NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 20 2017
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
WILLIAM SCHEIDLER, No. 17-35202
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:16-cv-06016-BHS
v.
MEMORANDUM*
STATE OF WASHINGTON; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Benjamin H. Settle, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 18, 2017**
Before: WALLACE, SILVERMAN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
William Scheidler appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing with prejudice his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging claims related to his
2010 property tax assessment. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
12(b)(6). Hicks v. Small, 69 F.3d 967, 969 (9th Cir. 1995). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Scheidler’s action because Scheidler
failed to allege facts sufficient to state any plausible claim. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also
Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 49 (1998) (state legislators are entitled to
absolute immunity from liability under § 1983 for their legislative activities); Noel
v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1163 (9th Cir. 2003) (“It is a forbidden de facto appeal
under Rooker-Feldman when the plaintiff in federal district court complains of a
legal wrong allegedly committed by the state court, and seeks relief from the
judgment of that court.”); Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986)
(en banc) (explaining that “[j]udges and those performing judge-like functions are
absolutely immune from damage liability for acts performed in their official
capacities”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in taxing costs against
Scheidler because the requested costs are allowable. See 28 U.S.C. § 1920(1)
(permitting court to include fees of the clerk as costs).
We reject as meritless Scheidler’s contentions that federal pleading
standards are inapplicable, that the district judge was biased, and that the removal
2 17-35202
of his complaint from the state court was improper.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
All pending motions or requests are denied.
AFFIRMED.
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