[Cite as State v. Dickerson, 2020-Ohio-3489.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
LUCAS COUNTY
State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. L-19-1152
Appellee Trial Court No. TRC 1802390A
v.
Thomas A. Dickerson DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Appellant Decided: June 26, 2020
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Matthew E. Exton and Daniel T. Ellis, for appellant.
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SINGER, J.
{¶ 1} Appellant, Thomas A. Dickerson, appeals from the July 3, 2019 judgment of
the Sylvania Municipal Court denying appellant’s motion to seal the record of Sylvania
Municipal Court case No. TRC 1802390A (hereinafter “the 2018 case”), which was
dismissed without prejudice, and granting his motion to seal the record of Sylvania
Municipal Court case No. TRC 1900656A (hereinafter “the 2019 case”), which was
dismissed with prejudice. For the reasons which follow, we reverse.
{¶ 2} On appeal, appellant assert the following assignments of error:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BY
APPLYING AN INCORRECT LEGAL STANDARD WHETHER
TO SEAL THE RECORDS OF THOMAS A. DICKERSON.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
DENYING THE MOTION TO SEAL.
2018 Case
{¶ 3} In 2018, appellant was charged with two violations following a collision on
April 21, 2018: operating a motor vehicle under the influence, R.C. 4511.19(A)(1),
(hereinafter “OVI”) and without an assured-clear-distance-ahead, Sylvania Codified
Ordinance 333.03(A), (hereinafter “ACDA”). The case was later dismissed without
prejudice.
2019 Case
{¶ 4} In 2019, appellee refiled the case, charging the same OVI offense and
changing the ACDA charge to a violation of R.C. 4511.21(A). Pursuant to a plea
agreement, appellant entered a no contest plea to the ACDA offense and the OVI offense
was dismissed with prejudice because the officer involved no longer worked for the
Sylvania police department and was unavailable to testify.
2.
Motion to Seal the 2018 and 2019 Cases
{¶ 5} Appellant moved to seal the records in both cases. At the hearing on the
motion, appellant produced evidence and sworn testimony that the records were
damaging his reputation in the community and his employment and causing him financial
hardship because his insurance rates had increased. Initially, the state objected to sealing
the record in the 2018 case anticipating the OVI charge would be refiled. However, at
the hearing, the state withdrew its objection. The trial court granted the motion as to the
2019 case but denied it as to the 2018 case. Appellant appeals.
First Assignment of Error
{¶ 6} On appeal, appellant argues in this first assignment of error that the trial
court erred as a matter of law by applying an incorrect legal standard in denying his
motion to seal the 2018 case.
{¶ 7} R.C. 2953.52(A)(1) provides that a criminal defendant who was found not
guilty or who was named in a dismissed criminal complaint has a statutory privilege to
request that their criminal record be sealed. State v. Radcliff, 142 Ohio St.3d 78, 2015-
Ohio-235, 28 N.E.3d 69, ¶ 15. The statute gives the trial court the discretion to determine
whether to seal the record. State v. S.R., 63 Ohio St.3d 590, 596, 589 N.E.2d 1319
(1992), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in In re Application to Seal
Record of No Bill, 131 Ohio App.3d 399, 402, 722 N.E.2d 602 (3d Dist.1999); State v.
Lesinski, 82 Ohio App.3d 829, 830, 613 N.E.2d 691 (6th Dist.1992). Whether or not the
trial court complied with the statute, however, is a question of law, which is reviewed
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under a de novo standard of review. State v. Futrall, 123 Ohio St.3d 498, 2009-Ohio-
5590, 918 N.E.2d 497, ¶ 6.
{¶ 8} Upon the filing of an application to seal a criminal record of the type of case
presented here, the trial court must hold a hearing to determine the following facts:
1) whether the movant was found not guilty or the criminal action was dismissed;
2) whether a dismissed action was dismissed with prejudice or, if not, whether the
relevant statute of limitations has expired; 3) whether any other criminal actions are
pending against the person; 4) whether the state has filed an objection to the motion; and
5) the weight of the interests of the movant in having the official records sealed and the
legitimate needs of the government to maintain those records. R.C. 2953.52(B)(2)(a)-(d).
After making these findings, the trial court must order the record to be sealed if the trial
court finds the defendant was found not guilty, the complaint was dismissed, no criminal
proceedings against the person are pending, and “the interests of the person in having the
records pertaining to the case sealed are not outweighed by any legitimate governmental
needs to maintain such records.” R.C. 2953.52(B)(4).
{¶ 9} In his first assignment of error, appellant contends the trial court applied the
wrong standard when weighing the relative interests of the parties regarding the 2018
case. The trial court found that the record should not be sealed in the 2018 case because
“the State’s significant interest in maintaining Defendant’s record of a dismissed OVI
charge is not outweighed by Defendant’s interest in having the record sealed.” Appellant
asserts the trial court should have determined whether appellant’s interests were
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outweighed by the government’s legitimate needs, not whether the government’s
legitimate needs were outweighed by appellant’s interests.
{¶ 10} We agree with appellant that the trial court did not state its findings in
compliance with the statute. The statutory language regarding the weighing of interests
reflects the intent to place the burden on the movant to demonstrate that his interests are
at least equal to the governmental interests before the trial court must determine if sealing
the record would be appropriate. State v. Haney, 70 Ohio App.3d 135, 139, 590 N.E.2d
445 (10th Dist.1991). Furthermore this language also reflects the General Assembly’s
intention of favoring the sealing of records if specific requirements are met. Radcliff, 142
Ohio St.3d 78, 2015-Ohio-235, 28 N.E.3d 69, at ¶ 17. Therefore, the court must
determine if the government’s interest outweighs the movant’s interests. If the interests
are equal, the trial court must grant the motion to seal the record. R.C. 2953.52(B)(4).
{¶ 11} Because the trial court applied the wrong standard, we find appellant’s first
assignment of error well-taken.
Second Assignment of Error
{¶ 12} In his second assignment of error, appellant argues the trial court abused its
discretion when weighing the interests regarding appellant’s motion to seal his 2018
criminal record. Because the trial court applied the wrong standard and must reconsider
the weighing of the interests of the parties, we find appellant’s second assignment of
error moot.
5.
{¶ 13} Having found that the trial court did commit error prejudicial to appellant
and that substantial justice has not been done, the judgment of the Sylvania Municipal
Court is reversed. Appellant’s motion to substitute brief and motion to amend case
caption are denied. This case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings
consistent with this decision. Appellee is ordered to pay the court costs pursuant to
App.R. 24.
Judgment reversed
and remanded.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
Mark L. Pietrykowski, J. _______________________________
JUDGE
Arlene Singer, J.
_______________________________
Christine E. Mayle, J. JUDGE
CONCUR.
_______________________________
JUDGE
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.
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