MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any FILED
court except for the purpose of establishing
May 28 2020, 6:09 am
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case. CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
James A. Hanson Caryn N. Szyper
Fort Wayne, Indiana Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Mickey Davis, May 28, 2020
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-CR-2818
v. Appeal from the Allen Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable David M. Zent,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
02D06-1905-F3-30
Bradford, Chief Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] In October of 2019, Mickey Davis was convicted of Level 3 felony criminal
confinement, Level 5 felony battery, and Level 5 felony domestic battery and
ultimately sentenced to sixteen years of incarceration. On appeal, Davis
contends that (1) the trial court failed to find that the State had engaged in
prosecutorial misconduct or to provide the jury with an admonishment
regarding the alleged misconduct, and (2) his criminal-confinement and battery
convictions violate Indiana constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy.
Because we disagree, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On April 26, 2019, Davis arrived at the residence of Jaleesa Jackson, his
girlfriend at the time. Shortly thereafter, the two began arguing. Jackson was
standing in her bathroom and attempted to leave, but Davis would not allow it.
Once Davis allowed Jackson to exit the bathroom, the argument continued.
After Davis refused to leave the residence, Jackson attempted to leave but was
stopped by Davis, who locked the security door and blocked it with his body.
Davis pushed Jackson in the face to force her away from the door. Noticing
that Davis was becoming more agitated, Jackson armed herself with a steak
knife, but Davis grabbed it from her and threw it to the ground. Jackson
grabbed her phone and attempted to call 911, but Davis knocked it out of her
hand. At that point, Davis began punching Jackson. Jackson fell to the floor
and curled into a ball, attempting to protect herself. Davis kicked Jackson
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several times and continued punching her once he positioned himself on top of
her. After Davis was on top of Jackson, he placed his hands around her throat
and choked her until she lost consciousness. As Jackson regained
consciousness, Davis began slamming her head against the floor.
[3] Around that same time, Jackson’s next-door neighbor Jada Clark heard noise
and a scream for help coming from Jackson’s residence. Clark went to
Jackson’s residence and observed Davis hitting Jackson while on top of her. As
she pounded on the door, Clark told Davis to stop and said that she was calling
the police. Realizing she had forgotten her phone, Clark ran back to her
residence, retrieved her phone, and called 911. Once Clark returned to
Jackson’s residence, Davis shoved past her and fled the scene in his vehicle.
When Detective Brent Roddy arrived on the scene, he observed
a large amount of blood on the sidewalk and the steps leading up
to the apartment, on the handrail, on the security door, just
inside of the door. When you proceed into the apartment it opens
up into a living room and all of the furniture was moved around
as if there had been an altercation. There was blood literally
everywhere. I was astonished that I didn’t find a body, that the
victim was still alive.
Tr. Vol. III p. 167. After law enforcement arrived, Jackson was transported to
the hospital, where she recounted the details of the altercation to law
enforcement and medical personnel. Jackson had a fully swollen left eye, a
partially swollen right eye, and a laceration on her nose; both of her lips were
split open; and she had a tremendous amount of blood covering her body.
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[4] On May 3, 2019, the State charged Davis with Level 3 felony criminal
confinement, Level 5 felony battery, Level 5 felony domestic battery, Level 6
felony strangulation, and Class A misdemeanor interference with the reporting
of a crime. On October 7, 2019, the trial court held a status hearing, at which it
appointed Jackson a public defender, given the possibility that she may testify
in contradiction to the statements she had previously made to police. That
hearing, in relevant parts, proceeded as follows:
[STATE]: This is one where we put it out for status because the
victim in this case is on probation for battery with a deadly
weapon. This is one we want her to have an attorney to be
advised of her consequences because it is my understanding, and
has been my understanding since [Defense Counsel] was in the
case that victim is going to recant and her recantation will be
inconsistent with what she told the police. Both of them cannot
be true. So I believe [the Chief Public Defender] spoke with her
and advised her, gave her some sound legal advice. I just wanted
to make sure that that was the case.
[CHIEF PUBLIC DEFENDER]: I did give her some legal
advice, but I didn’t go into any specifics with her because this
morning is not the time to do that. I’ve let her know that the
prosecutor is threatening her with having her probation violation
[sic] if what she says is different than what she said. My advice to
her is to tell the truth. Obviously, that’s what I told her to do.
