[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
SEPT 15, 2006
No. 06-10047 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 04-00336-CR-T-17MSS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JORGE NAUN AGUILAR,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(September 15, 2006)
Before MARCUS, WILSON and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Jorge Naun Aguilar appeals his convictions for conspiracy to possess with
the intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine while on board a vessel
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, 46 U.S.C. § 1903(a), (g), (j); 21
U.S.C. § 960(b)(1)(B)(ii), and possession with intent to distribute five kilograms or
more of cocaine while on board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States, 46 U.S.C. § 1903(a), (g); 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(1)(B)(ii). Aguilar argues that
(1) the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress evidence, (2) the
United States Coast Guard conducted an unconstitutional search and seizure, and
(3) the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion to dismiss for lack
of jurisdiction. We affirm.
On July 19, 2004, the United States Coast Guard intercepted the Miss Mery
Hill, a vessel sailing under the Honduran flag. The Coast Guard boarded the vessel
and discovered 64 bales of cocaine that weighed 1536 kilograms. Aguilar was
arrested as a crewmember and charged with conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute cocaine while on board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States, 46 U.S.C. § 1903(a), (g), (j); 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(1)(B)(ii), and possession
with intent to distribute cocaine while on board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction
of the United States, 46 U.S.C. § 1903(a), (g); 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(1)(B)(ii).
The government moved for pre-trial determination of jurisdiction. In
support of its motion, the government submitted a certification from a designee of
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the Secretary of State. The certification stated the Coast Guard had notified the
Honduran government of the search of the Miss Mery Hill, but the Honduran
government had waived its right to exercise jurisdiction and permitted the
enforcement of United States law over the vessel and the crew. The district court
granted the government’s motion and found that the Miss Mery Hill was a “vessel
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.” 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(1)(B)(ii).
Aguilar moved to suppress evidence found on board the vessel. Aguilar
argued that the Miss Mery Hill was not subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States and the Coast Guard did not have a reasonable suspicion that the vessel
violated United States law. Based on the findings by the magistrate judge after an
evidentiary hearing, the district court denied the motion. Aguilar then entered an
unconditional guilty plea.
Aguilar argues both that the district court erred when it denied his motion to
suppress and the search of the Miss Mery Hill was unconstitutional, but Aguilar
entered an unconditional guilty plea. We review de novo whether a voluntary
unconditional guilty plea waives the ability to appeal the rulings on pre-trial
motions. United States v. Patti, 337 F.3d 1317, 1320 n.4 (11th Cir. 2003). “[A]
voluntary, unconditional guilty plea waives all nonjurisdictional defects in the
proceedings.” Id. at 1320. Aguilar waived his right to appeal both the denial of his
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motion to suppress and the legality of the search of the Miss Mery Hill. See
United States v. McCoy, 477 F.2d 550, 551 (5 th Cir. 1973); United States v. Sepe,
474 F.2d 784, 787–88 (5 th Cir. 1973).
Aguilar also contends that the district court lacked jurisdiction because the
Miss Mery Hill was not subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, but Aguilar
also waived this argument. As we explained, “a voluntary, unconditional guilty
plea waives all nonjurisdictional defects in the proceedings.” Patti, 337 F.3d at
1320. Under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act, “[i]t is unlawful for any
person . . . on board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States”
knowingly to possess with the intent to distribute a controlled substance. 46
U.S.C. § 1903(a). Because the indictment charged Aguilar with a violation of a
law of the United States, “the district court [had] jurisdiction over the case and
empower[ed] it to rule on the sufficiency of the indictment.” United States v.
McCoy, 266 F.3d 1245, 1252 n.11 (11th Cir. 2001).
Aguilar’s argument that the Miss Mery Hill was not subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States is not a challenge to the subject matter jurisdiction
of the district court. Aguilar instead challenges the finding of the district court that
the Coast Guard complied with the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act to
establish that the Miss Mery Hill was a “vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the
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United States.” 46 U.S.C. § 1903(a). Because this argument does not challenge
the subject matter of the district court, Aguilar waived this argument when he
pleaded guilty unconditionally. See Patti, 337 F.3d at 1320.
Aguilar’s convictions are
AFFIRMED.
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