5/21/2020 4:21:43 PM
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 19–1402
Filed May 22, 2020
JANE DOE,
Plaintiff,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Defendant.
Certiorari to the Iowa District Court for Polk County, William A.
Price, District Associate Judge.
The petitioner seeks review of a district court order denying her
application for expungement of the record of a dismissed criminal case.
WRIT SUSTAINED AND CASE REMANDED.
Andrew Duffelmeyer (until withdrawal) and Robert J. Poggenklass
(until withdrawal), and Alexander Vincent Kornya of Iowa Legal Aid,
Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Louis S. Sloven, Assistant
Attorney General, and John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, for appellee.
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McDONALD, Justice.
In 2011, Jane Doe was charged with one count of unauthorized use
of a credit card. The charge was dismissed. In 2019, having satisfied all
of her financial obligations in the dismissed case, Doe filed an application
to expunge the criminal record pursuant to Iowa Code section 901C.2
(2019). The district court denied Doe’s application on the ground Doe had
had court-ordered financial obligations remaining in other cases and thus
had not met the requisite condition set forth in section 901C.2(1)(a)(2).
The question presented in this appeal is whether the district court erred
in denying Doe’s application for expungement on the ground Doe had
court-ordered financial obligations in other cases. This is a question of
statutory interpretation, and our review is for the correction of errors at
law. See State v. Doe, 903 N.W.2d 347, 350 (Iowa 2017).
Before addressing the merits, we first address a jurisdictional issue.
The State contends this court lacks jurisdiction over the case because an
order denying an application for expungement is not appealable as a
matter of right. See Iowa Code § 814.6(1). Doe responds that the district
court acted illegally in denying her application and that this court may
choose to treat her notice of appeal as a petition for writ of certiorari. See
Iowa R. App. P. 6.107(1)(a) (“Any party claiming . . . an associate district
court judge . . . acted illegally may commence an original certiorari action
in the supreme court by filing a petition for writ of certiorari as provided
in these rules.”); State v. Propps, 897 N.W.2d 91, 97 (Iowa 2017)
(“Additionally, if a case is initiated by a notice of appeal, but another form
of review is proper, we may choose to proceed as though the proper form
of review was requested by the defendant rather than dismiss the action.”).
We agree with Doe’s response, and we choose to treat Doe’s notice of
appeal as a petition for writ of certiorari.
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Turning to the merits of the case, in questions of statutory
interpretation, “[w]e do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only
what the statute means.” Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal
Interpretation, 12 Harv. L. Rev. 417, 419 (1899). This is necessarily a
textual inquiry as only the text of a piece of legislation is enacted into law.
Any interpretive inquiry thus begins with the language of the statute at
issue. See Doe, 903 N.W.2d at 350. Using traditional interpretive tools,
we seek to determine the ordinary and fair meaning of the statutory
language at issue. See State v. Davis, 922 N.W.2d 326, 330 (Iowa 2019)
(“We give words their ordinary meaning absent legislative definition.”); In
re Marshall, 805 N.W.2d 145, 158 (Iowa 2011) (“We should give the
language of the statute its fair meaning, but should not extend its reach
beyond its express terms.”); Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading
Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 33 (2012) [hereinafter Scalia &
Garner, Reading Law] (defining “fair reading method” as “determining the
application of a governing text to given facts on the basis of how a
reasonable reader, fully competent in the language, would have
understood the text at the time it was issued”). In determining the
ordinary and fair meaning of the statutory language at issue, we take into
consideration the language’s relationship to other provisions of the same
statute and other provisions of related statutes. See Iowa Code § 4.1(38)
(“Words and phrases shall be construed according to the context and the
approved usage of the language . . . .”); Doe, 903 N.W.2d at 351 (stating
we consider the “relevant language, read in the context of the entire
statute”). If the “text of a statute is plain and its meaning clear, we will
not search for a meaning beyond the express terms of the statute or resort
to rules of construction.” In re Estate of Voss, 553 N.W.2d 878, 880 (Iowa
1996); see State v. Richardson, 890 N.W.2d 609, 616 (Iowa 2017) (“If the
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language is unambiguous, our inquiry stops there.”). If the language of
the statute is ambiguous or vague, we “may resort to other tools of
statutory interpretation.” Doe, 903 N.W.2d at 351.
