RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0624-18T1
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
J. P. M-S.,1
Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________
Submitted May 20, 2020 – Decided June 19, 2020
Before Judges Haas and Enright.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Union County, Indictment No. 16-03-0178.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (John Walter Douard, Assistant Deputy
Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief).
Lyndsay V. Ruotolo, Acting Union County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Milton Samuel Leibowitz,
Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant
Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
1
We use initials to protect the privacy of the victim. R. 1:38-3(c)(12).
PER CURIAM
Defendant J.P.M-S. appeals from the November 15, 2016 order denying
his suppression motion, as well as the April 5, 2017 denial of his motion to
reconsider that suppression ruling. We affirm, substantially for the reasons set
forth in Judge John M. Deitch's cogent and thoughtful written opinions.
On August 15, 2015, defendant's wife reported to police that defendant
raped her earlier that day and the previous day. Defendant was arrested and
early the next morning, in a recorded interview, he provided a statement to
Detectives Alfredo Beltran and Richard Soso. Although defendant spoke
English, the interview was conducted in Spanish because that was the language
defendant preferred. Detective Beltran's first language was Spanish, so he
assumed responsibility for questioning defendant.
When defendant's custodial interrogation began, the detective gave him a
copy of a Miranda2 rights and waiver form written in Spanish. Detective Beltran
read the Spanish form to defendant as he followed along. After each right was
read to defendant, he was asked if he understood that right. Defendant
responded affirmatively and initialed each right. Defendant also read the waiver
of rights portion of the form aloud and signed the form.
2
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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The custodial interview lasted approximately twenty-five minutes.
Defendant first denied assaulting his wife but eventually conceded he "overdid
it some." He admitted he sexually assaulted her after he put "gauze" in her
mouth and tied her hands and legs. Subsequently, defendant was indicted on
two counts of first-degree aggravated sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(7) and
two counts of first-degree kidnapping, N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1(b).
Defendant filed a motion to suppress his confession. At the suppression
hearing, the State called Detective Beltran as its witness and moved the DVD
recording of defendant's custodial interrogation into evidence without objection.
The State also produced the English translation of defendant's Miranda warnings
and waiver of rights form, which included defendant's responses, as follows:
1. You have the right to remain silent.
Do you understand this right? Yes J[]M
2. Anything that you say could be utilized in your front
of the Court.
Do you understand this right? Yes JM
3. You have the right to consult with an attorney and to
have him (them) present during the interrogation.
Do you understand this right? Yes JM
4. If you don't have money for an attorney, one will be
named to represent or assist you before asking you
questions, if you so desire.
Do you understand this right? Yes JM
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5. At any time you can decide to make use of these
rights and refuse to answer questions or make any
statement.
Do you understand this right? Yes JM
WAIVER OF RIGHTS
I have read the Notice of Rights above appearing and
understand what are my rights. I am willing to declare
and answer questions. No promises or threats have
been made to me and I have not being coerced or
pressured in any way.
Signature (illegible)
Witness (illegible)
Date 8/15/05
Time 3[:]27 am
Defendant did not testify at the suppression hearing, but he argued that his
statements to the police should have been suppressed because the Spanish
version of the Miranda warnings contained serious errors. Specifically, he
claimed he was not informed that his statements "could and would be [used]
against him in a court of law." Defendant also contended the second sentence
in the Miranda notice advising anything he said could be "utilized in your front
of the court" was so defective linguistically that any statements flowing from
his interview should have been suppressed. However, as Judge Deitch observed,
"defendant did not argue that the police coerced, intimidated or tricked him into
giving the statement."
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In his November 15, 2016 opinion, the judge acknowledged the deficiency
in question two of the Miranda form but found that under the totality of
circumstances, "the essence of the warning [was] fulfilled" and defendant "was
properly advised of the consequences of . . . speaking with police."
Additionally, the judge found it was "unmistakable that [defendant] wanted to
speak to the Detective." Further, the judge determined defendant "was calm and
relaxed throughout the interview, he appear[ed] to have answered all questions
posed and did not provide any objective sign of being recalcitrant." The judge
denied defendant's motion to suppress, concluding he "was aware of his rights
and freely and voluntarily waived those rights."
Defendant moved for reconsideration of the suppression ruling. Based on
Detective Beltran's testimony during the suppression hearing, defendant
reiterated the arguments he had advanced previously and argued the detective's
"lack of fluency in Spanish" prevented him from realizing the deficient phrasing
in the Miranda rights form defendant signed. Judge Deitch denied defendant's
reconsideration motion, finding his arguments were "nothing more than a
repetition or an extrapolation of his arguments already proffered and considered
by this [c]ourt."
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In April 2018, defendant pled guilty to first-degree aggravated sexual
assault and approximately four months later, he was sentenced to an eight-year
prison term, subject to the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2.