THE COURT: Sure. Of course.
[CHIEF PUBLIC DEFENDER]: And if the truth is not what it
was previously said she may go to jail for that. She does want to
have a public defender?
THE COURT: She does?
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[CHIEF PUBLIC DEFENDER]: She does want a public
defender –
THE COURT: Okay.
[CHIEF PUBLIC DEFENDER]: - before she makes a decision
about what to say – um – but I have given her that bit of advice,
but I don’t know the specifics enough to do anything else today,
but I have told her that there will be a consequence for her
testifying next week, but I’m telling her to testify truthfully.
THE COURT: If she doesn’t tell the truth.
[CHIEF PUBLIC DEFENDER]: Well, no. If she does tell the
truth, if it’s not what she believes is the truth. If the prior
statement – if what she tells as truth next week is different than
what she previously said there’s a consequence for perhaps a false
reporting, so I’ve explained that to her.
Tr. Vol. II pp. 10–11.
[5] On October 15 and 16, 2019, a jury trial was held. On the first day of trial, the
State reported to the court that Jackson had been arrested over the weekend for
operating a vehicle while intoxicated and was being held in the county jail.
Jackson was ultimately transported to the courthouse and testified at trial.
Jackson testified that due to intoxication, she could not recall the events that
took place the night she was attacked or talking to police or medical personnel.
Jackson, however, did testify that on the evening of the attack, someone had
become physical with her and that Davis had caused her injuries. Jackson also
testified that there was a time when she had told others that Davis had not
caused her injuries, believing that it was none of their business. After the State
rested, Davis, through counsel, requested that the trial court give the jury a
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stipulation or statement regarding the “pressure the State applied to the victim
in this case,” essentially a threat of potentially revoking her probation. Tr. Vol.
IV p. 113. Upon Davis’s request, the following colloquy between the parties
and the trial court took place:
[THE STATE]: Your Honor, just so we’re clear, the State asked
you to appoint counsel to Ms. Jackson because she had rights
that she wanted – they wanted to make sure that her rights were
protected regardless of what decision that she made. When I
spoke with Caryn Garton, we talked about – she – what Caryn
said is I’m going to tell her to tell the truth. I’m gonna advise her
of the consequences of everything, but I’m going to tell her to tell
the truth, that’ [sic] what I’m gonna ask her to do. Um, as it
relates to the OWI, I did not interfere with that at all. No one – I
didn’t make any phone calls, anything. All we did was file an
order to transport. She was not given any benefits or privileges or
anything at all for her testimony. I mean if Mr. Hanson would
remember, probation was closed on Monday. So, therefore, they
wouldn’t have had knowledge of to file a petition. So, I think she
probably had a 2:00 probation appointment today. I anticipate at
some point there’s going to be a petition to revoke her suspended
sentence put on file. It just hasn’t caught up. There have been
numerous instances where someone who has been on probation
and their probation officer doesn’t catch it immediately, and they
– somebody has to be taken back in custody. In fact, there are
times, especially with an OWI, it’s set for informal adjustment
and then we have to then tell the probation officer to file petition
to revoke their bond.
THE COURT: Looking at Odyssey, a petition to revoke her
bond was filed at 11:02 a.m. today.
[THE STATE]: So –
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THE COURT: That’s public record. I just pulled that up on the
public access site.1
[THE STATE]: Thank you. So, um, in saying that, I – I’m
personally affronted by that cause it sounds like I did something
that was unethical. Um, number two, um, if we talk about the
fact that she’s on probation, it opens the door to a prior bad act,
which is her battery with a deadly weapon. And I believe that
would be substantially more prejudicial than probative. So,
therefore, I believe that that information should not come in front
of the Jury.
