NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 26 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JARNAIL SINGH, No. 18-70442
Petitioner, Agency No. A098-516-498
v.
MEMORANDUM*
WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted June 24, 2020**
Before: HAWKINS, GRABER, and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Jarnail Singh, a native and citizen of India, timely petitions for
review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal
from the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his application for asylum,
withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture
(“CAT”). The parties are familiar with the facts, so we do not repeat them here.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition.
We review the BIA’s decision, “except to the extent that the IJ’s opinion is
expressly adopted.” Hosseini v. Gonzales, 471 F.3d 953, 957 (9th Cir. 2006)
(quoting Cordon–Garcia v. INS, 204 F.3d 985, 990 (9th Cir. 2000)). “We review
petitions for review of the BIA’s determination that a petitioner does not qualify
for asylum or withholding of removal under the highly deferential ‘substantial
evidence’ standard.” Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1012 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing
INS v. Elias–Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992)).
Although Singh was entitled to a presumption of a well-founded fear of
future persecution in India, substantial evidence supports the finding that Singh no
longer has a well-founded fear of future persecution because country conditions in
India have fundamentally changed. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(A) (asylum),
1208.16(b)(1)(i)(A) (withholding of removal). The BIA reviewed country
conditions evidence submitted by both parties and concluded that the situation in
India and Punjab for Sikhs has improved considerably since the mid-1990s. The
BIA also concluded that members of Singh’s political party, the Shiromani Akali
Dal Amritsar, no longer face widespread ill-treatment and harassment by the
police.
The record reflects that the BIA considered how these country conditions
bore upon Singh individually. Reviewing the totality of the evidence, the BIA
2
concluded that only high-level members of Sikh militant groups are likely to face
persecution in India. The BIA reasonably concluded that if current, low-level
members of Sikh militant groups are not likely to be persecuted, then neither
would Singh, who was at most viewed by police as a militant sympathizer decades
ago. See Singh v. Holder, 753 F.3d 826, 834 (9th Cir. 2014). Although Singh
points to conflicting evidence in the record, “we have repeatedly recognized that
the IJ and the BIA are entitled to rely on country reports that contain mixed
messages, ambiguities, or inconsistencies.” Id. at 831. Here, substantial evidence
supports the BIA’s decision to deny Singh’s applications for asylum and
withholding of removal.
With respect to the CAT claim, the BIA is required to consider “information
regarding conditions in the country of removal” that may be “relevant to the
possibility of future torture.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3)(iv). In light of the country
conditions evidence, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that
Singh was unlikely to be tortured by, or with the acquiescence of, the Indian
government under current conditions in India.
PETITION DENIED.
3