We begin our inquiry in this case with the language of the statute as
a whole. See State v. Pettijohn, 899 N.W.2d 1, 16 (Iowa 2017) (“Interpreting
a statute requires us to assess it in its entirety to ensure our interpretation
is harmonious with the statute as a whole rather than assessing isolated
words or phrases.”); In re Estate of Melby, 841 N.W.2d 867, 879 (Iowa
2014) (“When construing statutes, we assess not just isolated words and
phrases, but statutes in their entirety . . . .”); Scalia & Garner, Reading
Law at 167 (“Perhaps no interpretive fault is more common than the failure
to follow the whole-text canon, which calls on the judicial interpreter to
consider the entire text, in view of its structure and of the physical and
logical relation of its many parts.”).
The statute requires the district court to expunge the record of a
criminal case upon the defendant establishing five conditions have been
satisfied. The statute provides,
1. a. Except as provided in paragraph “b”, upon
application of a defendant . . . in a criminal case . . . the court
shall enter an order expunging the record of such criminal
case if the court finds that the defendant has established that
all of the following have occurred, as applicable:
(1) The criminal case contains one or more criminal
charges in which an acquittal was entered for all criminal
charges, or in which all criminal charges were otherwise
dismissed.
(2) All court costs, fees, and other financial obligations
ordered by the court or assessed by the clerk of the district
court have been paid.
(3) A minimum of one hundred eighty days have passed
since entry of the judgment of acquittal or of the order
dismissing the case relating to all criminal charges, unless the
court finds good cause to waive this requirement for reasons
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including but not limited to the fact that the defendant was
the victim of identity theft or mistaken identity.
(4) The case was not dismissed due to the defendant
being found not guilty by reason of insanity.
(5) The defendant was not found incompetent to stand
trial in the case.
b. The court shall not enter an order expunging the
record of a criminal case under paragraph “a” unless all the
parties in the case have had time to object on the grounds that
one or more of the relevant conditions in paragraph “a” have
not been established.
Iowa Code § 901C.2.
When the statute is considered as a whole, it is apparent the statute
is concerned with only the singular case for which expungement is sought.
The application for expungement must be filed in “a criminal case”—
singular. Id. § 901C.2(1)(a). The conditions prerequisite to expungement
repeatedly refer to “the criminal case” or “the case.” Id. § 901C.2(1)(a)(1),
(3), (4), (5), .2(1)(b). The statute’s use of the definite article “the”
particularizes “the criminal case” and “the case.” See Nielsen v. Preap, 586
U.S. ___, ___, 139 S. Ct. 954, 965 (2019) (stating “grammar and usage
establish that ‘the’ is ‘a function word . . . indicat[ing] that a following noun
or noun equivalent is definite or has been previously specified by context.’ ”
(alteration in original) (quoting Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary
1294 (11th ed. 2005))); Am. Bus. Ass’n v. Slater, 231 F.3d 1, 4–5 (D.C. Cir.
2000) (“[I]t is a rule of law well established that the definite article ‘the’
particularizes the subject which it precedes. It is a word of limitation as
opposed to the indefinite or generalizing force of ‘a’ or ‘an.’ ” (quoting
Brooks v. Zabka, 450 P.2d 653, 655 (Colo. 1969) (en banc))); State v.
Hohenwald, 815 N.W.2d 823, 830 (Minn. 2012) (“The definite article ‘the’
is a word of limitation that indicates a reference to a specific object.”). “The
criminal case” and “the case” thus must refer to a particular antecedent.
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Here, the antecedent is the singular “criminal case” in which the
application for expungement was filed and for which expungement was
sought. See Iowa Code § 901C.2(1)(a).