On appeal, defendant raises the following arguments:
POINT I:
A CRUCIAL SENTENCE OF THE MIRANDA
WARNINGS WAS MISTRANSLATED IN THE
SPANISH-LANGUAGE FORM AND BELTRAN[]'S
TRANSLATION OF THAT SENTENCE INTO
ENGLISH REPRODUCED THE INCOHERENT
TRANSLATION OF THE FORM. A QUALIFIED
NEUTRAL [INTERPRETER] WAS REQUIRED TO
ENSURE THAT [DEFENDANT] PROVIDED A
KNOWING, INTELLIGENT AND VOLUNTARY
MIRANDA WAIVER.
A. The Prosecution's "Heavy Burden" Of
Proving A Valid Miranda Waiver
Under Federal Law Is Even Heavier In
New Jersey.
B. The State Must Prove By Competent
Evidence That A Defendant Had "The
Requisite Level Of Comprehension"
To Effectuate A Valid Waiver of His
Miranda Rights.
C. Police Officers Have Neither the
Qualifications nor the Neutrality to
Act as Reliable Interpreters.
i. Inexpert interpreters create
unreliable translation.
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ii. Using inherently biased police
interpreters compromises both
the interrogation and the
resulting records.
iii. The use of officers as
interpreters not only
compromises the interrogation
itself but also creates unreliable
and prejudicial records.
We find these arguments unavailing.
Our review of the trial court's decision on a motion to suppress is limited.
State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 15 (2009). "An appellate court reviewing a
motion to suppress evidence in a criminal case must uphold the factual findings
underlying the trial court's decision, provided that those findings are 'supported
by sufficient credible evidence in the record.'" State v. Boone, 232 N.J. 417,
425-26 (2017) (quoting State v. Scriven, 226 N.J. 20, 40 (2016)). We defer to a
trial court's findings "because those findings 'are substantially influenced by [an]
opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the "feel" of the cas e,
which a reviewing court cannot enjoy.'" State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412, 424-25
(2014) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161
(1964)). Our deferential standard of appellate review extends to "factual
findings based on a video recording or documentary evidence." State v. A.M.,
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237 N.J. 384, 396 (2019) (quoting State v. S.S., 229 N.J. 360, 381 (2017)). "We
owe no deference, however, to conclusions of law made by trial courts in
deciding suppression motions, which we instead review de novo." State v.
Brown, 456 N.J. Super. 352, 358-59 (App. Div. 2018) (citing State v. Watts, 223
N.J. 503, 516 (2015)).
Under Rule 4:49-2, a court "may reconsider final judgments or orders
within twenty days of entry." Lee v. Brown, 232 N.J. 114, 126 (2018). Although
Rule 4:49-2 does not expressly apply to criminal practice, courts have
nevertheless applied its standards to motions for reconsideration in criminal
actions. See State v. Puryear, 441 N.J. Super. 280, 294-95 (App. Div. 2015).
Reconsideration is "a matter within the sound discretion of the [c]ourt,"
Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J. Super. 374, 384 (App. Div. 1996) (quoting D'Atria
v. D'Atria, 242 N.J. Super. 392, 401 (Ch. Div. 1990)), and will not be set aside
unless the trial court abused its discretion. Granata v. Broderick, 446 N.J. Super.
449, 468 (App. Div. 2016), aff'd, 231 N.J. 135 (2017). "[G]rounds for
reconsideration are generally limited[,]" as "[t]he proper object of
reconsideration is to correct a court's error or oversight." Puryear, 441 N.J.
Super. at 294; see also Palombi v. Palombi, 414 N.J. Super. 274, 288 (App. Div.
2010). Reconsideration is "not appropriate merely because a litigant is
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dissatisfied with a decision of the court or wishes to reargue a motion[.]"
Palombi, 414 N.J. Super. at 288.
Governed by these standards, we are satisfied Judge Deitch correctly
found defendant freely, knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights.
Indeed, his findings are supported by substantial credible evidence in the record.
Likewise, we perceive no basis to disturb the judge's decision to deny
defendant's motion for reconsideration.
Turning to defendant's argument that his statements should have been
suppressed because the State failed to use a qualified, neutral interpreter during
his custodial interview, we are not persuaded. Recently, our Supreme Court
addressed whether it was necessary to "require qualified neutral interpreters in
all interrogations where suspects speak limited English." A.M., 237 at 394-95.
Noting any defendant "has the right to challenge a translation under N.J.R.E.
104(c), which governs pretrial hearings on the admissibility of a defendant's
statement," the Court declined to impose a requirement for a qualified neutral
interpreter to be present in all interrogations where suspects possess a limited
proficiency in English.
We note that in A.M., the defendant challenged the adequacy of an English
to Spanish translation by a prosecutor's office detective where the defendant felt
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more comfortable speaking in Spanish. Here, unlike the detective in A.M.,
Detective Beltran did not act as an interpreter. Instead, he administered Miranda
rights in the language defendant acknowledged he understood and preferred.
Further, the record is devoid of any indication defendant failed to understand
the detective.
To the extent we have not addressed defendant's remaining arguments, we
are satisfied they are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written
opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
Affirmed.
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