NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 10 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MITCHELL NELSON, No. 19-35401
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:18-cv-00251-RSM
v.
MEMORANDUM*
THE BOEING COMPANY; MICHAEL
CUMMINS,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Ricardo S. Martinez, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 2, 2020**
Before: LEAVY, PAEZ, and BENNETT, Circuit Judges.
Mitchell Nelson appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment
in his employment action alleging violations of Title VII. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Am. Tower Corp. v. City of San
Diego, 763 F.3d 1035, 1043 (9th Cir. 2014). We affirm.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Nelson’s sex
discrimination and retaliation claims because Nelson failed to raise a genuine
dispute of material fact as to whether the legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for
defendants’ actions were pretextual. See Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281
F.3d 1054, 1061-62, 1064 (9th Cir. 2002) (burden-shifting framework applies to
sex discrimination and retaliation claims under Title VII; circumstantial evidence
of pretext must be specific and substantial).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Nelson’s hostile
work environment claim because Nelson failed to raise a genuine dispute of
material fact as to whether defendant’s alleged conduct was based on his gender, or
that defendant’s conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions
of his employment. See Surrell v. Cal. Water Serv. Co., 518 F.3d 1097, 1108-09
(9th Cir. 2008) (elements of a prima facie Title VII hostile work environment
claim).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Nelson’s untimely
demand for a jury trial. See Zivkovic v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1086-
87 (9th Cir. 2002) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that
inadvertence does not justify granting an untimely jury demand).
AFFIRMED.
2 19-35401