The text of the subsection at issue also relates only to the record of
the singular criminal case in which the application for expungement was
filed and for which expungement was sought. The text provides the
defendant must establish as a prerequisite to expungement that “[a]ll court
costs, fees, and other financial obligations ordered by the court or assessed
by the clerk of the district court have been paid.” Id. § 901C.2(1)(a)(2).
The State argues this provision is not limited to the singular case sought
to be expunged because the provision does not specifically reference “the
case” or the “criminal case.” However, the State ignores other limiting
language in the provision. Section 901C.2(1)(a)(2) uses the definite article
“the” in limiting the financial obligations at issue to those “ordered by the
court or assessed by the clerk of the district court.” Id. Use of the definite
article “the” means “the court” and “the clerk” have antecedents and must
refer to a specific court or a specific clerk. See Am. Bus. Ass’n, 231 F.3d
at 4–5; Hohenwald, 815 N.W.2d at 830. Here, those antecedents are the
court that ordered the financial obligations or the clerk that assessed the
obligations at a particular point in time in the past in “such criminal case.”
Iowa Code § 901C.2(1)(a)(2). “[S]uch criminal case” refers to the singular
criminal case in which the application for expungement was filed.
An additional textual consideration shows the provision at issue
refers only to the criminal case in which the application for expungement
was filed. Iowa Code section 901C.3 provides a mechanism for the
expungement of misdemeanor convictions. As a prerequisite to the
expungement of a misdemeanor conviction, the Code provides the
defendant must prove she “has paid all court costs, fees, fines, restitution,
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and any other financial obligations ordered by the court or assessed by the
clerk of the district court.” Id. § 901C.3(1)(d). The misdemeanor
expungement provision specifically identifies “fines” and “restitution” as
amounts that must be satisfied as a prerequisite to the expungement of a
misdemeanor conviction. Fines and restitution are financial obligations
incurred only upon conviction. The absence of this language from the
expungement provision in section 901C.2(1)(a)(2) strongly shows section
901C.2 addresses only the financial obligations due in the case in which
the application for expungement was filed.
In addition to these textual considerations, we must also recognize
the statute has the patina of prior judicial interpretation. In Doe, the
defendant was charged with several aggravated misdemeanors in one trial
information and a simple misdemeanor in a separate complaint with all
charges arising out of the same operative facts. See Doe, 903 N.W.2d at
349. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the defendant in that case pleaded
guilty to a lesser included offense of one count in the trial information, and
the district court dismissed the remainder of the charges, including the
separate simple misdemeanor. See id. Doe subsequently sought
expungement of the record of the simple misdemeanor charge. See id.
“The fighting issue . . . [was] the meaning of ‘case’ as used in Iowa Code
section 901C.2. Is a case a particular numbered legal proceeding . . . or
all the charges arising out of a single transaction or set of circumstances
. . . ?” Id. at 351. We concluded “case,” within the meaning of section
901C.2, referred to the particular case file with a separate case number
for which expungement was sought. See id. at 355. Doe’s conclusion that
“case” referred to a separate criminal file with a separate case number is
consistent with our textual analysis that section 901C.2(1)(a)(2) refers to
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the financial obligations only in the singular case in which the application
for expungement was filed and for which expungement was sought.
The State resists the conclusion that section 901C.2(1)(a)(2) requires
Doe to establish only that she has satisfied the financial obligations arising
out of the singular case for which expungement was sought. In the State’s
view, the statute’s use of “the court” and “the clerk” refer to the court or
the clerk in the particular county in which the case was filed and thus the
“plain meaning is that financial obligations arising from other cases in the
same county would bar the expungement of any case files” in the county.
In the State’s view, this includes financial obligations in both criminal and
civil cases. In the State’s view, this interpretation advances the legislative
purpose of incenting defendants to pay court debt owed to the county in
which expungement was sought.
We find the State’s interpretation of the statute unconvincing. First,
the State ignores the structure of the statute as whole. “[W]e read statutes
as a whole rather than looking at words and phrases in isolation.” Iowa
Ins. Inst. v. Core Grp. of Iowa Ass’n for Justice, 867 N.W.2d 58, 72 (Iowa
2015). When an entire statute relates only to a single specific subject, it
seems reasonable to conclude that all provisions in the statute relate to
the same subject as a matter of structure and purpose. See Den Hartog v.
