NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 14 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JOHN R. SCANNELL, Esquire, AKA No. 19-35203
Zamboni,
D.C. No. 3:18-cv-05654-BHS
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. MEMORANDUM*
WASHINGTON STATE BAR
ASSOCIATION; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Benjamin H. Settle, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 6, 2020**
Before: BERZON, N.R. SMITH, and MILLER, Circuit Judges.
John R. Scannell, a disbarred Washington attorney, appeals pro se from the
district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action challenging his
disbarment and subsequent removal from the Washington Supreme Court ballot.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Mpoyo v.
Litton Electro-Optical Sys., 430 F.3d 985, 987 (9th Cir. 2005) (dismissal on the
basis of res judicata); Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003) (dismissal
under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Scannell’s claims relating to his
removal from the Washington Supreme Court ballot as barred under the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine because those claims are a “de facto appeal” of a prior state
court decision. Noel, 341 F.3d at 1163-65 (discussing the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine).
The district court properly dismissed Scannell’s claims relating to his
disbarment as barred by the doctrine of res judicata because Scannell raised or
could have raised these claims in his prior federal action which resulted in a final
judgment on the merits. See Mpoyo, 430 F.3d at 987 (elements of federal res
judicata; claims are identical if they arise from the “same transactional nucleus of
facts”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Scannell’s motions
for recusal because Scannell presented no basis for recusal. See DeNardo v.
Municipality of Anchorage, 974 F.2d 1200, 1201 (9th Cir. 1992) (setting forth
standard of review and explaining that “[t]he fact that [an appellant] sues a bar
association does not require recusal of judges who are members of that bar
2 19-35203
association”); United States v. Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 1986)
(explaining that “a judge’s prior adverse ruling is not sufficient cause for recusal”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Scannell’s requests
for a preliminary injunction because Scannell failed to establish a likelihood of
success on the merits of his claims. See Winter v. Natl. Res. Def. Council, 555
U.S. 7, 20, 24 (2008) (setting forth the standard of review and preliminary
injunction standard).
We reject as meritless Scannell’s contentions regarding the inapplicability of
federal pleading standards in the State of Washington.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
All pending motions and requests are denied.
AFFIRMED.
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