FILED
May 14 2020, 8:45 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Joel C. Wieneke
Attorney General of Indiana Wieneke Law Office, LLC
Brooklyn, Indiana
Ellen H. Meilaender
Supervising Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
State of Indiana, May 14, 2020
Appellant-Plaintiff, Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-CR-1735
v. Appeal from the Putnam Circuit
Court
April D. Glaze, The Honorable Matthew L.
Appellee-Defendant. Headley, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
67C01-1807-F1-168
Sharpnack, Senior Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-1735 | May 14, 2020 Page 1 of 13
Statement of the Case
[1] The State of Indiana appeals the trial court’s partial grant of April Glaze’s
motion to suppress evidence. We affirm.
Issue
[2] The State raises one issue, which we restate as: whether the trial court erred in
partially granting Glaze’s motion to suppress.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] On April 4, 2018, Detective Troy Cobb of the Indiana State Police and
Investigator David Meadows of the Putnam County Prosecutor’s Office
interrogated Glaze at the prosecutor’s office as part of an ongoing investigation
into the molestation of Glaze’s daughters. The interrogation was recorded.
[4] We discuss the circumstances of the interrogation in more detail below, but
Cobb had driven Glaze to the office, with the understanding that he would
return her home afterwards. Twenty-four minutes into the interview, Glaze
stated, “I just want to get this over with Dave . . . I want to go back home.” Tr.
Ex. Vol., State’s Ex. 1, 23:24. Meadows indicated they intended to take her
home, but they instead continued to question her. The interrogation continued,
with several breaks, for another hour, after which Cobb took Glaze home.
[5] On July 31, 2018, the State charged Glaze with several felonies, including child
molesting and promotion of human trafficking of a minor. On August 23,
2018, Glaze filed a Notice of Defense of Insanity and a request for funds to hire
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a psychiatrist or psychologist to assist her in her defense. The trial court
granted Glaze’s request and further appointed two experts to independently
examine her.
[6] On March 11, 2019, Glaze filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence, asking the
court to suppress all statements she made during the investigation of this case.
On April 29, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on suppression and
competency issues. The State subsequently filed briefs separately addressing the
suppression and competency issues.
[7] On July 7, the trial court issued two orders: the first stated that Glaze was
competent to stand trial; and the second granted in part Glaze’s motion to
suppress. Specifically, the court “suppresse[d] all statements and any
subsequent investigation that came out of these statements made by [Glaze]
after [she] requested to go home [during the April 4, 2018 interrogation].”
Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 79. This appeal followed. Upon the State’s
motion, the trial court has stayed further proceedings pending the outcome of
this appeal.
Discussion and Decision
[8] The State appeals the trial court’s suppression order pursuant to Indiana Code
section 35-38-4-2(5) (2015), which allows the State to appeal “from an order
granting a motion to suppress evidence, if the ultimate effect of the order is to
preclude further prosecution of one (1) or more counts of an information or
indictment.” On appeal, the State argues the trial court should not have
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suppressed the statements Glaze made after she said she wanted to go home,
because: (1) Glaze was not in custody, and as a result her Miranda rights were
not implicated; and (2) even if Glaze was in custody, she did not unequivocally
express her right to remain silent.
[9] We first address whether Glaze was in custody when she told Detective Cobb
and Investigator Meadows that she wanted to go home. The custody inquiry is
a mixed question of fact and law. State v. Ruiz, 123 N.E.3d 675, 679 (Ind.
2019), cert. pending. We defer to the trial court’s factual findings, without
reweighing the evidence, and we consider conflicting evidence most favorably
to the suppression ruling. Id. But we review de novo the legal question of
whether the facts establish that a suspect was in custody. Id.
[10] Custody, for purposes of Miranda, occurs when two criteria are met. Id. at 680.
“First, the person’s freedom of movement is curtailed to ‘the degree associated
with a formal arrest.’” Id. (quoting Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 112, 130 S.
Ct. 1213, 1224, 175 L. Ed. 2d 1045 (2010)). Freedom of movement is curtailed
when a reasonable person would not feel free to terminate the interrogation and
leave. Id. “[S]econd, the person undergoes ‘the same inherently coercive
pressures as the type of station house questioning at issue in Miranda.’” Id.