City of Waterloo, 847 N.W.2d 459, 462 (Iowa 2014) (“We have often
explained we construe statutory phrases not by assessing solely words and
phrases in isolation, but instead by incorporating considerations of the
structure and purpose of the statute in its entirety.”). For example, in
Iowa Insurance Institute we concluded a statute that “waive[d] any privilege
for the release of . . . information” did not constitute a waiver of work
product. Iowa Ins. Inst., 867 N.W.2d at 75. We concluded, instead, the
statute related only to a waiver of protection for medical information
9
because when the statute was considered as a whole “all the other
subsections relate[d] to health care services.” Id. at 72. Similarly, here,
the fact that the statute as a whole relates only to the particular case in
which the application for expungement was filed counsels in favor of
reading section 901C.2(1)(a)(2) as also being limited to the particular case
in which the application for expungement was filed.
Second, we disagree with the State’s purposive interpretation of the
statute. It is certainly true one of the critical aspects of statutory
interpretation is to determine the purpose of a statute. The purpose of a
statute, however, is primarily determined from the language of the statute
itself. See, e.g., Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension Fin.
Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 373, 106 S. Ct. 681, 688 (1986) (“The ‘plain purpose’
of legislation, however, is determined in the first instance with reference
to the plain language of the statute itself.”). Here, the language of the
statute does not support the conclusion that the purpose of the statute is
to incent the payment of court-ordered financial obligations to the
particular county where the application for expungement was filed.
Nowhere does the statute indicate the relevant consideration for
expungement is the defendant’s total court-ordered financial obligations
to the particular county in which the application was filed. The statute
does not even use the word “county.”
In our view, the State’s interpretation is actually contrary to the
purpose of the statute. “[A] driving concern behind chapter 901C was that
a member of the general public—such as an employer doing an informal
background check—could access our computerized docket and potentially
draw inappropriate inferences from the mere presence of a criminal file
relating to an individual, even though the criminal charges were dismissed
or the individual was acquitted.” Doe, 903 N.W.2d at 354. To avoid these
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inappropriate inferences and other “stigma,” the statute was enacted to
facilitate the expungement of the record in criminal cases in which the
defendant was acquitted or the case was dismissed. Id. Requiring a
defendant to satisfy financial obligations in cases other than the case for
which expungement was sought frustrates this statutory purpose. This is
particularly true with respect to the State’s proposed interpretation that
requires the satisfaction of all financial obligations in civil cases in the
same county.
Consider an example. Iowa Code section 901C.2(1)(a)(3) provides a
defendant may seek expungement of a criminal file on an expedited basis
where the “the defendant was the victim of identity theft or mistaken
identity.” The expedited process allows a victim of identity theft or
mistaken identity to quickly expunge the criminal record to avoid any
inappropriate inferences drawn from and stigma associated with a
criminal charge. See Doe, 903 N.W.2d at 354 (discussing purpose of
statute). Except, under the State’s interpretation, a victim of identity theft
or mistaken identity would not be able to avail herself of the statute and
avoid the stigma associated with criminal accusation if she had unpaid
financial obligations in a dissolution of marriage case, a personal injury
case, a landlord–tenant case, a small claims case, or any other civil case
in the county.
We do not see how including civil obligations within the meaning of
the statute in any way advances or even remotely relates to the expressed
statutory purpose of allowing a defendant to expunge the record of a
criminal case in which the defendant was accused but not convicted of a
crime. We do understand, however, why the statute would require the
defendant to satisfy the financial obligation in the particular case at
issue—(1) the legislature wanted to ensure a defendant paid his or her
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obligations in the case at issue before being allowed to exercise the right
of expungement; and (2) after expungement, it would be practically
impossible to collect the defendant’s court-ordered financial obligations in
the expunged case. The lack of any nexus between the State’s proposed
interpretation of the statutory text and the clear purpose of the statute
militates against the State’s interpretation.
