IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 20-0603
Filed June 17, 2020
IN THE INTEREST OF C.F. and D.B.,
Minor Children,
M.B., Mother,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Susan Cox, District
Associate Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to both children.
AFFIRMED.
Ronald E. Langford of Langford Law Office, LLC, Des Moines, for appellant
mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kathryn K. Lang, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee State.
Michael R. Sorci of Youth Law Center, Des Moines, attorney and guardian
ad litem for minor children.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Tabor and Ahlers, JJ.
2
AHLERS, Judge.
After nearly nine years of periodic services by the Iowa Department of
Human Services (DHS), the juvenile court terminated the parental rights of the
mother of the children and the father of each of the children.1 Only the mother
appeals. She raises three issues: (1) whether termination is in the best interest of
the children; (2) whether the juvenile court erred by admitting into evidence exhibits
alleged to be untimely filed or, alternatively, not granting the mother’s request for
a continuance; and (3) whether the juvenile court abused its discretion by admitting
into evidence exhibits that were deemed timely because the juvenile court held the
record open.
We must first address whether the mother has waived the issues by her
failure to adequately argue them in her filings with this court. In her petition on
appeal, with respect to each issue, the mother merely recited a legal conclusion,
stated error was preserved, and cited two sections of the Iowa Code and three
Iowa appellate cases. The section of the petition setting forth the issues does not
cite the record, set forth an argument, or give any explanation of how the cited
authorities apply to this case. By merely making conclusory statements without
references to the record or how the cited authorities apply to the case, the mother
may be deemed to have waived the issues. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.201(1)(d) (“The
petition on appeal shall substantially comply with form 5 in rule 6.1401.”); Iowa R.
App. P. 6.1401–Form 5 (“[S]tate what findings of fact or conclusions of law the
district court made with which you disagree and why, generally referencing a
1 The children are C.F., born in 2011, and D.B., born in 2007.
3
particular part of the record, witnesses’ testimony, or exhibits that support your
position on appeal. . . . General conclusions, such as ‘the trial court’s ruling is not
supported by law or the facts’ are not acceptable.” (emphasis added)); see also In
re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000) (“A broad, all encompassing argument
is insufficient to identify error in cases of de novo review.”); Hyler v. Garner, 548
N.W.2d 864, 876 (Iowa 1996) (“[W]e will not speculate on the arguments [a party]
might have made and then search for legal authority and comb the record for facts
to support such arguments.”); Inghram v. Dairyland Mut. Ins. Co., 215 N.W.2d 239,
240 (Iowa 1974) (“To reach the merits of this case would require us to assume a
partisan role and undertake the appellant’s research and advocacy. This role is
one we refuse to assume.”); cf. Iowa R. App. P. 6.903(2)(g)(3) (requiring
arguments in briefs to contain reasoning, citations to authorities, and references to
pertinent parts of the record). We acknowledge the expedited nature of appeals
in termination-of-parental-rights cases, see generally Iowa R. App. P. 6.201, but
the mother must give us something with which to work in conducting our review.
In this case, it is a close call whether the mother has given us adequate
information and argument with respect to the first issue. Due to the fact the recital
of the material facts in her petition gives us some indication of the nature of her
argument on the best-interest-of-the-children issue, we will overlook the waiver
problem and address that issue on its merits. However, with respect to the second
and third issues, after reviewing the mother’s petition, we are unable to determine
the nature of the claimed errors, as the mother does not identify the exhibits at
issue, does not identify where the exhibits are addressed in the record, makes no
argument as to why they should not have been admitted, makes no argument as
4
to how the mother was prejudiced by their admission, makes no argument about
why a continuance was needed, makes no argument as to how she was prejudiced
by a failure to grant a continuance, and makes no argument how the juvenile court
abused its discretion in admitting the exhibits or denying a request for a
continuance. Therefore, we deem the mother to have waived any claimed error
with respect to the admission of any exhibits or the denial of the mother’s
continuance request and will not address those issues any further.
As to the best-interest-of-the-children argument, we start with the standard
of review. “We review proceedings terminating parental rights de novo.” In re A.S.,
906 N.W.2d 467, 472 (Iowa 2018) (quoting In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 110 (Iowa
2014)). “We are not bound by the juvenile court’s findings of fact, but we do give
them weight, especially in assessing the credibility of witnesses.” Id. (quoting A.M.,
843 N.W.2d at 110).
Before turning to the merits, we note the mother raised no issue claiming
the State failed to meet its burden of establishing the statutory grounds for
termination or that any permissive factors set forth in Iowa Code section
232.116(3) (2019) should prevent termination. Therefore, we will not address
those two steps in the three-step analysis. See In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 706–
07 (Iowa 2010) (noting termination-of-parental-rights proceedings follow a three-
step analysis to determine (1) whether statutory grounds for termination have been
established, (2) whether termination is in the children’s best interest, and (3)
whether a statutory exception in Iowa Code section 232.116(3) should preclude
termination); Hyler, 548 N.W.2d at 870 (“[O]ur review is confined to those
propositions relied upon by the appellant for reversal on appeal.”).