(quoting Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 509, 132 S. Ct. 1181, 1190, 182 L. Ed. 2d
17 (2012)).
[11] The initial determination of custody depends on the objective circumstances of
the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the
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interrogators or the person being questioned. Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S.
318, 323, 114 S. Ct. 1526, 1529, 128 L. Ed. 2d 293 (1994). The test is how a
reasonable person in the suspect’s shoes would understand the situation, based
on the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation. Loving v.
State, 647 N.E.2d 1123, 1125 (Ind. 1995). The United States Supreme Court
has identified only one subjective characteristic relevant to the custody analysis:
whether the suspect is a child if the child’s age “was known to the officer at the
time of the interview, or would have been objectively apparent to any
reasonable officer, . . . .” J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 274, 131 S. Ct.
1
2394, 2404, 180 L. Ed. 2d 310 (2011).
[12] The Indiana Supreme Court has identified some of the factors that may be
considered under the totality of objective circumstances: “the location,
duration, and character of questioning; statements made during the
questioning; the number of law-enforcement officers present; the extent of
police control over the environment; the degree of physical restraint; and how
the interview begins and ends.” Ruiz, 123 N.E.3d at 680.
[13] The events leading to the April 4, 2018 interrogation are pertinent to our
custody inquiry. Two years before the interrogation, Glaze’s then-husband,
Robert Glaze (“Robert”), and Paul Crowder had been convicted of offenses
1
Glaze asks the Court to extend the custody analysis to consider the subjective factor of whether a suspect
has an intellectual disability, if the disability “is known or obvious to the police officers” conducting the
questioning. Appellee’s Br. p. 23. Conversely, the State argues the trial court erred by considering Glaze’s
intellectual disability in the custody analysis. We need not address these issues to resolve the State’s appeal.
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related to the molestation and trafficking of Glaze’s two daughters. Glaze was
on probation for convictions related to the investigation into Robert and
Crowder, and the Department of Child Services had custody of Glaze’s
daughters.
[14] The April 4 interrogation occurred after law enforcement had received
additional information indicating Glaze may have been directly involved in the
offenses against the children. Investigator Meadows had previously questioned
Glaze several times in connection with the investigation into Robert’s and
Crowder’s offenses.
[15] Next, we turn to the interrogation itself, considering the factors stated by the
Indiana Supreme Court in Ruiz. Starting with the location of the interrogation,
Detective Cobb picked up Glaze at her home and drove her to Investigator
Meadows’ office in the Putnam County Courthouse. Glaze did not have a car
and depended on Detective Cobb for a ride home. Cobb and Meadows put
Glaze in an interview room. It appears from the recording of the interrogation
that the room was not very large, because Cobb and Meadows sat across from
Glaze at a table. These facts weigh in favor of a determination that Glaze was
in custody.
[16] On a related note, although the interrogation did not occur at a police station,
law enforcement still had full control over the interview room. Meadows and
Cobb directed Glaze into the room, told her where to sit, and closed the door at
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the beginning of the interrogation. When Meadows and Cobb took breaks,
they left the room and closed the door behind them.
[17] We next consider the character of the questioning. Meadows read Glaze an
advisement of her Miranda rights, after she demonstrated difficulty in reading
the advisement form by herself. Meadows asked her to sign the form, if she
understood it, and Glaze signed. Meadows and Cobb both told Glaze she
could end the questioning at any time, and Meadows stated Glaze was not
under arrest.
[18] Next, Meadows reminded Glaze that she was on probation for offenses arising
out of Robert’s and Crowder’s molestations and trafficking of her daughters,
and he stated that she had previously minimized, or failed to fully discuss,
Robert’s criminal activities. Meadows stated he thought Glaze’s daughters had
experienced more abuse than had been previously disclosed, and he further
stated he needed more information from Glaze.