In sum, section 901C.2 provides the district court “shall enter an
order expunging the record of such criminal case” if the defendant
establishes five requisite conditions. Iowa Code § 901C.2(1)(a). Upon the
defendant establishing each of the requisite conditions, expungement is
mandatory. See State v. Klawonn, 609 N.W.2d 515, 522 (Iowa 2000)
(“Additionally, we have interpreted the term ‘shall’ in a statute to create a
mandatory duty, not discretion.”). Iowa Code section 901C.2(1)(a)(2)
requires the defendant to establish she satisfied all financial obligations
“ordered by the court or assessed by the clerk of the district court” in the
singular criminal case in which the application for expungement was filed
and for which expungement was sought. This interpretation of the statute
follows from the ordinary and fair meaning of the text. This interpretation
is consistent with the statute’s purpose as expressed in the text of the
statute. This interpretation is consistent with our prior interpretation of
the statute in Doe. And this interpretation allows the statute to “be applied
predictably, quickly, and in a ministerial way.” Doe, 903 N.W.2d at 353.
For these reasons, the district court erred in concluding section
901C.2(1)(a)(2) required the defendant to establish she satisfied all
financial obligations in this case as well as any other case and erred in
denying Doe’s application on that ground.
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We grant Doe’s petition for writ of certiorari, sustain the writ, and
vacate the order of the district court. We remand this matter for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
WRIT SUSTAINED AND CASE REMANDED.
All justices concur except Appel, J., who concurs specially and
McDermott, J., who takes no part.
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#19–1402, Doe v. State
APPEL, Justice (concurring specially).
I agree with the result in this case. It seems to me the best
interpretation of the statute is that the payment of restitution in the case
at hand is all that is required for expungement. I think the State’s
interpretation of “all” in the statute is not entirely unreasonable and
therefore gives rise to a degree of ambiguity. But the State’s position is
unpersuasive. I come to this conclusion in part because of the language
of the statute, as ably canvassed by the majority, but also in part because
the clear legislative purpose of this remedial statute would be substantially
undermined by the State’s interpretation of the statute. Further, there are
no persuasive countervailing arguments to the majority’s interpretation
based upon, for example, any germane legislative history or significant
linguistic departure from a model statute. So, for me, it is a combination
of text, purpose, and absence of meaningful countervailing considerations,
that drives the result.
In reaching this result, I do not endorse any sweeping
methodological statements about textualism as the proper approach to
statutory interpretation. I fully agree that the starting point of analysis of
any statute is the language. Analysis of the language matters, and here,
the case against the State’s interpretation is fairly strong.
But textual analysis is often not the be-all and end-all of statutory
interpretation and is merely the starting point. Commentators have noted
the difficulty in relying solely on textual analysis, or so called “plain
meaning.” See, e.g., State ex rel. Helman v. Gallegos, 871 P.2d 1352, 1359
(N.M. 1994) (urging caution in applying the plain-meaning rule, stating
that “[i]ts beguiling simplicity may mask a host of reasons why a statute,
apparently clear and unambiguous on its face, may for one reason or
14
another give rise to legitimate (i.e., nonfrivolous) differences of opinion
concerning the statute’s meaning”); 2A Norman Singer & Shambie Singer,
Sutherland Statutory Construction § 46.1 (7th ed.), Westlaw (database
updated Oct. 2019) (describing issues inherent in the plain-meaning rule
in application); see generally Michael R. Merz, The Meaninglessness of the
Plain Meaning Rule, 4 U. Dayton L. Rev. 31 (1979) (critiquing the plain
meaning rule and proposing alternative methods of statutory
interpretation). A quick look at the legal encyclopedia Words and Phrases
reveals that many frequently used verbal expressions are ambiguous and
have multiple meanings. Ambiguity arises from not only the meaning of
particular words, but also “from the general scope and meaning of a
statute when all its provisions are examined.” Holiday Inns Franchising,
Inc. v. Branstad, 537 N.W.2d 724, 728 (Iowa 1995). Further, statutory
terms cannot always be taken literally when considered in context. See
Iowa Ins. Inst. v. Core Grp. of Iowa Ass’n for Justice, 867 N.W.2d 58, 72
(Iowa 2015) (“[E]ven if the meaning of words might seem clear on their face,
their context can create ambiguity.”). Sometimes the text pushes us
toward absurd results that rightly drive the interpretation away from
textual literalism. Mall Real Estate, L.L.C. v. City of Hamburg, 818 N.W.2d
190, 199 (Iowa 2012) (stating that, while the canon of construction noscitur
a sociis would ordinarily apply, “we cannot apply this canon if its
application thwarts legislative intent or makes the general words
meaningless”).