5
Turning to the merits, after our de novo review of the record, we agree
termination of the mother’s parental rights is in the best interest of the children.
We find the following summary provided by the juvenile court to be accurate:
The issue in this case is if the Court should terminate the mother’s
parental rights, after 9 years of DHS services and numerous
treatments. Within the last two weeks, the mother finally understood
she is an alcoholic and cannot drink at all. Due to the mother’s
alcoholism, the children have been exposed to her erratic intoxicated
conduct, violence from her boyfriend, and unsanitary living
conditions resulting in bugs and rodents. Even after the most recent
removal, the mother was intoxicated when she visited the children.
The mother is correct in pointing out that, before the current child-in-need-
of-assistance proceedings that led to termination, prior DHS involvement during
the nine-year-span was sporadic and short-lived. However, the fact remains that
the mother has had those nine years to address her alcoholism. She has failed to
do so. Showing up at the termination hearing after those nine years and claiming
to have finally realized she is an alcoholic does not preclude termination. First, the
mother has a history of complying with demands for sobriety for short periods of
time, only to return to drinking. Therefore, we are not convinced her current
profession of dedication to sobriety will take root. See In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764,
778 (Iowa 2012) (“Insight for the determination of the child’s long-range best
interests can be gleaned from ‘evidence of the parent’s past performance for that
performance may be indicative of the quality of the future care that parent is
capable of providing.’” (quoting C.B., 611 N.W.2d at 495)).
Second, these children have already had to wait too long to have a reliable
parent. They finally have reliable parents in the form of their foster parents, who
intend to adopt if permitted. See In re J.B.L., 844 N.W.2d 703, 706 (Iowa Ct. App.
6
2014) (noting Iowa Code section 232.116(2)(b) provides that, in determining a
child’s best interest, the court may consider a child’s integration into a foster home
and the foster family’s willingness to permanently integrate the child into the foster
family). They should not have to wait any longer to see if the mother will finally
successfully address her alcoholism and adequately parent them. See A.M., 843
N.W.2d at 112 (“It is well-settled law that we cannot deprive a child of permanency
after the State has proved a ground for termination under section 232.116(1) by
hoping someday a parent will learn to be a parent and be able to provide a stable
home for the child.” (quoting In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010))).
The mother points out that a significant amount of evidence was presented
about the cleanliness of her house. While this is true, it does not help the mother’s
argument. The juvenile court made the following observation:
This case is not about clutter. [The mother] is unable to keep the
house sanitary and free from rodents/bugs because of the
alcoholism. The filth of the house is an indicia of [the mother’s]
alcoholism—along with other behavioral indicators which
demonstrate her inability to provide for the children’s most basic
safety needs.
We view this observation as an acknowledgment that the lack of cleanliness of the
house by itself would not necessarily have led to removal and eventual termination.
We agree with the juvenile court’s observation and acknowledgment. Like the
juvenile court, we view the unclean house as a symptom of the mother’s alcoholism
that contributes to the overall concern that prevents return of the children. This
concern also undermines the mother’s argument that there must not be any
concerns about the condition of the house because supervised visits took place
there. There is a vast difference between supervised visits and returning the
7
children to the mother’s care. The fact that conditions of the home are good
enough to permit supervised visits to take place there in no way signifies the home
is safe enough for the children to live there, just as the fact that the mother’s
behavior being good enough to permit supervised visits with her in no way signifies
her behavior is good enough to allow the children to live with her.
Finally, we address the mother’s claim that she has generally been
compliant with services and the picture painted of her is an unfair characterization.
After our review of the record, we disagree. The mother skipped visits, lied to
service providers about reasons for skipping visits, refused to allow service
providers to enter her home, blocked access to the bedroom where she is known
to stash alcohol, and was intoxicated during visits. Her repeated abuse of alcohol
has not only led to an unsanitary house, fighting with her boyfriend, and sporadic
parenting, but it has also damaged her relationship with the children. D.B. refused
to attend visits because of the mother’s drinking, became upset during visits
because of the mother’s drinking, and unfairly assumed a parenting role at a young
age because of the mother’s drinking. He has also reported being uncomfortable
and embarrassed by the mother’s drinking. C.F. has been observed to act out
toward others when a visit with the mother is about to occur and has generally
grown indifferent to attending visits. The picture painted of the mother by the
juvenile court is an accurate one.
For the foregoing reasons, we find termination of the mother’s parental
rights to be in the children’s best interest.
AFFIRMED.