IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 19-0324
Filed June 3, 2020
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
CHRISTOPHER ANTHONY HOLTON,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, Todd A. Hensley,
District Associate Judge.
Christopher Holton appeals his conviction and sentence for operating while
under the influence, third offense. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Matthew R. Metzgar of Rhinehart Law, P.C., Sioux City, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Genevieve Reinkoester, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Bower, C.J., and May and Greer, JJ.
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BOWER, Chief Judge.
Christopher Holton appeals his conviction and sentence for operating while
under the influence (OWI), third offense. Holton contends the district court erred
in not sentencing him in accordance with the plea agreement or affording him a
chance to withdraw his plea. Holton also claims his counsel provided ineffective
assistance. We find the court failed to either sentence Holton as provided in the
plea agreement or reject the agreement and provide him the opportunity to
withdraw from the plea. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
I. Background Fact & Proceedings
On October 14, 2018, Holton failed to maintain control of his vehicle and
struck another vehicle. He failed multiple field sobriety tests and was arrested. On
October 19, he was charged with OWI, third offense, and driving while license
revoked.
On November 21, at the plea hearing, Holton entered a guilty plea pursuant
to a plea agreement. The plea agreement provided:
The defendant would stand guilty and convicted of operating while
intoxicated, third offense . . . . He would be committed to the custody
of the director of the adult corrections for a term not to exceed five
years for assignment into the OWI continuum. That sentence would
be suspended and the defendant is committed to the Woodbury
County Jail for a period of [thirty] days. . . . Count 2, driving while
license revoked, . . . is dismissed.[1]
The court stated, “Sir, I’m not going to accept the plea agreement yet because we
don’t have a [presentence investigation report] done. I want to see that before I
1 This phrasing implies without stating the agreement relies on the court’s
concurrence to the sentence. On remand, we encourage the parties to clarify
whether the agreement requires the sentence stated or if it is an agreement to
jointly recommend a sentence.
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do, but if I were not to accept your plea agreement, then you can withdraw your
plea of guilty at that point.”
The court completed the plea colloquy on the offense of OWI and the prior
convictions and Holton admitted the elements the crime.
The court found the defendant was voluntarily entering his guilty plea,
understood the consequences of the plea, and that a factual basis for the plea
existed “based on the defendant’s admissions here today as well as my
conversations with him.”
The court then informed Holton of his right to file a motion in arrest of
judgment. The court did not tell Holton that right extended not only to his plea but
also to the colloquy used to enhance the OWI conviction.
The sentencing hearing was held on January 30, 2019. At sentencing, the
court sentenced Holton to a five year term but—contrary to the plea agreement—
did not suspend the sentence of incarceration. The court did not allow Holton the
opportunity to withdraw his plea, which was contrary to the court’s earlier advisory
that “if I were not to accept your plea agreement, then you can withdraw your plea
of guilty at that point.”
Holton appeals.
II. Plea Agreement
Holton claims the court erred in not sentencing him according to the plea
agreement or allowing him to withdraw his guilty plea if the court did not concur in
the plea agreement. We agree.
Under the Iowa Rules of Criminal Procedure, when the plea agreement is
conditioned upon the court’s concurrence and the court accepts it, the court must
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“inform the defendant that it will embody in the judgment and sentence the
disposition provided for in the plea agreement or another disposition more
favorable to the defendant.” Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.10(3). If the court rejects or refuses
to be bound by the plea agreement,
the court shall inform the parties of this fact, afford the defendant the
opportunity to then withdraw defendant’s plea, and advise the
defendant that if persistence in a guilty plea continues, the
disposition of the case may be less favorable to the defendant than
that contemplated by the plea agreement.
Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.10(4) (emphasis added).
Here, the plea agreement included an agreed sentence to be imposed,
requiring the court’s concurrence. In the plea hearing, the court specifically
reserved ruling on whether or not it would accept the plea agreement. Therefore,
at the sentencing hearing the court had the obligation to either concur in the plea
agreement and sentence Holton as provided (or in a more favorable manner) or
inform the parties it rejected the plea agreement and provide Holton the opportunity
to withdraw his plea.2 The court did neither and actually referred to the plea
agreement as supporting its sentence, which did not comply with the plea
agreement.
“[B]ecause a plea agreement requires a defendant to waive fundamental
rights, we are compelled to hold prosecutors and courts to the most meticulous
2 The State claims error was not preserved on this claim because Holton did not
file a motion in arrest or claim his counsel was ineffective by not filing such a
motion. In State v. Thompson, 856 N.W.2d 915, 921 (Iowa 2014), our supreme
court found the court rule on motion in arrest of judgment “has no applicability to a
situation, as in this case, where the defendant does not know the deficiency in the
plea proceeding until after sentencing.” Accordingly, Holton could “raise this issue
on appeal without first filing a motion in arrest of judgment.” Id. at 921–22.
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standards of both promise and performance.” State v. Macke, 933 N.W.2d 226,
236 (Iowa 2019) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). The district court failed
to inform Holton it did not concur with the sentence to be imposed pursuant to the
plea agreement and did not allow Holton the opportunity to withdraw his plea. The
court thus erred.
We reverse and remand for a new plea hearing in compliance with Iowa
Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.10. Given our ruling, we need not address Holton’s
ineffective-assistance claim.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.