Case: 19-15099 Date Filed: 05/29/2020 Page: 1 of 5
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 19-15099
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:18-cv-04529-MLB
THASHA A. BOYD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT
OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
________________________
(May 29, 2020)
Before WILLIAM PRYOR, JILL PRYOR, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Thasha Boyd, a prior employee of the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs
(“Department”), was terminated for cause by the Department. She brought suit in
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia alleging legal and
constitutional error in the decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board
(“MSPB”), the administrative body to which she appealed her termination. The
District Court granted the Department’s motion to dismiss Boyd’s complaint with
prejudice under the doctrine of res judicata. The Court found that the decision of
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit denying Boyd’s petition for
review of the MSPB’s decision precluded Boyd from raising the same arguments
in a different federal court. The Court also denied Boyd’s motion entitled “Motion
for Relief from Judgment Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), to Reopen, and Change
of Venue,” which requested relief from the Federal Circuit’s judgment and a
transfer of venue to the Northern District of Georgia due to unspecified new
evidence being available.
On appeal, Boyd argues that, because the Federal Circuit’s disposition was
not a decision on the merits of her claim and was influenced by fraud, the doctrine
of res judicata is inapplicable. Thus, she argues that the District Court erred in
applying the doctrine and dismissing her complaint. However, we need not, and
cannot, reach the merits of the res judicata issue, as we find that the District Court
lacked jurisdiction to entertain Boyd’s complaint.
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It is well settled that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and may
hear only those cases and controversies federal statutory law authorizes. Kokkonen
v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S. Ct. 1673, 1675 (1994).
This is referred to as the requirement of subject-matter jurisdiction. Federal courts
are “obligated to inquire into subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte whenever it
may be lacking.” Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 410 (11th
Cir. 1999). If “a federal court concludes that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction,
the court must dismiss the complaint in its entirety.” Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546
U.S. 500, 514, 126 S. Ct. 1235, 1244 (2006). A dismissal on subject-matter
jurisdiction grounds is not a judgment on the merits and is entered without
prejudice. Stalley ex rel. U.S. v. Orlando Reg’l Healthcare Sys., Inc., 524 F.3d
1229, 1232 (11th Cir. 2008). Accordingly, we consider whether any federal statute
would grant the District Court jurisdiction to entertain a petition for review of an
MSPB decision.
The MSPB — the board which issued the decision upholding Boyd’s
termination from the Department — is an entity established to hear the claims of
civil service employees or employment applicants who wish to challenge certain
employment actions. See generally 5 U.S.C. § 7701. A federal statute grants the
federal courts jurisdiction, on a limited basis, to hear petitions for judicial review
of the MSPB’s decisions. See id. § 7703. As a general rule, petitions for review of
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any MSPB decision must be filed in the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
Id. § 7703(b)(1)(A). An exception to that rule applies when the underlying
substance of the complaint involves prohibited employer conduct related to
whistleblower protections;1 in such a case, a petition for review may be filed in any
court of appeals of competent jurisdiction. See id. § 7703(b)(1)(B). 2
The Department argues that the Federal Circuit was the only court with
jurisdiction over Boyd’s petition because “whistleblower reprisal [was not] the
basis of her appeal.” While Boyd’s legal arguments are not a model of clarity,
allegations of reprisal for whistleblowing constitute a repeated refrain. But even if
we assume, for the sake of argument, that Boyd’s claims are premised on reprisal
for whistleblowing, jurisdiction still does not lie with the District Court. Section
7703(b)(1)(B) states that a case that involves reprisal for whistleblowing “shall be
filed in the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of
appeals of competent jurisdiction.” 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B). The district courts
are clearly omitted from this grant of jurisdiction. Therefore, while Boyd’s claim
1
The relevant whistleblower protections are codified at 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) and id. §
(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), and (D).
2
The general rule has one other exception, albeit one which does not apply here. 5
U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2) provides that petitions to review a MSPB decision in cases that include a
claim of unlawful discrimination are to be filed under the applicable anti-discrimination statute.
These so-called “mixed cases” must be filed in federal district court, consistent with the grant of
jurisdiction in the relevant anti-discrimination statutes. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c); 29 U.S.C. §
633a(c); 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); see also Kloeckner v. Solis, 568 U.S. 41, 50, 133 S. Ct. 596, 604
(2012). Boyd does not raise any claim of discrimination, so her case is not a “mixed case” and §
7703(b)(2) does not operate to grant jurisdiction to the District Court.
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did not need to be filed in the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, it was
impermissible to file it in the Northern District of Georgia. See Gibbs v. Jewell, 36
F. Supp. 3d 162, 166 (D.D.C. 2014) (“A final decision of the MSPB is appealable
to the Federal Circuit, although certain whistleblower claims may also be appealed
to any court of appeals . . . [but] under no circumstances does the [Whistleblower
Protection Act, codified at 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)–(9)] grant the District Court
jurisdiction to entertain a whistleblower cause of action brought directly before it
in the first instance.” (internal quotations omitted)).
Thus, our independent review confirms that no statute provided the District
Court with jurisdiction to hear this case, and it therefore must be dismissed.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the District Court’s order of dismissal
with prejudice and remand with instructions that the District Court dismiss Boyd’s
complaint without prejudice for want of jurisdiction and deny her Rule 60(b)
motion as moot.
VACATED and REMANDED.
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