NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1955-18T2
BURROUGH'S MILL
APARTMENTS,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
RYAN ARMSTRONG,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Submitted October 28, 2019 – Decided May 21, 2020
Before Judges Moynihan and Mitterhoff.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Camden County, Docket No. LT-008859-18.
Ryan Armstrong, appellant pro se.
Dale W. Keith, LLC, attorneys for respondent (Dale W.
Keith, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Ryan Armstrong appeals from the trial judge's November 15,
2018 decision indicating that the judge would issue a judgment of possession to
plaintiff Burrough's Mill Apartments unless defendant paid all outstanding rent
and related charges. He also appeals the judge's December 6, 2018 decision
denying his motion for reconsideration. We affirm, substantially for the reasons
stated in the trial judge's oral opinions. We add only the following comments.
Defendant, as a tenant in plaintiff's apartment complex, entered into two
lease agreements. The first lease was for a period of one year ending on May 3,
2018 at a rate of $1390 a month. In April 2018, defendant executed a second
lease for a term of four months ending on September 3, 2018 at a monthly rate
of $1810. The second lease provided: "This [l]ease [c]ontract will automatically
renew month-to-month unless: (1) We give you written notice(s) of termination
that may include a rent increase or other reasonable contract changes . . . or (2)
you give us [sixty] days['] notice of your intent to terminate the lease and move
out."
Before the second lease expired, plaintiff offered defendant the option to
renew the lease for a one-year term at the $1810 monthly rate. Defendant
declined the offer and did not sign a new lease. Therefore, under the terms of
the second lease, defendant's tenancy converted to a month-to month on the same
terms as the four-month lease.
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Believing it unfair to continue paying the $1810 monthly rate, defendant
unilaterally chose to make reduced monthly payments of $1390. Plaintiff then
brought this action under N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(a), seeking to evict defendant for
unpaid rent. After a trial, the judge entered an order and oral decision directing
that defendant pay plaintiff unpaid rent, together with costs and fees, and that if
he failed to pay this amount, a judgment of possession would be entered against
him. Defendant vacated the apartment and moved to reconsider this decision.1
The trial judge denied defendant's motion. This appeal followed.
On appeal, defendant raises the following arguments:
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN
CONSIDERING AN UNCONSCIONABLE
RENT INCREASE BY PUTTING THE
BURDEN OF PROOF ON THE TENANT.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN
CONSIDERING . . . DEFENDANT A HOLD
OVER TENANT BY IGNORING . . .
DEFENDANT'S RIGHT AGAINST
UNCONSCIONABLE RENT INCREASE.
III. THE TRIAL JUDGE WAS PAST
MANDATORY RETIREMENT AGE AND
UNFAMILIAR WITH LAW AND CASE LAW.
1
On November 19, 2018, defendant filed a notice of motion to vacate
default/default judgment. We infer that because there was no default, the trial
judge decided to construe this motion as one for reconsideration of his
November 15 decision.
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We conclude defendant's arguments lack sufficient merit to warrant
discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). We affirm substantially for the
reasons set forth by the judge in his well-reasoned decision. We add the
following brief remarks.
In an appeal from a bench trial, "[t]he scope of [our] review of a trial
court's fact-finding function is limited." Seidman v. Clifton Sav. Bank, S.L.A.,
205 N.J. 150, 169 (2011) (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411 (1998)).
We review final determinations made by the trial court "premised on the
testimony of witnesses and written evidence at a bench trial, in accordance with
a deferential standard[.]" D'Agostino v. Maldonado, 216 N.J. 168, 182 (2013).
The factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge are not disturbed
"unless we are convinced that they are so manifestly unsupported by or
inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to
offend the interests of justice." In re Trust Created by Agreement Dated Dec.
20, 1961, 194 N.J. 276, 284 (2008) (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv'rs
Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)). We owe no deference to a trial court's
interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established
facts. Maldonado, 216 N.J. at 182-83 (citing Manalapan Realty L.P. v. Twp.
Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)).
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Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(a),
"[n]o lessee or tenant . . . may be removed by the
Superior Court from any . . . tenement leased for
residential purposes . . . except upon establishment of
one of the following grounds as good cause: a. The
person fails to pay rent due and owing under the lease
whether the same be oral or written[.]"
In contrast, N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(f) establishes that a tenant may be removed if
the tenant "has failed to pay rent after a valid notice to quit and notice of increase
of said rent, provided the increase in rent is not unconscionable and complies
with any and all other laws or municipal ordinances governing rent increases."
A "holdover tenant" is generally defined as "[s]omeone who remains in
possession of real property after a previous tenancy . . . expires[.]" Holdover
Tenant, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019); see also Newark Park Plaza
Assocs., Ltd. v. City of Newark, 227 N.J. Super. 496, 499 (Law Div. 1987) ("It
is well-settled law in New Jersey that when a tenant continues to occupy a
premises after the termination of a lease, his status becomes that of a month-to-
month holdover tenant."). The rights and duties of a holdover tenant are
governed by the terms of the expired lease, absent a contrary agreement.
Newark Park Plaza, 227 N.J. Super. at 499.
It is simply indisputable that under the plain terms of the May 2018 lease
agreement, and consistent with well-established case law, defendant was a
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holdover tenant subject to the terms of the last effective lease. See generally
Whalen v. Schoor, DePalma & Canger Grp., Inc., 305 N.J. Super. 501, 505-09
(App. Div. 1997) (explaining that under freedom of contract, agreements should
be enforced unless contrary to public policy); see Newark Park Plaza, 227 N.J.
Super. at 499. In that regard, the lease's exceptions to a month-to-month
holdover renewal are not present in this case because the landlord never
terminated the lease and defendant never provided notice of an intent to
terminate the lease and move out. We also conclude that the judge was
unquestionably correct in finding that the provisions of N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(f),
prohibiting unconscionable increases in rent "after a valid notice to quit," simply
do not apply because there was no notice to quit and there was no increase in
rent after defendant voluntarily entered into a lease agreement at the monthly
rate of $1810.
For the same reasons, we find that the trial judge did not abuse his
discretion in denying defendant's motion for reconsideration. See Guido v.
Duane Morris LLP, 202 N.J. 79, 87 (2010).
Reconsideration should be utilized only for
those cases which fall into that narrow
corridor in which either 1) the [c]ourt has
expressed its decision based upon a
palpably incorrect or irrational basis, or 2)
it is obvious that the [c]ourt either did not
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consider, or failed to appreciate the
significance of probative, competent
evidence . . . .
[Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J. Super. 374,
384 (App. Div. 1996) (third alteration in
original) (quoting D'Atria v. D'Atria, 242
N.J. Super. 392, 401 (Ch. Div. 1990)).]
In this case, on his motion for reconsideration defendant simply continued to
press his unfounded claims of unconscionability, which the judge correctly held
do not apply to the facts of this case.
To the extent that we have not addressed defendant's remaining
arguments, we conclude that they also lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion
in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
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