RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4728-18T1
NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF
CHILD PROTECTION AND
PERMANENCY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
L.M.,
Defendant,
and
S.S.,
Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________
IN THE MATTER OF
S.J., a minor.
_________________________
Submitted April 22, 2020 – Decided May 14, 2020
Before Judges Koblitz and Mawla.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Gloucester County,
Docket No. FN-08-0055-17.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Robyn A. Veasey, Deputy Public Defender,
of counsel; Steven Edward Miklosey, Designated
Counsel, on the brief).
Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for
respondent (Jane C. Schuster, Assistant Attorney
General, of counsel; Cynthia Sozio, Deputy Attorney
General, on the brief).
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian,
attorney for minor (Meredith Alexis Pollock, Deputy
Public Defender, of counsel; Joseph H. Ruiz,
Designated Counsel, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant S.S.1 appeals from a May 7, 2019 Family Part order terminating
his parental rights to his daughter, who is now seven years old. L.M., the
biological mother, executed an identified surrender2 to both the maternal great-
grandparents and maternal aunt and uncle, whichever couple was approved by
1
We use initials to preserve the privacy of the parties. R. 1:38-3(d)(12).
2
"In practice, an 'identified surrender' means that those exact person(s) as to
whom the surrender is made shall adopt the children. If for some reason the
'identified' persons are not able to adopt the child, the surrender becomes 'void'
and the parental rights of surrendering parent(s) are reinstated. See N.J.S.A.
9:3-38(j); N.J.S.A. 9:3-41; N.J.S.A. 30:4C-23." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family
Servs. v. D.M.B., 375 N.J. Super. 141, 145 (App. Div. 2005).
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2
the court. Defendant failed to attend the guardianship trial. The Law Guardian
urges affirmance. We affirm substantially for the reasons stated by Judge John
J. Matheussen in his thorough oral opinion issued with the order.
The evidence is outlined in detail in the judge's opinion. A summary will
suffice here. Defendant never provided sustained care for his daughter or stable
housing and she does not have a strong relationship with him. He was not able
to offer his daughter a home at the time of trial but suggested his mother as a
resource parent. After an investigation, the paternal grandparents who live in
Pennsylvania were ruled out through the Interstate Compact on the Placement
of Children (ICPC), N.J.S.A. 9:23-5. Defendant was incarcerated multiple times
and had domestic violence and substance abuse issues. He did not cooperate
with services to address these issues. The Division of Child Protection and
Permanency (Division) offered defendant substance abuse treatment, batterer's
intervention, parenting time and a bonding evaluation. Defendant did not fully
cooperate with any service offered.
In his comprehensive opinion, Judge Matheussen found that the Division
had proven all four prongs of the best interests test by clear and convincing
evidence, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(1) to (4), and that termination of defendant's
parental rights was in the child's best interests. On this appeal, our review of
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3
the trial judge's decision is limited. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M.,
189 N.J. 261, 278 (2007). We defer to his expertise as a Family Part judge,
Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 412 (1998), and we are bound by his factual
findings so long as they are supported by "adequate, substantial and credible
evidence." M.M., 189 N.J. at 279 (quoting In re Guardianship of J.T., 269 N.J.
Super. 172, 188 (App. Div. 1993)). After reviewing the record, we conclude
that the trial judge's factual findings are fully supported by the record and, in
light of those facts, his legal conclusions are unassailable.
On appeal, defendant argues that the Division failed to prove prongs two,
three and four of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) and his daughter should have been
placed with his mother in spite of her failure to gain ICPC approval. These
arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant further discussion in a written
opinion, R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E), especially in light of the child's proposed adoption
by maternal relatives.
Affirmed.
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