THE COURT: Do you have any information there was some – I
don’t even know what the proper word to use is.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Well – and I’m not going –
THE COURT: Unkind or influence that the State used?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I’m not going full blown Giglio, I’m
not accusing [the State] of – of directly doing anything. Uh, I’m
simply stating that the circumstances are such that the witness, as
she sat there and testified, knew she has this sort of sword of
Damocles over her head. She sat down with an attorney and
been advised specifically on the pros and cons of what she
decides to do. And I spoke with Ms. Garton as well, and I’m in
agreement, Ms. Garton gave good advice and told her you gotta
tell the truth. And if you don’t – if - you tell the truth this way,
and if you tell the truth this way, whatever the truth is, she
mapped out for her the basic scenarios that she was facing and
told her the legal consequences of those scenarios, gave her good
advice. I don’t have any problem with that. I don’t have any
1
There was discussion by defense counsel as to why Jackson was not held on a probation violation following
her arrest for OWI. As the trial court pointed out, the State eventually filed a petition to revoke her bond for
violating the terms of her probation.
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problem with – uh, there’s been no – I – I guar (sic) – I have no
information that any promise was made to her. [ … ]
THE COURT: So, you want me to tell the Jury that her lawyer
told her to tell the truth and there was an accident and she was
allowed out of jail?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: No, that’s not what I’m trying to say.
I’m saying that it’s relevant context that she had been advised of
consequences so when she testifies, she testifies, uh, based on her
knowledge of what could be the consequences of her testimony –
[THE STATE]: Your Honor, I specifically –
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: - in light of her probation, but.
[THE STATE]: I specifically asked Ms. Garton what advice she
gave her. And she said that I told her to tell the truth. I explained
to her that it would not be okay – if he didn’t do it, it would not
be okay for you to get on the stand and say that he did it. You
have to tell the truth. She was very clear. She went through
everything and talked about very good advice. She said tell the
truth no matter what. She told her to tell the truth, so.
Tr. Vol. IV pp. 117–21. The trial court declined Davis’s request to admonish the
jury.
[6] At the conclusion of trial, the jury found Davis guilty of Level 3 felony criminal
confinement, Level 5 felony battery, and Level 5 felony domestic battery. On
November 5, 2019, the trial court sentenced Davis to sixteen years for the
criminal-confinement conviction, merged the battery conviction with the
criminal-confinement conviction, and vacated the domestic battery conviction.
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Discussion and Decision
I. Prosecutorial Misconduct
[7] Davis contends that the trial court failed to prevent or remedy the prosecutorial
misconduct which occurred when the State allegedly threatened Jackson with a
probation violation, which ultimately deprived Davis of his right to call
witnesses pursuant to the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
We review a claim of prosecutorial misconduct properly raised in the trial court
by determining “(1) whether misconduct occurred, and if so, (2) whether the
misconduct, under all of the circumstances, placed the defendant in a position
of grave peril to which he or she would not have been subjected otherwise.”
Ryan v. State, 9 N.E.3d 663, 667 (Ind. 2014).2 Regarding the Sixth Amendment
of the United States Constitution,
[a] fundamental element of due process of law is the right of an
accused to present witnesses in his own defense. Those witnesses
must be free to testify without fear of governmental retaliation.
While a trial court judge may advise a witness of his right to
avoid self-incrimination, he may not do so in a threatening or
browbeating manner. A prosecutor’s warning of criminal charges
during a personal interview with a witness improperly denies the
defendant the use of that witness’s testimony regardless of the
2
There is some argument that Davis failed to preserve his prosecutorial-misconduct claim for appellate
review. See id. (“To preserve a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, the defendant must—at the time the
alleged misconduct occurs—request an admonishment to the jury, and if further relief is desired, move for a
mistrial.”). We nonetheless choose to address Davis’s claim on the merits.
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prosecutor’s good intentions. A prosecutor may not prevent nor
discourage a defense witness from testifying.
Collins v. State, 822 N.E.2d 214, 220 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied.
[8] Davis bases his argument on the Chief Deputy Public Defender’s statement that
she told Jackson that “the prosecutor is threatening her with having her
probation violation if what she says is different than what she said.” Tr. Vol. II
p. 10. Not only is this merely the Chief Deputy Public Defender’s
characterization of the issue, but it also stands as an outlier to the other
evidence contained in the record, which indicates that the State sought only to
have Jackson testify truthfully and that she be advised of the legal consequences
if she chose not to. At the October 7, 2019, status hearing, the State informed
the trial court that it believed Jackson was going to recant the prior statements
she made to police regarding the attack. The State’s belief was not unreasonable
given that Davis had attempted to call Jackson 3079 times from jail while
awaiting trial, and of those calls, 696 had connected. During one call, Davis
had told Jackson to “say less and stick to the script,” and that “less is better.”
