumulation of consecutive sentences for multiple offenses."
The sentencing court should qualitatively, not quantitatively, weigh the
factors set forth in Yarbough guideline three. Carey, 168 N.J. at 427. The court
must separately state the reasons for each consecutive term. State v. Miller, 108
N.J. 112, 122 (1987); Yarbough, 100 N.J. at 643-44. A court may impose
consecutive sentences even if "a majority of the Yarbough factors support
concurrent sentences." Carey, 168 N.J. at 427-28.
Zuber directs sentencing courts to "exercise a heightened level of care
before imposing multiple consecutive sentences on juveniles." 227 N.J. at 450.
While the Zuber Court did not discuss in detail what it meant by this, it couched
the statement in terms of the "concerns that Graham and Miller highlight" and
the "overriding importance of" the Miller decision. Ibid. We agree with Zuber
that the trial court did not demonstrably apply the Yarbough guidelines with
such a heightened level of care to its decision to continue to impose five
consecutive terms, and particularly as to the two robbery counts.
As our State Supreme Court explained years ago in a different Miller case,
factors relied on to sentence a defendant to the
maximum term for each offense should not be used
A-2677-18T2
37
again to justify imposing those sentences
consecutively. Where the offenses are closely related,
it would ordinarily be inappropriate to sentence a
defendant to the maximum term for each offense and
also require that those sentences be served
consecutively, especially where the second offense did
not pose an additional risk to the victim. The focus
should be on the fairness of the overall sentence, and
the sentencing court should set forth in detail its reasons
for concluding that a particular sentence is warranted.
[108 N.J. at 122.]
Here, the trial court relied on the same aggravating and mitigating factors
to justify consecutive terms as it relied on to impose maximum and near
maximum terms with maximum parole bars.
With respect to the crimes against the first victim, the court imposed
consecutive terms for the kidnapping, second-degree robbery, and sexual assault
by vaginal penetration, explaining that the first kidnapping was a separate crime
because "the sexual assault took place at a different location and later in time."
With respect to the crimes against the second victim, the court imposed
consecutive terms for the kidnapping and first-degree robbery convictions and
ran the sexual assault and weapons sentences concurrently with those terms. The
court specifically found that "it is likely that the objective of [the second]
kidnapping was to commit another sexual assault," leading to a conclusion that
A-2677-18T2
38
"the [second] kidnapping and sexual assault crimes were one continuous act."4
The trial court did not show that it exercised "heightened care" in
maintaining consecutive sentences and consecutive parole ineligibility periods
for the two robberies. The only portion of relevant written amplification is a
sentence at the end of the paragraph discussing the December 1981 second
indictment, after explaining why the second kidnapping and the second sexual
assault were "one continuous act." The sentence reads: "I do not find this
[continuity] for the robbery as well, however, as the monetary gain is a distinct
objective and involved its own threats of violence." It is unclear whether this
sentence was intended to pertain to the first robbery in November 1981 as well.
The court also did not explain why it felt the Miller youth factors warranted a
reduction of Zuber's sentence for only the first robbery from ten to six years,
while leaving the twenty-year sentence on his second robbery intact.
With all due respect to the judge who undertook this understandably
difficult responsibility on remand, we are not satisfied that this discussio n
4
On remand, a trial court may change a concurrent term to a consecutive term
without violating double jeopardy protections so long as the aggregate sentence
does not exceed the current aggregate sentence. State v. Kosch, 458 N.J. Super.
344, 351-52 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 240 N.J. 20 (2019). Thus, the court was
authorized to change the sexual assault sentence as to the second victim to run
consecutively to the sexual assault sentence as to the first victim, as Zuber
concedes would be justified.
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39
suffices to fulfill the Supreme Court's mandate for heightened care. We
recognize that, under a traditional Yarbough analysis not involving a juvenile
tried as an adult, it may be sufficient for a sentencing judge to state that a robbery
has a "distinct objective" and involved distinct "threats of violence" from other
crimes the youth committed that same day. But this special constitutional
context also requires the court to consider the real-time confinement impacts of
stacking these robbery sentences in such a fashion upon a juvenile offender
already sentenced to decades of imprisonment on other counts.
Surely the most serious offenses here are the first-degree sexual offenses
and the kidnappings. They involved horrendous crimes committed against the
person. By comparison, the robberies were hastily committed after the
kidnappings and assaults. The robberies arguably did not place the victims in
substantially more danger than the initial violent and brutal crimes. The trial
court's sentencing analysis does not adequately elaborate upon those
characteristics with the "heightened" care mandated by the Supreme Court.
Under the revised sentences imposed by the trial court, the consecutive
terms for the two robberies result in an additional three years of parole
ineligibility on the first indictment, and another ten-year parole disqualifier on
the second indictment. Although we do not resolve the propriety of those
A-2677-18T2
40
additional thirteen years of parole ineligibility here, it is necessary to remand
the matter for a third resentencing to justify, with "heightened" care, those real-
time consequences.
Zuber's looming eligibility for release five years from now does not make
a remand for this limited purpose an inconsequential exercise. If,
hypothetically, the robbery sentences were either made concurrent to other
additional offenses, or left consecutive but reduced in length, Zuber could
potentially be eligible for a parole hearing before his current projected date in
2025. Again, we do not forecast what outcome on remand will be
constitutionally satisfactory and instead leave that to the trial court 's careful
"heightened" reassessment.
All of Zuber's remaining arguments lack sufficient merit to warrant
discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
Affirmed in part and remanded in part. We do not retain jurisdiction.
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41