[19] After a brief discussion of who else may have interacted with the girls,
Meadows told Glaze he wanted the children to be safe. Glaze responded that
she also wanted them to be safe and wanted them to come home. She began to
cry, and Meadows repeatedly stated that he needed her help. He also discussed
steps Glaze had taken to regain custody of her daughters, including obtaining
counseling and seeking employment. Meadows then told Glaze, “the next part
is . . . to get this all out.” Tr. Ex. Vol., State’s Ex. 1, at 8:22-8:29. He also said,
“If you truly love them . . . you’re going to help us do that.” Id. at 8:30. A
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reasonable person would have concluded that participating in the interrogation
was a necessary part of the process of regaining custody of her children.
[20] Meadows further accused Glaze of wrongdoing, stating “I think you probably
did have some idea of what was going to happen” when her daughters went
with men who molested them. Id. at 14:24. Glaze denied knowing what
Robert and Crowder were doing with the children, but Meadows responded
that she knew Robert was molesting the children, having caught him with them.
He stated, “you knew it was wrong.” Id. at 17:10. Meadows also stated Glaze
and Robert “had nothing but sex on your mind – whether it was with the girls .
. . .” Id. at 20:22. He further stated, “you knew they were being sold.” Id. at
21:59.
[21] The United States Supreme Court has stated, “An officer’s knowledge or beliefs
may bear upon the custody issue if they are conveyed, by word or deed, to the
individual being questioned.” Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 325, 114 S. Ct. at 1530.
“The weight and pertinence of any communications regarding the officer’s
degree of suspicion will depend upon the facts and circumstances of the
particular case.” Id. Meadows accused Glaze of participating in the
molestation and trafficking of her daughters, and a reasonable person, being
faced with such serious accusations, may have believed she was in custody to
answer for those offenses.
[22] The above factors support the trial court’s determination that Glaze was in
custody. Balanced against those factors, the State notes: (1) Cobb and
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Meadows had told Glaze at the beginning that they would stop the questioning
if she wished; (2) the interview lasted only twenty-four minutes before Glaze
asked to be taken home and was rebuffed; (3) Glaze was not handcuffed; and
(4) Cobb ultimately took Glaze home when she asked for a lawyer, one hour
after she had first asked to be taken home.
[23] Nevertheless, under the totality of the circumstances, including being
transported to the prosecutor’s office, being questioned in a small room under
the control of law enforcement, being led to believe that participation in the
interrogation was part of the process of getting her children back, and being
accused of committing serious crimes, we conclude a reasonable person would
have concluded his or her freedom of movement was curtailed, and he or she
was being subjected to coercive pressures similar to a police station interview.
The trial court did not err in concluding Glaze was in custody when she asked
to be taken home and was refused. See Ruiz, 123 N.E.3d at 681 (Ruiz was in
custody during interrogation; despite being told he was free to leave at any
time, officers had directed Ruiz to appear at the police station, he was
questioned in a small room by two officers, and they accused him of serious
crimes); see also Bean v. State, 973 N.E.2d 35, 43 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (Bean was
in custody when he was questioned by police; although he was told he was free
to leave at any time, the police drove Bean to the station, he was subjected to
aggressive questioning, including accusations of child molesting, and he was
advised of his Miranda rights at the beginning of the interrogation); trans. denied.
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[24] Having determined that Glaze was in custody for purposes of Miranda when
she stated she wanted the interview to be over and she wanted to be driven
home, we must next determine whether the trial court erred in determining that
Glaze had exercised her right to remain silent at that point, and the
2
interrogators disregarded that right.
[25] For purposes of this issue, the State appeals from a negative judgment. Ruiz,
123 N.E.3d at 679. Accordingly, the State must show the trial court’s decision
was contrary to law, “meaning that the evidence was without conflict and all
reasonable inferences led to a conclusion opposite that of the trial court.” Id.
To the extent we consider matters of law, including constitutional questions,
our review is de novo. Tiplick v. State, 43 N.E.3d 1259, 1262 (Ind. 2015).
[26] On the question of whether a suspect has exerted the right to remain silent, the
Indiana Supreme Court has stated:
An assertion of the Miranda right to remain silent must be clear
and unequivocal. In determining whether a defendant has
asserted this right, the statements are considered as a whole.