Ex. 43. Moreover, Jackson testified at trial that she had been telling others that
Davis had not caused her injuries. Given its belief, the State requested that the
trial court provide Jackson with counsel to advise her of the perils of testifying
untruthfully, which was also reasonable given that untruthful testimony could
have resulted in criminal charges for Jackson, i.e., perjury or false reporting,
which could result in a revocation of her probation. At trial, the State again
reiterated that it only wanted Jackson to testify truthfully and sought to have
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counsel appointed to “make sure that [Jackson’s] rights were protected
regardless of what decision that she made.” Tr. Vol. IV pp. 117–18. The trial
court made a similar observation, stating that “the pressure on [Jackson] was to
tell the truth is my understanding.” Tr. Vol. IV p. 122. We believe that the
State’s actions in this matter amounted to nothing more than an attempt to
warn Jackson that there could be consequences if she did not testify truthfully,
which we have previously concluded does not amount to prosecutorial
misconduct. See Greer v. State, 115 N.E.3d 1287, 1291 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018)
(concluding that the prosecutor was entitled to inform “the witness that there
could be consequences for lying on the stand” and that “the prosecutor did not
explicitly threaten [the witness] with prosecution and repeatedly reminded him
that he would reminded him that he would be in trouble only if he did not tell
the truth, not if he testified on [the Defendant’s] behalf.”).
[9] In support of his argument, Davis directs our attention to Collins. In Collins,
during a pretrial interview, the witness informed the prosecutor that she would
testify that the contraband belonged to her and not the defendant. 822 N.E.2d
at 220. The prosecutor told the witness that if she testified as such, he would
arrest her “the moment she stepped off the witness stand.” Id. After the witness
refused to testify, the defendant moved for a mistrial, and the prosecutor
admitted to telling the witness he would have had her arrested, stating
I and Detective Tammy Kunz on October 21 st visited [the
witness,] who very edgily told me essentially the conjured and
coach[ed] version of events that [defendant’s counsel] had
worked with … [her] in his office under the suggestion that if she
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took responsibility for all these actions, then she would only
get—she would at most get probation. What I told her … [is that]
at the conclusion of what she told me, that if she said those things
under oath, on this witness stand, that I would have her arrested.
Not for perjury, … [but that] she would be arrested for what she
told me. And that is—possession of cocaine with a firearm—
which is a Felony C—as well as possession of cocaine as a
Felony D and possession of marijuana as a Misdemeanor A.
That is what I told her she would be arrested for…
Id. at 221. We concluded that the prosecutor’s conduct violated the Sixth
Amendment but that it was harmless error. Id. at 223.
[10] That said, Collins is easily distinguished from the present matter. Here, there is
no indication in the record that the State ever met with Jackson and told her
that if her testimony differed from the statements she made to police, she would
be arrested and criminally charged. Rather, knowing that Jackson was on
probation, the State requested the trial court to provide Jackson with counsel to
advise her of the possible consequences which could result if she testified
untruthfully or made a false report. In Collins, the State directly threatened the
witness with future legal peril if she essentially took responsibility for the
defendant’s actions; here, the State was attempting to provide the witness with
sound legal advice in order to avoid any future legal peril. Davis has failed to
establish that any prosecutorial misconduct occurred.
[11] Even assuming, arguendo, that prosecutorial misconduct had occurred, it could
only be considered harmless error. The United States Supreme Court has held
that “some constitutional errors … are so unimportant and insignificant that
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they may, consistent with the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless.”
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 630 (1993) (internal quotations omitted).
Errors under the Sixth Amendment are subject to harmless error analysis.
Collins, 822 N.E.2d at 221. “Error is deemed harmless when there is no
substantial likelihood the error contributed to the verdict, or, in other words,
that the error was unimportant.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).
