NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 2 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JASPREET SINGH, No. 18-72754
Petitioner, Agency No. A202-017-678
v.
MEMORANDUM*
WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted May 15, 2020**
Portland, Oregon
Before: BYBEE and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges, and CHHABRIA,*** District
Judge.
Jaspreet Singh of Jalandhar, India petitions for review of a Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA) order affirming an immigration judge’s (IJ) denial of
his claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Vince Chhabria, United States District Judge for the
Northern District of California, sitting by designation.
Convention Against Torture. Because the parties are familiar with the facts, we
will not recite them here except as necessary. We deny the petition.
We review BIA determinations of law de novo and findings of fact for
substantial evidence. Singh v. Whitaker, 914 F.3d 654, 658 (9th Cir. 2019). The
BIA’s findings of fact are conclusive unless a reasonable adjudicator would be
compelled to conclude to the contrary. Id.
1. The BIA’s adverse credibility determination is supported by substantial
evidence. In his testimony, Singh could not provide a logistically consistent
account of one of the alleged attacks. He did not plausibly explain how his
assailants could have known where to find him, nor did he explain how they could
have gotten the better of him when he was driving a motorcycle and they were on
foot. Based in part on the implausibility of Singh’s account, the BIA credited the
IJ’s finding that Singh appeared to be “simply making up most of his testimony as
he went along.” The BIA reasoned that the implausibility of some parts of Singh’s
testimony, along with some minor inconsistencies between Singh’s testimony and
his documentation, supplied evidence to support an adverse credibility
determination. The record does not compel a contrary conclusion.
2. Even if Singh’s testimony were credible, there is substantial evidence to
support the conclusion that Singh was ineligible for relief because the government
was neither behind the attacks nor powerless to stop them. The attacks that Singh
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described were committed by private members of opposing political parties. He did
not report the attacks to the police, and there is little evidence that asking the police
for help would have been futile. Though Singh described one instance in which he
was pursued by police officers, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s finding
that this pursuit was warranted because Singh had fled a lawful checkpoint. These
determinations, and the resulting conclusions that Singh’s allegations lacked the
government connection necessary for asylum, withholding of removal, or
protection under the Convention Against Torture, are supported by the record.
3. A reasonable adjudicator would not be compelled to conclude that Singh’s
proceedings in immigration court were tainted by judicial bias. Substantial
evidence supports a conclusion that the IJ was unbiased. An IJ has the authority to
“interrogate, examine, and cross-examine the alien,” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1), and
the IJ’s questions can be understood as a genuine effort to sort out narrative
inconsistencies. The IJ could have taken more care to discuss the corroborative
elements in Singh’s documentation, but his decision to highlight parts of the record
that supported his finding does not compel a conclusion that he acted out of bias.
Because substantial evidence supports the BIA’s findings, and because
Singh’s claims cannot succeed in the face of these findings, we deny the petition.
PETITION DENIED.
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