Mere expressions of reluctance to talk do not invoke the right to
remain silent. This Court has held several times that raising
doubts or expressing concern about continuing followed by
2
Glaze argues that her waiver of her Miranda rights at the beginning of the interrogation was invalid due to
her intellectual disability. We do not need to address this argument to resolve the State’s appeal. In addition,
Glaze’s Appellee’s Brief does not present a cross-appeal challenge to the admission of statements Glaze made
during the interrogation before she stated she wanted to be taken home.
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continued dialogue do not unambiguously assert the right to
remain silent.
Wilkes v. State, 917 N.E.2d 675, 682 (Ind. 2009) (citations omitted).
[27] In Wilkes, officers questioned Wilkes in connection with multiple murders.
During the interrogation, and before he ultimately made incriminating
statements, Wilkes told the officers, “I don’t want to talk about it no more. I
don’t want to think about it. Cause right now I’m still high.” Id. He also said,
“Well, I have, I’m still high and you’re going to go away,” and “No I can end
this today with me . . . .” Id. After he made those statements, the interrogation
continued. The Indiana Supreme Court concluded Wilkes had not
unequivocally expressed his right to remain silent.
[28] Similarly, in Clark v. State, 808 N.E.2d 1183, 1190 (Ind. 2004), police officers
questioned Clark in connection with a murder. Clark made the following
statements: “This is crazy. Y’all might as well send me across the street
(referring to jail),” “Please, man, you might as well take me across the street,”
and “You already tryin’ to charge me with this. So leave me alone and take me
over here.” Id. After he made those statements, Clark continued to speak with
the officers. The Indiana Supreme Court concluded Clark had not sufficiently
invoked his Miranda rights.
[29] By contrast, in Risinger v. State, 137 N.E.3d 292, 295 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans.
denied, two officers questioned Risinger about his involvement in a murder.
Nineteen minutes into the interview, Risinger stated, “I’m done talking.” Id.
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The detectives continued to question him. Later in the interview, Risinger
repeated that he was “done talking,” but the questioning continued. Id. at 295-
96. A panel of this Court determined that Risinger had unequivocally exercised
his right to remain silent, and the interrogating officers had not “scrupulously
honored” his rights. Id. at 298.
[30] Turning to Glaze’s case, we conclude the circumstances more closely resemble
the facts of Risinger rather than the facts of Wilkes and Clark. Cobb had driven
Glaze to the prosecutor’s office from her home, a distance of twenty-five miles.
Cobb had agreed to drive Glaze home at the end of the questioning.
[31] At the beginning of the interrogation, Meadows and Cobb both told Glaze, who
is cognitively impaired, that she had the right to stop the questioning at any
time. Twenty-four minutes into the interview, Cobb suggested that they should
take a break and give Glaze time to think. Glaze stated, “I just want to get this
over with Dave . . . I want to go back home.” Tr. Exhibit Vol., State’s Ex. 1,
23:24. Cobb said, “I intend to take you back home. But we’re gonna – we’re
going to get this entire thing out. Because I’m not gonna have six or seven or
eight conversations with you. Are you Troy?” Id. at 23:32 Troy responded,
“Nope.” Id. A minute later, Meadows and Cobb took a short break and then
resumed questioning Glaze. About thirty minutes later, Meadows and Cobb
took another break. While Glaze was alone in the room, she was in an
emotional state and stated, “They won’t take me home.” Id. at 1:08. She next
stated out loud she would just tell them she was done with the questioning.
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[32] The interrogation ultimately ended when Glaze specifically requested an
attorney, but by that point Glaze had already unequivocally expressed an intent
to end the questioning. The officers rejected her request to be taken home,
stating that they were going to finish up the questioning that day. We conclude
that the officers failed to “scrupulously honor” Glaze’s exercise of her right to
remain silent, as described in Risinger, and the trial court did not err in
suppressing statements Glaze made after she stated that she wanted to end the
questioning and go home.
Conclusion
[33] For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
[34] Affirmed.
Kirsch, J., and Robb, J., concur.
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