[12] Law enforcement and medical personnel testified regarding their conversations
with Jackson, during which she identified Davis as her attacker and recounted
the details of the attack. Law enforcement also testified to observing blood
throughout the residence and furniture in disarray, indicating there had been an
altercation, and locating a steak knife on the floor. Moreover, Clark’s and her
mother’s 911 calls were played at trial, which identified Davis as the attacker.
Detective Roddy also testified regarding his conversation with Clark, during
which she informed him that she had witnessed Davis punching and slapping
Jackson. Given this overwhelming evidence of guilt, any misconduct that
occurred was harmless error.
II. Double Jeopardy
[13] Davis contends that his convictions for Level 3 felony criminal confinement
and Level 5 felony battery violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Indiana
Constitution, which provides that “[n]o person shall be put in jeopardy twice
for the same offense. Garret v. State, 992 N.E.2d 710, 719 (Ind. 2013).
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In Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32 (Ind. 1999) this Court
concluded that two or more offenses are the same offense in
violation of article 1, section 14 if, with respect to either the
statutory elements of the challenged crimes or the actual evidence
used to obtain convictions, the essential elements of one
challenged offense also establish the essential elements of another
challenged offense. Under the actual evidence test, we examine
the actual evidence presented at trial in order to determine
whether each challenged offense was established by separate and
distinct facts. To find a double jeopardy violation under this test,
we must conclude that there is a reasonable possibility that the
evidentiary facts used by the fact-finder to establish the essential
elements of one offense may also have been used to establish the
essential elements of a second challenged offense. The actual
evidence test is applied to all the elements of both offenses. In
other words … the Indiana Double Jeopardy Clause is not
violated when the evidentiary facts establishing the essential
elements of one offense also establish only one or even several,
but not all, of the essential elements of a second offense.
Id. (cleaned up). “The existence of a reasonable possibility turns on a practical
assessment of whether the [fact finder] may have latched on to exactly the same
facts for both convictions.” Id. at 720 (internal quotations omitted). We
evaluate the evidence from the factfinder’s perspective and may consider the
charging informations, jury instructions, and counsel’s arguments. Id. Whether
two convictions violate the Double Jeopardy Clause is a pure question of law,
which we review de novo. Grabarczyk v. State, 772 N.E.2d 428, 432 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2002).
[14] To convict Davis of Level 3 felony criminal confinement, the State was
required to prove that Davis knowingly or intentionally confined Jackson
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without her consent, resulting in serious bodily injury to Jackson. Ind. Code §
35-42-3-3(a), (b)(3)(B). To convict Davis of Level 5 felony battery, the State was
required to prove that Davis knowingly or intentionally touched Jackson in a
rude, insolent, or angry manner, resulting in serious bodily injury. Ind. Code §
35-42-2-1(c)(1), (g)(1). Serious bodily injury means bodily injury that creates a
substantial risk of death or that causes serious permanent disfigurement,
unconsciousness, extreme pain, permanent or protracted loss or impairment of
the function of a bodily member or organ, or loss of a fetus. Ind. Code § 35-
31.5-2-292.
[15] Regarding criminal confinement, the record indicates that Davis locked the
door of Jackson’s residence, positioned himself on top of her, and repeatedly
beat her, which resulted in her sustaining two swollen eyes, split lips, and a
laceration on her nose, which is now permanently scarred. The record also
indicates that Jackson lost large amounts of blood and was hysterical and in
pain when medical personnel arrived. Regarding battery, the record indicates
that while on top of Jackson, Davis strangled her until she lost consciousness.
Moreover, the State’s closing argument also presented these distinct facts to
support each conviction as follows:
So to be able to find him guilty of the Criminal Confinement, the
State will submit to you that when he was on top of her hitting
her and caused that mark on her nose, that’s the Criminal
Confinement resulting in serious bodily injury. For the Domestic
Battery resulting in serious bodily injury, and the Battery for that
matter as well, and the Strangulation. When he strangled her and
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caused her to lose [consciousness,] that will support those
charges.
Tr. Vol. IV p. 136. Davis has failed to persuade us that there is a reasonable
possibility that the jury used the same evidentiary facts to convict him of both
criminal confinement and battery and therefore his convictions do not violate
the Double Jeopardy Clause under the Indiana Constitution.
[16] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Baker, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
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