Because of the challenges of statutory interpretation, we have a long
history of looking to legislative history and statutory purposes as so-called
“extrinsic aids” in determining the proper approach to statutory
interpretation. See, e.g., Mulhern v. Catholic Health Initiatives, 799 N.W.2d
104, 113 (Iowa 2011) (“We also consider the legislative history of a statute
15
when ascertaining legislative intent.”); Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Iowa Dep’t
of Revenue, 789 N.W.2d 417, 427 (Iowa 2010) (noting that reliance on
legislative history, purpose, and definitions are considered, even if it “leads
to a result that seems contrary to the court’s expectations”). We also
sometimes consider what was not said in statutes, as when an Iowa
statute departs from a model act from which it was derived. See, e.g., State
v. Lindell, 828 N.W.2d 1, 7–8 (Iowa 2013).
Iowa Code section 4.6 (2019) provides that the court may consider
seven extrinsic sources in the interpretation of statutes. 1 The statute may
raise serious questions of separation of powers, but there is certainly no
legislative bar, and in fact we have been permitted, if not encouraged, to
examine extrinsic indications of legislative purpose. Indeed, one study of
a ten-year timeframe of our court’s legislative interpretation cases found
that the three members still on the court today utilized legislative history,
on average, in 51.7% of the legislative interpretation opinions that they
authored. 2 See generally Karen L. Wallace, Does the Past Predict the
1Iowa Code section 4.6 provides,
If a statute is ambiguous, the court, in determining the intention
of the legislature, may consider among other matters:
1. The object sought to be attained.
2. The circumstances under which the statute was enacted.
3. The legislative history.
4. The common law or former statutory provisions, including laws
upon the same or similar subjects.
5. The consequences of a particular construction.
6. The administrative construction of the statute.
7. The preamble or statement of policy.”
2This law review article categorized the percentage of statutory interpretation
opinions that each justice authored that cited historical sources. Justice Mansfield cited
historical sources in 61.1% of his statutory interpretation opinions, as did Justice
Waterman in 56.5% of his opinions, and Justice Appel in 37.5% of my opinions. Karen
L. Wallace, Does the Past Predict the Future?: An Empirical Analysis of Recent Iowa
16
Future?: An Empirical Analysis of Recent Iowa Supreme Court Use of
Legislative History as a Window into Statutory Construction in Iowa, 63
Drake L. Rev. 239 (2015). To the extent the majority opinion’s dicta implies
that extrinsic aids should not be used to divine legislative purpose or are
disfavored, it is sailing dead against Iowa Code section 4.6 and the
established recent practice in this court. As a general rule, we have used
extrinsic evidence to follow Judge Learned Hand’s admonition not to allow
hypertextualism “to make a fortress out of the dictionary.” Cabell v.
Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1945).
I have no objection to the result reached in this case; but for me it
is a combination of text, purpose, and absence of countervailing argument
that reaches that result. I arrive at that decision in its full statutory
context. If we are to do our jobs, we judges must continue to have the full
panoply of intrinsic and extrinsic tools available to us when confronted
with difficult issues of legislative interpretation. Sometimes the text will
control. In those cases, there will rarely be appeals. If such cases are
appealed, they are handled crisply. But when difficult questions of
statutory interpretation arise, we will need a complete toolbox to make the
best choices through the art of legislative interpretation.
Supreme Court Use of Legislative History as a Window into Statutory Construction in Iowa,
63 Drake L. Rev. 239, 270 (2015).